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ABSTRACT
The interaction of policy and technological development in the era of “convergence” is 
messy and fraught with contradictions. The best expression of this condition is found in the story 
behind the development and proliferation of digital audio broadcasting (DAB). Radio is the last 
of the traditional mass media to navigate the convergence phenomenon; convergence itself has 
an inherently disruptive effect on traditional media forms. However, in the case of radio, this 
disruption is mostly self-induced through the cultivation of communications policies which 
thwart innovation. A dramaturgical analysis of digital radio’s technological and policy 
development reveals that the industry’s preferred mode of navigating the convergence 
phenomenon is not designed to provide the medium with a realistically useful path into a 21st 
century convergent media environment. Instead, the diffusion of “HD Radio” is a blocking 
mechanism proffered to impede new competition in the terrestrial radio space. HD Radio has 
several critical shortfalls: it causes interference and degradation to existing analog radio signals; 
does not have the capability to actually advance the utility of radio beyond extant 
quality/performance metrics; and is a wholly proprietary technology from transmission to 
reception. Despite substantive evidence in the record clearly warning of HD Radio’s 
fundamental detriments, the dominant actors in the policy dialogue were able to quell these 
concerns by dint of their economic might and through intensive backstage discourse directly with 
the Federal Communications Commission. Since its official proliferation in 2002, HD Radio’s 
growth has stagnated; some early-adopter stations are actually abandoning the protocol and 
receiver penetration is abysmal. As a result, the future of HD Radio is quite uncertain. 
Domestically, the entire process of HD Radio’s regulatory approval can be seen as a capstone in 
the history of communications regulation which favors neoliberal ideology over empirical 
engineering data and a vocal public interest. However, the apparent failure of digital radio is not 
confined to the United States: the dilemma of DAB’s adoptive weakness is a global and 
technologically agnostic phenomenon. Perhaps this says something about the inherent necessity 
of digitizing radio, and invites significant confusion over the future identity of “radio” as we 
know it today. If DAB were to fail, the outcome would invite entirely new ways of thinking 
about the future of broadcasting in a convergent media environment.
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Chapter 1: Identifying Radio’s Digital Dilemma
Radio broadcasting is the last of the traditional analog mass media to negotiate the 
communicative phenomenon known as “convergence.” Convergence refers to the ongoing 
digitalization of all media and embraces the notion that previously separate mediums will 
inevitably “converge” in such a way so that the distribution of information takes place over a 
uniform conduit, such as the Internet.1 From a purely technological standpoint, this definition is 
useful. However, scholars and policymakers that study convergence often fail to address all three 
important factors which make the phenomenon possible, of which the development of new 
technologies is only one; the other two include industry strategy and public policy.2 
Communications policy often “downplay[s] the way in which technological change is the 
product of political will, rather than inexorable logic.”3 At every technological turn toward 
communicative “progress” - with digitalization and convergence being the topics du jour - 
policymakers promise us that new communications technologies will “fundamentally make our 
media system more democratic.” Yet with every new advancement, corporate interests skew 
regulatory development to entrench the priorities of commerce.4  
Far from being a utopian phenomenon, convergence opens up the potential for potent 
unsettlement.5 In fact, convergence operates within limits, including the notion that “the 
evolution of the physical embodiments of [convergent technology] is shaped by the social and 
cultural context in which they are embedded.”6 Henry Jenkins noted that convergence within a 
corporate media structure, “from the ground,”  looks more like “great big dysfunctional families, 
whose members aren’t speaking with each other and pursue their own short term agendas even at 
the expense of other divisions of the same companies.”7 Despite its apparent messiness, critical 
communications scholars watching convergence in action are certain of one thing: it is shaped by 
“the abiding principles of a capitalist political economy,”8 which seeks to bring the “entire 
‘ideological’ sphere of society...into the market orbit.”9 
Changes taking place in the realm of radio broadcasting are quite illustrative regarding 
the perversely negative effects that convergence can have on a medium undergoing disruptive 
change. On one hand, as discussion of media digitalization gained steam during the 1990s and 
the commercialization of the Internet engendered the formal study of convergence, the U.S. radio 
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broadcast industry and the regulators that oversaw it remained surprisingly insular in their 
outlook for the medium. This was to be a decade of consolidation and the reconfiguration of 
radio relative to its mission to serve “the public interest, convenience, and necessity” into a fully-
entrenched marketplace paradigm. Convergence, on radio’s radar, was a tool which allowed the 
programming of multiple stations from one location and was utilized more for cost-savings than 
for the creative or communicative expansion of broadcasting itself. As the World Wide Web 
began its explosive growth following the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, radio 
broadcasters, to put it bluntly, saw the development as simply another means by which to 
promote a radio station. By the time regulators, media professionals, and scholars began to 
grapple with the economic implications of convergence, the radio industry as a whole wasn’t 
even fully aware that the phenomenon was underway.10 
The expansiveness of the Internet and the introduction of satellite radio broadcasting 
served to change this ignorance; the digitalization of radio became a growing topic of debate 
within the U.S. broadcast industry. It initially defined digitalization as convergence, when in 
reality digitalization is only the first step in the convergence process. With the support of a 
neoliberal regulatory agenda elucidated by the Federal Communications Commission, 
commercial and public radio broadcasters began to add digital components to their AM and FM 
signals. However, as David Sedman has noted, a new radio service “generally requires four 
levels of adoption: (1) Approval by a governing body (such as the FCC in the United States); (2) 
Acceptance by the broadcast station; (3) Consent from the consumer electronics industry to 
design and market a new technology; [and] (4) Adoption by the mass buying public.”11 
The digital audio broadcast (DAB) technology developed by the U.S. radio industry and 
sanctioned by the FCC actually represents the worst possible iteration of digital radio, and does 
more to fragment the medium’s participation in the convergence phenomenon than it does to 
embrace it. Only one of Sedman’s four criteria (approval by the FCC) has been met. Obtaining 
this approval was not a difficult process: driven by what David Harvey has termed the “market 
exchange ethic” of neoliberalism,12 regulators did not even bother to examine the technological 
implications of radio’s digitalization, much less its potentially deleterious impact on the 
communicative efficacy of radio itself. Despite the fact that the radio industry chose a digital 
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broadcast framework which made it more difficult to participate in convergence and might 
actually harm legacy analog radio service, communications regulators cast the digitalization of 
radio as an economically evolutionary necessity, trusting in radio’s “market leaders” to craft the 
formative policies that would best serve their own needs and, by dubious extension, the needs of 
the public. 
Regulators have not always been so laissez-faire. The FCC has wrestled for decades with 
how the “public interest, convenience and necessity” is actually embodied in regulation of 
media, and at times has actually considered democratic principles in its decision-cycle. However, 
neoliberal ideology now defines communication policy’s operative rationale in wholly economic 
terms, which effectively absolves regulators of the need to understand new technologies and their 
effects on the democratic potentiality of our media environment. Communications policymakers 
no longer function as servants of the people from whom they ostensibly derive regulatory power; 
they are now facilitators of the ethos of corporate capitalism. The end-state of such a situation is 
regulatory capture, and in the case of digital radio, the evidence is quite distinct. The over-
reliance on economic metrics has led to the unleashing of a form of broadcasting that may do 
more harm than good to radio’s importance as a mass medium. Although the United States leads 
the world in its dogged adherence to neoliberalism, the ideology’s effects are heavily felt in all 
developed countries and, as a result, has similarly confounded their exploration of digital radio 
broadcasting. Irrespective of the specific form of government, communications policymakers 
have uniformly treated the digitalization of radio in a similarly single-dimensional fashion and 
effectively reaped the same results.
Radio’s digital dilemma arises from the conflict between the traditional strengths of the 
medium and the perceived interests of broadcasters badly navigating a convergent media 
environment governed by a captive regulator. Can terrestrial radio broadcasting find a 
meaningful place? If not, what damage might the process of broadcast digitalization do to radio’s 
analog service, which is still a viable and popular method of mass communication? Broadcasters 
are struggling to define their interests in the face of competitors that digitization and convergence 
have engendered. New forms of radio, such as satellite broadcasting, portable digital music 
storage devices and, more recently, the ability to stream audio content via the Internet to 
“receivers” such as phones and in-vehicle entertainment suites, began to draw listeners away 
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from traditional broadcasting in the 1990s. From the perspective of the listener, the identity of 
“radio” is now in flux.13 As a result, those that have historically claimed ownership over radio as 
a unique medium may find themselves usurped. This dissertation attempts to explain the 
conditions that led terrestrial radio to this impasse. I argue that the political and economic 
decisions locking terrestrial broadcasters into substandard digital broadcast technologies promise 
to marginalize their usefulness as media outlets in the 21st century.14 I will show how the 
regulatory process - which is ostensibly designed to maximize the functional utility of all media - 
conspired to produce such a potentially deleterious outcome. The future of radio broadcasting (as 
currently conceived and executed) may already be in jeopardy.15 If the ubiquity and 
“naturalization” of analog radio is disrupted by new digital technologies, it will have detrimental 
knock-on effects that will make it more difficult to “establish the medium’s significance” in our 
contemporary media environment.16  
I. Learning from the Neoliberalization of Radio Regulation
Today, the dominant regulatory paradigm, defined by David Allen as “corporate 
rationalization,” directly controls the development of new media technologies, and little room is 
allowed for critiques of the political-economic structure in which they are being deployed.17 In 
the process, the “sovereignty of citizens over the state” has been undermined, and the status of 
“citizen” has been gradually replaced by the “consumer.”18 This has led to a situation where 
corporations, heavily privileged by their accumulation of capital relative to the public, have a 
voice in the communications policymaking process which is nearly impossible for the public to 
match, much less effectively debate the merits of regulatory inclinations and outcomes. The 
design of digital audio broadcasting, in effect, is built around the primary goal of acting as a 
blocking mechanism to prevent new competition in the terrestrial radio space.19 A power elite 
developed the technology in the image of their own self-interests, which undermines the way in 
which radio be democratically used.20 In fact, the story of the digitalization of radio broadcasting 
may be one of the clearest examples of how a stringently neoliberal ideology can destroy 
democratic media systems as they fall under a private paradigm of control, where even regulators 
cannot intervene. The result may represent an example of Joseph Schumpeter’s “creative 
destruction,” in which a new technology threatens to push out an old one.”21 However, the 
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process has already produced negative consequences regarding the integrity of terrestrial 
broadcasting itself.22
This situation inevitably leads “researchers...to analyze what is arguably the root cause of 
the problem rather than concentrate on marginal effects.”23 How and why did policymakers 
willingly choose an outcome for digital radio that saddles the medium with net detriments? This 
is best addressed by looking at the rationales which govern the activities of the FCC. What Paul 
Starr calls “constitutive choices”  are decisions made during the creation of media systems which 
affect “how things are built and how they work - their design and rules of operation.”  
Oftentimes, constitutive choices are made through the process of “slowly crystallizing cultural 
practices or gradual economic and political change,” but in some cases they arise in “bursts set 
off by social and political crises, technological innovation, or other triggering events, and at 
these pivotal moments the choices may be encoded in law, etched into technologies, or otherwise 
embedded in the structure of institutions.”24 Constitutive choices have three primary effects on 
the nature of democratic communications: they determine “the general legal and normative rules 
concerning such issues as free expression, access to information, privacy, and intellectual 
property; second, the specific design of communications media, structure of networks, and 
organization of industries; and third, institutions related to the creation of intangible and human 
capital - that is, education, research, and innovation.”25 Good constitutive choices are made when 
all three factors are taken into account and balanced in such a manner as to maximize the 
democratic potentiality of a communicative system or act. 
The constitutive choices of digital radio were made with casual disregard of public input 
and by those with access to proprietary information, which has negatively affected the trajectory 
of its development and proliferation.26 Historically, the development of radio broadcasting in the 
United States has taken place under priorities which heavily favor “economic forces shaped 
through political decisions,” and with casual disregard for normative concepts such as freedom 
of expression, public access to the airwaves, and the intellectual property aspects of broadcast 
technology.27  Starr himself argues that from the inception of broadcast regulation, commercial 
forces worked “to create a set of rules...that virtually amounted to a system of private regulation 
of politics.”28  Through a convergent lens, radio’s digitalization represents a struggle which 
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Lawrence Lessig has identified as being “between old and new. The story...is about how an 
environment designed to enable the new is being transformed to protect the old” [emphasis in 
original].29 At its most basic level, the story of digital radio highlights the primacy of neoliberal 
principles in the development of communications policy, and the role of regulators as overseers - 
not intervenors - in the act of its promulgation. From this perspective, the development of digital 
radio broadcasting in the United States is a parable for the larger history of communications 
policy.
Thomas Streeter has argued that this sort of communications regulation couches the 
function of policymaking as “actions as a matter of neutral, technological necessity in service of 
the social system.”30 If such systems are increasingly characterized by “technologically enabled 
commodification and exchange of intangibles,” broadcast policymaking “provides us with an 
example of one way that such commodification can be accomplished, and of the problems that 
are likely to be encountered if that path is taken.”31 Broadcast regulation has promoted 
institutions that are “dependent on government privileges and other forms of collective 
constraints.” Although such regulation harkens to “the classical ideals of private property and the 
free marketplace, American...broadcasting, under close inspection, calls the coherence of those 
ideals into question.”32 The neoliberal foundation of broadcast policy “sets the terms and broad 
boundaries of acceptable action within which interest group struggles can take place.”33 
Considering that the “key players” of broadcasting in the United States “have always been 
organized along corporate lines,” this guarantees that neoliberal ideology “permeate[s] the 
institution of...broadcasting at numerous levels,”34 and creates a stratification of power among 
constituents involved in communications policymaking - where the “core [is] dominated by an 
alliance of corporate and government elites” and a subaltern “economic periphery of smaller 
enterprises and a political periphery of electoral politics” exist.35 
This has led to a what Streeter terms a “functionalist social vision” of broadcast 
regulation, in which the “furtherance of technological and economic progress” are priorities to 
which democratic principles are given lip service. The “apparently illiberal outcomes” of this 
process are “thus reconciled with liberal goals by framing the issue as a matter of system 
maintenance; maintaining the system [is] less a matter of rights than one of neutral technological 
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necessity and overriding public purpose - all in the service of broadly liberal goals.”36 In this 
context, the “character of American ‘broadcast policy’ becomes clear”: 
broadcast policy is a realm for experts, not for “politics” in the broad sense of governance 
in a democratic society...And when those inside the delimited broadcast policy world 
knowingly acknowledge that policy is political, they mean political in the sense of 
maneuvering for gain - low politics. The world of policy, they readily acknowledge, has 
become infected by the processes associated with self-interested strategizing and 
struggles. But they don’t describe the subject matter...as “broadcast politics” because this 
might imply high politics: matters of value, structure, and legitimacy that they and their 
sponsors have little interest in opening for consideration.”37 
If such a paradigm has dominated U.S. broadcast regulation from its inception, it becomes easier 
to understand how such poorly designed constitutive choices for the digital future of radio are 
facilitated. 
According to Hugh Slotten, adherence to “technocratic values” allows regulators to 
“legitimate complex decisions in terms of narrow technical concerns. Boundaries [are] 
constructed between technical and nontechnical criteria to facilitate policy-making processes and 
give authority to final decisions.”38 Doing so provides a clever foil with which to avoid 
addressing the thorny issues of a new communications technology’s sociopolitical implications.39 
“Being practical” in the context of regulation simply means “that one somehow contribute to the 
larger project of using neutral expertise to integrate broad liberal principles within a corporate 
consumer economy.”40 Neolilberal ideology invokes technocratic justifications for regulation 
over democratic ones, in the belief that the marketplace is the only meaningful forum for public 
discourse. As a result, communications policymakers equate the “public interest” component of 
regulation “more and more rigidly with the supposedly neutral and desirable state of marketplace 
competition,”41 which predisposes communications regulators away from engaging in 
policymaking in any substantively democratic fashion.42 
The fact that “a nontrivial part of public policy is determined in secret, and that much of 
what is public is either too costly, or is largely unintelligible to the vast majority of the 
electorate, is quite enough to falsify...pluralist assumptions” about the democratic nature of 
communications regulation.43 The FCC’s historic rationale to promulgate policy in the “public 
interest, convenience and necessity” has faded as policymakers redefine the phrase in purely 
economic terms. The end result, according to Ithiel de Sola Pool, “can turn out to be 
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inappropriate to more habile forms of the technology which gradually emerge as the technology 
progresses. This is when problems arise, as they are arising so acutely today,”44 especially in a 
context where the actual science of digital radio is considered more important as a means to 
justify the continuance of neoliberal regulatory ideology than as a mechanism to fundamentally 
improve the communicative aspects of the medium.
Institutionally, communications regulation in the United States occurs under burdensome 
constraints and pressure from several directions (constituents, Congress, and the courts). These 
impediments lead regulators to ignore or downplay actual public sentiment regarding the policies 
they promulgate - especially when the public attempts to assert a larger role in the policymaking 
process than regulators have already allowed for. Mark J. Braun has catalogued the “immense 
workloads and small staffs” that “contribute to a hectic FCC decision-making environment,”45 
which only becomes more turgid when policymaking becomes publicly controversial. Walter B. 
Emery calls the Commission’s resources “pathetically inadequate,”46 leading to policymaking 
done in an ad-hoc, typically conservative fashion, as the FCC attempts to placate all the groups 
that pressure it, rather than thinking proactively about the issue at hand.47 These structural 
weaknesses in the FCC have led to a situation which former Commissioner Nicholas Johnson 
described as “a ‘subgovernment’ of industry lobbyists, specialty lawyers, trade associations, 
trade press, congressional subcommittee staff members, and commission personnel who 
dominate” the policymaking process.48 The agency’s practice of ex parte meetings, whereby 
constituents meet in person with regulators to discuss and decide policy issues, promotes 
regulatory capture. Ex parte conversations are a favored tool by which regulated industries 
manipulate the policy process to their own ends.49 In a contemporary example, broadcast industry 
executives and lobbyists met behind closed doors with policymakers more than 200 times during 
the FCC’s 2003 debate over the revision of media ownership rules; the agency ultimately 
promulgated policy in line with the desires of industry actors, even though 97% of public 
comment received on the issue vehemently opposed this outcome.50  
Regulatory capture is also promoted by a reliance on regulated industries for information 
that directly dictates the trajectory of policy outcomes. The FCC’s lack of meaningful, 
independent analytical ability has been in clear decline for more than 30 years.51 Increasingly, the 
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agency accepts data collected by the industries it regulates and uses it to directly formulate 
policy.52 If the data underlying a new policy favors a particular outcome, it is quite likely that 
such an outcome will result.53 According to Philip Napoli, “On many points, commercial data 
collection and public policy needs fail to align. Commercial data is structured around the 
financial, investment, and marketing needs of media corporations and investors.” Although the 
FCC conceivably “answers to a more complex concept of the public interest, which balances 
economic efficiency with concerns for equity, diversity, and constitutional rights,”54 the end 
result of reliance on industry analysis from which to craft communications policy means that 
“the communications industry's social and political functions are diminishing in importance 
relative to its economic function in the eyes of the FCC.”55 Regulatory agencies simply cannot 
keep up with the industries they are charged with regulating. At the very moment when our 
“information society” requires both citizens and policymakers to be better-versed in the 
intricacies of the technologies which define their lives,56 the FCC appears to be moving toward 
what Sandra Braman characterizes as “narrative simplicity, even as the data upon which state 
narratives are placed become more diverse and complex.”57 
Within the agency itself, the makeup of key management staff has gradually shifted away 
from people with legal or technical backgrounds to those with expertise in politics and 
economics.58 This leads to the promulgation of regulation “without a sound empirical basis” that 
“contribute[s] to...inconsistency and ambiguity...in communications policy.”59 Former FCC 
Commissioner Jonathan Adelstein found the FCC’s data collection process and decision cycle so 
devoid of actual facts that he dubbed the agency’s activity “faith-based regulation.”60 Instances 
such as the FCC’s 2003 media ownership rules review, according to Mark Cooper, were 
conducted without “any hint of intellectual or public policy integrity,” and in recent years, when 
staff research has not meshed well with the political objectives of the FCC Chairman, it is 
suppressed outright.61 When private interests trump the “public interest” and regulators can no 
longer can claim independence from the industries they ostensibly oversee, the process of 
regulatory capture occurs, and the FCC is undoubtedly a captured regulator.62 
Where does the public fit in broadcast policymaking? Following the passage of the 
Communications Act of 1934, it was denied a formal voice in FCC proceedings until the 
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imposition of the Fairness Doctrine and subsequent judicial decisions which upheld the principle 
of public agency in the regulatory process.63 Even so, there are many obstacles to obtaining data 
relevant to regulation, ranging from “opaque pricing structures and restrictive licenses for 
commercial data, to legal barriers to access, to the basic adversarial nature of contemporary 
communications policymaking” itself.64 The public at large thus cannot afford to engage in the 
intensive level of policy discourse claimed to be required by the FCC.65 Public interest groups 
have repeatedly tried to intervene in communications policy debates, but the FCC has no 
coherent way of dealing with such input. The treatment of public comment is left up to the 
discretion of FCC staff working on a particular issue and they are free to disregard it as they see 
fit.66 Although electronic means of filing public comment now exist, FCC staff expect 
commenters to “do their homework,” and are much more inclined to disregard comments if they 
arrive in the form of petitions.67 Non-governmental “media reform” organizations may make “the 
public” more visible in the eyes of regulators, but that does not guarantee a policy outcome in the 
public interest.68 
In the United States, the dominance of neoliberalism over all other ideologies in the 
process of radio regulation has deep roots. Robert McChesney, Susan Douglas, Mark Lloyd, 
Susan Smulyan, and Thomas Streeter all assert that critiques of capitalism were ill-considered 
during the formative years of radio policymaking,69 even though this exclusion was openly 
contested along the way.70 Public push-back against the initial commercialization of 
broadcasting, while spirited, ultimately failed, for a variety of reasons - the main one being its 
inability to compete with corporate capital.71 The history of radio broadcasting, as McChesney 
puts it, “has the earmarks of a history written by the victors,”72 as it casts the development of 
contemporary broadcast regulation as a natural process when it most definitely was not. 
The historical highlights of neoliberalism’s ascendancy in the context of radio policy 
dovetail well with the constitutive choices made about the medium’s digital future. Douglas 
notes that the Radio Act of 1912 set a “watershed” precedent: “that only consolidated 
institutions...could anticipate, implement, and protect ‘the people’s’ interest in spectrum use.”73 
C. Twight implicates regulators with repeatedly and strategically distorting technical information 
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in order to pursue the implicit political-economic objectives of the Radio Act of 1927.74 The 
Federal Radio Commission’s first major policy action, the imposition of General Order 40, 
fundamentally skewed use of the airwaves toward commercial interests.75 When allocating FM 
spectrum more than a decade later, the FCC would couch the move in terms of technicalities 
while obscuring the political-economic motives behind the action.76 Most recently, the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 “boldly equated the public interest with a competitive 
economic environment,” put a heavy burden on regulators to justify their existence, and 
mandated they pare their powers back wherever economic interest may demand it.77 McChesney 
now calls any idea of proactive broadcast regulation under current conditions a “living 
absurdity”  and “tragicomedy,” given that notions of public service by broadcasters, who are 
granted “government rights of scarce monopoly licenses,” is almost wholly defined by 
commercial interests.78 Public service as a measurable metric of regulatory action has fallen out 
of favor with the FCC, except in situations where such activities may serve to increase the 
monetization of broadcasting itself.79 More than 30 years ago, Dallas Smythe contended that a 
neoliberal regulatory environment would not be good for the democratic potentiality of 
broadcasting;80 his observations, unfortunately, have proven to be prescient.
Scholars have long asserted that intellectual property concerns controlled the 
technological development of radio,81 and that such concerns left little “interpretative flexibility” 
in the formulation of broadcast policy.82 Digital broadcasting in the United States involves 
wholly proprietary technology,83 whose proliferation was sanctioned with little substantive 
discussion on the possible consequences of such a structure.84 The story of radio’s digitalization 
in many ways represents the capstone of a neoliberal communications policy goal defined by 
Nicholas Garnham as “a struggle to turn all information into private property and therefore a 
struggle of private profit rather than the claimed development of a system to provide information 
widely and cheaply to all.”85 In such an environment, the public is discouraged from participating 
in the policymaking process, ignored if it does, and generally notified of the outcomes after all 
constitutive choices have been made.86 This belies the notion that any meaningful semblance of 
“public interest” in the literal sense of the phrase has any place in contemporary communications 
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policy, and explains the opaque and seemingly inchoate manner by which regulators fostered the 
development and proliferation of digital radio.87  
The end result is a democratically dysfunctional communications policymaking regime; it 
is not a question of whether media policies will be made, but in whose interest.88 The history of 
broadcast regulation does not paint a bright picture. It is already clear that the FCC’s modus 
operandi often substitutes “the act of evaluating and studying a problem or policy for the act of 
actually dealing with a problem or making policy.”89 Several scholars have addressed this 
conundrum. Erwin Krasnow and Lawrence Longley postulate that “[l]egal and ideological 
symbols play a significant role in the process....Often stock phrases become cherished in and of 
themselves….Thus ideological concepts [become] symbols which [supersede] real actions in 
importance.”90 Sandra Braman comments that while policymakers may think they are designing 
rules and institutions using the language of facts, “their role in policy-making is more likely to 
belong to the rhetoric of decision-making processes rather than their content.”91 Dallas Smythe 
concurs in the explicit context of radio regulation, where “[t]he elements that make up a market 
simply do not exist on the broadcaster-program-audience axis. We are left therefore with 
metaphors - figures of speech, repeated by rote - that conceal the reality” of neoliberal influence 
on the policymaking process. 92 Philip Napoli observes that “the foundational principles of 
communications policy are used as rhetorical vessels to justify post hoc regulation, and typically 
do so from the point of view of dominant stakeholders in the process.”93 When applied to the case 
of digital radio, the inevitable dominance of neoliberalism on contemporary communications 
policy becomes painfully clear. 
It does not have to be this way. In 1993, I began a seven-year career in commercial radio 
journalism, a field in which I worked full-time upon receiving my undergraduate degree in 1996. 
Nobody warned me about the implications the Telecommunications Act would have on my 
chosen vocation. The spasm of consolidation and cost-cutting unleashed within the radio 
industry hit the practice of journalism first and deepest; by 1999, as the assignment editor for a 
state radio news network, I literally listened to local radio newsrooms disappear as their 
existence conflicted with the maximal profitability of commercial broadcasting. By the end of 
2000, I could not in good faith continue working in the world of commercial radio journalism. 
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During this period of alarm and introspection, I began reporting online about the proliferation of 
unlicensed or “pirate” radio stations in the United States; following the passage of the Telecom 
Act, pirate stations flourished as a movement of electronic civil disobedience against the 
neoliberal principles of broadcast regulation, most popularly identified as the evisceration of 
localism in radio. In 1998, the FCC accepted public petitions to create a noncommercial low-
power FM (LPFM) community radio service. By 2000, the FCC had officially sanctioned the 
service, representing an historic first in media policy: the creation of radio stations facilitated 
directly by and for the public.94 As a journalist, I wrote extensively about the evolution of LPFM; 
in the process, I explored the inner workings of the FCC’s policymaking process. In my first 
iteration of graduate school, I produced a master’s thesis about the legal history of unlicensed 
broadcasting in the United States and its connection to the creation of LPFM.95 
I literally stumbled across references to digital radio in the process of writing my thesis, 
but it was not until 2002, when the FCC formally approved its proliferation, that I began to 
seriously assess the scope and importance of this development. Having started my graduate 
education with the goal of understanding how and why radio broadcasting has changed so much 
in such a short period of time, I complete my formal studies with new questions about the future 
of the medium. Instead of being treated as a substantive issue that stands to radically transform 
radio, digital broadcast policy has been reduced to a marketplace-paradigm heavy on metaphor 
but light on empiricism. According to McChesney, if “the critical question facing us is whether 
the new technologies can rejuvenate...political democracy or whether the corporate, commercial 
domination of...the communication industries will be able to subsume the technologies within the 
profit net and assure that the corporate domination of both U.S. society and the global political 
economy remain unquestioned and unchallenged,”96 the case of digital radio points dramatically 
in the latter direction. Although “critical scholarship remains a minority phenomenon”97 and 
substantive debate “regarding the control and structure of the media” may be difficult under such 
circumstances, when the future of radio broadcasting is at stake it is incumbent upon scholars to 
pay closer attention to the issue and learn lessons from the development of digital radio policy 
that may be applied to resist the neoliberal paradigm affecting our entire convergent media 
environment.98 The solution to this problem is not the further diminution of regulation: it is the 
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reconfiguration of communications policy more firmly in line with democratic principles which, 
although they have been historically marginalized, do exist and deserve far more than lip service.
II. Using Dramaturgical Analysis to Probe Technology and Policy
To conduct a proper exploration of the technological and policy development of digital 
radio, the research methodology of dramaturgical analysis is useful. As the root word implies, 
dramaturgy is used to characterize an item or subject by certain performative aspects and provide 
context to the variety of factors which form the locus of a dramaturgical process. Dramaturgical 
analysis has existed in some form for hundreds of years,99 but was first applied to the social 
sciences by sociologists and has been employed in various fields ranging from organizational 
management to media studies.100 
Where many types of research methodologies focus on texts, dramaturgical analysis 
allows for the examination of the actors behind the texts, seeking to explain their actions in the 
context of a discursive process.101 In this regard, dramaturgical analysis is useful because it 
allows the examination of the bonds between action and meaning.102 While some scholars have 
limited the usefulness of dramaturgical analysis to the illustration of a “confrontation of villains 
and heroes in a staged spectacle,” thinking of the methodology in such a manner is overly 
shallow.103 With regard to policy studies, the understanding of the bond between action and 
meaning is key to critically and constructively analyzing the mechanisms by which policy is 
made. Dramaturgical analysis also provides an insight into the social and material logic of media 
texts and actors104 and allows the construction of a conceptual framework within which 
practically useful conclusions can be derived.105 Some scholars see this type of analysis as key to 
reclaiming any notion of democratic principles in contemporary U.S. policymaking.106 
In the specific case of media policy, Jan Ekecrantz believes dramaturgical analysis is very 
effective in illuminating “intricate institutional and other power relations, which imbue them 
with meaning and constitute their sine qua non in the first place.”107 Under the neoliberal 
paradigm, “acting” done well is not seen as acting, but as reality itself.108 In such an environment, 
one can never be sure “what is real or what is play,” which calls into question the authenticity of 
actors and their performances.109 The regulatory analyses of Sandra Braman, Erwin Krasnow and 
Lawrence Longley, Philip Napoli, Dallas Smythe and Thomas Streeter imply that much of what 
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passes for media policy is dramaturgical. 
Sociologist Erving Goffman has been instrumental in opening up the utility of 
dramaturgical analysis to the social sciences more generally. Goffman provides a pragmatic 
approach to the application of the methodology:110 “Meaning and performance may be seen as a 
continuous process of bargaining and temporary accommodation between individuals and 
groups. Order may be seen as that which is improvised, maintained and dissolved by the 
interpretation and actions of the social actors associated with it.”111 Actors do not simply “assert 
that their conceptions of the good or plans for the future are intrinsically superior to those of their 
fellow citizens. Positions must be secured by strong arguments, not merely by strong arms or 
strong credentials.” Goffman-style dramaturgical analysis thus provides an excellent vehicle to 
observe the actions of power-maintenance in a modern neoliberal society.112  It allows the 
powerful to advance ideas that are given “credibility relative to their standing,” as well as 
providing “a generalized immunity to perceptions of risk and danger that their activities might 
otherwise produce.”113 In the context of digital radio policymaking, these two points are critical to 
understanding the process which led to such questionable outcomes for the future of the medium.
Much of the dramaturgy conducted in modern society involves the practice of rituals 
which Peter K. Manning argues can be distortionary to core notions of “truth” on which the 
structure of social power rests.114 Such rituals can depress truth and sanction lies: power becomes 
synonymous with truth, whether or not “truth” actually exists.115 According to Manning, “Rituals 
are in some sense an index of social power, because they close off and truncate complexity of 
meaning, challenging and flattening the response to the predictable, the acceptable, the 
sanctioned....Power collapses variety in meaning, authority stabilizes it.”116 In the maintenance of 
institutionalized trust, irony becomes a bellwether by which power may also be measured. 
Manning asserts that “[t]he higher the trust in the industry, the lower the level of information 
required and produced by the industry.”117 This diminished desire for information on which to 
construct media policy based on the assumed trustworthiness of actors can lead to ironic 
outcomes, many of which can be detrimental to society at large.118 
Goffman-style dramaturgical analysis also explores the control of information by and 
between actors and the “audience.”  Power may be exercised by the “concealment of discrediting 
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information about actors and the gathering of intelligence about audiences. It means presenting 
performances which persuade audiences but hiding the planning and rehearsals of these 
performances.”119 In general, “powerful interests do not maintain their control as much by 
persuading us to believe them but, more often, by preventing us from knowing what they are 
doing.”120 This is a succinct descriptor of the history of U.S. communications policymaking, and 
of radio’s digital transition more specifically.
In order to use Goffman’s dramaturgical analysis as a tool to assess power relations 
within contemporary communications policymaking, it is important to define some key terms in 
his methodological framework.
Stages are the places where dramaturgical action takes place.121 In Goffman’s model, 
there are three stages on which dramaturgy occurs. “Onstage” is the forum where dramaturgy is 
played out in front of an audience. In the onstage environment, the characters, their perspectives, 
and rhetoric relative to the “plot” are apparently transparent. However, much of the practical 
negotiation of power between actors takes place elsewhere: “offstage” and “backstage.” In the 
offstage environment, the realm of acceptable discourse may differ significantly from onstage, as 
actors converse in language not meant for the audience. Some, but not all, of the dramaturgy that 
takes place offstage is observable; actors use this lack of transparency to negotiate alliances that 
refine their onstage performances.
Knowledge of backstage activity, Goffman asserts, is crucial to understanding the power 
relations that an audience later observes. Whether onstage or offstage, actors must still behave 
“in character”; backstage, much may be set aside in order to construct or contest new power-
relations. Backstage dramaturgy does not necessarily mean actors entirely “step out of 
character,” but they are most likely to do so in this forum. This makes illuminating backstage 
dramaturgical behavior crucial to understanding public representations of power-sharing. 
Goffman’s practice of dramaturgical analysis also centers around the idea of metaphor. 
This word need not be taken literally; in fact, “metaphor” is more properly defined in this context 
as frames or agendas elucidated by actors backed up by rhetoric which may or may not be 
truthful. The main role of metaphor in dramaturgical analysis is to contest the definition of truth 
itself to fit the desires of any given actor and adjust the “plot” in a specific direction. 
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Traditionally, metaphor “acts as a compass, which serves to orient us.” However, if the metaphor 
on which dramaturgical discourse occurs is not based on truth, it can alter the path of social 
development in an undemocratic fashion. Therefore, “we can become more aware of the 
powerful effects metaphors have on our thinking and behavior by focusing on and analyzing 
them.”122 Metaphors also act as interpretative shortcuts among actors in a dramaturgical setting. 
Shared understanding “become[s] the insider wisdom, the insider's sense of what's practical, 
interesting, and original and what's foolish, trivial, and outdated.”123 
In the case of this dissertation, Goffman’s template of dramaturgical analysis is useful 
because it provides a conceptual framework that makes the communications policymaking 
process understandable to a larger audience and allows for the use of vernacular shortcuts which 
more easily explain what can sometimes be the impenetrable language of regulation.124 Streeter 
notes that communications policymaking takes place in an interpretative community where 
shared meanings of certain metaphors are taken for granted, and there is ample evidence that 
such behavior does not produce the most rational outcomes.125 In this context, the stages are 
realms for “experts, not for ‘politics’ in the broad sense of governance in a modern neoliberal 
society”; thus fundamental matters such as “value, structure and legitimacy” become difficult to 
debate and democratically refine.126
Applying dramaturgical analysis to the digital radio debate first requires definition of the 
main aspects of the template. Onstage is defined as the FCC fora in which public discussion over 
DAB policy occurs, such as periods of comment and reply-comment in rulemaking proceedings. 
In this arena, not only are all actors represented, but their metaphorical objectives are most clear 
to the audience, which has some level of agency (if only by voice) in the process. Offstage is 
defined as discourse that takes place in the industry trade press. Although the trade press is 
publicly available, very few members of the public are aware it exists, much less follow it 
regularly. Therefore, dramaturgy conducted offstage is often more frank and truthful than the 
actors’ portrayal of their operative metaphors onstage, and can be useful for ferreting out the 
“truth” (or lack thereof) behind the behavior of actors involved in digital radio policymaking. 
Backstage is defined as ex parte discussions between actors involved in policymaking and 
regulators themselves. While ex parte discussions are ostensibly private, a summary of them 
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must be included in any active FCC docket. Examining backstage discourse helps to reveal the 
controlling metaphors of policy discussion and assess the relative power of the actors engaged in 
the onstage dramaturgy.
Secondly, the actors in the development and promulgation of digital radio must be 
defined. Of these, there are many, and to simplify matters actors are grouped into “character-
constituencies” who share common metaphors,127 which are classified as follows:
The FCC is both a stage and a character. As the keeper of the stage, the FCC is 
responsible for setting and maintaining the ground-rules of onstage discourse. At the same time, 
the FCC is an important arbiter of whether digital radio ultimately succeeds or fails, primarily 
through the imposition of constraints put on the introduction, proliferation, and maintenance of 
the technology. Perceived by other character-constituencies as the actor which retains final say 
over which metaphors will drive the policymaking process, the FCC engages in surprisingly little 
public dialogue, instead preferring to consider the words and deeds of preferred constituents in 
the dramaturgy in an attempt to promulgate what it believes to be the best policy, biased by its 
own historical and institutional understanding of radio regulation.
The Industry encompasses all corporate proponents of digital audio broadcasting. This 
includes iBiquity Digital Corporation, the technology’s proprietor; the nation’s largest broadcast 
conglomerates, all of whom are investors in iBiquity and collectively control the majority of 
radio industry revenues; the National Association of Broadcasters, which has worked to facilitate 
a metaphor of inevitability surrounding the adoption of digital radio; and application-
development companies, who have expressed interest in the technology’s convergent potential. 
Industry actors are the primary protagonists in the digital radio policy dramaturgy: they direct the 
“plot” toward an outcome most advantageous for them, and their operative metaphors about 
digital broadcasting are the ones against which the FCC judges all others. 
Public Broadcasters differ from the industry in that their support of digital radio has been 
enthusiastic but historically qualified, due to the conflicting service objectives of commercial and 
public radio. As such, public broadcasters follow their own operative metaphors about what 
DAB may be useful for. In some instances, these metaphors are at cross-purposes to the 
industry’s, though public broadcasters remain useful ancillary protagonists in their support of the 
industry’s chosen digital radio technology and were instrumental in advancing it through the 
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regulatory gauntlet by manipulating the institutional credibility they have with policymakers.
Independent Broadcasters are defined as any owner, engineer, or staff member of a radio 
station not directly affiliated with the technology’s proprietors. They are strong antagonists in the 
policy dramaturgy. Although independent broadcasters represent the majority of radio stations in 
the United States, they deploy strong oppositional metaphors to define the future of radio and 
engage in the most contentious dialogue regarding its digitalization.  
Consulting Engineers are broadcast-certified scientists not employed by a single station 
or broadcast conglomerate. Initially, they worked to concretize the industry’s operative 
metaphors about digital radio, but later openly questioned its technical viability. They are also 
predisposed to define “truth” in forward terms which leave little room for irony and deception.
Electronics Manufacturers include the makers of broadcast transmission and reception 
equipment, the trade association that represents them (the Consumer Electronics Association), as 
well as end-users of such components, such as automobile manufacturers. One might think that 
electronics manufacturers would be closely aligned with the broadcast industry on the issue of 
digital radio, but instead they portray a justifiable reticence to its adoption. This makes 
electronics manufacturers another important antagonist within the policy dramaturgy, albeit 
defined more by inaction than action.
The Public plays an important role in the digital radio dramaturgy. It includes two sub-
constituencies: individual citizens with the knowledge and desire to participate in the 
policymaking process directly, and nonprofit groups who intervene in issues of communications 
policy on behalf of the public. Much like independent broadcasters, the public advances 
oppositional metaphors about the future of radio based upon their practical use of the medium. 
Finally, it is important to lay out the dominant metaphors which have controlled the 
digital radio policy debate. They are surprisingly few in number, and in some cases 
contradictory. 
The dominant operative metaphor is that it is inevitable that radio become a digital 
medium. Stemming from industry anxiety about convergence, as well as an institutional 
orientation within the FCC to embrace new technologies without a full understanding of their 
implications, cementing this metaphor early on as foundational to subsequent policy 
development was of the utmost importance. Secondly, digital radio need not be significantly 
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superior to its analog equivalent. Why this must be so is directly related to the form of DAB 
technology preferred by the broadcast industry, which essentially does not have the capability to 
do much more than digitize a station’s preexisting analog signal. The obvious question of 
adopting a digital service that has no qualitative superiority over its analog counterpart is ignored 
by the protagonists and regulators in the policy debate. Relatedly, sacrifices must be readily 
made to analog radio service in order to introduce digital broadcasting. This is the most 
contentious metaphor in the dramaturgy because it hints at the potentially disruptive nature of 
digital radio technology and makes the premature assumption that there is little value left in 
analog broadcasting. 
How these metaphors are employed by the various character-constituencies provides for 
feisty policy discourse, though ultimately the outcome of the FCC’s digital radio deliberations 
was preordained due to the overarching influence of neoliberalism on the regulatory paradigm, 
which predisposes favoring the perspectives of certain character-constituencies over others. 
Employing these metaphors involved a tortuous process where disagreements over the 
fundamental meaning of key words and terms were contested, brought into compromise, or 
dismissed.
Dramaturgical analysis can serve a powerful purpose in the study of emergent 
communications policy.128 Sue Curry Jansen believes that a “semantic rescue mission” is urgently 
required to create a language, especially within our media environment, that favors democratic 
discourse over words “taken...hostage” by existing holders of power.129 The dramaturgical 
exploration of media policy is an effective method by which to facilitate and sustain this process.
III. Dissertation Source Materials
In order to conduct a dramaturgical analysis of digital radio’s development and 
proliferation, several primary and secondary sources are utilized. Since digital radio has received 
scant attention from media scholars, there is little direct academic foundation from which to start. 
Thus it is necessary to examine the entirety of the dramaturgy that is directly germane to the 
digital radio policymaking process itself. This information spans more than 20 years.
The primary sources for this dissertation are the FCC’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
on digital terrestrial radio (RM-9395) and the rulemaking itself (Mass Media Bureau Docket 99-
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325). The former was promulgated in November of 1998; the latter was published for public 
comment on November 1, 1999. Both dockets contain the entire archive of comments filed by all 
character-constituencies, as well as subsequent FCC orders that have been promulgated to foster 
digital radio’s adoption. The entire archive of both proceedings is available online via the 
agency’s Electronic Comment Filing System;130 all filings are chronologically ordered, though 
the ECFS allows for searches along a variety of themes such as date, identity of filer, and type of 
correspondence. For this dissertation, the entire record of comments, reply comments, notices, 
letters, and policy documents filed in RM-9395 and MM 99-325 were collected and analyzed. As 
of December 31, 2010 there are more than 1,450 individual filings between the two proceedings. 
Not all FCC filings are created equal. Uniformly archived as PDF documents, the length 
of filings can vary widely, from a single-paragraph comment submitted by a member of the 
public to 700+ page technical documents filed by the industry. After removing duplicate and 
corrupted documents, the number of useful filings in the dockets is closer to 1,300. More than 
85% were used directly in the construction of this dissertation. The cumulative size of the FCC’s 
archive of digital radio policymaking documentation is not easily quantifiable, but is estimated to 
range in the thousands of pages of material. These filings directly elucidate the onstage 
performance of actors in the policy dramaturgy and provide a revealing glimpse into their 
backstage behavior. This gives a clear picture of the motivations of character-constituents and is 
extremely important in scrutinizing the operative metaphors that have controlled (or conflicted 
with) policy outcomes.
In addition, two archives of secondary source material are utilized; both are trade 
publications. Radio World is the preeminent industry newspaper for broadcast station owners, 
managers, and engineers.131 Published biweekly, each 50-page issue provides an excellent forum 
in which to observe the offstage behavior of character-constituents directly related to the radio 
industry, whether they are protagonists or antagonists in the policy dramaturgy. Although Radio 
World relies wholly on industry advertising for support and thus displays an editorial bias in 
favor of industry desires, the publication’s change in tenor over time with regard to digital radio 
can be clearly mapped; it has enough integrity to openly welcome opposing points of view, thus 
making for a useful lens through which to observe how various character-consituents debated the 
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operative metaphors of digital radio policymaking offstage. Radio World served to supplement 
many official FCC filings with more candid assessments of digital radio technology and its 
prognosis for success. A trip to the Library of Congress allowed for the reading of more than 300 
issues of Radio World, covering the start of the intra-industry DAB conversation (1988) through 
to the present state of affairs (ending in April 2010). 
Similarly, the trade publication for public radio, Current, was examined to glean 
information on the offstage dialogue of noncommercial broadcasters.132 Current is also published 
biweekly, and its archives were reviewed through the same timeframe as was Radio World. 
Current is a smaller publication, with each issue comprising between 20 and 30 pages. Once all 
research materials were centrally collected and organized, the distillation/analysis process began; 
this resulted in approximately 900 pages of refined research material from which this dissertation 
draws.
IV. Chapter Synopses
Chapter 1 describes the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of this dissertation, 
as well the source material from which it is constructed. Chapter 2 charts the initial 
developmental trajectory of U.S. digital radio broadcasting. Covering a timeline between 1988 
and 1998, the chapter summarizes the offstage discussion that took place before the FCC became 
directly involved with the DAB issue. During this phase, definable character-constituencies 
began to congeal, focused around three pivotal moments in the decade: the consideration and 
discarding of non-domestic forms of DAB technology; the imposition of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 and its effects on the radio industry’s digital broadcast 
objectives; and the formal commencement of an FCC rulemaking on the subject. Surprisingly, 
this period illustrates deep-seated disagreement between various character-constituents, both 
about the necessity for and viability of digital radio broadcasting itself. These early schisms, and 
their subsequent fallout, would significantly affect how the policy dramaturgy would evolve.
Chapter 3 provides a critical overview of the fundamental detriments of U.S. digital radio 
technology. This critique is boiled down into three main categories. The first involves spectral 
integrity: the mixing of analog and digital radio signals on the AM and FM dials not only favors 
the property rights of incumbent broadcasters, but has the demonstrated potential to degrade 
existing analog broadcast service. The second critique involves bandwidth capacity: unlike 
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newer forms of digital broadcast technologies such as satellite radio, digital television, and 
webcasting, terrestrial radio is not endowed with a new distribution channel to exploit. Although 
the designers of U.S. DAB technology proclaim it can be used to provide a panoply of new 
services, in reality this is untrue: digital radio broadcasting neither extends the medium’s 
communicative effectiveness nor provides it with a useful vector into a convergent media 
environment. Finally, the wholly proprietary nature of the U.S. digital radio standard is 
explained. One private corporation, iBiquity Digital, controls all the patents for the transmission 
and reception of domestic DAB signals. Openly likening its business model to Microsoft, 
iBiquity envisions a future where two licenses will be required by broadcasters: one from the 
FCC for the use of broadcast spectrum, and another from iBiquity for the permission to transmit 
digitally. Not only does this represent a significant shift in the gatekeeper-function of the FCC 
itself, but a closed system stifles innovation and inflates adoption costs for both the radio 
broadcaster and listener.
Chapter 4 begins the dramaturgical analysis of the FCC’s digital radio rulemaking in 
earnest. Protagonists begin to deploy, refine, and buttress their operative metaphors, while 
antagonists conduct a thorough and critical analysis of the shortcomings of the U.S. DAB 
system. Irrespective of a lack of substantive, impartial, and independent testing of the 
technology, coupled with a concerted effort of backstage lobbying by its protagonists at the FCC, 
regulators approved the deployment of digital radio in 2002, even though little was known about 
its inner workings and implications for analog broadcasting. This speaks volumes to the relative 
disengagement of the FCC in the DAB development and testing process and the power of 
neoliberal ideology in the adoption of new communications technology and policy.
Chapter 5 chronicles the initial rollout of digital radio in the United States. During this 
period, serious technical faults are found with DAB technology when deployed in the real world; 
this generates a flurry of offstage discussion about whether or not digitalization is actually good 
for the medium itself. Independent broadcasters, members of the public, and consulting 
engineers all bring forth compelling evidence of digital radio’s fundamental detriments. 
Offstage, broadcast engineers and electronics manufacturers debate the validity of the industry’s 
operative metaphors; some radio stations who were early-adopters of DAB abandon their digital 
signals. Protagonists work furiously to engineer fixes to the multiple problems of the technology 
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identified “in the wild”; they petition the FCC not to intervene, trusting marketplace innovation 
to assuage all concerns. As a result, regulators approve further rules governing digital radio 
deployment which loosen restrictions on its proliferation and exacerbate its real-world 
consequences. 
Chapter 6 ends the dramaturgical analysis and reviews the current state of U.S. digital 
radio. The number of DAB-capable stations on the air has stagnated. Transmitter manufacturers 
lament little to no demand for digital radio equipment; consumer electronics companies, reticent 
about the technology’s development from the outset, do not help matters by refusing to mass-
produce compatible receivers. As a result, the term “digital radio” itself begins to evolve, now 
encompassing other radio-like services such as portable digital music players, satellite radio and 
streaming via wireless broadband. The detrimental attributes of digital radio signals cause 
consumer confusion and consternation. In effect, radio broadcasting stands to diminish its 
importance as a mass medium by ceding a tried-and-proven distribution method for one which 
disincentivises terrestrial radio listening. The end result, dramaturgically speaking, is a tragedy 
leavened with farce: DAB’s protagonists truly believed they were charting a clear course toward 
entre into a convergent media environment when, in effect, their efforts may actually lead to the 
obsolescence of legacy radio broadcasting. The farce comes from the fact that the operative 
metaphors on which digital radio policy are based clearly have no solid technical foundation, 
although all of its proponents (including the FCC) still believe they do.
Chapter 7 examines digital radio in a global context. The United States was not the first 
to explore digital broadcasting, and many countries have adopted DAB technologies vastly 
different from the U.S. model. Irrespective of this, however, there is compelling evidence to 
suggest that the failure of digital radio is a technologically-agnostic phenomenon fostered by 
broadcast policies that are universally neoliberal in orientation. Countries that began their efforts 
at digital radio policymaking long before the United States are now in the process of reevaluating 
their activities; DAB transmitters are being turned off as they have captured little to no audience 
share; and radio listeners, regardless of nationality, are similarly confused as to why regulators 
look to degrade or replace a medium which has worked well for so many decades with 
something inferior and more expensive to receive. Further research on this worldwide 
phenomenon is absolutely necessary to get a grasp on what the future of digital radio (regardless 
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of its form) portends. 
The concluding chapter highlights the weakness of substance on which digital radio 
policies are based, offers lessons from the story of digital radio that may be useful in the broader 
world of convergent media policy, and contemplates the future of radio broadcasting following 
the potential failure of its chosen mechanisms of digitalization. Antagonistic actors in the 
dramaturgy repeatedly assert that it is not the means by which radio is delivered that counts; it is 
the content it provides. Digital radio essentially forfeits many of the attributes which made the 
medium historically unique, which marginalizes its utility in the eyes of the public and opens up 
the identity of radio itself to contestation. A potential outcome of radio’s digital transition is 
perhaps not to have one at all; were that to occur regulators might wholly reconsider the relative 
importance of radio in a 21st century media environment, as well as the primacy of neoliberal 
principles which have led to such confusing and potentially deleterious outcomes regarding 
convergent media policies more generally. Such deliberation would undoubtedly invite further 
developments that complicate the challenge to radio’s identity. For those who still find value in 
radio broadcasting, it is not the concept of the medium that needs reclamation, but its purpose.
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Chapter 2:  The Developmental Trajectory of U.S. Digital Radio
During the 1990s, the character-constituencies that would ultimately promulgate digital 
audio broadcasting in the United States began to crystallize. At first, U.S. broadcasters 
tentatively agreed to adopt the same DAB technology as the rest of the industrialized world; 
however, reticence among regulators to allocate new spectrum necessary for the promulgation of 
DAB service effectively forced broadcasters to invent a wholly new technology that could 
deployed on the existing AM and FM bands. As research into “in-band” DAB technology 
progressed, the broadcast industry supported certain developers not on the merits of their 
research, but based upon who financed the work. Two major developers of in-band DAB 
technology would emerge, but only one would be selected as the U.S. standard. Not surprisingly, 
the DAB developer with the most ties to the broadcast industry ended up gaining the upper hand. 
The Federal Communications Commission was wholly uninvolved in the intra-industry 
debate over digital radio development and did nothing during the decade to constructively 
advance the issue. Had regulators been actively engaged in the early stages of DAB research, 
there might have been a real possibility that the technology which the industry ultimately put 
forth for approval would represent a significant advancement in radio broadcasting more 
broadly; instead, the FCC allowed incumbent broadcasters to develop a DAB system which 
served their economic needs first and effectively ignored all other metrics by which to judge the 
technology’s actual viability. 
Early prognostications about what DAB would be had no basis in empiricism: by the time 
the FCC was presented with a DAB technology framework, its proprietors had only proven that 
the simultaneous transmission of both analog and digital radio signals were possible. During the 
early stages of DAB research, broadcasters identified satellite radio as the primary competitive 
threat that would eat away at their listening audiences and, in turn, cut into their revenue streams. 
They were obsessed with the fact that satellite radio would be digital from its inception while 
terrestrial radio remained analog. Thus, broadcasters’ desire for digital radio was based around 
the concept of digitalization itself, not around any tangible benefits that digitalization would 
provide. 
This created an important early schism between two constituencies necessary for the 
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successful adoption of any digital radio technology - broadcasters and receiver manufacturers. In 
a nutshell, broadcasters saw their eventual digitalization as necessary to compete with other 
forms of digital audio distribution, of which satellite radio was the first and only recognizable 
“threat” to the industry during the time of DAB development. However, manufacturers of radio 
receivers did not support the concept of in-band DAB and wanted the U.S. radio industry to 
adopt the global DAB standard; the former would require electronics manufacturers to develop 
and produce entirely new radio receivers for the domestic market, while the latter would have 
allowed the production and marketing of existing digital receiver technology. Given the 
chimerical nature of in-band DAB’s supposed “improvements” to terrestrial radio, electronics 
manufacturers tried repeatedly throughout the decade to advance the notion of a global DAB 
standard while broadcasters placed priority on a technology that, while unproven, would give 
them firm control over the pace and principles of any digital transition.
The pre-policy dramaturgy of DAB is archived in the trade press. Since the FCC would 
not be formally engaged in the digital radio transition until 1998, the work of the decade - and its 
rationalization - would first be debated within Radio World and Current. Both cater to specific 
constituencies within the broadcast industry - commercial and public broadcasters. As such, 
those constituencies which assumed positions of dominance within the pre-policy dramaturgy 
were awarded this power by dint of being the target audiences of the publications that most 
thoroughly covered the DAB development process. In the case of Radio World, its coverage 
would focus on the companies working to develop in-band DAB technology and the sentiments 
among commercial broadcasters about which developer seemed to offer the most profitable and 
least disruptive method by which radio stations could digitize their signals. Radio World also 
extensively covered the period of trial-and-error that occurred during the early days of DAB 
development, but always from the perspective of unarticulated “progress,” defined within the 
operative metaphor of “digital equals better.” Problems that developed during the in-band DAB 
development process were characterized as growing pains, as opposed to possible red flags that 
in-band DAB technology could not realistically provide broadcasters with a robust analog-to-
digital transition path. 
Current, the trade publication of public broadcasters, played up the role of public radio as 
an innovator within the in-band DAB space; in fact, claims about the technology’s functionality 
35
were more grandiose in Current then they were in Radio World. Part of this may be explained by 
actors within the public radio environment seeking to achieve a place of primacy within the DAB 
development process; as it became clear over the decade that a commercial broadcaster-endorsed 
DAB technology would prevail, public broadcasters focused primarily on preventing the 
marginalization of public broadcasters on the digital radio issue more generally. Both 
commercial and noncommercial broadcasters made unsubstantiated claims about in-band DAB’s 
utility, but these were tendered as part of a larger strategic effort to position constituencies with 
agency during the development process and subsequent FCC rulemaking on terrestrial digital 
radio.
I. Premature Consensus in the Face of Satellite Radio
On August 1, 1986, public radio broadcaster WGBH-FM in Boston successfully 
simulcast its programming over a digital sideband adjacent to WGBH-TV’s analog signal. 
Although details of the experiment are unclear, it represented the first documented instance of a 
U.S. radio station making a tentative foray into the world of digital audio broadcasting.1 The test 
had no significance beyond proving the theory that digital audio could be transmitted as its own 
unique data stream. Other than this single test, the U.S. radio broadcast industry was yet not 
oriented toward actively pursuing a digital radio transition when the FCC first raised the issue in 
1990 as part of a wide-ranging proceeding on the digitization of radio.2 The rulemaking was 
designed to explore and facilitate various forms of digital broadcasting; primarily, it was focused 
around the creation of a new satellite-delivered digital audio radio service (SDARS) but also left 
open the possibility for setting fundamental ground-rules regarding the development of terrestrial 
DAB.
In reaction to the FCC’s rulemaking, the industry’s first step was to convene a private 
working group of commercial and public broadcasters to contemplate U.S. radio’s digital future. 
Mike Starling, one of NPR’s top engineering experts, co-chaired this initiative. The group 
sponsored a seminar for U.S. and European broadcasters to discuss terrestrial DAB;3 by the end 
of 1990, Starling would claim that “from all indications, [the adoption of a terrestrial DAB 
standard] is on the fast track at the FCC.”4 John Wilner, a staff writer for Current, explained the 
importance of NPR taking an early leadership role in DAB development: “In an effort to avoid 
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the mistakes of the 1920s, when what was then called ‘educational’ radio was tacked onto the 
nascent commercial broadcasting system as an afterthought, NPR and other public radio 
organizations are eager to secure a position in the digital movement.” Said Starling, “Our support 
for [DAB] has really been based on positioning public radio so that we can take advantage of it 
and participate in it. The only way to compete with those people is to become one of them.”5 
Public radio, as a constituency within the U.S. broadcast industry, was the first to actively drive 
thinking about innovation within the DAB space, but not because of the technology’s inherent 
possibilities; rather, public broadcasters sought a place within the DAB development process that 
would give them an element of control over the technology’s creation in such a way as to 
minimize their own potential marginalization in the face of a transition which they recognized 
would be driven by commercial broadcasters. 
Initially, the U.S. broadcast industry seemed prepared to adopt the apparent global 
standard of DAB, then known as Eureka 147, and the National Association of Broadcasters 
formally passed a resolution pursuing further domestic study and development of Eureka at its 
annual convention in January of 1991.6 The Eureka system was conceived in 1981 by a German-
based consortium, with research and development assistance from the country’s corporate sector 
and several European public-service broadcast agencies.7 Notably, Eureka 147 DAB worked on 
swaths of spectrum not traditionally allocated to radio broadcasting at the time. Initial testing of 
the Eureka system began in 1985 and was formalized in 1986; its first field demonstration took 
place in Geneva, Switzerland in 1988.8 As development of the technology matured, the 
capabilities of the Eureka 147 system became better known. 
Unlike traditional, terrestrial analog broadcasting, the Eureka 147 system is designed 
around the use of “multiplexes,” or single transmitters which occupy an entire range of spectrum 
in a given geographic area. “Stations” were offered slices, or “channels,” of spectrum available 
on a multiplex. These channels provided each station with the capability of delivering a high-
quality audio stream or the option of carving up its channel into multiple program streams, some 
of which might be audio, others which might provide any content capable of digital conveyance. 
Eureka 147 also had the benefit of being cross-compatible with other digital media distribution 
networks; its data-stream could be carried by satellite and across cable networks where point-to-
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point, over-the-air terrestrial extension of a multiplex proved infeasible.9 
System specifications for the Eureka 147 system were finalized in 1994, and the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) recommended it as a global DAB standard the 
same year.10 EuroDAB, a collective effort to cement Eureka 147 as the pan-European standard, 
was launched in 1995.11 The British Broadcasting Corporation and Swedish Broadcasting 
Corporation launched the first full-time DAB services in September of 1995;12 other countries, 
within Europe and beyond, began active pilot projects involving both digital audio and 
datacasting using the Eureka platform.13 After lining up the commitment of several broadcasters 
and receiver manufacturers,14 Canada formally adopted the Eureka system;15 its transition was 
driven by the expectation of the “value added services,” such as datacasting, that DAB might 
bring to the broadcast marketplace.16 By 1997, the Eureka system was considered “a de facto 
standard in Europe, Canada, Mexico, and many other countries”;17 the president of EuroDAB, 
David Witherow, confidently predicted that Eureka 147 was “on its way to becoming - if it is not 
already - a world standard for digital radio.”18 
As the U.S. broadcast industry began thinking about digitalization, it first set general 
service goals for any proposed DAB technology. These coalesced into six “performance and 
service objectives”: “compact-disk quality sound, immunity from multipath and other 
interference, no objectionable interference with other services, minimization of transmission 
costs as well as reception complexity and costs, additional data capacity, and degradation at the 
reception threshold with a minimum of objectionable artifacts.”19 At the time, Eureka 147 was 
the only DAB system in existence which could address all of these criteria.20 A live 
demonstration of the Eureka technology at the National Association of Broadcasters’ annual 
conference in 1991 received an enthusiastic response and led to the organization’s formal 
endorsement.21 
Since the Eureka system used spectrum not allocated for broadcasting, the U.S. radio 
industry and FCC examined the availability of such spectrum domestically. At the time, the 
frequencies on which the Eureka system could be deployed were in geographically-sporadic but 
systematic use for military applications like flight- and missile-test telemetry.22 Within two 
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months of the NAB’s passage of its resolution endorsing Eureka 147, the Pentagon formally 
objected to the Department of Commerce’s National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration (NTIA) - the regulator of all government-used spectrum - about appropriating 
that spectrum for digital broadcasting.23 A short but intense flurry of lobbying ensued; the FCC 
suggested three other patches of spectrum for terrestrial DAB using Eureka 147 technology, but 
all were shot down by the NTIA.24 An attempt to legislatively force a spectrum set-aside, mostly 
carried forth by public broadcasters, also failed in Congress.25 
By January of 1992 the radio industry realized it did not have the political muscle to 
wrest new spectrum from the Pentagon, and the FCC seemed unwilling to force the issue on its 
behalf. This resulted in the effective abandonment of any form of alternate-band digital audio 
broadcasting in the United States.26 Seeing no immediate alternative to Eureka on the horizon, 
and noting that industry consensus around a DAB technology died with the banishment of 
Eureka in the United States, the FCC separated (and effectively terminated) its terrestrial DAB 
proceeding.27 Its rulemaking now focused solely on SDARS, from which the Sirius XM satellite 
radio service is its final result.28 This provoked much the consternation of the radio industry,29 
which viewed the proposed launch of SDARS later in the decade as a make-or-break deadline by 
which terrestrial broadcasters also needed to go digital.30 By detaching the development of digital 
terrestrial radio from its larger digital radio rulemaking, the FCC effectively ceded control over 
DAB development to broadcasters exclusively.
The looming rise of satellite radio worried broadcasters in two identifiable ways. SDARS 
promised increased programming choice, which the radio industry feared would entice listeners 
away from their stations. Less listeners would translate into lower station ratings and a 
concomitant depression in advertising rates, thereby fiscally weakening the entire broadcast 
industry. Secondly, SDARS would be a fully-digital service, and the working assumption at the 
time was that digital satellite broadcasts would provide programming at a higher audio quality 
than traditional analog AM and FM stations were capable of. Although both of these 
assumptions had no empirical evidence to support them at the time, and a fundamental access 
distinction existed between terrestrial and satellite radio - the latter would require a monthly 
subscription by listeners, while the former was free to anyone with a receiver - these attributes 
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were considered threatening enough to force the U.S. broadcast industry to begin its own DAB 
research and development initiatives. Since Eureka 147 was the only DAB system in existence at 
the time, the industry would have to create its own from whole cloth.  
II. “Coming to Grips” With In-band DAB
Although the Eureka 147 system had been endorsed by the NAB, it did not have the 
unanimous support of its membership. Not only would the process of multiplexing harmonize the 
transmission power (and resultant coverage area) of all competing stations in a market, but 
broadcasters feared “a marketer’s nightmare” in trying to educate the listening public about any 
alternate-band transition.31 Therefore, the fear of new competition in a multiplexed DAB 
environment probably played as much of a role in quashing the notion of alternate-band DAB in 
the United States as did the military and NTIA’s opposition.32 Indeed, there were some 
corporations, like Westinghouse, which had interests in both broadcasting and the military; 
Westinghouse had invested millions of dollars in avionics infrastructure that used spectrum now 
proposed for digital broadcasting.33 The appearance of an intra-broadcaster division this early 
into the DAB development project would plague the U.S. radio industry for nearly a decade. 
There is also evidence that the NAB made the decision to endorse Eureka 147 out of self-
interest: under the tentative agreement reached (but never ratified) by the NAB and the Eureka 
147 consortium, the NAB would have “developed plans for the association’s profit-making arm 
to license the technology to American stations for a fee.” This would have been a radically new 
role for a trade association that ostensibly worked to increase the overall economic health of its 
membership.34 
The record also shows that, from the outset, the U.S. radio industry had not put all of its 
eggs in the Eureka basket. An alternative to Eureka, code-named “Project Acorn,” was originally 
founded by Westinghouse in 1989. Having started as a relatively informal science experiment, 
over the next two years the Gannett Corporation and CBS Radio would officially join the 
venture, while public radio executives and engineers also signed on to the effort. Project Acorn 
was an attempt to develop an “in-band” DAB system - one where analog and digital signals 
would coexist on the traditional AM and FM broadcast bands. This would solve the problem of 
needing to move all stations to new spectrum; maintain the variable coverage of stations under 
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existing FCC allocation rules; and, most of all, protect incumbents’ investments in the existing 
radio broadcast marketplace.35 Technically speaking, it was a task previously considered 
impossible without harming existing analog radio service. The conundrum boils down to one of 
the most fundamental rules of radio-frequency physics: if you add new RF energy into an area of 
spectrum already occupied, interference is bound to result. Nevertheless, in-band DAB would be 
officially endorsed as public radio’s preferred digital transition plan in a CPB study released in 
1993; it expected FCC approval of the Project Acorn concept “within a year or so.”36 Public radio 
engineers suggested an analog/digital radio transition would take, at minimum, 10 to 15 years, 
probably beginning with “simulcasts of our old medium on our new medium.”37 The NAB 
similarly expected any digital radio transition to take “a long time.”38  
At the same convention where the NAB debuted Eureka 147 with much fanfare, a muted 
display of Project Acorn’s DAB concept was also demonstrated.39 The first display unit was 
actually a mockup, which could only illustrate what the effects might be of placing digital data 
underneath and around a typical FM broadcast signal. By 1992, Westinghouse, Gannett, CBS, 
and other interested broadcasters (including Cox Radio, ABC, and Emmis Communications) 
founded a separate company, USA Digital Radio (USADR) to consolidate their research and 
development efforts toward the creation of a workable in-band DAB system. Housed as a 
subsidiary of Westinghouse and initially based in Chicago,40 USADR functioned with employees 
on loan from investor-companies, and farmed out most of its early research to consultants and 
contract engineering laboratories.41 The FCC took no active role - either as participant or 
observer - in this early research.
That same year, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting announced it would spend 
$350,000 on research into digital audio broadcasting. The CPB was optimistic about the ways by 
which in-band DAB would allow broadcast radio entre into a convergent digital media 
environment.42 At the same time, NPR’s point-person on all things digital, Mike Starling, urged 
the public radio community to envision DAB not as a mechanism by which to provide a 
cornucopia of new services, but rather as an improvement to existing broadcasting as 
conventionally understood: “It’s not really the sound quality but the absence of distortion and 
noise that’s the biggest improvement,” he wrote in Current. 
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Although Starling acknowledged that in-band DAB might bring the opportunity to 
introduce some new services to the radio broadcast environment, these would be minor relative 
to broadcasting’s primary role of audio content distribution.43 More importantly to Starling was 
that public broadcasters had secured a seat at the table during the start of in-band DAB 
development: “Digital radio is still at the talking stage in this country....We are extremely 
fortunate to have a more formalized presence in telecommunications policymaking than our 
predecessors....We have a blank sheet of paper for the design of the role of public radio in the 
American public’s future.”44 How this would be actualized was, at the time, technically 
indescribable. The CPB itself suggested that prognostications about DAB’s potential at the 
present juncture were premature, “because technology only defines what can be - the consumer’s 
wants and needs, the interaction of competing products in a marketplace, economics, finance and 
regulation collectively define what will be.”45 This did not stop some commentators from 
predicting a fundamental shift in radio’s identity: some suggested “tailored bit-streaming” would 
become a major application, and display screens and printer ports would subsequently be 
installed in receivers, morphing them into multimedia devices.46 
At 4 a.m. on August 29, 1992, public radio station WILL-FM in Urbana, Illinois became 
the first radio station in the United States to successfully conduct an experimental hybrid 
analog/digital broadcast.47 Apparently, the prototype hardware was developed at an unnamed 
laboratory on the campus of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, to which a part of 
USADR’s research had been contracted. When WILL-AM/FM/TV General Manager Donald 
Mulally inadvertently tumbled to the project, he “volunteered the FM station as a guinea pig.” 
The first hybrid/digital FM broadcast transmitted the digital portion of the signal at one one-
thousandth the power of WILL’s analog signal.48 Engineers were impressed at the proof-of-
concept so much that the prototype was packed up and displayed at the National Association of 
Broadcasters’ annual radio convention the following month. Unfortunately, only “one hand-built 
prototype receiver” could decode this first foray into hybrid analog/digital FM broadcasting, and 
nothing substantive was reported about its audio fidelity or signal robustness.49 Meanwhile, in 
Cincinnati, Ohio, USADR began testing hybrid AM broadcasts on an experimental station 
licensed for the purpose by the FCC; although the agency was not actively involved in the in-
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band research and development process - much less willing to consider the practical implications 
of adopting such a DAB system - it was eminently comfortable providing broadcasters with as 
much latitude as they could handle for experimental purposes.
Now that a crude proof-of-concept had been demonstrated, other companies, potentially 
sensing the profits to be made from digitizing the radio broadcast industry, launched their own 
research and development projects on in-band DAB. Among them was AT&T and its then-
subsidiary, Lucent Technologies.50 Lucent began development of an in-band DAB system as a 
means by which to spin off existing research on digital audio technology into markets that could 
be readily monetized.51 While both USADR and Lucent had pounced on the idea of a hybrid 
analog/digital FM broadcast system, USADR was the only company to initially field a hybrid 
AM broadcast scheme.52 
Although competition in the innovative phase of in-band DAB seemed like a positive 
development, the introduction of a second DAB proprietor actually served to highlight the 
technical challenges of in-band digital radio and pushed constituents within the broadcast 
industry toward taking sides in the development process. Unlike USADR, which had the direct 
financial support of several major broadcasters and regularly tapped their insights on radio’s 
digital future as part of its research, broadcasters saw Lucent as a disruptive “outsider” whose 
ideas of DAB might not mesh with the industry which would ultimately deploy it. Although 
Lucent had plenty of scientific intelligence and capital by which to pursue the technology’s 
development, the fact that the broadcast industry did not have direct ties to its DAB program 
worried many. If a major goal of the radio industry was to have control over the development of 
its digital future, it would be more likely to succeed in this endeavor under the auspices of a 
company it controlled than one with which it had no substantive relationship. 
By 1994, the National Radio Systems Committee (NRSC) was engaged to oversee the 
testing of competing DAB technologies, and established a DAB Subcommittee to facilitate the 
process. The NRSC is a private consortium of representatives from the broadcasting, broadcast 
equipment, and consumer electronics industries. Other interested parties can join the NRSC 
following application and/or invitation; for example, the FCC has a handful of members on the 
NRSC, but they act in an ex-officio manner. Typically, the NRSC is a place where industry 
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works out consensus on new broadcast technology standards, and then forwards its endorsement 
to the FCC for formal approval.53 Discourse between NRSC members is kept private; its 
meetings are closed to the public and press. With regard to the NRSC’s DAB Subcommittee, 
there was no “evenness” with regard to the representation of constituencies: the vast majority 
were broadcasters who, incidentally, worked for companies that invested in USADR, and the 
DAB Subcommittee was chaired by a commercial broadcast engineer. By agreeing to the 
placement of responsibility for evaluating in-band DAB systems in the hands of a private 
consortium, the FCC effectively ceded any input or authority over the technology’s development 
and testing process and signaled tacit approval that any outcome would be embraced by 
regulators.
At the time, Current conducted a comparative cost-analysis for each station to convert to 
any flavor of DAB; USADR’s price-range came in the lowest ($20-75,000) while Eureka 147 
conversion was pegged at around $45-95,000 per station, with costs for implementation of the 
Lucent system falling between the two. However, the article did note that since Eureka involved 
multiplexing, the actual conversion costs under such a system could be shared by each 
participating broadcaster in a multiplex.54 It took two years for the NRSC to develop DAB field-
testing and system-evaluation guidelines.55
Notably, the first round of NRSC test guidelines did not subject the competing 
technologies to a comparative analysis; rather, it simply set out to test their inherent viability. By 
this point in time, the criteria for an “adequate” DAB system had shifted slightly: a “winning” 
technology would be robust to interference and other propagation characteristics (especially with 
regard to FM); offer “CD-quality [fidelity] standards”; not interfere with existing analog 
broadcast stations; and offer digital coverage equivalent to a station’s analog service area. 
Questions about the deployment of ancillary services, such as datacasting, were not factored into 
the NRSC’s initial consideration. Early reports from the NRSC on laboratory testing of all 
proposed in-band DAB systems “posted poor performers in every category.”56 One of the largest 
problems of in-band DAB was the susceptibility of digital radio signals to interfere with their 
“host” analog stations. Bench-tests using a “representative” sample of radio receivers revealed 
this fundamental flaw in every proposed system.57 Although the NRSC kept quiet on the results 
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of its initial in-band DAB evaluation, its was inevitable some of the details would be leaked. 
Given the disappointing results of the laboratory tests, preparations for the field testing of in-
band DAB systems slipped into 1995.58 
Despite a the lack of a workable technology, USADR - with help from the NAB and 
trade press - began to paint a picture of inevitability about the adoption of in-band DAB in the 
United States. At the Los Angeles World Media Expo in September of 1994, USADR created a 
“static, in-booth demonstration” of its digital radio system, which included a controlled 
exhibition of hybrid analog/digital AM and FM broadcasts.59 USADR representatives told Expo 
attendees that the company was already in discussion with equipment-manufacturers to mass-
produce DAB transmission and reception components.60 NAB DAB Task Force Chairman Alan 
Box declared USADR’s system to be ready for deployment; the AM system, he boasted, “sounds 
as good as our current FM analog signals,” while FM DAB sounded as good as a CD. Other in-
band DAB proponents such as Lucent also had models of their equipment on display, and 
promised their own “static” demonstrations at forthcoming broadcast conventions.61  None of 
these claims rested on any solid technical foundation. NRSC tests had conclusively proven that 
the developmental state of in-band DAB was quite immature, and that the technology did not yet 
meet the criteria necessary for viability, much less adoption. 
As the developer with the most backing from broadcasters themselves, it was important 
for USADR to demonstrate its technology first, so as to gain a perceived place of primacy within 
the DAB development process and reassure non-investor broadcasters that its technology would 
be a feasible one. Given that there was no fallback to an in-band digital broadcast solution, and 
existing technical data on in-band DAB systems was admittedly weak, radio broadcasters had to 
show support for their homegrown DAB system - otherwise the notion of radio’s digitization 
lacked traction for further research and development. Based around the nebulous threat of 
incipient satellite radio services, broadcasters at the time backed in-band DAB out of an 
inarticulate need to “go digital” for the simple sake of doing so.     
As USADR began a concerted campaign of promoting the potential strengths of its 
technology, it received a large vote of confidence from the NAB. In a Radio World commentary 
published in February of 1995, NAB executive vice president John Abel attempted to articulate 
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the potential of radio’s digital future. In doing so, he cast DAB not as simply complimentary to 
existing analog radio services, but as a revolutionary mechanism by which broadcasters could 
expand the range of information they could provide.
The industry has yet to comprehend or understand what digital broadcasting means. To a 
large extent, radio broadcasters continue to think of ‘digital broadcasting’ as a higher 
quality sound through digital audio broadcasting (DAB). But DAB is only one 
application of digital broadcasting: or to say it another way, DAB is simply an extension 
of the concept of digital broadcasting. Digital broadcasting does not necessarily mean 
higher quality; digital broadcasting means the flexibility to achieve multiple purposes for 
the broadcast signal and certainly one of those applications is sound [emphasis added]. 
Predicting that “tomorrow’s digital receivers will be more like today’s computers,” Abel 
insinuated that the reception of radio would merge into other devices, like household appliances 
and mobile telephony, which would open up many new possibilities for digital radio 
broadcasting. Forecasting potential uses such as “multiple audio signals into a digital data 
stream; real-time traffic updates; weather updates and other emergency 
announcements...displayed/played on demand,” Abel believed broadcasters could use the 
technology to create new “bit streams...allocated to e-mail paging, PDAs, signaling devices like 
utility load management, data transmissions, fax transmissions, differential global positioning 
system (D-GPS)” and the like. “Theoretically, all of these additional transmissions could be 
accomplished while still providing a real-time broadcast as is done now.”  Going far beyond the 
initial goals for the technology as articulated by in-band DAB developers, Abel urged the 
industry to look past the provision of audio service to drive the development and uptake of DAB: 
“As we become digital wireless broadcasters in the revolutionary conversion to digital 
broadcasting, we can provide services we never would have dreamt of in the past. The future of 
digital broadcasting is bright and need not be feared.”62 
Though neither of in-band DAB’s main developers, USADR and Lucent Technologies, 
promised such functionality in their systems, Abel’s commentary suggests that broadcasters 
hoped the technology would not only give them qualitative parity to future satellite radio 
services, but would open up new revenue streams related to digital media distribution more 
generally. Such hypothetical benefits served to gloss over the known technical immaturity of in-
band DAB development and urged the formation of consensus among broadcasters that a digital 
future was not only inevitable, but could be quite lucrative. Although there was no scientific 
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basis for these claims about in-band DAB technology, both USADR and Lucent did not caution 
against such wishful thinking. For its part, the FCC remained mum on the issue.
During the annual industrywide NAB convention in April, 1995, Las Vegas public radio 
station KUNV-FM was outfitted to broadcast a hybrid analog/digital signal,63 while a hybrid AM 
demonstration-station broadcast live from the convention floor. USADR gave half-hour bus tours 
around carefully-planned routes within the city to demonstrate the viability of its system.64 
Although proponents admitted that the AM side of the technology needed more work before 
market-size demonstrations could be undertaken, USADR strongly asserted that AM 
broadcasters were guaranteed a meaningful place in any digital radio transition.65 In fact, the AM 
demonstration unit on the NAB convention floor had been assembled only two weeks before the 
show.66 Unbeknownst to convention attendees, USADR was collecting field data from these 
demonstrations, which it would later submit to the NRSC for evaluation.67 
At the NAB convention, Milford K. Smith, vice president of engineering for Greater 
Media, Inc., a USADR investor, led an engineer’s roundtable on the promises of in-band DAB.68 
It was not without its fireworks: European engineers could not understand why the United States 
appeared to be bucking the global trend toward Eureka 147 and worried about the potential for 
interference that would be created by intermixing analog and digital radio signals.69 NRSC 
Chairman Charles Morgan, then a vice president for engineering with Susquehanna Radio 
Corporation, another USADR investor, candidly responded, “We are basically studying to 
determine whether an in-band on-channel system will be substantially better than what we have 
today.”70 Morgan effectively elucidated the first informal metric by which in-band DAB would 
be evaluated: was it better than analog? This was a far cry from the potential of DAB envisioned 
by Eureka 147 supporters, and a much lower standard then the NRSC’s own evaluative criteria 
for a successful in-band system. Morgan also hinted that the NRSC’s formal release of its DAB 
laboratory studies would occur in late August, though the Committee would likely take until the 
end of the year to analyze developers’ data and make any solid conclusions about the 
technology.71  
Elsewhere at the NAB convention, USADR announced tentative agreements with a 
transmitter and semiconductor manufacturer to produce hardware for its embryonic technology.72 
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All FCC Commissioners, save Chairman Reed Hundt, took the company’s bus ride, though 
Hundt did inquire as to just how much “new spectrum” the system would require.73 The response 
to this critical question could not be found on the bus, though Tony Masiell of CBS Radio - one 
of USADR’s corporate cofounders - did admit that radio stations would need to expand their 
spectral footprints in order to accommodate the broadcast of both analog and digital signals. 
Simply put, USADR’s system proposed to double the spectral footprint of every FM radio 
station and quadruple the footprint of every AM station in the United States. The implications of 
this proposal on the traditional spectral allocation regime of the U.S. radio broadcast system went 
unquestioned at the time.74 European attendees of the NAB convention good-naturedly 
challenged their U.S. counterparts to put in-band DAB into a head-to-head test against the 
Eureka 147 system - though all agreed any in-band technology required further refinement for a 
realistic comparison to be meaningful.75 
By the end of the 1995 NAB annual convention, Radio World’s Thomas R. McGinley, 
who rode the bus, noted that “[e]ven system skeptics and critics had to admit that the systems 
pressed the envelope to...perform very impressively in the almost-real world of a developmental 
mobile receiver traveling the side streets of the Las Vegas strip.” This did not stop the 
publication of an editorial urging the FCC to take a closer look at USADR’s technology, with an 
eye toward sanctioned proliferation.76 
Despite these entreaties, there was no clear industry consensus on the idea of in-band 
DAB; another article in the same issue of Radio World examined a sampling of Usenet-published 
reaction toward the NAB demonstrations and found them decidedly mixed, if not downright 
critical.77 Some convention attendees who monitored USADR’s demonstration stations on their 
own noted “splatter” which affected both AM and FM frequencies near the experimental outlets. 
Remarked one observer, “I cannot think of a single FM broadcaster who would add DAB if it 
caused the current signal to sound noisy, scratchy or inferior. And channel splatter of the 
magnitude that was present at the show would cause chaos in those markets where there are a lot 
of stations. I hoped USA Digital Radio is also aware of these problems and has some plans to 
address them.”78 Robert C. Tariso, chief engineer of the highly-rated WLTW-FM in New York, 
was more emphatic: 
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We will...have to come to grips with whether analog AM and FM can really coexist with 
this additional RF signal...no broadcaster in his or her right mind will destroy his or her 
existing business in the hope that digital will catch on. Remember, in the beginning 
99.999 percent of the public will still be listening to conventional AM and FM 
receivers....Digital broadcasting appears so far to be an effort to throw out the baby with 
the bath water. Let’s try and understand more fully what we have...before we wipe the 
slate clean and start over. If we do not, perhaps the same laws of physics will plague a 
digital system as well. Trading one set of problems for another may not prove to be 
beneficial.79 
These early rumblings of unease about the compatibility of in-band digital and analog radio 
signals from rank-and-file broadcast engineers were brusquely brushed aside. Several Radio 
World reports and editorials in the summer and fall of 1995 suggested that the continuation of 
research into out-of-band DAB systems, such as Eureka 147, simply delayed the eventual 
validation of a U.S. developed in-band solution.80 The editors of Radio World observed that a 
worldwide DAB standard was “an agreeable thought but not necessarily an economic need.” 
They were convinced the United States, with its affluent base of 200+ million consumers, could 
swing the global DAB trajectory toward the as-yet unproven in-band solution, and implored the 
broadcast industry to assume tighter control of the DAB testing and validation process.81 USADR 
and Lucent prepared more demonstrations for the annual NAB Radio Show in the fall of 1995,82 
one of which would include a Lucent-sponsored “field trip” similar to the show USADR scripted 
in April. The test-riders had no means by which to compare the Lucent system to any analog 
counterpart.83  
Nevertheless, the NRSC began plans in late 1995 to test all proposed DAB systems in 
one U.S. market. San Francisco was chosen for its diverse terrain, in order to challenge each 
technology to its maximum extent regarding signal coverage and robustness.84 Not surprisingly, 
there were significant difficulties securing temporary authorizations from the NTIA to establish 
Eureka 147 transmission facilities in the testing zone;85 coupled with worries from consumer 
electronics manufacturers that the NRSC would construe any testing protocol to maximize 
beneficial outcomes for an in-band DAB system, the field testing schedule slipped into 1996.86 
The suspicion of consumer electronics manufacturers that the NRSC’s field tests would 
not be objective was well-founded. Due to their material investment in the development of an in-
band DAB system, broadcasters had a predisposed preference for that technology, while the 
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consumer electronics industry held out hopes that a Eureka 147-style plan for the United States 
could be crafted.87 The consumer electronics industry was skeptical from the outset that a 
practical in-band DAB solution was even possible; it was also quite wary of the way USADR 
flew “hand-picked” groups of broadcasters to its testing sites to demonstrate its technology in a 
hyper-controlled environment.88 The consumer electronics industry sensed a forced patina of 
solidarity around the in-band DAB idea, which was publicly inflamed by an October, 1994 
news/analysis piece published in Radio World. “Can a trade organization representing one 
faction of those who will decide the fate of DAB in the U.S. purport to perform objective tests on 
the one hand and support a caucus of its large members on the other hand?,” asked Radio 
World’s editors. “And what happens if all systems perform well, but not exactly in a way that’s 
comparable? Would the [consumer electronics industry] ignore broadcasters’ stated position to 
support only [in-band DAB]?”89 
Such criticism was not necessarily fair: the consumer electronics industry had already 
conducted its own independent analysis of potential in-band DAB systems, made the process 
transparent to both the NAB and NRSC, and, in the end, declared them them infeasible.90 Initial 
attempts by the broadcast industry to cast doubt on the credibility of these tests were quashed in 
a declarative letter published in Radio World by all who oversaw the work and analyzed its 
results, including some broadcast engineers.91 Despite the empirical evidence assembled by these 
tests, in-band DAB proponents would undertake a smear campaign against the science behind the 
consumer electronics industry’s evaluation.92 In response to this criticism, the Electronics 
Industry Association (EIA) - later to become the Consumer Manufacturers Association (CEMA) 
in 1996-97 and the Consumer Electronics Association (CEA) in 1999 - agreed to retest all DAB 
systems. The validity of the test protocols was confirmed by Radio World observers.93  In 
February of 1996, the consumer electronics industry released the results of its DAB retesting.
Described by Radio World as a “dramatic hit,” the EIA concluded that in-band digital 
broadcasting would create destructive interference to both the “host” analog signals along which 
digital data would reside and to adjacent stations, whether they also broadcast digitally or not. 
This problem was most significant on the AM band. USADR acknowledged these problems, but 
downplayed them, and vowed that the equipment tested in the NRSC’s San Francisco assessment 
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would be dramatically improved from the units tested by the EIA.94 
When the EIA polled its membership on raising the necessary funds to support DAB field 
tests, the reaction was not positive.95 James B. Wood, President and Chief Engineer of Inovonics, 
Inc., a manufacturer of a variety of broadcast equipment in Santa Cruz, California, boiled the bad 
blood down into simple sentiments. “We recently received a letter in the mail...asking not for our 
ideas about digital radio, but for a contribution between $10,000 and $40,000 (whatever we 
might have in petty cash?) to fund the EIA and/or the NRSC evaluation of proposed systems. 
What does this say about digital radio in the U.S.?”96 By the mid-1990s, a notable chasm existed 
between radio broadcasters and receiver manufacturers: the former was committed to an in-band 
digital radio solution, while the latter had not only proven that such technology was undesirable, 
but expressed open dismay at the idea of having to build a receiver base to support it. The lack of 
strategic alignment between broadcasters and receiver manufacturers over the future of U.S. 
digital radio would continue to resonate throughout the technology’s later development and 
proliferation.
By the time of the annual NAB convention in April of 1996, broadcasters were scratching 
their heads over the future of digital radio. The EIA’s tests called into question the very viability 
of in-band DAB, and the NRSC had yet to weigh in on the issue. No proponents held 
demonstrations or generally promoted their technology at the convention. Equipment for the 
NRSC’s field tests had not yet even been fully built.97 The mood at the NAB convention was one 
of in-band DAB facing “its darkest hour.” Existing test results of in-band DAB were openly 
termed “disappointing.” Yet proponents stood up in panel discussions and gave impassioned 
speeches that the faults of in-band DAB were simply part of the growing pains associated with 
developing any new technology, not rooted in a fundamental conflict with physics. The preferred 
system simply needed time to “mature.”98 
III. The Telecommunications Act’s Impact on Digital Broadcasting
1996 would prove to be a pivotal year, both for the developmental trajectory of U.S. 
digital radio and the radio industry itself. That year saw the passage of a new 
Telecommunications Act which, among other things, greatly deregulated ownership of the U.S. 
radio industry. Prior to 1996, the number of stations a single entity could own was tightly 
51
capped, at both the local market level and nationally. The new rules dramatically relaxed the 
number of broadcast outlets a single company could own in any given market and abolished the 
national station ownership limit.99 Within six years of the Act’s passage, the number of 
commercial radio station owners would decline by 34% while the number of actual stations rose 
5.4%.100 As a result, much like the housing bubble of the last decade, prices for individual radio 
stations, especially in major markets, ballooned out of all proportion to their actual potential to 
generate revenue. As the radio industry consolidated, new radio conglomerates, such as Clear 
Channel, thrived in the grow-big-grow-fast-cut-costs environment, while older media companies 
such as Westinghouse looked to increase the “synergy” between their existing media holdings. 
Such conglomerates would end up controlling the majority of the industry’s revenue stream: by 
2002, one broadcast company controlled, on average, 40% of the advertising revenue in any 
given market; in 23% of Arbitron-ranked radio markets, the top two broadcasters controlled 
more than 80% of market revenue.101 
Between 1996 and 2000 radio industry advertising revenue grew by nearly 54%.102 
Furthermore, a large infusion of investment capital into the industry took place; several 
companies leveraged their operations on Wall Street, and the market capitalization of the radio 
broadcast industry rocketed from the hundreds of millions to hundreds of billions of dollars. 
Considering that many of those who had taken maximum advantage of consolidation were 
investors in the development of in-band digital radio broadcasting, it was inevitable that some of 
the largesse engendered by consolidation would find its way into DAB development. For its part, 
the FCC was mandated by the 1996 Telecom Act to assume a panoply of new oversight and 
enforcement responsibilities which extended far beyond broadcasting, and was legislatively 
directed to favor economic metrics (under the guise of “competition analysis”) over all others in 
the pursuit of future regulation. Burdened by an increased regulatory workload in which 
broadcast regulation assumed a lower priority, and faced with a radio industry undergoing an 
historically unprecedented increase in economic clout, the FCC effectively ceded any meaningful 
involvement in DAB development to the new industry behemoths. 
USA Digital Radio represented the “insider” proponent of the radio’s digital future; as 
consolidation placed the fiscal fulcrum of the industry more firmly in the hands of 
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conglomerates, and considering that USADR was the child of one, the industry’s largest 
commercial broadcasters lined up to invest in its venture. During 1996, Westinghouse acquired 
CBS; CBS announced plans to acquire Infinity Broadcasting; and the Gannett company sold its 
radio assets. All of the original “Project Acorn” investors were now consolidated under one 
corporate roof. Westinghouse placed USADR under the direction of its Baltimore-based 
Wireless Solutions division and appointed Robert Struble to oversee the USADR effort.103 
According to Struble, until this reorganization the corporate perspective behind in-band DAB 
development had been had been one of “a big science project...it wasn’t really a whole-hog 
effort.” Within a year of the Telecom Act’s passage, USADR had lined up 15 of the 20 largest 
radio conglomerates as investors in its venture, which collectively controlled “more than two 
thousand radio stations, served thousands of other affiliate stations, beamed signals to a potential 
audience of more than 110 million people, and took in nearly half of all radio industry revenues 
in the United States.”104
USA Digital Radio engineers presented a paper at the 1996 NAB Radio Show outlining 
an “improved” in-band DAB system, which would theoretically provide “virtual CD-quality 
stereo audio” for FM broadcasters as well as capacity for ancillary datacasting; USADR’s 
improved AM system would deliver audio “quality comparable to present analog FM,” along 
with a trickle of datacasting overhead. USADR engineers predicted they would finish their 
simulations of the new system by 1997.105 Sometime in late 1996 or early 1997, Lucent and 
USADR discussed the idea of combining their efforts toward a single in-band DAB standard; the 
partnership sparked for 10 months but later died, due to USADR’s concerns about the influence 
of non-broadcast constituents on the DAB development process.106 
Telecommunications Act-related consolidation also spurred conglomerate broadcasters to 
upgrade the physical plants of their radio stations, so as to maximize their value in the event of 
future sale (a process later popularly recognized in the housing bubble as “flipping”), or as part 
of a “clustering” process where the operation of several radio stations was consolidated into a 
single location. This led to a surge in orders for analog AM and FM transmission plants, thus 
inadvertently pushing the short-term implications of DAB development aside, and signifying that 
the U.S. radio industry considered DAB to be a long-term issue economically. Enthusiasm for 
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any form of DAB, especially in small and medium-sized radio markets, was nearly nonexistent 
in the wake of the Telecom Act.107 Regardless, the largest players in the industry had begun to 
line up behind USADR; rhetoric expressed in the trade press hailed the move as an historic step 
forward in the progress of U.S. digital radio.108 This did not stop some, particularly in the 
consumer electronics industry, from imploring that study of Eureka 147 should be continued.109  
At an NAB-sponsored broadcast engineering conference in 1996, all eyes and ears were 
focused on the progress of in-band DAB research. Attendees generally agreed that the 
interference issues inherent to in-band DAB were “probably...solvable.” The NAB blamed 
pessimism about its chosen technology on “press coverage,” which did not exist outside of the 
trades. FCC staff held two meetings with members from the USADR and Lucent DAB 
development teams, as well as with NAB representatives. The agency’s sentiment expressed in 
the meetings favored an industry-sponsored DAB solution; proponents of an alternate-band DAB 
technology, such as Eureka 147, were greeted “somewhat skeptical[ly].” Even so, the mood 
among those gathered at the conference was certainly not united: ‘To me, [in-band DAB 
development involves] a lot of solutions looking for problems,” said Carlos Altgelt, a supervisor 
in the Automotive Components Division at the Ford Motor Company. Ford product design 
engineer Joseph Huk put the situation in stark terms: “The only [DAB system] that is going to 
succeed is the one that doesn’t cause interference and provides a better quality service.”110 
The summer and fall of 1996 were tortuous times for the proponents of an in-band digital 
radio solution. As the NRSC finalized its field-test preparations, a scuffle developed between the 
technology’s primary developers, USADR and Lucent. Each company provided some of the 
equipment to be used by the NRSC, and each company felt the terms under which the tests 
would be conducted left them at a disadvantage. This wrangling would delay field tests by at 
least two months.111 Further complicating matters, some of the stations in San Francisco that had 
originally volunteered to be guinea pigs for the NRSC had been sold following the passage of the 
Telecom Act, and the new owners wanted no part in the testing process.112 In a dramatic gesture, 
USADR pulled its DAB system from the NRSC’s analysis. This left only the Lucent and Eureka 
147 systems to be tested in San Francisco.113 Some commentators opined that the results would 
“simply yield a lot of data and no consensus on a U.S. DAB standard.”114
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NRSC field evaluation of the Lucent in-band FM DAB system commenced in July. Philip 
Kayne, a Radio World correspondent who rode along for a part of the test, was impressed by the 
automation and computerization of the data collection, as well as the methodology behind the 
process. Kayne gave the Lucent version of in-band DAB a thumbs-up: “I firmly believe that 
‘digital FM’ of this quality can become the broadcast standard of the future,” he reported.115 As 
the results of the tests were being compiled, Radio World scored an exclusive interview with 
NAB President Eddie Fritts. Fritts thought the fieldwork was useful for testing the concept of in-
band DAB, but strongly highlighted the fact that not all proponents had been tested. For this he 
squarely blamed the the consumer electronics industry, which in his view was still biased toward 
an alternate-band DAB solution and had, through its members on the NRSC, “controlled [the 
DAB exploration process] from day one.” Fritts then offered the NAB “as a secretariat to 
facilitate testing of in-band [DAB] in a fair and impartial, underlined, capitalized, manner.”116 
Given that many major NAB members were now investors in USA Digital Radio, Fritts’ 
commentary signaled a general industry intent to back the company as DAB’s leading proponent. 
Before the interview, the editors of Radio World had tentatively proposed that the U.S. 
radio industry “should begin to feel a little pressure to move forward on this technology,” given 
the global adoption rate of Eureka 147 at the time.117 Following the Fritts feature, the publication 
clamored for the broadcast industry to “step up and take control of the development of DAB 
testing for the United States....The focus of U.S. testing should be directed at finding an in-band 
system that fits the bill for U.S. radio....Receiver manufacturers will not ignore the U.S. 
consumer market; it is safe to say they will cater to it.”118 If necessary, the NAB should 
“commandeer the...testing process and ensure its fairness to all proponents involved.”119 Despite 
these calls to action, field-tests of the Lucent in-band FM DAB system had to be halted because 
the station involved in the evaluation had been sold and the new owners declined to continue the 
experiment.120 
Consumer electronics manufacturers crowed about the collapse of the field tests. CEMA 
president Gary Shapiro pronounced it a “failure of both system performance and real interest 
from broadcasters” and “calls into question the future of [in-band DAB].”121 Further salting the 
wound, Shapiro wrote a scathing commentary to Radio World in the parting month of 1996. “So, 
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they finally admitted it!,” he wrote. 
After accusing us of all sorts of sins, including bad testing and unfairness...By their own 
admission, the USADR system [has major interference issues]....These are the same 
findings shown by the EIA/NRSC lab tests...in1995....[CEMA] is owed a major apology. 
[CEMA] was painted as being one-sided by both USADR and [Radio World]. USADR 
consistently claimed its system worked fine and that our process was flawed. However, 
we committed to fair and impartial testing and that is what we provided. I won’t hold my 
breath waiting for the apology. Until USADR changes its management team and [Radio 
World] adds some healthy skepticism, I will doubt any of their future claims without 
further unbiased, third-party testing.
In an editor’s note, Radio World stood by its coverage.122 Within a year, all formal cooperation 
between CEMA and the NAB on the issue of digital radio, outside of the auspices of the NRSC, 
would dissolve. CEMA’s co-chair on the NRSC’s DAB Subcommittee was essentially reduced 
to a figurehead. CEMA would try one last time to influence debate in 1998 by taking the 
extraordinary step of independently and formally endorsing the Eureka 147 system for use in the 
United States: of all the protocols examined, “only the Eureka 147 DAB system offers the audio 
quality and signal robustness that listeners would expect...in all reception environments.” CEMA 
concluded that in-band DAB was “not feasible at this time due to deficient performance.” 
However, CEMA pledged to refrain from conducting official “advocacy of any system at the 
request of the broadcasters who said they needed more time to correct the flaws of the [in-band] 
system.”123 
By this point in the pre-policy dramaturgy, several of the character-constituencies and 
their perspectives on a digital future for radio broadcasting were now identifiable. Commercial 
and public broadcasters were the primary proponents of an in-band digital broadcast transition, 
with USA Digital Radio as the favored developer. The degree to which broadcasters supported 
the technology varied by the size of the company, most notably between larger USADR 
investors, who were perennial sources for trade-press boosterism, and smaller non-investors, who 
were not. Public broadcasters made a strategic decision early on in the DAB development 
process to support the wishes of their commercial counterparts, so as to secure themselves a seat 
at the table during the crafting of rules involving the use of digital radio. Independent 
broadcasters, primarily through the words of rank-and-file broadcast engineers, expressed a 
healthy skepticism about the viability of in-band DAB, though they were not yet as prevalent in 
the offstage dialogue as they would later become. Most importantly, any semblance of a unified 
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front among all industrial sectors involved in radio broadcasting had collapsed: consumer 
electronics manufacturers were strongly opposed to the development of an in-band digital radio 
system, and effectively stepped aside during the course of the decade to allow broadcasters to 
carry the burden of its development and proliferation alone. Although regulatory intervention 
could have been beneficial to moderate the intra-industry squabbles over the digital future of 
radio, the FCC was missing in action.
IV. Setting the Stage for DAB Policymaking
Proponents of an in-band DAB system spent 1997 attempting to make analog and digital 
radio signals peacefully coexist on the same spectrum. From the perspective of public 
broadcasters, the “daunting technical problems and a general lack of enthusiasm for the 
transition” hampered these efforts. Some proponents implored the FCC to take a more active role 
in the DAB development and testing process. According to Don Lockett, vice president of 
technology for National Public Radio, “Until there’s a mandated timetable, as in television, I 
don’t see that progress happening in radio.” USADR told the NAB it would have a workable in-
band DAB system ready for peer review within 18 months - sometime by mid- to late 1998. 
Milford Smith, vice president of engineering at USADR investor Greater Media, Inc. and 
chairman of the NRSC DAB Subcommittee, frankly described the situation as dire: he 
characterized USADR’s research as “a maximum effort and perhaps the final effort at trying to 
make this thing work.” The company, in his view, was “basically going back to the drawing 
board.” Lucent’s field demonstrations were not hot news; USADR’s continued failure to 
demonstrate a viable in-band DAB system was. 
Skip Pizzi, a technology manager for Microsoft with ties to public broadcasting - and 
who would later become a member of the NRSC and a regular Radio World commentator on 
DAB - viewed the work of USADR and Lucent as “kind of like a fairy tale, technologically 
speaking, but seductive from a business point of view.” However, he also warned the stakes were 
high. “It’s never a good idea to have a business concept in place before the technology can allow 
it,” said Pizzi. “There’s no Plan B in the United States.”124 In its budget request for 1997, the 
Corporation for Public Broadcasting asked for $22.5 million to ready its member-stations for an 
eventual DAB transition. The total subsidized cost of the transition was estimated to be $50 
million, and the figures were completely based around the notion of a workable in-band DAB 
57
solution. According to NPR’s Don Lockett, stations could expect to incur “upgrade” costs 
between $100,000 and $125,000 to broadcast a hybrid analog/digital signal - a figure five times 
the lowest cost-estimate first projected by Current in 1993. As for alternate-band DAB solutions, 
Lockett suggested that “radio may face a complex simulcast transition like TV - scrambling for 
frequencies and paying costs three times greater” than what an in-band DAB solution would 
offer: “Most people don't want to talk about this yet.”125 
Despite the falling-out between broadcasters and consumer electronics manufacturers, 
1998 was positioned to be a fruitful year in the development of digital radio. Both USADR and 
Lucent scientists expected to “conduct over-the-air field tests of their DAB systems by autumn. 
They’d like to see transmitter and receiver manufacturers begin the rollout process in 1999, 
followed by 10 to 15 years in which stations would...broadcast a hybrid [in-band DAB] system, 
compatible with both analog and digital receivers.”126 In February, emboldened by such 
optimism, the NRSC prepared to formally and comprehensively evaluate in-band DAB proposals 
alone.127 According to David Maxson, a member of the NRSC’s DAB Subcommittee who wrote 
the definitive engineering textbook on in-band DAB as it is presently constituted in the United 
States, the NRSC’s initial goals were simple and twofold: “[C]an [in-band DAB] be better than 
analog? The next question, if the answer to the first were yes, is what the impact of [DAB] on 
existing analog service; can they coexist?”128 These were the same questions raised by NRSC 
chairman Charles Morgan at an NAB engineering conference three years prior. They would now 
become the primary technical metrics on which all future NRSC action would be based. 
Although the NRSC declared it would only consider in-band DAB systems for future 
evaluation, the dearth of actual knowledge about either USADR’s or Lucent’s systems precluded 
it from developing test specifications.129 Instead the NRSC would “would tell [in-band DAB] 
proponents for what information that NRSC was looking, and, in a general way, how it should be 
accomplished.”130 This gave increased latitude to in-band DAB proponents to massage their data 
toward the objective of what seemed to be guaranteed NRSC endorsement. With leadership of 
the NRSC, and especially its DAB Subcommittee, firmly in the hands of people who worked for 
broadcasters invested in USADR, it was clear by this point that henceforth large broadcasters 
would be making the primary decisions behind the proliferation of DAB in the United States. 
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The FCC said nothing about this radical shift in the methodological objectives of the NRSC’s 
DAB testing protocol.
The rejuvenation of the NRSC’s DAB Subcommittee in 1998 spurred a flurry of new 
activity within the development sphere. A new competitor in the race to make in-band DAB 
work appeared on the scene. Digital Radio Express (DRE) announced it would have its own 
“prototype” of an FM in-band DAB system available for examination by midyear. According to 
Radio World, DRE’s cofounder, Derek Kumar, was once a subcontractor involved in USADR’s 
preliminary DAB research. USADR subsequently scrapped his designs after its 1996 
reorganization, and Kumar continued to work on DAB independently.131 In initial meetings with 
the NRSC, DRE’s technology did not impress, though Committee members said they were open 
to any in-band DAB technology which demonstrated a semblance of viability. Partially in 
response to the debut of DRE, USADR and Lucent resumed joint development work on an audio 
encoding algorithm for use with their systems.132 At the time, the NAB’s director of advanced 
engineering, David Layer, characterized the NRSC’s goal as simply to “evaluate [DAB] 
technology and determine whether it’s viable or not.”133 Though this fundamental question had 
yet to be answered, the NRSC hoped that it could complete field-testing of all in-band DAB 
competitors by the end of the year with “the beginning of industry rollout by summer of 1999.”134 
FCC approval of any in-band DAB system, it would seem, was already a foregone conclusion, 
despite the technical challenges it still faced.
As further details about the functionality of an in-band DAB system began to emerge, 
more rank-and-file broadcast engineers began to question the actual potential of the technology. 
Mike Worrall, the assistant chief engineer for a cluster of stations in Los Angeles, was not 
impressed with the projected audio quality of in-band digital broadcasts; he predicted that digital 
radio would sound worse than analog. “[W]hy are we as an industry willing to consider a 
universal transmission standard that is completely and totally dependent on audio bit-rate 
reduction?”, he asked in Radio World. “Why is [DAB] seen as such a necessary development for 
terrestrial broadcasting...if the audio quality by definition will be compromised?...I’m beginning 
to sense that the emperor has no clothes.”135 E. Glynn Walden, the director of Engineering for 
CBS Radio and a man whose involvement with in-band DAB dated back to Project Acorn (later 
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described by Radio World as a “cofounder” of USADR), responded within one publication cycle 
to ameliorate Worrall’s suspicions. According to Walden, USADR and Lucent’s digital audio 
encoding algorithms were more sophisticated than garden-variety techniques such as MP3 
compression; their technology used “perceptual audio coding” which could provide “digital CD 
quality within the broadcast channel.” Walden further claimed that USADR had already 
performed a battery of listening tests involving its encoding algorithm, which purportedly 
“demonstrated that trained listeners cannot identify which source is the CD and which is [in-band 
DAB]....[it] delivers on quality - quality that is perceptually identical to that of a CD.”136 
Walden’s portrayal of USADR’s developmental strides was buttressed by two informal 
technical articles in Radio World by USADR subcontractors. According to them, “The [in-band 
DAB] approach...meets the needs of regulatory agencies because there is no need to allocate 
scarce spectral resources for DAB. Also, the process of analyzing station-to-station interference 
scenarios is not needed because DAB is designed to operate properly with the current allocation 
scheme.”137 Although this did not comport with what was already known about in-band DAB 
functionality, the FCC declined comment on these claims.138
In March of 1998, Radio World sat down with Walden for an interview about USADR’s 
developmental work. He began by advancing the dominant operative metaphor behind radio’s 
digitalization: “The world is going digital. We are going to make (DAB) optimized for 
broadcasting and for our listeners. If we don’t do that, we have nothing. We’re going to be in 
business for a long time. We have to train people to convert radio stations to digital. We have 10 
years of implementation issues.” In the next breath, Walden predicted in-band DAB stations 
would be on the air within a year, with receivers available to the public by the 2000, and that 
there would be “nothing analog” left on the air by then.139 He also revealed more detail about 
collaboration between USADR and Lucent; it suggested that the two companies were discussing 
the merger of their development efforts.140 
The following month, Radio World anticipated that “advances in [DAB] research and the 
pending launch of satellites to provide direct digital radio to U.S. listeners” would speed the 
momentum of DAB implementation, most likely within the next 18 months.141 Later that April, at 
the NAB’s annual convention in Las Vegas, proprietors of USADR and DRE debated the merits 
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of their DAB systems in front of interested broadcasters. USADR positioned itself as the front-
runner in the race to develop a workable in-band DAB technology; it announced that field-testing 
of its AM and FM systems would commence “during the first quarter of 1999” on 16 stations.142 
Shortly following the NAB convention, Lucent Technologies created a subsidiary, Lucent 
Digital Radio, to move its DAB development process forward. LDR’s president, Suren Pai, 
would not say how much investment capital the subsidiary had been seeded with, other than that 
it was “substantial.” In the mind of its parent company, LDR had developed a significant amount 
of intellectual property that was critical to the basic functionality of in-band DAB; consolidating 
this effort under a single structure was expected to increase the net value of its research. Pai also 
announced that Lucent was “walking away from” collaboration with USADR to develop a 
system that does “not use technology that it [LDR] does not currently own.”143 This included the 
audio encoding algorithm that Lucent had developed, which USADR had already announced it 
would use in its own DAB system. Lucent would now keep the codec for itself, and USADR 
would have to develop an alternate algorithm, unless it desired to license Lucent’s.144 
With the benefit of hindsight, the creation of Lucent Digital Radio had multiple missions. 
Lucent attempted to corner the market on important components of in-band DAB technology; if 
LDR could not “win” the overall development race, at least it could force USADR to share the 
wealth by controlling intellectual property necessary for the system’s functionality. Relatedly, by 
taking its expertise in digital audio compression methods away from USADR, LDR forced its 
competitor to reallocate developmental resources, presumably in a move designed to slow down 
USADR’s research and give LDR a chance to design a fully integrated AM and FM in-band 
DAB system. Pai also predicted that LDR DAB-enabled stations would be on the air within 18 
months.145  
The disentanglement of USADR and LDR’s joint research introduced complications into 
the testing and verification of in-band DAB’s usefulness. Furthermore, the Digital Radio Express 
DAB system was too new to form any realistic impressions about. Most importantly, opined 
Radio World, nobody had yet directly answered a fundamental question on the minds of many 
broadcasters: can an in-band DAB signal provide better quality than legacy analog service 
without harming it?146 
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During the summer of 1998, each DAB proprietor jockeyed within the trade press for the 
position of perceived forerunner in the development race. USA Digital Radio unveiled expanded 
research and development facilities in Columbia, Maryland and announced it had commenced 
limited field tests of its FM DAB system. It expected its technology would hit the market by 
2000 and the digital radio transition to be completed within 10 years.147 Digital Radio Express 
reported that it had a volunteer station on which to field-test its system, and an experimental 
license from the FCC for the work had already been acquired.148 By September of 1998, USADR 
and DRE reported the completion of limited field tests of its systems, while LDR claimed to be 
not far behind. Meanwhile, the NRSC announced it hoped to have a package of in-band DAB 
testing guidelines drafted and ready for industry comment by October. 
For their part, FCC staff said they would expedite the processing of applications for 
experimental authorization to conduct hybrid analog/digital broadcast tests, but otherwise would 
passively observe the NRSC evaluation.149 Radio World reported that broadcasters would have 
welcomed the FCC’s more proactive involvement at this stage: according to members of the 
NRSC’s DAB Subcommittee, there was difficulty in settling on DAB test criteria as all three 
proponents kept significant technical details of their systems “close-to-the-vest.” According to 
the NAB’s David Layer, “As an engineer, I find it hard to get satisfaction from the proponents in 
terms of what they’re doing. But I’m just going to have to deal with that, because from a 
business standpoint, they’re doing the right thing.” Due to this complication, the NRSC had 
already agreed to farm out the actual implementation of its testing criteria to third-party 
laboratories; Layer said this move was inevitable because “Frankly, if the committee’s work is 
going to be accepted, the committee needs to be able to say more than, ‘The proponents handed 
us this data and we looked it over.’”150 Radio World later reported that in-band DAB proponents 
were willing to bypass the NRSC at this stage and submit their designs directly to the FCC for 
review if necessary, so long as the NRSC’s drafting of a testing protocol remained 
“painstakingly slow.” Both USADR and Lucent expected that FCC consideration of in-band 
DAB would occur within 12 to 24 months.151 The FCC made no comment on these overtures nor 
expressed any interest in deeper engagement with the NRSC testing process.
By the fall of 1998, the business model of in-band DAB proponents had become clear. 
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Lucent Digital Radio had already hinted that its corporate mission was to fast-track proprietary 
applications to market, but not necessarily manufacture them. Similarly, USA Digital Radio and 
Digital Radio Express announced they had no plans to actually build their systems, but would 
instead license their technology to transmitter and receiver manufacturers for construction. 
USADR’s Robert Struble was the most explicit about the race to develop in-band DAB being 
one not of technological progress, but of intellectual property: “We will provide technology to 
[equipment manufacturers] and then receive a license and stream off them. So the business 
model is actually real attractive. We don’t have to build the plants, we don’t have to hire millions 
of people to go do this stuff. We just need to make sure the technology works...and then go out 
and strike some deals with these folks.”152 
Given that all three companies were more explicit about their intended business models 
than the actual feasibility of their technologies, broadcasters openly wondered just what the 
potential of digital radio might actually be. An important point of consensus first articulated in 
1995 now crystallized: the expectations of an in-band DAB system were to be set low. At this 
stage, the NRSC’s primary metric for determining any system’s viability would simply be that it 
demonstrate better performance than analog radio; questions of DAB’s detrimental effects to 
analog signals and extended applications of digital radio spectrum were pushed to the back 
burner. Public radio engineers endorsed this metric at their annual 1998 conference, where 
attendees agreed that any DAB system “must be significantly better than current analog radio 
service in order to have any chance to gain traction in the marketplace.” The NAB’s Radio Board 
subsequently approved a similar resolution.153 In the main, 1998 provided more news about the 
progress of corporate maneuvering between in-band DAB’s proponents than about the 
developmental progress of the technology itself. Industry observers were left with a sense of 
optimism, tinged with a feeling of caution; they knew digital radio was in the works, but 
remained uninformed about its practical application.
USA Digital Radio would force the development issue on October 7, 1998, when it filed 
a Petition for Rulemaking with the FCC, asking the agency to begin the certification process for 
its in-band DAB technology. USADR president Bob Struble said the filing was prompted in part 
by conversations with equipment manufacturers and was designed to inspire enthusiasm among 
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them by demonstrating a modicum of regulatory engagement with the issue of digital radio. 
Simultaneously, USADR tendered several filings with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
covering terminologies to describe in-band DAB that it claimed to have invented. USADR 
predicted the FCC would take 18 to 24 months to act on its Petition. Meanwhile, the NRSC had 
still not yet formalized the terms under which it would evaluate the three in-band DAB 
contenders.154 Unsurprisingly, USADR’s competitors were critical of the FCC filing. Lucent 
Digital Radio was utterly dismissive; Digital Radio Express called the filing “premature.” DRE 
founder Derek Kumar said the filing “in effect, circumvented input from representatives of 
interested parties taking part [in the NRSC process],” and he threatened lawsuits if USADR 
received the patents and trademarks it desired.155 
Radio World deemed the Petition a mixed blessing. Although it would focus industry 
attention firmly around an in-band DAB solution, the fact that the technology’s proprietors were 
not working collaboratively - and one of them had circumvented the NRSC by taking the issue of 
in-band DAB approval directly to the FCC - hinted at a bumpy road ahead for the creation of a 
single, nationwide DAB standard. The publication asked all three proprietors about the 
possibility of future collaboration; their responses were characterized as “lukewarm.”156 This 
prompted Radio World’s editor, Paul McLane, to pen a provocative commentary pleading with 
the FCC to take a more proactive role in the DAB development process.
We have talked seriously about DAB for eight years or so, and the process has seen 
numerous setbacks and detours....USADR clearly wants to assert ‘ownership’ of the [in-
band] DAB issue....The challenges for USADR now are to justify the content of its filing, 
to show that it has not circumvented the NRSC process, to show fellow broadcasters that 
the plans of this CBS-backed enterprise are consistent with the goals of all radio owners. 
And, of course, to show that the USADR system actually works....The people who run 
Lucent know that they could be seen as outsiders, an extension of the phone 
company....Among their challenges now is to demonstrate that their commitment is 
real...that they understand the financial and technical needs of broadcasters. And, 
of course, that the Lucent system actually works....The challenges for DRE are to 
communicate its goals to the industry, to demonstrate that it has the financial resources to 
see this project through over the next several years, to dispel its image of a minor player. 
And, of course, to show that the DRE system really works.157
The implicit suggestion made by McLane was that the FCC work with in-band DAB proponents 
to foster collaboration, instead of letting the marketplace develop separate DAB standards which 
might be implemented at the discretion of any given station. Such an outcome could balkanize 
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the adoption of DAB technology, dooming it in a manner similar to the adoption of multiple 
analog AM stereo standards in the 1980s. He noted that FCC intervention was required to force a 
“grand alliance” between DTV technology developers, which ultimately led to industry 
consensus behind a single DTV standard. While this did not seem in the offing with regard to 
DAB, McLane suggested that it was critical to radio’s digital transition. The FCC remained silent 
on the salient points of McLane’s commentary.
USADR’s Petition for Rulemaking is more important as a marker of where in-band DAB 
developers stood relative to each other than as a status report on the actual feasibility of the 
technology. Filing a Petition for Rulemaking does not guarantee FCC regulatory action on an 
issue; indeed, given the agency’s passivity during the formative years of the digital radio debate, 
and coupled with a dearth of substantive technical data on the feasibility of any in-band DAB 
system, there was ample room for regulators to intervene beyond simply starting a policy 
discussion on the issue. The FCC ignored or declined several opportunities to involve itself in 
DAB development, and by accepting USADR’s Petition for Rulemaking in the absence of strong 
technical rationales, the agency effectively signaled that it would go along with whatever digital 
broadcast solution the radio industry would come up with, irrespective of its detrimental effects 
on analog radio service or the realistic potential of DAB itself. 
Had the FCC expressed concerns with the checkered record of digital radio development 
during the 1990s, it could have conceivably altered the trajectory of digital radio’s promulgation 
away from the underdeveloped and questionable points of advocacy proffered by in-band DAB 
proponents and toward the development of a digital radio service that offered tangibly 
meaningful improvements to the broadcast status quo. However, the FCC’s increasingly 
institutional orientation toward economic metrics as the primary rationale for policymaking, 
especially in the wake of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, made such a course of action 
apparently politically infeasible. At the very least, the FCC’s acquiescence allowing market 
actors to proceed with the promulgation of a technology they did not fully understand represents 
a significant abdication of regulatory responsibility with regard to the agency’s trustee-function 
involving the integrity of the public airwaves.
With the FCC on the sidelines, the National Radio Systems Committee’s DAB 
Subcommittee became the forum-of-choice for the technical vetting of any DAB system, and 
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over time key positions within the NRSC were assumed by broadcasters with direct ties to USA 
Digital Radio. However, USADR apparently felt the strategic need to position itself as a front-
runner in the DAB development race before the NRSC’s evaluation of competing systems had 
even begun. In retrospect, USADR’s Petition can be seen as insurance that formalized 
consideration of DAB would continue even if the NRSC’s own evaluative mechanisms broke 
down as they did in 1996. This fear was real: as a supposedly collaborative effort between those 
involved in the transmission and reception of radio, the NRSC’s decision to support a technology 
not endorsed by consumer electronics manufacturers had strong political fallout during the 
1990s. CEMA’s parting shot in 1998, endorsing the out-of-band Eureka 147 DAB system after 
nearly a decade of broadcast industry-backed development on a different track, effectively 
signified the end of goodwill between receiver-makers and broadcasters over the DAB issue. 
While CEMA representatives (and those of its member-companies) would continue to take part 
in NRSC proceedings, the direction of the DAB Subcommittee’s work would now effectively be 
controlled by the broadcasters on board. The effects of this early rift between broadcasters and 
consumer electronics manufacturers would take years to manifest themselves, and not to the 
benefit of anyone.
Perhaps most importantly, the fact that USADR felt it had enough political and economic 
momentum behind its in-band DAB technology to ask the FCC for endorsement of its system is 
itself an important indicator of USADR’s perceived position in the DAB development sphere. 
Not only had it corralled the majority of material and rhetorical support from post-1996 radio 
conglomerates, but the U.S. public radio system played an important role in facilitating 
USADR’s DAB explorations; it provided all of the station-platforms on which the technology 
was initially demonstrated and declared early on in the decade that public radio would not be 
shunted aside by commercial radio concerns as it was when analog spectrum was first allocated 
more than 80 years ago.158 Although National Public Radio and the Corporation for Public 
Broadcasting also did not fully understand the technical implications of an in-band DAB system, 
leadership at these organizations made the strategic decision to align themselves with the will of 
the commercial radio industry, and ultimately with USADR.
The fact that DAB policy discussion began on flimsy technical grounds is no accident. As 
the 1990s demonstrated, the initial development of an in-band digital radio system was plagued 
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with problems. The primary challenge was to develop a mechanism by which analog and digital 
signals could coexist on the same spectrum: the early record of laboratory and field testing 
simply did not justify the inherent viability of in-band DAB technology. In fact, the move by 
USA Digital Radio to jump-start a policy discussion on DAB even before any in-band 
technology had been proven to even be marginally functional should have raised alarm in some 
quarters of the constituencies involved in the DAB development process, and especially among 
regulators. Indeed, independent broadcasters openly questioned the viability of any in-band DAB 
system and were unimpressed by the stated goal of adopting a technology that only provided a 
level of service “better than analog.” Unfortunately, these concerns were swept aside by in-band 
DAB proponents, aided by a trade press which reinforced notions that DAB was inevitable and 
early critics of the technology were uninformed or sought to interfere with “progress.”
Consolidation within the radio industry, fomented by the Telecommunications Act of 
1996, shifted a large segment of its economic power behind a single in-band DAB proponent; the 
combined might of USA Digital Radio’s supporters was ultimately justification enough to 
effectively preclude all but its protocol as the digital future of domestic radio broadcasting. This 
occurred before the FCC even became actively involved in the issue and was exacerbated by 
regulators’ unwillingness to influence the developmental process prior to the start of the policy 
discussion. Consensus among those anointed as “players” in the DAB debate ultimately revolved 
around an inarticulate sense of urgency, sparked by the creation of a satellite digital radio 
service, that all radio must go digital, and that an in-band solution was the only economically 
feasible and least disruptive way of making that transition. As Chapter 3 will illustrate, placing 
faith in the future policy of U.S. digital radio on what was still essentially a concept technology 
at the time would lead to potentially dangerous consequences for the future of both analog and 
digital broadcasting.
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Chapter 3: The Fundamental Detriments of IBOC-DAB
According to the National Radio Systems Committee, a successful digital audio broadcast 
technology is one which provides “a significant improvement over the analog systems currently 
in use.”1 To understand the chosen U.S. DAB system’s inherent inability to achieve this goal 
requires an overview of its fundamental detriments. This chapter is not designed to be a thorough 
deconstruction of the U.S. DAB protocol, but rather to highlight significant and unresolved 
problems with the technology which make it difficult - if not impossible - to employ on a 
nationwide basis, and to provide background for the salient points of controversy which occur in 
the following chapters. The specific metrics by which U.S. DAB technology is judged - the use 
of “no new spectrum” and a quality of broadcast considered to be “better than analog” - are 
difficult to meet with the country’s chosen protocol, due to its invasive spectral occupancy and 
lack of meaningful bandwidth capacity. Coupled with the technology’s wholly proprietary 
nature, U.S. DAB technology faces several major hurdles to successful implementation.
I. Spectral Occupancy
In Chapter 2, two general categories of digital radio broadcast technologies were referred 
to, for the sake of simplicity, as “in-band” and “alternate-band” DAB. The United States has 
chosen an in-band digital audio broadcast protocol called “In-Band-On-Channel,” or IBOC 
DAB. “IBOC” implies that analog and digital audio signals peacefully reside on the same swath 
of spectrum. This is untrue.
As shown in Figure 3.1, an IBOC hybrid analog/digital FM signal appropriates new 
spectrum to broadcast the digital portion of the transmission. The triangle represents an FM 
station’s analog signal; the squares on either side represent the digital “sidebands” of the IBOC 
signal. An “extended hybrid” mode allows stations to widen their digital sidebands toward the 
center of their analog signal, sacrificing some analog quality for more digital capacity if desired.2  
Traditionally, the FCC has allowed analog FM stations to occupy up to 200 kilohertz (KHz) of 
spectrum; hence the FM dial is divided into channels that are 200 KHz wide. However, figure 
3.1 clearly shows that a hybrid analog/digital IBOC FM signal actually occupies nearly 400 KHz 
of spectrum. These digital sidebands are redundant (i.e., they carry duplicate information) in case 
one of them is interfered with by an adjacent channel signal, since the sidebands technically 
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reside on the adjacent channels of its analog FM host.3 
If the FCC’s FM allocation rules require a spacing between stations of at least 200 KHz, 
and an FM-IBOC hybrid analog/digital signal occupies twice that space, how is IBOC allocation 
even permissible under current broadcast rules? Looking again at Figure 3.1, the entire FM-
IBOC waveform is outlined by what is described as the “FCC FM Mask.” Historically, the FCC 
has maintained emission masks for analog transmissions;4 these rules were originally 
implemented to protect stations from potentially interfering transmissions by their neighbors on 
the dial. For example, sometimes a transmitter malfunctions, and this can cause off-frequency 
emissions to occur. Or a station may overmodulate its signal, thereby “splattering” its 
transmission onto adjacent frequencies. The FCC’s spectral mask is designed to prohibit such 
transmissions and, if they do occur, to minimize their harm to neighboring radio stations.
Proponents of IBOC have cleverly appropriated the spectrum covered by the FCC’s 
emission mask around each station as the station’s own.5 While it is true that IBOC digital 
sidebands do fall within the mask, this is an abuse of the rule’s original intent. In simple terms, 
the FCC’s spectral mask was designed to provide a “guard band” of fallow spectrum between 
stations to protect against spurious and transient emissions - not to be utilized as spectrum 
intended for the continuous transmission of energy. Where once the outer edges of the mask 
were left empty to accommodate any rogue or unintended transmissions, IBOC employs this 
guard-band in order to function. Although IBOC emissions may “conform” to the limits of the 
emissions mask, they do so in a spirit wholly unintended by the FCC’s original rulemaking - a 
fact seemingly lost on the FCC itself.6  In fact, the NRSC had to convince the FCC to expand its 
spectral mask rules in order to accommodate FM-IBOC hybrid signals, otherwise some of the 
“spurious noise” generated by the system would be legally unallowable.7 
David Maxson has gone so far as to redefine what a radio “channel” is to justify the 
deployment of IBOC: “[T]he concept of a ‘channel’ as an immutable protective boundary is 
mistaken, because the channel is a more complex concept than simply a fixed bandwidth 
reserved for the exclusive use of one transmission.”8 These rhetorical gymnastics are necessary 
to redefine decades of spectral allocation policy in order to implement a digital radio technology 
which has the potential to interfere with not only its analog host, but adjacent stations as well, 
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even though “the rules for station allotment and spectral occupancy still anticipate substantial 
out-of-band emissions.”9 However, the notion that IBOC appropriates new spectrum on which to 
function is made clear by looking at the all-digital FM broadcast mode, illustrated in Figure 3.2. 
IBOC’s all-digital spectral footprint is an aggregate 396.8 KHz10  - double that of an analog FM 
station’s footprint - and the power of the digital sidebands are raised to protect a station’s core 
digital capacity. This implies that, once a station commences IBOC transmissions in hybrid 
(analog/digital) mode, it will use this newly-utilized spectrum in perpetuity. This has caused 
many engineers, including NPR’s point-man on DAB, Mike Starling, to urge the redefinition of 
U.S. DAB technology as “in-band-adjacent-channel,” or “IBAC,” since that is what it actually 
represents.11 However, doing so would tacitly acknowledge that the domestic digital radio system 
requires more spectrum to work than what is currently allowed under analog broadcast allocation 
rules. By appropriating all useable spectrum under the FCC mask, incumbent broadcasters 
effectively double their footprints on the dial.
The digital portion of an FM-IBOC station’s signal cannot replicate the full coverage area 
of its analog counterpart, given that the digital sidebands are broadcast, at most, at a power level 
equivalent to just 10% of the analog transmission; thus, while a hybrid digital FM signal is likely 
to provide coverage to a portion of an FM station's service area, it cannot cover its entire analog 
broadcast footprint.12 According to IBOC’s proprietors, the technology “cannot overcome the 
strong interference that exists beyond the edge of coverage, nor was it designed to.”13 NPR field 
tests could not conclusively predict the coverage area of an FM-IBOC signal, calling predicted 
digital coverage of any given FM station a “hypothes[i]s until tested.”14 Penetration of FM-IBOC 
signals in buildings is extremely poor and, in come cases, described as “impossible.”15 NPR 
found that the digital portion of an FM-IBOC transmission has an indoor signal penetration 
potential of less than half its analog counterpart. According to NPR, “Resurgence in the use of 
outdoor antennas could be promoted” to address this problem, but that would be “an unlikely 
candidate to significantly affect user patterns.”16 This especially worries public broadcasters, as 
half of an average public radio station’s revenue is based on listener contributions, and any 
broadcast technology which degrades a station’s coverage area represents a threat to their fiscal 
health.17 
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Furthermore, the danger of self-interference exists between the analog and digital 
portions of an FM-IBOC radio signal, especially in the extended hybrid broadcast mode. 
Considering that the digital sidebands overlap the edges of a station’s analog signal, there is the 
potential for digital data to leak through the filters of analog radio receivers and cause audible 
interference to analog FM radio broadcasts. This interference sounds like “white noise” on 
analog receivers. Essentially, extended hybrid FM-IBOC transmissions not only appropriate new 
spectrum on which to broadcast the requisite digital sidebands, but sacrifice analog bandwidth in 
order to increase the signal’s digital capacity. There is no concrete way to prevent the increased 
likelihood of self-interference between the analog and digital portions of any given FM radio 
station. The extended hybrid mode of FM-IBOC was never thoroughly evaluated by the NRSC.18
IBOC’s proprietors have developed a workaround to the problem of diminished digital 
coverage area. When a digital signal begins to degrade, an IBOC receiver “gracefully” blends to 
to the analog signal of the same station, thereby avoiding the “cliff effect” quite common to other 
digital audio platforms.19 Proponents of the technology qualify the blend-to-analog function as a 
mechanism to guarantee that an “IBOC signal can never be worse than, and is usually much 
better than, the performance afforded by existing analog service.”20 They also assert that the 
audio quality of a digital radio signal is significantly better than its analog counterpart; however, 
given the paucity of bandwidth allocated to the transmission of digital sidebands, and their 
fractional power relative to analog transmissions, this is a debatable assertion.
IBOC advocates admit that FM analog-to-digital and digital-to-digital interference is a 
real concern.21 According to an unnamed broadcast transmission equipment vendor quoted in 
Radio World, the question of IBOC’s interference potential cannot be answered “until some 
stations go digital” - in other words, until the technology is applied in the real world.22 There are 
various ways by which interference may occur in an IBOC environment, in addition to the basic 
insertion of new RF energy into already-crowded broadcast spectrum. One involves the 
phenomenon of “spectral regrowth,” which occurs when analog and digital FM signals combine 
in such a way as to generate harmonics that can affect both the host analog signal and stations on 
first-adjacent channels to the interfering broadcaster.23 Another is digital-to-digital 
intermodulation, which can affect the reception of stations on the FM dial that are located two to 
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three channels away from an IBOC-enabled broadcaster.24 Figure 3.3 represents how two FM 
stations, both operating with IBOC sidebands, might cause destructive interference to each other. 
Not only do portions of their analog signals overlap, but the digital sidebands associated with 
both stations directly impinge upon the analog transmissions of each other. Sideband redundancy 
helps little in situations like these, considering that a station’s analog signal is the “fallback” 
when reception conditions make the digital signal unlistenable. Additionally, while IBOC 
proprietors claim there is little interference potential between FM stations located at least two 
channels apart, as evidenced by Figure 3.4, the effects of intermodulation and spectral regrowth 
belie the impression that such interference is impossible.
Consulting engineer Michael Couzens claims this digital allocation framework will create 
significant problems for low-power FM (LPFM) stations, which may only broadcast at an analog 
power level of 100 watts or less. To put this in perspective, the University of Illinois’ public 
radio station, WILL-FM, operates at an effective radiated analog power of 100,000 watts. WILL 
also runs an IBOC signal, which gives it the ability to place 10,000-watt digital sidebands on the 
adjacent channels of its analog signal, located at 90.9 MHz. Were WRFU-LP, the Urbana-
Champaign Independent Media Center’s LPFM station, located adjacent or nearly adjacent to 
90.9 (which, fortunately, it is not), would its 100-watt analog signal stand a chance against a 
digital sideband transmission 100 times more powerful? The question of IBOC’s destructiveness 
to LPFM stations is a hotly-debated issue and, to this point, inconclusively answered.25 Listeners 
do not understand the nature of the interference caused by FM-IBOC digital sidebands and 
therefore may believe there is something wrong with their receivers, when the problem is 
actually due to the imposition of new RF energy on the radio broadcast spectrum.26 
Generating an FM-IBOC waveform is no easy task. It turns out that getting analog and 
digital radio signals to coexist takes a lot of effort.27 To combine the analog and digital portions 
of an FM radio signal, a transmitter requires approximately 35% more power, and operates at a 
20% reduction in efficiency.28 One broadcast engineer noted that stations will probably need to 
feed ten times the power into their IBOC-compatible transmitters in order to generate the 
necessary hybrid analog/digital output; the rest of that power will dissipate as heat, increasing the 
electrical and cooling requirements of all broadcast transmission facilities that employ the 
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technology.29 A mechanism of transmitting the digital sidebands separately from an analog FM 
signal has been tested and approved by the FCC, but this does not significantly reduce the 
chances of analog-to-digital or digital-to-digital interference, and may increase the potential for 
self-interference.
Finally, there is no “average” cost associated with adding IBOC functionality to an FM 
radio station; the price of the “upgrade” will vary depending on the age and existing condition of 
its transmitter plant, as well as the effective radiated power at which the station is licensed to 
broadcast.30 In the long run, larger stations will pay more to broadcast in IBOC than smaller 
stations.31 Once the feat is accomplished, the only way to verify that the analog and digital 
signals have combined successfully is to view the IBOC waveform on a spectrum analyzer.32 
On the AM side of IBOC technology, the potential for interference is much worse. 
According to David Maxson, the basic nature of the FCC’s analog AM station allocation rules 
exacerbates this situation: “If we knew a half-century ago what we know now, things might have 
been different, but it is obviously far too late to make wholesale changes to the station 
assignment scheme, and the laws of physics are quite immutable.”33 In simple terms, “Every 
digital communication system is a trade off between data throughput and robustness against 
channel impairments.”34 
While an FM station is allocated 200 KHz per channel, an AM station must get by with 
just 5% - or 10 KHz - per channel. As is the case with FM-IBOC, AM-IBOC appropriates the 
FCC’s emissions mask on which to place digital information. Indeed, one of IBOC’s early 
developers explained the technology as “an expansion of the use of the AM band.”35 As shown in 
Figure 3.5, whereas an analog AM station uses just 10 KHz of spectrum, an AM-IBOC hybrid 
analog/digital signal triples that footprint. Furthermore, the sidebands AM-IBOC signals are not 
uniform emissions; each are subdivided into dozens of “subcarriers.” In order to work around the 
limits of the FCC’s AM emissions mask, the NRSC and IBOC’s proponents calculate the overall 
power density of AM digital sidebands by measuring one subcarrier and using that as a reference 
point to infer the overall power of the entire sideband. As at least one broadcast engineer has 
pointed out, this evaluation is technically disingenuous.36 
Unlike hybrid FM-IBOC signals, AM-IBOC transmissions actually place digital data 
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directly underneath the analog signal.37 To accommodate the underlying data, the analog signal 
must be transmitted monophonically; thus a portion of spectrum devoted to analog AM 
broadcasting is preemptively appropriated, to the detriment of existing analog service quality.38 
Although this design was justified as nondestructive given the weak channel-sensitivity of cheap, 
modern AM radios,39 listeners may still notice the underlying digital transmission as a “hiss” on 
their receivers and, as in the case of FM-IBOC interference, will not understand the source of the 
noise. If and when AM stations go all-digital, as shown in Figure 3.6, their spectral footprints 
will actually decrease - but will remain double the width of existing analog channels.40 
The analog/digital hybrid mode of AM-IBOC carries with it a plethora of interference 
concerns. Whereas the problems with FM-IBOC are many, they pale in comparison to the 
propagation characteristics inherent to the AM band. AM signals travel in two ways - through the 
ground (these are called “groundwave” signals, and they are the signals you pick up from your 
local AM station), and through the sky (these are called “skywave” signals, and are most notable 
at night, when AM signals bounce off the ionosphere to cover great distances). According to 
system developers, AM-IBOC was developed to accommodate groundwave coverage only, so 
problems that exist between stations whose skywave signals interfere is ironically not considered 
a problem at all. Figure 3.7 illustrates how AM-IBOC stations on adjacent channels to each other 
easily overlap their transmissions. At night, due to the increased range of many high-power AM 
stations, the potential for interference grows from a local to a regional or national phenomenon. 
Since hybrid AM-IBOC stations triple the spectral footprint of any station, the potential for 
interference to second-adjacent channels, as illustrated in Figure 3.8, is also very real, and can be 
similarly destructive over large areas at night. As with FM-IBOC, the intermodulation of AM-
IBOC signals can cause interference up to three channels from the offending station.41 
Thus, AM-IBOC transmissions can cause interference to both the groundwave and 
skywave signals of AM radio stations.42 A conservatively projective statistical analysis of IBOC 
interference problems on the AM band found that approximately two-thirds of those stations 
currently licensed to operate at night could most likely do so in a hybrid analog/digital mode 
without serious problems; most of the rest would have to modify their broadcast power and 
directionalize their signal patterns to avoid or mitigate digitally-induced interference. Ninety-five 
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AM stations currently authorized to operate at night - about three percent of the total number of 
licensed AM stations in the U.S. - might have to cease broadcasting due to unresolvable IBOC-
related interference.43 
Further complications to the successful deployment of AM-IBOC technology involve the 
intricacies of AM broadcast antenna systems. Unlike FM stations, which place antenna 
componentry on a single mast or tower, AM stations use arrays of antenna towers and wires 
buried in the ground (called “radials,” which extend from each tower) to transmit their signals. 
As a result, the U.S. AM radio station allocation scheme is much more complicated than its FM 
counterpart. Due to the skywave propagation characteristics of AM broadcasting, some stations 
must reduce power after sunset or leave the air entirely; others must directionalize their radiation 
patterns so as to protect stations in other locales. Applying IBOC technology to such complicated 
antenna systems, which vary greatly from station to station, opens up new problems with regard 
to the compatibility of IBOC on the AM band. Because the primary digital sidebands of hybrid 
AM IBOC signals are deliberately placed at the edges of the station’s spectral footprint, it makes 
them highly susceptible to corruption by antenna system design issues.44 In order to accommodate 
an IBOC signal, many AM stations may have to completely redesign and rebuild their antenna 
arrays, introducing a hidden cost to IBOC which has not yet been fully quantified.45 Station-to-
station AM-IBOC interference manifests itself as a “bacon-frying effect” on analog radios and, 
in all other cases of IBOC-related interference, is not likely to be noticed by listeners for what it 
really is.46   
The basic prevailing industry view is that while IBOC DAB may have its drawbacks, its 
potential “improvements” to the radio broadcasting experience are worth making “compromises” 
for.47 Although the laboratory-science behind the technology asserts there will be no significant 
problems, limited field-testing, combined with the proliferation of stations now implementing the 
IBOC protocol, does not seem to justify such dismissiveness. Even though the ultimate benefits 
of IBOC may arrive when all stations go completely digital, there is no mandated timetable to do 
so, and while the potential destructiveness of the hybrid IBOC system is acknowledged, there are 
many in the industry content to leave these issues unresolved.48 As consulting engineer Doug 
Vernier, who worked closely with NPR on IBOC development issues, concludes, “The scale of 
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IBOC interference on analog coverage is unknown,” and such interference is most likely to 
manifest itself in situations where there are “short-spaced stations, overpower grandfathered 
stations, stations that have contour overlap despite meeting minimum spacing requirements, dual 
antenna installations, and ‘grungy’ installations.”49 Introducing a new digital broadcast service in 
ignorance of its potential destructiveness to existing analog services, with which it must 
cohabitate indefinitely, does not seem like wise policy.50
II. Bandwidth Capacity
“Bandwidth” is loosely defined as the capacity to carry digital data; the higher the 
bandwidth, the larger the informational carrying capacity. As benchmark figures, most home 
broadband connections have a minimum bandwidth of 512 kilobits per second (kbps) or higher; 
many services are now offered in the multiple-megabit range. 3G and 4G wireless telephony also 
offer bandwidth capacity measured in megabits. Individual digital television (DTV) channels 
occupy 6 MHz of broadcast spectrum (or 15 times the footprint of a typical hybrid FM-IBOC 
station); each channel contains enough bandwidth to transmit slightly more than 19 megabits per 
second (mbps) of digital data. Hybrid FM-IBOC stations have a digital bandwidth capacity of 
approximately 150 kbps (in the extended hybrid mode)51  and AM-IBOC stations are capable of 
transmitting approximately 64 kbps of digital data.52 Even in their all-digital configurations, FM-
IBOC signals can carry just 300 kbps of digital data, while AM-IBOC is projected to top out at 
96 kbps.53 Due to the aforementioned channel capacity constraints, IBOC is simply incapable of 
providing broadband-level digital data distribution services. 
The bandwidth restrictions of the IBOC DAB system has not stopped its supporters from 
exploring other uses for their digital sidebands. Several “value-added” features have been 
suggested, such as “multicasting,” or the ability to split an FM-IBOC digital signal into multiple 
program streams (there is not enough bandwidth to multicast in AM-IBOC), and “datacasting,” 
or the provision of non-audio digital data. Examples of datacasting include iTunes tagging 
(which allows listeners to “bookmark” songs they hear on the radio for later purchase online), 
Dolby 5.1 surround sound, traffic and navigation services, recording-on-demand, and 
subscription audio content.54 
IBOC developers are also pondering several ways to either mimic interactivity or provide 
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such functionality via a separate wireless information conduit. Some believe linking DAB 
receivers to in-car GPS systems will allow radio stations to serve up locale-specific advertising 
to listeners depending on where they are and in which direction they may be traveling. A service 
called Visual Radio, developed jointly by HP and Nokia, proposes to link artist and song 
information conveyed by FM-IBOC radio stations to enhanced content streamed on-demand to 
compatible mobile phones. Others are exploring interactivity as a means to provide real-time 
station audience measurement.55 Many of these features, such as multicasting, were not originally 
built into the IBOC feature-set; for example, FM-IBOC multicasting was developed by NPR 
following a crash program in 2002 - long after its proprietors petitioned the FCC to approve the 
DAB standard. Therefore, the ability to multicast or datacast were not initially conceived as 
primary rationales for IBOC’s adoption, but rather as additional incentives for stations to expand 
their program and service offerings by an unspecified but relatively minor degree. 
These “value-added services” are mostly unavailable on AM, where digital bandwidth is 
already insignificant.56 In addition, non-audio digital services require dedicated bandwidth to 
function properly, which forces each radio station to choose whether or not to sacrifice digital 
audio fidelity for the provision of non-audio content. Proponents of IBOC claim that applications 
such as multicasting and datacasting use “opportunistic data”: for example, if an FM-IBOC 
station airs programming that does not call for high fidelity (such as a news or talk program), the 
station can conceivably decide on the fly to devote some of its digital data stream to other uses.57 
However, given IBOC’s inherent bandwidth constraints, no radio station can provide the 
complete panoply of the system’s features: a station may multicast, or broadcast in surround-
sound, or provide other non-audio services, but it may only choose one or two features from the 
suite. 
IBOC-enabled stations are not likely to share their spectrum and application-windfall 
with other broadcasters. Milford K. Smith, Jr., Chairman of the NRSC’s DAB Subcommittee, 
has commented that the industry was not interested in accommodating new entrants via the 
IBOC platform. “Potentially unprofitable demographic segments,” he opined, were more likely 
to find the Internet a better place “to seek mass distribution of their product.”58 Thus, while the 
promise of increased audio fidelity and the provision of additional applications is claimed to be a 
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benefit of IBOC DAB, the technology’s practical limitations call these new uses of the radio 
spectrum into question.
IBOC’s primary touted feature is an increase in audio fidelity, defined as “CD-quality” 
sound on FM and “FM-quality” sound on AM.59 True, uncompressed audio requires 1.4 mbps of 
bandwidth; therefore, IBOC radio signals must significantly reduce the bandwidth of source 
audio to fit the system’s constraints. This is performed by a codec, which stands for 
“encoder/decoder,” and is essentially an algorithm designed to compress digital audio data. Not 
all codecs are created equal: for example, the widely-used MP3 format is a lossy algorithm 
which reduces the bandwidth of uncompressed digital audio by about 90%.60 IBOC’s proprietors 
experimented with several codecs before developing one called HDC (Hybrid Digital Coding).61 
It is known as a perceptual codec: according to Ken C. Pohlmann, “physical identity is waived in 
favor of perceived identity. Using a psychoacoustic model of the human auditory system, the 
codec...identifies imperceptible signal content (to remove irrelevancy) as bits are allocated. The 
signal is then encoded efficiently (to avoid redundancy) in the final bitstream.” Noise from the 
psychoacoustic modeling of digital audio is inherent to a perceptual audio codec system, but the 
main question becomes how much noise is tolerable before the human ear notices it.62 In theory, 
while all psychoacoustic-based codecs are lossy, they are designed to trick the human ear into 
not perceiving any loss of acoustic range.63 The Hybrid Digital Coding algorithm compresses 
audio at a ratio of approximately 15:1,64 thanks to a series of “carefully-engineered perceptual 
tricks.”65 
Laboratory tests and field observations do not reflect well on the technology’s actual 
audio quality. David Maxson claims that 96 kbps is the “absolute minimum at which a credible 
[FM-IBOC] stereo signal can be transmitted,”66 and disputes claims that IBOC can create the 
sound it promises: “By building a broadcast system that compresses audio into such a narrow 
data stream, we would be profoundly affecting one of the features of our current radio broadcast 
system....Compressed digital broadcasts will sacrifice some of the details of musical dynamics 
that analog FM is capable of delivering.”67 In other words, depending on program type, analog 
FM might sound better than its IBOC equivalent, considering that analog audio is not digitally 
encoded for broadcast. Since the imposition of digital sidebands preclude an AM station from 
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broadcasting a stereo analog signal, the perceived relative “improvement” of AM-IBOC audio 
quality is actually accomplished largely by the degradation of the analog transmission.
One engineer involved in IBOC development noted that the system’s audio quality is 
optimized for use in vehicles, where road noise and other distractions can mask any of the HDC 
codec’s flaws.68 Sony Electronics has commented that the “near-CD” fidelity of IBOC 
transmissions may “be less tolerable by the public”69 as the overall quality of consumer audio 
electronics improve.70 Satellite radio also utilizes a digital compression algorithm to broadcast its 
signals but, unlike IBOC, these signals do not have to share spectrum with incumbent analog 
transmissions. Therefore, while satellite radio employs mechanisms of bandwidth efficiency to 
cram multiple channels into a single digital signal, the entire bandwidth afforded to satellite radio 
can be utilized for this purpose, resulting in less of a need to sacrifice digital audio quality in 
order to protect neighboring incumbent broadcasters (of which there are none). IBOC DAB’s 
audio quality relative to digital satellite radio has never been evaluated.
When put to the test, IBOC’s codec must be judged subjectively. Typically, a mechanical 
ear is used to measure the fidelity of codecs, but it cannot effectively judge the “perceptual 
tricks” used in the Hybrid Digital Codec to fool a real human brain.71 IBOC’s proponents tested 
their codec by using a generally-selected sampling of people and a cadre of “expert listeners” to 
compare the quality of HDC-encoded audio relative to other source material, most notably 
analog FM broadcasts.72 Expert listeners are important because they “are more familiar with 
peculiar and subtle artifacts....The reference [audio sample] must be of the highest quality, and 
the testing conditions must be designed to attack the codec at its weakest points.”73 In order for 
such a test to be valid, it must meet a set of International Telecommunication Union performance 
guidelines, which include stressing the algorithm under scrutiny.74 It is not clear that this test was 
actually done, given that the reference samples were simply analog FM sound clips as opposed to 
uncompressed digital audio. Although IBOC’s proprietors claim their codec performed in such a 
manner as to be “perceived by typical listeners as ‘virtually’ the same as a CD,”75 the data 
underlying this statement does not support it.
The metric by which the NRSC ultimately evaluated IBOC audio quality was one of 
compromise; not only was HDC’s “success” defined simply by the provision of fidelity “better 
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than analog,” but the NRSC’s evaluation also contained qualifiers that effectively authorized 
some level of audio degradation resulting from the intermixing of a station’s analog/digital 
hybrid signals. It allowed a successful IBOC standard to compromise analog audio fidelity in 
order to maintain the robustness of the digital signal.”76 This further lowered the benchmark of 
what was considered acceptable audio quality. When the listening test data was revealed, IBOC’s 
codec performed mediocre at best. AM listener test data was never released, but the FM figures 
paint a disturbing picture. Figure 3.9 breaks down, by percentage, the general audience-sample 
which compared FM-IBOC audio quality to analog FM broadcasts. 82% of the respondents rated 
IBOC audio as sounding equal to or worse than analog FM; only 18% heard an improvement in 
fidelity. Among expert listeners, as shown in Figure 3.10, the results were strikingly similar; 
85% found IBOC’s audio quality to be equal to or worse than analog FM, with just 15% 
perceiving that digital sounded better. But perhaps the most damning result of the listener tests 
were those that used expert listeners to compare analog FM and hybrid FM-IBOC sound samples 
under conditions involving potential interference. The results are shown in Figure 3.11: of the 
100 respondents in the test, 82% judged the FM-IBOC signal to sound the same or worse than its 
parent analog FM transmission.
In addition, the Hybrid Digital Codec does not work well with other digitally-encoded 
audio. When compressed digital audio is re-compressed by another codec, a process called 
“transcoding” takes place, which can result in the generation of artifacts which further degrades 
the final audio output.77 Many radio stations already use compressed digital audio in some form; 
encoding it for broadcast through the HDC algorithm opens up many new possibilities for 
degraded audio.78 Therefore, stations are encouraged to rebuild their entire air-chain so that 
uncompressed audio is fed directly to the IBOC encoder/transmitter, or, if prior encoding is 
unavoidable, that stations use only one “family” of codecs to minimize transcoding artifacts in an 
IBOC signal.79 This, too, is a hidden cost that must be considered in a radio station’s 
digitalization.80 IBOC’s proprietors have subsequently “clarified” that the “HD” in IBOC’s 
trademarked name, “HD Radio,” does not stand for “High Definition,”81 although early 
marketing efforts suggested otherwise.82 This change in the meaning of “HD” has been termed 
“disingenuous” by Radio World.83   
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III. Proprietary Nature
Perhaps the least discussed feature of IBOC DAB is its wholly proprietary nature. After a 
few years of developmental competition, IBOC’s two major proprietors (Lucent Digital Radio 
and USA Digital Radio) merged to form iBiquity Digital Corporation in 2000 (see Chapter 4). 
With the creation of iBiquity, all of the intellectual property used in IBOC DAB technology was 
brought under one roof.84 iBiquity has no qualms with leveraging this position; in fact, it is 
inherent to its business model. 
For broadcasters, there is a one-time licensing fee payable to iBiquity in order use the 
technology;85 for a time, iBiquity considered setting the license fee based on a station’s market 
size and audience share, but dismissed that formula as overly complicated.86 If a station wishes to 
deploy value-added applications, such as multicasting or datacasting, it will be charged an 
amount equal to 3% of quarterly net revenue derived from the applications or $1,000 per year, 
whichever is greater.87 iBiquity will not charge for software upgrades that fix bugs in the IBOC 
system, but as new features are added to the protocol those, too, will come at a price.88 For 
example, iBiquity has acquired the intellectual property rights to technology that would allow the 
encryption of subscription-based programming on the IBOC platform, so fees to use that feature 
will also flow to the company.89 
iBiquity’s broadcaster licensing terms clearly state that the contract is perpetual; that a 
broadcaster does not own the IBOC software; and may not sell or otherwise transfer IBOC 
technology to another party, except in cases where a radio station is sold, although such a 
transfer may only occur after written permission is obtained.90 Furthermore, iBiquity retains the 
right to audit a station’s financial records at any time and revoke a station’s license agreement 
after 30 days of licensing fee nonpayment.91 In the event of a radio station in fiscal difficulty, 
iBiquity retains the right to allow the broadcaster to continue to use the IBOC system, provided a 
1.5% interest charge is tacked onto the station’s unpaid license balance.92 If iBiquity software 
does any material damage to a radio station, the company is indemnified for costs in excess of 
$200,000.93 These terms were promulgated against the recommendations of iBiquity’s own 
broadcaster advisory council.94 
As a result, iBiquity wholly controls who may broadcast in the U.S. digital radio domain. 
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Until now, such gatekeeper-authority rested solely in the hands of the FCC, which seems 
unconcerned about this fundamental shift in power that IBOC’s proprietary nature portends.
For IBOC DAB receiver manufacturers, the terms of license are similarly strict. Licenses 
are nontransferable; all products that contain IBOC technology must be labeled on the outside as 
such; derivative works are disallowed under penalty of law; and license terms are only good for 
five years. Monetarily, receiver manufacturers must pay a one-time fee (the amount of which is 
undisclosed) and a “per unit” royalty “based on a percentage of the aggregate total gross 
invoiced [receiver] sales.” Per-unit royalties are to be paid quarterly. Receiver manufacturers 
must also agree to open their books to iBiquity and submit “quarterly sales reports along with 
royalty payments.”95 Adding IBOC functionality is expensive relative to other receiver-features: 
whereas a chipset to provide analog FM radio reception might cost a consumer electronics 
manufacturer forty cents, with no perpetual charge, the price of an IBOC receiver chipset is in 
the range of $12, and comes with residual costs.96 
Finally, all developers of IBOC-related applications must first run their proposals by 
iBiquity and, if they are approved, must pay to use the programming language that iBiquity has 
written for application-development.97 The FCC’s operative governance on this intellectual 
property issue dates back to a rulemaking from 1961 - well before the advent of modern 
computing, much less the intricate problems that come with the constraints of proprietary 
technology in the realm of software.98 
Public radio stations initially reacted very strongly against IBOC’s proprietary nature. At 
the 2002 Public Radio Conference, Nevada Public Radio General Manager Lamar Marchese 
asked an FCC representative, “How is the FCC coming down on this perpetual franchise granted 
with no competition?” Marchese received much applause, but no substantive answer. Instead, 
iBiquity President and CEO Robert Struble responded nonchalantly, “We are a business. We do 
have to make some money.”99 Public radio broadcasters subsequently banded together to seek 
some relief from iBiquity’s pay-to-play system.100 Ultimately, iBiquity and the Corporation for 
Public Broadcasting hammered out a deal for CPB-qualified stations that waived the one-time 
license fee for early adopters, capped it at a discounted rate for the rest, and removed the 
perpetual fees for the use of applications such as multicasting and datacasting.101 Even so, by 
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2005, the CPB had spent more than $8.8 million on proprietary IBOC hardware and software to 
help public radio stations affect a digital conversion.102 
Perhaps most importantly, technical information about the IBOC DAB standard has not 
been fully disclosed. According to the terms of the National Radio Systems Committee’s 
broadcast standard-setting process, standards must include two forms of documentation: 
normative and informative. Normative documents contain “a detailed description of a component 
of the standard. To be compliant with the standard, a device or system must satisfy not only the 
general criteria in the main standard document, but also the detailed criteria contained in those 
normative references that relate to the workings of the device.” As of now, all normative 
documents included in the NRSC’s IBOC standard remain the property of iBiquity Digital 
Corporation.103 Informative references, on the other hand, are used to “help the reader understand 
something about the standard that may not be evident by reviewing the...normative references. 
An informative reference may contain, for instance, an example of an implementation of the 
standard, or material that provides background information on a specification.” An informative 
reference for the IBOC standard, for example, would include specifications on the codec used to 
process audio. iBiquity has declined to provide complete normative or informative references for 
the HDC codec, leaving those with an interest in exploring IBOC without a complete set of 
documentation with which to tinker.104 The company explained that it had “compelling reasons” 
for not releasing this information, and its recalcitrance on the issue forced the NRSC to publish 
an IBOC standard that does not include a codec. This provides iBiquity with the opportunity to 
change or modify this aspect of its system with no meaningful review or oversight, which could 
add future costs to the implementation of IBOC DAB.105 
iBiquity’s refusal to disclose this information forces transmitter and receiver 
manufacturers into the company’s intellectual-property straitjacket. According to David Maxson, 
“In theory, a manufacturer could develop a product that is...compliant but that has not earned the 
right to use the HD Radio name and logo. In practice, the manufacturer would find it necessary 
to license iBiquity patents to manufacture and sell its...product. While doing so, the manufacturer 
may be enticed...to take the next step and join the HD Radio family.”106 Nondisclosure also 
subverts patent expiration on IBOC technology.
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Although the National Radio Systems Committee ostensibly approves standards that are 
open on a Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory (RAND) basis,107 it is difficult to see how that 
applies to the certification of the IBOC digital radio system. In Radio World, Skip Pizzi lamented 
that
there is something fundamentally troubling about a digital broadcasting format 
designed by a unilateral, proprietary group and not driven by an open standards 
process....If the FCC rubber-stamps a format proposed by private interests, it will be 
neglecting due diligence and abdicating its ultimate responsibility as a steward of the 
public interest.108 
Pizzi was not alone in his criticism: Paul Signorelli, Chief Technology Officer for Impulse 
Radio, a developer of digital radio broadcast applications, opined that a proprietary approach 
would not spur innovation in the IBOC arena. “Ironically, it seems iBiquity would rather own all 
of nothing rather than a large piece of something huge,” he wrote. “So let’s not simply let them 
assuage us with talk of openness. We’re dumb, but not that dumb.”109 David Maxson agreed: 
With such dominance of the technology comes the potential for too much control in the 
hands of one enterprise. As the regulatory authority, the FCC should be certain that all 
standards and policies encourage competition in all levels of the IBOC 
marketplace....Innovators should not be forced to get the permission of the dominant 
competitor to develop new ideas. Licensure of the core technologies should be at arms 
length from the activities that develop features that utilize the technology.110 
Suspicion of IBOC’s proprietary nature can be found among all constituencies involved in the 
digital radio issue, but is most severe among independent broadcasters, consulting engineers, and 
the public. Many worry that by adopting IBOC technology, the United States is forcibly 
balkanizing global digital radio compatibility, creating a universe of “undesirable diversity” in an 
embryonic technological space.111 For its part, iBiquity has demonstrated a powerful sense of 
hubris when confronted with these concerns. At the 2002 NAB annual convention, Robert 
Struble directly likened the company to Microsoft: “We’re a software company. If you buy a 
transmitter, you’ll need new software from us.”112 That same year, iBiquity claimed it would reap 
some $600 million per year in licensing revenue by 2010.113 
The three fundamental flaws of IBOC DAB cannot be overcome through redesign or 
other remedial measures. The spectral footprint of hybrid IBOC signals - twice as large as that of 
an FM analog station, and three times the size of an analog AM station - is required for its most 
basic operation, and this can cause destructive interference to both IBOC host-broadcasters and 
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neighboring stations on the dial. In the case of AM-IBOC, the potential impact of interference 
may be regional or national in scope. With regard to bandwidth capacity, IBOC provides very 
little compared to other 21st century digital information conduits. It falls far short of providing 
broadband-level service, and its lack of interactivity is a hindrance that IBOC developers and 
broadcasters are still seriously pondering. The promise of providing radio service that sounds 
“better than analog” is a dubious one; furthermore, IBOC’s “value-added services” such as 
multicasting and datacasting are underwhelming and can only be deployed at the sacrifice of 
digital audio fidelity. Finally, the end-to-end proprietary nature of IBOC stifles its uptake as well 
as innovation in the digital radio space. Ironically, when IBOC’s supporters formally engaged 
the FCC in policymaking to cement the standard as the future of U.S. digital radio, these issues 
were hardly on the agency’s radar. The result was a controversial standards-setting process 
where IBOC’s fundamental flaws would repeatedly come back to haunt it.
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Figure 3.1. Spectral schematic of a hybrid analog-digital FM signal.114 
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Figure 3.2. Spectral schematic of an all-digital FM signal.115 
Figure 3.3. Example of two FM-IBOC stations on adjacent channels, with analog and digital 
signals overlapping each other.116 
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Figure 3.4. Example of two FM-IBOC stations on second-adjacent channels to each other.117 
Figure 3.5. Spectral schematic of a hybrid analog/digital AM-IBOC radio signal.118 
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Figure 3.6. Spectral schematic of an all-digital AM-IBOC signal.119 
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Figure 3.7. Illustration of how two hybrid AM-IBOC stations on adjacent channels can cause 
interference to each other.120 
Figure 3.8. Illustration of second-adjacent channel interference between two hybrid AM-IBOC 
stations.121 
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Figure 3.9. Percentage of general-public listeners grading IBOC audio quality relative to analog 
FM (n=1600).122  
Figure 3.10. Percentage of expert listeners grading IBOC audio quality relative to analog FM 
(n=100)123 
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Figure 3.11. Percentage of expert listeners grading IBOC-FM audio quality in an “intrusive” 
environment where interfering signals exist (n=100).124 
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Chapter 4: FCC “Deliberation” of HD Radio
Between 1998 and 2002, the proponents of IBOC DAB would work to formally establish 
the dominant operative metaphors of the technology and its advocate for its selection as the 
future of U.S. radio broadcasting. Although the question of whether analog and digital radio 
signals could peacefully coexist remained an open one, USA Digital Radio forced the issue by 
filing a Petition for Rulemaking with the Federal Communications Commission on October 7, 
1998.1 Touting its long-standing connection to the broadcast industry and claiming that 
“commercial [IBOC] transmission systems will be available within 18 months,”2 USADR asked 
the Commission to “immediately make a finding that IBOC will be the method of transmission 
for DAB in the United States.”3 
USA Digital Radio claimed its technology had wide support within the industry when it 
actually had the support of a minority of station-owners who happened to control the majority of 
industry revenue. Since the FCC’s regulatory paradigm favors economic metrics over all others, 
the consensus among broadcast conglomerates in favor of IBOC technology was equated by 
regulators with nearly-universal support within the industry itself. This disconnect would become 
painfully apparent within the policy dramaturgy. With tacit support from public broadcasters, 
who represent the majority of noncommercial stations in the nation, regulators undertook digital 
radio policymaking on the mistaken premise that the entire industry backed IBOC as the 
preferred technology by which radio broadcasting could navigate a digital, convergent media 
environment. Given the contentious record of public comment that would result from USADR’s 
Petition for Rulemaking, the FCC’s ultimate approval of IBOC would only be possible if the 
agency remained willfully ignorant of the technology’s real-world implications.
Left similarly unaddressed by regulators was any exploration of alternatives to IBOC. As 
a rule, industry incumbents will prefer a technological development which strengthens their 
incumbency; as a product of industry investment and sanctioned by the industry’s standards-
setting body, IBOC appeared to be the least painless and most profitable way to digitize radio 
broadcasting in the United States. Although there was no concrete evidence that IBOC would 
function well (i.e., in a manner that could ultimately supplant existing analog services) - much 
less a clamor among the listening public for the digitization of radio broadcasting - the industry’s 
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largest station-owners effectively gambled on the marketplace primacy of IBOC as a transitional 
technology with no competitor. For its proponents, IBOC did not have to be substantially better 
than the analog signals it might replace, just good enough to set the digital paradigm for radio’s 
future. 
There is no evidence that external factors played any significant role in the industry’s 
decision to push for the approval of IBOC DAB. For example, the pending launch of digital 
satellite radio service was not actually a meaningful threat to broadcasters’ inherent ability to 
profit by serving specific locales well, though SDARS was invoked to imbue the regulatory 
approval of IBOC with a sense of urgency. Secondly, the Internet was still in its infancy - most 
people online did not yet have broadband connections - so the concept of webcasting was not 
recognized as a viable competitor to “traditional” radio broadcasting. It is difficult to characterize 
USA Digital Radio’s supporters as anything other than oblivious to the dynamic landscape for 
emerging, broadcast radio-type services that the Internet would engender. The FCC, having been 
disengaged from the IBOC development process, took many of its proponents’ assertions at face 
value, including those that positioned multicasting and datacasting as features which would 
revolutionize the act of broadcasting itself, even though those features were not fully developed 
or documented at the time. Dissenting voices - of which there were many - were simply 
considered outside the realm of acceptable policy discourse that had been defined by the Petition 
for Rulemaking itself, and were thus ignored or marginalized by the FCC. Regulators, too, 
simply ignored the technology’s fundamental detriments and refused to considerer any 
alternative digital radio technologies.
I. Justifying the Compulsion to Digitize
Establishing the dominant operative metaphor - that radio must go digital - was 
USADR’s first task. It accomplished this by characterizing its technology as the “means to 
preserve the special role broadcast radio plays in American life,” which was left undefined.4 The 
FCC’s impending satellite radio rulemaking was cited as a competitive threat to the radio 
broadcast industry - not because of its inherent originality as a new broadcast audio service, but 
primarily because it was digital and terrestrial radio was not. More importantly, IBOC 
technology was construed as the only viable solution to bring radio broadcasting into the digital 
era. Observing that finding new spectrum for digital radio was “exceedingly difficult, if not 
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impossible,” USADR asserted that any other path to digitization would “create tremendous 
turmoil in the radio industry, disrupting service to the public, and impose a significant 
administrative burden on regulatory authorities.”5 USADR’s Petition for Rulemaking also laid 
the foundation for the second operative metaphor, that DAB need not be substantially superior to 
existing analog radio service. No significant elements of the USADR technology, save for a 
projected improvement in audio broadcast fidelity and couple of references to nebulous “new 
services” that the protocol might provide, were discussed by USADR in its Petition.
In fact, most of USADR’s Petition for Rulemaking emphasized the third operative 
metaphor: that sacrifices must be made to analog service in order to accommodate IBOC 
broadcasts. USADR admitted that “a number of technical tradeoffs” would be required to make 
IBOC work, but if implemented correctly, it could be adopted “without disruption in service to 
the public.”6 USADR claimed that any new interference introduced into the broadcast bands by 
digital radio would be “self-masking” and that existing analog service “should not be 
significantly affected by introducing IBOC DAB signals into the environment.”7 
In effect, what USADR accomplished by filing the first digital radio Petition for 
Rulemaking was to cast itself as the leading developer of IBOC technology in the eyes of 
policymakers. By 1998, USADR had enjoyed the backing of the radio industry in some shape or 
form for nearly a decade, while Lucent Digital Radio was a latecomer to the IBOC development 
game and seen as an outsider with no direct experience in the business of broadcasting. Although 
USADR and LDR’s IBOC systems were far from deployment-ready, USADR hoped that 
triggering a policymaking process on the technology would serve in a tactical sense to clear the 
field for a single standard. The Federal Communications Commission officially acknowledged 
USADR’s Petition and allowed public comment on it for two and a half months.8 
Industry proponents immediately rallied to the USADR call. Bonneville International 
Corporation agreed with the need for expedited regulatory approval of IBOC, citing satellite 
radio as the prominent catalyst for doing so.9 Clear Channel practically begged the FCC to 
referee further development of the technology in order to avoid implementation hurdles such as 
those that plagued the DTV transition process.10 Susquehanna Radio Corporation, whose top 
engineering executives were involved with the National Radio Systems Committee’s study of 
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IBOC, endorsed the technology as in “the best interest of both the broadcasters and the public.”11 
Many large national broadcasters, such as Disney, CBS and the Gannett Company (the latter two 
being founders of USADR) joined this chorus.12 Cumulus Media summed up the primary 
operative metaphor - and the nebulous understanding of convergence on which it rested - most 
succinctly: “The driving force behind this digital revolution is clear; for most applications, digital 
is simply superior to analog.”13 Heftel Broadcasting Corporation, the largest owner of Spanish-
language radio stations at the time, and Radio One, the largest owner of radio stations in the 
country targeted toward African-Americans, urged the FCC to sanction IBOC broadcasting “with 
all due speed.”14 By the end of the first round of public comment on its Petition, USADR claimed 
that it had equity investment from 12 of the largest radio broadcasters in the United States, as 
well as an infusion of funding from Chase Capital Partners.15
Others within the industry, while supportive of IBOC in concept, urged the FCC to take 
more care with the evaluation and eventual approval of any digital radio technology. National 
Public Radio artfully acknowledged all operative metaphors behind the industry’s push toward 
digitalization but cautioned the FCC not to foreclose consideration of “alternative approaches to 
DAB if IBOC proves infeasible or so burdened with compromises that the benefits of a digital 
transition are fundamentally undermined.”16 NPR’s initial Comments, while facially supportive 
of IBOC, represent the only preliminary filing from a constituency intimately involved with the 
technology’s development that suggested it may yet fail. Others, such as Greater Media and the 
Radio Operators Caucus (an “informal group” of 20 radio broadcast engineers employed with 
regional broadcast conglomerates that represented “hundreds of...stations”), agreed in principle 
with a DAB rulemaking but did not want USADR’s technology to be chosen as the de facto 
standard simply on the basis that it had filed first.17 This was a point readily agreed to by IBOC’s 
other primary developer, Lucent Digital Radio, and the newcomer, Digital Radio Express.18 
Independent broadcasters and consumer electronics manufacturers expressed significant 
concerns about the technical weaknesses of IBOC DAB. Big City Radio, a company with a 
handful of stations on the peripheries of major markets, asserted that IBOC technology had not 
been adequately evaluated and “risks significant - and even fatal - interference to many existing 
AM and FM licensees.”19 Big City also cued in on the economic momentum behind the Petition: 
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“That a large number of parties supporting an immediate Notice of Proposed Rule Making now 
have business interest in USADR is another reason to discount their support for USADR’s 
proposal. The Commission should not credit the advocacy of USADR’s investors as a reason for 
moving hastily on its Petition, especially when USADR’s proposed technology has been only 
incompletely simulated and even less sufficiently tested.”20 Ford Motor Company told the FCC 
that it could only support an IBOC system so long as it would not harm existing analog signals - 
a guarantee which the technology could not provide.21 Similarly, the Consumer Electronics 
Association emphasized the need for a more complete test-record on IBOC performance before 
any rulemaking could begin in earnest.22 
USA Digital Radio noted these concerns but asserted that its technology was “in a final 
stage of development and there is consensus on an IBOC approach. Hesitation on the part of the 
Commission is unnecessary and will prolong the wait for digital radio.” It disagreed with the 
need to protect analog radio service, given that the ultimate goal of its Petition was to transition 
terrestrial radio to an all-digital broadcast mode. Finally, to amplify its growing support within 
the radio industry, USADR referenced “a recent study of broadcasters” which suggested that 
“approximately 30% of radio stations are likely to convert to digital broadcasting within the first 
two years, with 56% likely to convert within the first five years.”23 It is unclear from USADR’s 
comments whether non-investor broadcasters were consulted in the compilation of the survey.
Members of the public came out wholly against IBOC DAB as the preferred technology 
for U.S. radio’s digital future. The Citizen’s Media Corps of Brookline, Massachusetts noted that 
the industry had initially supported an alternate-band DAB system; it still believed that such a 
system “would be in the best interests of the citizens of the United States....It is by no means a 
foregone conclusion that new spectrum cannot be found. What is not lacking is spectrum, it is the 
will to prioritize finding that spectrum over the objections of the very powerful radio industry 
lobby.”24 The Prometheus Radio Project, a primary facilitator for the development of new, 
noncommercial low-power FM (LPFM) radio stations,25 also questioned the political-economic 
rationale behind IBOC; while its proponents vaguely promised some sort of better radio service, 
Prometheus recommended that “the FCC find independent data about what the American public 
really wants from radio before going ahead with a plan that ignores the potentialities for more 
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channels.”26 Relatedly, the Amherst Alliance, an ad-hoc coalition of aspiring LPFM applicants 
and interested citizens, implored the agency look beyond the economic rationales of IBOC 
proponents: “We know [the industry] ha[s] invested considerable sums in Research & 
Development...If IBOC is not implemented, these sums may never be recovered....We will take a 
moment to savor the irony of institutions which loudly proclaim the need for a ‘laissez-faire’ 
economy, with minimal government regulation, while looking to government for recoupment of 
a potentially bad investment.”27 
Additional context for the developmental status of IBOC at the time could be found 
offstage, through discourse documented in the trade press. Less than a month after USADR’s 
Petition was formally accepted by the FCC, Lucent Digital Radio President Suren Pai told Radio 
World that his company was preparing to field-test both its FM and AM-IBOC systems.28 During 
the November, 1998 NAB Radio Show, all three proponents of IBOC showed off “simulated” 
versions of their systems to broadcasters, as opposed to the more intricate displays proffered by 
USADR and LDR just a few years earlier.29 Public broadcasters’ trade newspaper, Current, 
reported that the NRSC had asked all IBOC proponents to tender test results to the industry 
standards panel by December 15, 1999, so as to expedite its evaluation process in the wake of 
USADR’s Petition for Rulemaking. NPR’s chief technology officer, Don Lockett, conceded that 
USADR “has the lead in clout, if industry politics count for anything at the FCC.” However, he 
was also surprisingly candid about the potential for IBOC to fail. “This is the last round for 
IBOC, I would say,” he told Current. “Based on what I learned in the first round of testing, it has 
to work [soon] or we have to move on to something else.””30 
Backstage discussions at the FCC involving IBOC’s top proprietors commenced early on 
in the regulatory process and would continue long after deadlines for public comment had 
passed. These meetings strongly shaped the digital radio rulemaking which the FCC would 
ultimately promulgate. USADR met with Commissioner Susan Ness, a representative of 
Chairman William Kennard, and senior Media Bureau staff within days of filing its Petition. In 
these meetings, USADR emphasized the need for quick action on the approval of IBOC 
technology, on the meager premise that “digital” equaled “better.”31 During 1999, USADR 
representatives would meet with FCC Commissioners, their advisors, and senior staff nearly 20 
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times to advance the operative metaphors of IBOC technology and press for expeditious action 
on a DAB rulemaking.32 Lucent Digital Radio also made ex parte presentations to FCC 
Commissioners and key staff, but did not begin its backstage activities until nearly five months 
after initial public comment on USADR’s Petition had closed. LDR’s backstage dialogue with 
policymakers was more nuanced; it spent a lot of time explaining the merits of its own IBOC 
technology and urged the FCC to take a considered and measured approach to any DAB 
rulemaking.33 All ex parte presentations, either from USADR or LDR, ignored the notion of 
alternate-band DAB as a viable policy outcome. 
On November 1, 1999, the FCC officially issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
(NPRM) to explore the concept of terrestrial digital radio.34 Claiming that IBOC could provide 
higher-quality sound and the potential for broadcasters to “offer the public an array of new 
auxiliary services,” the technology was contextualized by regulators as a means “to significantly 
enhance the American radio broadcast service.”35 The FCC admitted that such systems “have not 
been conclusively proven to be technically viable at this point in time, yet great strides have been 
made and the systems certainly hold real promise.” However, the NPRM tacitly skewed the 
subsequent policy discourse toward an IBOC solution to the DAB issue. Acknowledging that 
“CEMA and other documentation” demonstrated that alternate-band DAB technology may be 
superior to IBOC, “No proponent of a Eureka-147 or other non-IBOC DAB system has filed 
comments in response to USADR' s Petition. We currently are unaware of any such proponents 
in the United States.” This statement was untrue: independent broadcasters, consumer electronics 
manufacturers, and the pubic all suggested the exploration of non-IBOC alternatives in their 
initial comments on USADR’s Petition, but the FCC set precedent early on to ignore these 
constituencies in the policymaking process. In short, although other digital radio systems existed, 
they were not considered feasible as the domestic radio industry had no interest in them; a 
comparative analysis of DAB technologies, which would have clearly highlighted the 
fundamental detriments of IBOC early on, would not be required by the FCC. However, the FCC 
did question two of the operative metaphors pushed by the industry: it wished for a digital radio 
service that would provide “vastly improved” service to the public, and one that “does not 
weaken the vitality” of existing radio services.36 
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The FCC’s NPRM took at face-value many of IBOC proponents’ claims about its 
technology, including those not grounded in any technical fact.37 Such commentary illustrates the 
detachment of the FCC in the IBOC development process and the relative ignorance of the 
agency about the real-world implications of deploying the system. Finally, the FCC squarely put 
the notion of overseeing the progress of DAB development in the hands of the radio industry: it 
dismissed the idea of establishing an FCC-coordinated advisory committee to study digital radio, 
citing its historical use of the NRSC for the advancement of new radio technologies, and 
concluded, “We believe that it is necessary and appropriate to rely to some degree on the 
expertise of the private sector for DAB system evaluations and, ultimately, recommendations for 
a transmission standard.” However, it did request that all testing and evaluation of DAB systems 
be filed in the official record for additional analysis by interested parties.38 
This left radio conglomerates with three nominally competitive IBOC systems to 
consider and the task of consolidating them into a single DAB standard for FCC certification. 
USA Digital Radio filed a 333-page technical report it had submitted to the NRSC detailing the 
testing it had accomplished to-date on its IBOC system.39 The report also revealed that USADR 
and Digital Radio Express had effectively merged their development efforts; USADR would 
continue to explore IBOC technology, while DRE would concentrate on the development of 
applications for it.40 DRE’s capitulation in the race to own the U.S. DAB standard more strongly 
positioned USADR as the front-runner over Lucent in the digital radio development process. 
USADR went into great detail describing the strength of its company; it now claimed the 
financial backing of radio conglomerates which boasted “coverage in 196 of the 270 Arbitron-
rated markets, access to 200 million listeners and combined revenues equating to 46% of the 
radio industry' s total revenues.”41 More than “forty world-class engineers and scientists” were 
tasked to the USADR IBOC project, which already had “27 patents, with numerous pending 
patent applications covering broad aspects of IBOC DAB technology.”42 USADR effectively 
implied that the radio industry had already settled on a digital broadcast standard, and the only 
thing holding up its adoption and implementation was a regulatory blessing.
With the FCC content to sit on the evaluative sidelines, the focus of IBOC’s technical 
endorsement firmly resided with the National Radio Systems Committee. USADR explicitly 
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opted to provide the NRSC with “only the level of information it views as necessary to 
demonstrate an improvement over analog.” The withholding of data was justified by a desire to 
protect proprietary information.43 With regard to the fundamental technical weaknesses of IBOC, 
USADR’s portrayal of its technology was upbeat. Interference to existing stations would not be a 
problem because “degradation due to the environment, such as noise and the analog portion of 
first adjacent [channels], dominates over any additional noise added by baseline DAB.”44 Not 
only did USADR’s report claim that IBOC would generate no significant interference, but that 
its testing program specifically examined worst-case scenarios not likely to be found in the real 
world.45 USADR confidently claimed there was no reason to string along a policy proceeding on 
digital radio, given that its technology was “tested,” “ready,” and supported by the industry’s 
largest players.46 
Within a month of USADR’s technical filing, the FCC was spiked with dozens of 
comments from supposedly independent broadcasters - who coincidentally used identical 
wording in their correspondence - endorsing the USADR system and asking for its immediate 
promulgation.”47 USADR also relied heavily on its investors to make the case for why its 
technology was the only viable solution for the future of domestic broadcasting. Their arguments 
praised the IBOC protocol and vilified any notion of an alternate-spectrum DAB option. Several 
USADR investors, in conjunction with the NAB, coordinated the filing of complementary IBOC 
assessments with the FCC.48 Of USADR’s broadcast-investors, only Greater Media conceded 
that while the developer’s technical submissions were “admittedly limited,” and that there was 
still room for IBOC to fail, progress at the NRSC (in which Greater Media was involved) should 
give the FCC enough confidence to preemptively select the technology as the U.S. digital radio 
standard.49 USADR filed follow-on comments urging the FCC to sanction the proliferation of its 
technology by the end of 2000. Expeditious Commission action was necessary “in order to avoid 
a stalemate between different components of the industry,” referencing the disparate levels of 
enthusiasm for IBOC between broadcasters, who flooded the FCC’s docket with positive 
comments, and consumer electronics manufacturers, who either ignored the start of the DAB 
policy proceeding or weighed in on the side of a cautiously thorough rulemaking that considered 
all possible digital radio technologies.50 
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Not to be left behind, Lucent Digital Radio filed a 191-page technical synopsis of its 
IBOC technology with the FCC and NRSC within three months of the FCC’s Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking.51 Lucent claimed its technology would use no new spectrum, preferring to 
characterize the necessary expansion of each station’s footprint on the dial as “refarming.” To its 
credit, Lucent did candidly admit that there would be tradeoffs between analog and digital 
reception quality on the AM and FM bands, but such compromises were “variables” that should 
be left up to individual stations to accommodate.52 Lucent also declared that any alternate-band 
DAB development and proliferation in the United States would run “counter to the public 
interest....The Commission should be a facilitator of new technologies and services being 
delivered to the public, including doing whatever is necessary to allow existing licensees to 
upgrade their facilities in a manner consistent with the overall regulatory scheme of 
broadcasting.”53 If the word “overall” is replaced with “incumbent,” the emphasis of Lucent’s 
comment rings very true. 
In order to illustrate the industry’s willingness to move quickly on the issue, the NAB, on 
behalf of the NRSC, filed the latter’s evaluative criteria for a successful IBOC digital radio 
system with the FCC on January 24, 2000. While coy on the definition of performative metrics, 
the filing did explain the concepts that IBOC test methodology would be built upon, with the 
primary criterion being that it represent “a significant improvement over existing analog 
services.”54 The NRSC’s ultimate goal was to “develop a testing process and measurement 
criteria that will produce conclusive, believable and acceptable results, and be of a streamlined 
nature so as not to impede rapid development of this new technology.”55 However, the 
Committee did admit that “a number of compromises and tradeoffs among key aspects of the 
system” would have to be made in order to make IBOC function in the real world: “Only after a 
system’s data has been evaluated and the technical performance pinned to a system's tradeoffs 
and compromises is known will it be possible to say if an IBOC system represents a significant 
improvement over analog services. Even then, such an assessment will be challenging.”56 Even 
though the NRSC was surprisingly candid about the developmental hurdles left to overcome 
involving IBOC and did not discount its potential to be unworkable, the Committee’s declarative 
path is clear: it would investigate IBOC DAB solutions for radio’s digital transition above all 
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others, and would exhaust all avenues with regard to such development before entertaining the 
exploration of alternative DAB technologies. 
In the wake of the FCC’s NPRM, other character-constituencies were not as cavalier 
about IBOC’s prospects. Public broadcasters qualified their advocacy. Instead of framing digital 
radio’s technical appraisal in terms of what worked best for the radio industry, National Public 
Radio cautioned that “[t]he process for evaluating potential systems should be sufficiently open 
so that the positive and negative attributes of individual systems can be assessed to determine 
which is the best of the competing systems, as well as whether, on balance, the public interest 
would be served by authorizing the implementation of that system.”57 NPR also categorized the 
Commission’s performative goals for IBOC DAB as “simply unrealistic”: IBOC could not 
provide increased signal robustness, improved audio fidelity, and new digital program or data 
services all at the same time.58 NPR urged the Commission to stay proactively engaged in the 
testing and evaluation of DAB systems.59 Similarly, the Station Resource Group, “a national 
membership organization of forty-five leading public radio licensees that operate some 170 
stations,” gently attempted to dispel the Commission’s hopes that a digital transmission 
infrastructure would be the sole mechanism by which terrestrial radio could navigate a 
convergent media environment. Instead, SRG suggested that the FCC look at IBOC as only one 
vector that terrestrial broadcasting could use to compete in a digital media world.60 
Consumer electronics manufacturers again attempted to emphasize the deficiencies of 
IBOC DAB. Sony, the world’s largest manufacturer of consumer electronics, acknowledged that 
radio’s digital transition was inevitable, but asked the FCC to select a standard that could 
effectively compete against other digital audio distribution conduits, which were multiplying 
quickly.61 Sony suggested IBOC was simply not robust or flexible enough to entice listener 
interest; the impetus for a digital radio transition would ultimately be “either derived from a 
variety of new channels or new value-added services,”62 neither of which IBOC could yet 
promise to deliver. It suggested that the Commission remain open to alternate-band digital radio 
technologies.63 “As a first step, it is important to evaluate IBOC performance as it compares to 
current AM and FM analog [radio]. In order to draw conclusions, however, new band 
alternatives need to be available to provide a reference for comparison....Although there is no 
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similarity with implementations, there is value in comparing performance of the digital systems 
and the complexities of implementations.”64 
Receiver manufacturers working specifically in the automotive space also urged careful 
consideration of a digital radio transition. Visteon Automotive Systems, one of the world’s 
largest producers of manufacturer-installed radio receivers, observed that should a substandard 
DAB protocol be chosen, it would cause consumer confusion and dismay.65 Conceding that the 
creation of an alternate-band DAB system “would probably not be economically practical,”66 any 
IBOC solution that degraded analog radio reception that listeners were used to or did not “offer 
value for the additional costs that will be incurred by the broadcasters and by the public to 
implement the service” was undesirable.67 Visteon observed that simply adding digital broadcast 
capability to existing AM and FM stations “would not, in itself, promote diversity in 
programming.”68 As a means of heading off consumer dissatisfaction with any new digital radio 
service, Visteon suggested the FCC create an advisory committee to examine the implications of 
imposing IBOC DAB. It did not favor the NRSC as the venue for standards-evaluation because it 
already seemed predisposed to support IBOC above all others; “As such, it is too narrowly 
focused to provide all of the data that the FCC will need to make a reasoned decision and to 
select the best DAB alternative.”69 Finally, Visteon proposed a public education program to 
explain to listeners how and why their existing analog reception may change in the face of 
IBOC. “For example, they will need to understand why their analog reception will not be as 
robust as it once was and that, initially, digital broadcasting service areas might not equal those 
of the older analog technology until the technology is fully implemented.”70 
The Consumer Electronics Association boiled down its critique of IBOC to a finer point. 
It challenged the technology’s proponents to “convincingly demonstrate that an IBOC-delivered 
audio experience is attractive to listeners [and] sufficient to persuade consumers to purchase new 
radio receivers.”71 With more than 710 million analog radio receivers in use in the United States, 
CEA implored the Commission to become better-versed in the negative impacts of IBOC 
technology on existing analog radio service.72 CEA requested the FCC set benchmarks for any 
digital radio system that would guarantee fidelity higher than what current iterations of IBOC 
could provide.73 In addition, it wanted the FCC to keep open the possibility for alternate-band 
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DAB services;74 to that end, CEA submitted a 42-page concept analysis to the FCC of a “new 
mobile multimedia broadcast service” deployed on reclaimed swaths of analog UHF television 
spectrum.75 This would be the last time that any major industry-related constituency would 
substantively raise the notion of alternatives to IBOC.
Consulting engineer David Maxson, a member of the NRSC’s DAB Subcommittee, filed 
his own comments in response to the FCC’s NPRM. Although he supported IBOC in concept 
and disputed the notion that such a system represented a spectrum-grab of any real value,76 he 
was well-aware of its technical deficiencies. “Because of the limited data capability,” Maxson 
wrote, 
IBOC in its hybrid mode (with analog still present) does not appear to break radio 
broadcasting into this brave new world in the manner that DTV appears to do for 
television....The main feature of a hybrid IBOC system is its anticipated improved 
robustness over analog. Is improved robustness enough of a draw to get people to change 
out millions of analog radios for new DAB radios over a few years? 
“If radio broadcasters did not fear that their investments would be at risk for proposing a 
DTV-like solution, we suspect one might have been developed,” he commented.77 Ultimately, 
Maxson challenged the FCC to approve a digital radio service primarily from the perspective of 
the radio audience, not on the basis of economic rationales proffered by the industry. “[W]e 
believe the Commission has a duty to be the advocate for consumer benefit in selecting a final 
approach,” he wrote. “Because the nature of free over-the-air broadcasting requires ubiquitous, 
low cost reception, it should not be left to the marketplace to decide how it should be done.”78  
The primary antagonists of IBOC implementation were independent broadcasters and the 
public. Many of them had followed the turgid development of IBOC systems during the 1990s 
and were not impressed. In general, they viewed any IBOC system as fundamentally flawed and 
were somewhat taken aback by the possibility that the FCC seemed amenable to the degradation 
of analog radio service in order to introduce an unproven technology. Gene A. Benedictson, 
owner of Washington state-based Clarkston Broadcasters, Inc., noted that “[s]o far all of the 
money and support seems to be coming from the huge broadcasting groups that have huge 
money resources to dip into. Small market radio can't afford to spend money like that.”79 Willis 
Broadcasting Corporation, a minority-owned licensee of more than three dozen stations, 
commented that “on the assumption that the two major proponents of IBOC DAB are able to 
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demonstrate superior audio quality and robust resistance to interference, IBOC DAB should have 
everyone’s vote.” But if that were not so, the FCC should not “shirk its responsibility” to make 
alternate arrangements with regard to digital radio.80 
This concern was amplified by the U.S. Small Administration’s Office of Advocacy, 
which suggested the FCC had not done due diligence with regard to weighing the costs of 
imposing a DAB system on small-to-medium broadcasters who did not have the capital 
necessary to undertake a digital conversion.81 The Commission, argued the SBA, “offers little 
evidence, and may not have any evidence, that digital audio broadcasting is technically feasible, 
compatible with analog broadcast (including low-power FM), and cost effective for 
broadcasters.” Only after solidly justifying the need for radio’s digitalization could “the 
Commission reasonably conclude that digital conversion would serve the public interest.”82  
Members of the public offered the most explicit critiques of an IBOC-led digital radio 
transition. Several individuals were mystified that a regulatory agency specializing in 
communications technology could overlook the potentially detrimental nature of expanding the 
spectral footprint of all radio stations.83 Others questioned just where the impetus for 
“improving” radio broadcasting via digital technology was coming from.84 Richard Hartnett of 
London, Ohio, was “perplexed” by major broadcasters’ desire to go digital. “Before considering 
this issue, please let the public know what you are proposing. I have not seen any press on this in 
the public press....The listeners should have as much input as industry.”85 Alan Ricotta of Naples, 
Florida observed, in contradiction to the industry’s dominant operative policy metaphor, that 
“[d]igital does not always mean better.”86 The Virginia Center for the Public Press remarked that 
“[b]ooks are still popular ... in spite of being ‘obsolete’. So...the notion that analog radio is 
‘obsolete’ and that this is the best excuse to replace it with digital radio should NOT be accepted 
without question.”87 The VCPP also provided the first independent report of FM-IBOC 
interference, monitored on two receivers, during previous USADR field tests.88 
Public comment focused on the motives behind an industry-prompted digital radio 
transition. The Amherst Alliance suggested the rush to approve IBOC DAB was “a flawed 
attempt to address program content problems,” such as the diminution of local programming in 
the wake of post-Telecom Act broadcaster consolidation, “with a technological ‘fix’ -- and we 
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doubt it will generate the results which broadcasters expect.”89 Others noted the disparity of 
support for IBOC between large broadcast conglomerates and the rest of the radio industry, and 
openly questioned whether the move toward digitalization was intentionally designed to squeeze 
out smaller competitors and fatten the pockets of IBOC proponents and investors above all else.90 
Many radio listeners suggested the FCC leave existing analog radio service alone and implement 
DAB on other spectrum, for which several swaths were suggested.91 Ted M. Coopman of Santa 
Cruz, California, writing on behalf of 15 community media groups and 29 individuals from 13 
states, noted that an alternate-band digital radio system could raise billions of dollars in revenue 
from the auction of new DAB frequencies. “Simply granting additional spectrum to 
broadcasters...for this conversion is nothing more than a give-away of national resources to for-
profit business interests.”92 
For its part, industry proponents of IBOC either ignored, dismissed, or misconstrued the 
concerns of antagonists. USA Digital Radio asserted that “the comments of a few small 
broadcasters expressing concern about the cost of IBOC reflect a misunderstanding of the nature 
of the flexible IBOC implementation process rather than a fundamental disagreement about a 
transition to DAB.”93 Lucent Digital Radio reiterated the primary operative metaphor - that “there 
is no justification for AM and FM radio broadcasters to be left in the analog world, 
notwithstanding the Commission’s decision on whether additional spectrum is justified for radio 
broadcasting.”94 Both Lucent and the National Association of Broadcasters chastised the 
Consumer Electronics Association for casting doubt on IBOC’s viability by questioning the 
integrity of CEA’s own analysis.95 
As protagonists cast IBOC as an absolute necessity for the future survival of radio, 
antagonists questioned not only the viability of the technology but the need for DAB itself. The 
Virginia Center for the Public Press focused on what it saw as the core value of radio, which was 
technologically-neutral: “Duncan Radio Research suggests that the public would actually prefer 
a wider variety of formats and programming values (owners) with the same level of audio 
quality. In other words, the best thing that can be done for radio vis-à-vis the listeners is to 
encourage as many new entrants in the business of producing programming as absolutely 
possible. The current DAB proposals actually would produce the opposite, less owners and less 
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stations with less range for less people.”96 
Backstage, following the first round of comment and reply-comment on the FCC’s 
NPRM, IBOC’s proprietors strengthened their personal contacts with the FCC. USADR and 
Lucent both met with key FCC staff in March and April of 2000 to convince them to prioritize 
IBOC in its DAB deliberations and demonstrate prototypes of their technology.97 In a pernicious 
use of the FCC’s ex parte rules, the National Association of Broadcasters filed the NRSC’s first 
digital radio system evaluations with the agency on May 12, 2000 - more than three months after 
the window for initial public comment on the proceeding had closed. Given the report’s 
conclusions, there is good reason why the NAB first leaked this information backstage.
The NRSC followed the wishes of IBOC’s proponents and limited its technical review to 
those systems alone.98 However, the NRSC’s initial conclusions about IBOC were far from a 
ringing endorsement; it simply did not have the necessary information on which to formulate a 
firm opinion. USA Digital Radio, for example, submitted “at least partial results” for only 18 of 
the 67 FM lab tests specified in the NRSC’s evaluative criteria. USADR’s record of timely and 
comprehensive information declined from there: “For FM field tests, of the 12 tests specified in 
the guidelines, partial results for 5 were submitted. For AM lab tests, of the 25 specified tests, 
partial results on 8 were submitted. Finally, for the AM field tests, of the 8 specified tests, partial 
results for 1 were submitted.”99 This made it “impossible” for the NRSC to “state unequivocally 
that USADR' s IBOC technology provides a significant advance over current analog system 
performance in the AM and FM broadcasting bands,”100 much less provide more granular 
observations regarding USADR’s performance in the context of interference tolerance, signal 
robustness, audio fidelity, or the creation of new, digital-only broadcast applications.101 As for 
Lucent Digital Radio, it did not fare much better: “For FM lab tests, of the 67 specified in the 
guidelines, at least partial results were submitted for 5. For FM field tests, of the 12 tests 
specified in the guidelines, partial results for 4 were submitted. For AM lab tests, of the 25 
specified tests, partial results on 5 were submitted. Finally, for the AM field tests, of the 8 
specified tests, partial results for 0 were submitted.”102 
II. IBOC Proponents Merge, Demand Action  
The spring and early summer of 2000 passed with little policy movement on digital radio. 
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This pause ended on July 12, when USA Digital Radio and Lucent Digital Radio announced their 
formal merger into a new entity named iBiquity Digital Corporation. Robert Struble, CEO of 
USADR, became iBiquity’s new chief, while LDR’s president Suren Pai was appointed co-
chairman of the board. iBiquity announced plans to combine the two IBOC systems into one that 
cribbed from the best features of both; in doing so, it expected to shave “a year or two” off the 
time necessary for the FCC to sanction its technology.103 Struble was confident in the future of 
iBiquity’s digital radio system: “IBOC is going to be on the air in a year. It’s on the air now, but 
I think it’s going to be on the air commercially in a year in dozens, if not hundreds of stations. 
The plan currently calls for us to have commercially available transmission equipment by the 
NAB show in Vegas in April 2001.” iBiquity now had a lock on all intellectual property 
associated with the IBOC protocol. To electronics manufacturers, Struble was blunt: “You guys 
want to sell radios in 5 or 10 years, you have to build IBOCs or you need to work with us” 
[emphasis in original].104 While the merger was primarily contextualized as a means by which to 
provide “regulatory clarity” regarding the developmental status of IBOC, it also highlighted the 
technology’s third primary weakness - its wholly proprietary nature. Upon hearing about the 
merger, Mike Burns, chief engineer at public radio station WAMU in Washington, D.C., 
remarked that it was “kind of is a loss for all of us. I just would have loved to see a double-blind 
competition where the benefits and detriments of each system were exposed....That would have 
been kind of fun.”105 
iBiquity subsequently announced several advancements, including verbal commitments 
from a few consumer electronics manufacturers to produce IBOC-compatible receivers;106 the 
first tests of the datacasting component of its FM-IBOC system, along with the recruitment of 
application-developers;107 potential evaluation of the technology by the International 
Telecommunications Union;108 and its first formal meeting with the National Radio Systems 
Committee. Yet the mood at the 2000 NAB Radio Show was one of uncertainty. Radio World 
editor Paul McLane reported that the gamut of opinion among broadcast managers and engineers 
ranged from an undeveloped sense of urgency about approving a DAB system, “magnified by 
[competition from] satellite radio,” to a failure to see any need for digital broadcasting.109 By 
November, after “two months of intense work,” iBiquity reported that it had integrated the 
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USADR and LDR IBOC technologies into a single framework. iBiquity predicted it would have 
comprehensive FM-IBOC test results ready for NRSC review by September of 2001 and AM-
IBOC data “in early 2002.”110 The NRSC announced it would step up its meeting schedule to 
“complete the evaluation” of IBOC technology111 - an evaluation which remained, from many 
perspectives, sorely incomplete. 
This was reflected in offstage comments by independent broadcasters and members of the 
public. In a letter to the editor of Radio World, Christopher Maxwell, Secretary of the Virginia 
Center for the Public Press, reiterated the popular sentiment that it was the improvement of radio 
content - not the adoption of new broadcast technology - which stood to reinvigorate radio. 
“People don’t listen to the Internet because it sounds great; people suffer the Internet audio 
hassles because the Internet has the programming variety they can’t get on the usual FM dial,” 
Maxwell wrote. 
And that is why IBOC digital audio broadcasting... is going to be a catastrophic failure. 
IBOC will destroy the listening range of many of the smaller independent commercial, 
religious and community/college radio stations that serve the “unheard third” of 
American listeners who are escaping the...dial as we speak. To bring them back...we need 
more variety of programming and you get that with more channels.112 
Scott Todd, a broadcast engineer in Cambridge, Minnesota, told Radio World that he “used to be 
bullish on IBOC, but now I believe it is just bull.”113 Dana Puopolo, the chief engineer of KKBT-
FM in Los Angeles, cast the foundation of iBiquity as a mechanism by which to maintain the 
industry’s non-competitive status quo.114 Macon, Georgia-based Good News Network’s chief 
engineer, Glenn Finney, advocated for the adoption of spread-spectrum broadcast technology, 
which had already been implemented in the arena of wireless telephony, and would not restrict 
the proliferation of digital broadcasting to the AM and FM bands alone.115 
Backstage, iBiquity and its representatives made a flurry of ex parte presentations to the 
FCC advocating an IBOC-only solution for radio’s digital transition. Between July 2000 and the 
end of the year, iBiquity would meet once a month with the FCC to discuss the “submission of 
additional data about IBOC system testing” with an eye toward expeditious Commission 
approval.116 In a letter to Mass Media Bureau Chief Roy Stewart, iBiquity claimed that the FCC’s 
formal support of IBOC would “remov[e] any uncertainty and accelerat[e] the time when AM 
and FM broadcasters can join the digital revolution and provide the benefits of digital 
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technology to the American public.” There was “no public policy benefit to continuing 
consideration of new spectrum for DAB when the means exist to reuse the existing spectrum 
and spectrum shortages threaten the future viability of other wireless services.”117 
In 2001, iBiquity reorganized its 80-person workforce into two locations; Suren Pai was 
removed from any real position of power within the company, although he remained a member 
of iBiquity’s board of directors; and the company announced its technology licensing scheme.118 
iBiquity initially refused to discuss how much radio transmitter and receiver manufacturers 
would pay to license IBOC technology, but conceded there would be “an ongoing cost for each 
unit manufactured.” Most controversially, radio stations would also be required to pay licensing 
fees to broadcast digitally. iBiquity proposed various incentives to encourage early adoption of 
the IBOC technology, which typically involved the waiving or capping of certain fees; these 
included special license terms for broadcast conglomerates who were equity investors in the 
company.119  By the end of 2001 iBiquity had yet to sign a licensing commitment with any 
receiver manufacturer,120 though it did clinch deals with two transmitter companies and three 
electronics component firms, one of which was an iBiquity investor.121 By September of 2001, 
iBiquity claimed to have spent “nearly $1 million on developing its technology so far,” 
compared to the $100 million XM Satellite Radio budgeted for 2002 on marketing alone.122 
During 2001, iBiquity and the National Association of Broadcasters kept up the 
backstage discourse with FCC Commissioners, their senior advisors, and Media Bureau staff, 
pushing IBOC as the only viable solution for digital radio in the United States and asking ever 
more assertively for “prompt FCC action to endorse” the technology.123 Shortly after iBiquity 
submitted “comprehensive” testing data to the NRSC, the Committee announced its intent to 
render an evaluation of IBOC to the FCC by the end of the year. According to FCC Mass Media 
Bureau Associate Chief Keith Larson, who was repeatedly briefed by iBiquity in private, 
“the...product has tremendous potential,” though the agency remained concerned about the 
technology’s potentially deleterious impact on analog radio service.124 On October 9, 2001, 
iBiquity representatives gave a detailed PowerPoint presentation to FCC officials about the 
company and its plans for IBOC. iBiquity’s investors were described as including “14 of the 
nation's largest broadcasters (including the top 8); 2,300 radio stations with access to 208 million 
128
listeners; In Top 50 markets alone, owner stations have a 60% share; Owners account for more 
than half of radio industry revenues.” 
By the first half of 2002, iBiquity expected “some form of FCC endorsement” of IBOC, 
which would pave the way for the company and its broadcast-investors to roll out 50 stations in 
six target markets by the end of the year. Under the heading for a slide entitled, “What Can the 
FCC Do?,” iBiquity tersely listed the following: “Endorse IBOC as the approach US will pursue 
for digital radio. Discontinue consideration of new spectrum alternatives. Allow stations to begin 
conversion. Ask for details needed to set IBOC standard.”125 
On November 29, 2001 the NRSC’s DAB Subcommittee formally endorsed iBiquity’s 
IBOC system as the digital framework for U.S. FM radio broadcasting. Like the NRSC’s first 
evaluation, it surfaced as an ex parte (i.e., out-of-bounds for public comment) filing tendered by 
the NAB and CEA.126 Wholly based on iBiquity-compiled data, the 215-page report parrots 
almost completely the company’s technological promises.127 Based “on a full set of FM-IBOC 
system laboratory and field test data collected in strict accordance with NRSC-developed test 
procedures”128 - which constituted a total of eight stations in three markets129 - the NRSC 
concluded that “the iBiquity FM IBOC system as tested by the NRSC should be authorized by 
the FCC as an enhancement to FM broadcasting in the U.S., charting the course for an efficient 
transition to digital broadcasting with minimal impact on existing analog FM reception and no 
new spectrum requirements.”130 However, claims of improved digital audio fidelity in the 
NRSC’s endorsement were strongly qualified,131 the potential for analog-to-digital interference 
was confirmed, and the NRSC reported it still did not have enough information in hand to grade 
the feasibility of ancillary digital radio services such as multicasting and datacasting.132 
To complement the record, iBiquity released the entirety of its test data, amounting to 
roughly 700 pages of material.133 This avalanche of information made two notable claims. The 
first was a prediction that less than .6% of any given FM station’s listeners would experience 
interference problems related to the broadcast of a hybrid FM-IBOC signal.134 Secondly, iBiquity 
boasted that its FM-IBOC field-test program “so far has accumulated over 8.5 on-air years 
of...testing, at sometimes much higher power levels than proposed,” and “produced not one 
single complaint of interference by an auto receiver manufacturer, the broadcasters, the FCC or 
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the listening public” [emphasis in original].135 Considering that public knowledge of the 
technology’s existence was slim to none - and those members of the public who did know about 
the technology had already panned it  - these claims were a canard. 
The FCC formally acknowledged the NRSC and iBiquity’s submissions on December 19, 
2001 and invited public comment on them for three months.136 Industry proponents took the 
opportunity to cast IBOC as the only realistic path toward a digital radio future in the United 
States. As with the first round of comment on the NPRM, the second wave of filings included 
another barrage of industry-incited astroturf. Several broadcasters, ranging from conglomerates 
to religious networks to stand-alone commercial stations, as well as a leavening of broadcast 
equipment manufacturers, all cajoled the FCC to “take several steps.”
The Commission should clarify that it is no longer pursuing an out-of-band solution for 
terrestrial digital radio. iBiquity's demonstration of the viability and benefits of IBOC 
eliminate the need for examination of alternative approaches. The Commission should 
also endorse both IBOC as the specific solution for terrestrial digital radio and the 
iBiquity system. Finally, the Commission should take steps toward the adoption of a 
formal IBOC standard to encourage broadcasters, receiver manufacturers and consumers 
to upgrade to digital. This should include proposing rules that enable the introduction of 
IBOC at the earliest possible date.137 
The astroturf campaign was inadvertently unmasked by KONP Radio in Port Angeles, 
Washington, who failed to fill the first blank in the script: “On behalf of [BROADCAST 
COMPANY X], I am submitting these comments....”138 
Other IBOC proponents filed more eloquent testimony, but all worked to advance the 
industry’s operative metaphors in a campaign to cement IBOC DAB as the de facto digital radio 
standard. iBiquity and the NAB led the choir. “It has been more than two years since the 
Commission issued the NPRM,” wrote iBiquity. “During that time, there has been tremendous 
technical and business progress in the development of IBOC. Today, the technology is poised for 
commercial introduction. Continued Commission silence on the path it will pursue for 
implementation of DAB...will chill the commercial introduction of this innovative and unique 
technology.”139 Any technical disputes, it claimed, were settled by the NRSC’s endorsement; thus 
“[t]here should be no further questions about the viability of IBOC technology, its usefulness or 
the ability to implement IBOC in the field.”140 iBiquity also announced that IBOC transmitters 
would be ready for sale by April of 2002, and claimed that FM-IBOC-equipped stations would 
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be on the air in 11 markets by the end of the year.141 Although no receiver manufacturer had yet 
formally committed to manufacturing IBOC-compatible radios, the company predicted they 
would “be initially available at a small premium over existing receivers but it is anticipated that 
prices will come down as the volume of receivers sold increases.”142 iBiquity confidently 
predicted that FCC endorsement of its technology would encourage receiver manufacturers to 
come to the table.143 
The NAB was even more adamant about FCC action on IBOC. The technology was cast 
as “the radio industry’s preferred route to a digital future.”144 Technically, the NAB summed up 
the status of FM-IBOC in simple terms: “it works; it’s ready.”145 Any “open questions” about the 
protocol’s viability had been settled by the NRSC, leaving the FCC with no conclusive reason to 
stall its approval of the technology.146 The NAB told the FCC it should declare that “FM IBOC 
will be the digital technology for terrestrial radio broadcasting in the United States for the FM 
band and to specifically delineate the necessary remaining steps for rapid authorization and 
introduction of digital radio broadcasting for the greater public and industry good” [emphasis in 
original].147 Furthermore, the NAB expressed confidence that endorsement of AM-IBOC would 
arrive from the NRSC sooner rather than later, and suggested the FCC fold its approval of AM-
IBOC into “whatever process is occurring leading to Commission authorization. The time is now 
ripe and the Commission should act without delay.”148 During the open public comment period, 
the NAB met backstage with several senior FCC staff members to punctuate the need to 
“expedite” the IBOC rulemaking.149 
Several iBiquity broadcast-investors carried the tune. Susquehanna Radio Corp. 
commented that while the NRSC report did point to some “shortcomings” in the FM-IBOC 
technology, as a whole the system offered “a definite improvement over existing FM in the 
United States.”150 Infinity Broadcasting, now spun off from USA Digital Radio cofounder CBS, 
“strongly urge[d] the FCC to endorse and help facilitate rapid implementation of this superior, 
cutting-edge technology.”151 Bonneville International observed that “[r]adio broadcasters face 
substantial technical challenges and significant competitive circumstances in the age of digital 
communications,” and asked the FCC approve the proliferation of FM-IBOC “as soon as 
possible to provide broadcasters the ability to compete and be participants in this new 
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environment.”152 More to the point, Emmis Communications justified FCC approval of the 
technology if only to “giv[e] broadcasters reassurances that their investment in this national 
technology will be rewarded.”153 
National Public Radio suggested that IBOC would thrive only if it had the potential to 
provide new program services, not just better-sounding audio.154 Multicasting, in the eyes of 
NPR, held the greatest potential for making DAB useful: “While we do not diminish the 
potential value of text-based and other datacast services, NPR believes that digital radio, like its 
analog counterpart, should first and foremost serve the public's listening needs.”155 Since iBiquity 
had not yet developed a multichannel broadcast capability for FM-IBOC, NPR respectfully 
suggested that the FCC had a duty to promote such a feature in the form of pursuing “progressive 
regulatory policies to assure the flexible use of the iBiquity...system to provide new and 
innovative program services.”156 NPR essentially expanded the scope of the NPRM to urge the 
FCC to both mandate new functionality in iBiquity’s technology and leave open the door to 
competition from DAB technologies other than IBOC.157 The Station Resource Group filed 
comments critical of iBiquity’s licensing model, noting that “[f]ees that are paid by public 
broadcasters to iBiquity owners are simply resources that will be displaced from public service 
programming” [emphasis in original]. SRG feared that public and other noncommercial 
broadcasters might not be able to afford IBOC, and worried that under the proposed licensing 
structure they would “be treated simply as radio competitors,” perpetuating fiscal constraints on 
noncommercial broadcasters that have gone historically unrecognized by the commercial radio 
industry.158 
Many equipment manufacturers also advocated for regulatory approval of FM-IBOC. 
Texas Instruments (an iBiquity investor) and Alps Electric USA both reported that they were 
ready to begin manufacturing components for IBOC-compatible receivers, and urged swift FCC 
action to prime the pump for this new marketplace.159 Transmitter-manufacturer Harris 
Corporation referenced the primary operative metaphor driving proponents’ advocacy: “If 
tomorrow’s terrestrial broadcaster is to occupy the dominant and important role it plays today in 
the lives of Americans, then changes must begin to occur immediately in the technology, 
equipment and regulatory structure of this industry.”160 Receiver manufacturers Visteon and 
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Kenwood Corporation acknowledged reaching development and licensing arrangements with 
iBiquity; Kenwood predicted it would have IBOC-compatible radios on the market within a 
year.161 The Consumer Electronics Association concurred with the conclusions of the NRSC and 
urged the FCC to “act swiftly to adopt a single standard for FM IBOC technology.”162 This 
seemed to signal the trade association’s submission to the fact that an alternate-band DAB 
system was no longer a viable regulatory outcome. However, CEA also suggested that “[a]ll 
intellectual property included in the standard must either be available free of charge to those 
wishing to use it, or it must be licensed under reasonable terms in a non-discriminatory manner 
to anyone who wishes to use it.”163 CEA reminded the Commission to “take note of the fact that 
many of the commenters in this phase of the proceeding are investors in iBiquity or have entered 
into special contractual or licensing agreements with iBiquity. While their input to the 
proceeding is valuable...the Commission should also consider the interests of parties who...do not 
currently have an established relationship with iBiquity.”164
By this time, the majority of independent broadcasters who filed comments with the FCC 
were openly skeptical of IBOC. Many asserted that the technology had no perceived net benefit. 
Chuck Conrad of Kilgore, Texas, who first entered broadcasting by building an LPFM station 
and then flipping it for a full-power FM station, worried about the NRSC’s acknowledgment of 
IBOC’s interference potential, which he believed was being downplayed: “Why do we want to 
do something that we are pretty sure will cause problems down the road?”165 Anthony Hunt, 
general manger of Ball State University’s public radio station, directly challenged the operative 
metaphor that IBOC need not be significantly superior to analog. “In addition to running a 
station,” he wrote, “I also teach college courses. A survey of my class indicated that a majority of 
my 19-year-old students do not listen to radio. They do not like the music presented to them, so 
they are looking elsewhere. Now they can find what they want by downloading the music they 
like, eliminating the need for radio altogether.”166 Hunt believed that IBOC would not address 
this trend among younger listeners, and unless the FCC found a technology that did “the decision 
to adopt IBOC will ultimately drive the radio industry into telecommunications obscurity.”167 
The National Federation of Community Broadcasters (NFCB) also chimed in on radio’s 
digital transition. In acknowledgment that it was late to the stage, the NFCB did not directly 
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oppose iBiquity’s technology per se, but did observe that “IBOC is not the best, and may be the 
worst system that could be devised.” Although it minimized transitional risk for existing radio 
broadcasters, IBOC made “no provision for new stations or new program services. That may be 
understandable from the view point of the large entities that recently invested many billions to 
accumulate dozens, or even hundreds of stations in common control. But the FCC is under no 
duty to follow the investors’ risk aversion calculus to its every logical conclusion, where it is 
regulation itself that has deterred entry and frustrated fresh competition.”168
Aspiring LPFM broadcasters similarly worried about IBOC’s effects on their micro-
power signals. Redhawk Community Radio, an LPFM applicant in Temecula, California, 
worried that digital radio interference might “displace the frequency for which we have applied 
and many other frequencies as well.”169 Duane Wittingham of Macomb, Illinois, one of the 
owner/managers of WTND-LP, expressed deep concern that “evidence and comments by some 
organizations that are NOT owners or members of iBiquity [and] the National Association of 
Broadcasters...may turn out to be valid issues and thus could destroy radio reception for many 
Americans.”170 
Other independent broadcasters took issue with the proprietary nature of iBiquity’s 
technology. Radio Kings Bay, Inc. of Kingsland, Georgia was extremely dismayed by iBiquity’s 
licensing scheme. “In...manufacturing venues, such licensing fee costs are funneled back down 
to radio stations or consumer end users as part of equipment purchase pricing. The perverted 
notion of a...license royalty fee on individual radio stations clearly raises the bar for a potential 
Commission sanctioned shakedown of our business where no industry pattern for such 
egregious extortion previously existed.171 Likening the scheme to “a per user Microsoft software 
license” (a comparison iBiquity CEO Robert Struble had already made), Radio Kings Bay 
characterized iBiquity’s business model as “pure sophistry and nothing short of an Enron caliber 
attempt to maximize corporate profits without any regard for broadcast operators like RKBI, a 
last-of-a-dying-breed ‘mom and pop’ community radio station serving a small South Georgia 
market.”172 
If the public was simply skeptical in the first round of public comment on the FCC’s 
digital radio NPRM, by the turn of 2002 it was downright hostile to the idea of IBOC. Several 
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commenters pointed out the potential for interference that FM-IBOC induced by design,173 and 
the especially deleterious effect that interference might have on independent, locally owned 
stations.174 The Amherst Alliance proposed judging the merits of IBOC by a simple “litmus test”: 
“Does this so-called ‘reform,’ or ‘improvement,’ increase or decrease the number of voices being 
heard?”175 In the collective mind of Amherst, the potential for IBOC’s digital sidebands to 
interfere with the signals of other stations made the answer an unqualified “no.” In fact, “[i]n the 
view of most Members of [the Alliance], radio Digitalization is still seen as an expensive, and 
potentially counterproductive, effort to resolve problems of  substance -- poor quality 
programming, lack of enough news coverage, lack of enough local coverage, lack of enough 
innovation, lack of enough variety and far too many commercials -- with technological ‘glitz’ 
and glitter.”176 Philipp E. Meyer of Cambridge, Massachusetts might not have been the most 
eloquent commenter, but was certainly the most passionate. “DO NOT LET THIS OCCUR!!!,” 
he wrote. “Let’s look out for the interests of the people here...not the interest of a few gigantic 
profit-driven corporations. Radio belongs to you, me, and our grandchildren. Not to the CEO’s 
and controlling shareholders of a few big media and telecom companies. Leave the FM Dial FM. 
Help us get more stations, more choice, more freedom.”177 Edward Czelada of Imlay City, 
Michigan openly questioned the long-term viability of IBOC: “Why should we switch...if the 
audio quality is only subjectively better than analog FM? In 10 years we may have a better idea 
what is the best method for transmitting digital audio.”178 
Other members of the public questioned the apparent imbalance of benefits that would 
accrue to large broadcast conglomerates should IBOC be approved by the FCC.179 The Virginia 
Center for the Public Press expanded upon its initial criticisms. “The FCC errs in assuming 
IBOC would be of any value to the public interest. In fact, it is quite contrary to the public 
interest,” it declared.180 “The unchallenged assumption that broadcasters are entitled to a one-to-
one replacement of their analog station with a digital station is simply the worst kind of 
Corporate Welfare, a 21st century equivalent of the Divine Right Of Kings.”181 Mark Nagel of 
Santa Rosa, California pointed out that military hurdles to using spectrum compatible with 
Eureka 147 DAB technology in the United States no longer existed. “[J]ust a few months ago, 
the FCC...announced that in a complete reversal of 1992 decisions, the Commission is now 
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reallocating portions of [Eureka-147 spectrum] for private civilian uses. Thus it is now politically 
and technically possible as well as more economically advantageous to re-investigate America 
joining the rest of the world in using the world accepted standard for Digital Audio 
Broadcasting.”182 
At the very least, the public begged the FCC to engage in independent testing of IBOC 
instead of relying solely on industry-provided data funneled through the NRSC.183 In the words of 
William Stribling of New York City, “I am...concerned about the continuing escalating loss of 
the public airways to private interest whose interests are not in the public interest.”184 Some 
citizens continued to question the need for a digital radio conversion; Dana J. Woods of 
Richmond, Virginia reminded the FCC that “for every letter such as this that you receive, there 
are probably literally tens of thousands of Americans who are not even aware of this unsavory 
conversion plan and its implications.”185  
The industry response to this barrage of increasingly incisive opposition to IBOC was to 
ignore, dismiss, or misconstrue the issues causing conflict between the actors. The National 
Association of Broadcasters was adamantine: “NAB, along with virtually all industry 
commenters, call on the FCC to rapidly follow the now ineluctable steps leading to digital 
broadcasting for America’s radio broadcasters and the listening public.”186 iBiquity asserted that 
“No technical problems associated with IBOC have been identified, and no credible regulatory or 
business impediments to the implementation of IBOC have been presented,”187 and that “[t]he 
comments in this proceeding fully support the conclusions of the NRSC...on this issue. It is 
important to note that no one has provided any evidence to the contrary.”188 This declaration 
simply refused to acknowledge the scores of comments filed against the imposition of IBOC by 
independent broadcasters and members of the public, some of whom had documented the 
existence of the technology’s fundamental detriments. From iBiquity’s viewpoint, “the public 
interest would be better served by a regulatory approach that has a presumption in favor of 
IBOC.”189 On questions of the technology’s proprietary nature, iBiquity promised it would 
comply with existing FCC rules governing patented technologies, invoking a policy promulgated 
more than 40 years ago and never revised since.190 In response to NPR’s suggestion that 
alternate-band DAB systems be left open to consideration, iBiquity argued that any such 
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exploration was “a separate issue not relevant to this technical proceeding and [should be 
addressed] in another forum.”191 
Offstage, conversations took place that suggested deep disunity within the broadcast 
community over the potential benefits of FM-IBOC. Charles Morgan, senior vice president of 
Susquehanna Radio and chairman of the NRSC, admitted in Radio World that “A search of [our 
evaluation] will show flaws that we wish were not there, but it will also reveal many reasons why 
broadcasters should embrace this new form of FM broadcasting.” However, “[f]or IBOC to 
succeed, we will need a cooperative effort between iBiquity and broadcasters to get stations on 
the air quickly...if broadcasters do not move forward and support IBOC, it and iBiquity will fail - 
and if IBOC fails, we, the broadcasters, will also suffer.”192 The NRSC would later hint that 
significant problems still existed with iBiquity’s AM-IBOC system, which might preclude its 
full-time use by radio stations.193 Radio World reported that “consistently, FCC staff engineers 
and commissioners have indicated that the agency wants to help radio with the digital transition, 
that they recognize the importance of DAB and have confidence in the NRSC,”194 despite the 
growing amount of public comment to the contrary.
iBiquity pushed ahead with its business plan, working with a handful of consumer 
electronics manufacturers to have digital radio receivers on store shelves by the beginning of 
2003 and planning marketing campaigns in the markets where IBOC would first be introduced.195 
The company deflected criticism of its broadcaster licensing fee, portraying it as “consistent with 
those of other high-end, low-volume software applications and reflects a much smaller 
component of the licensing revenues iBiquity will receive compared to those from [equipment] 
manufacturers.”196 The NAB and NRSC took no official position on iBiquity’s business model, 
and Radio World reported that “a source close to the Commission said he doubted the agency 
would ‘put a wet blanket on this transition by getting into’” the licensing fee controversy.197 
iBiquity CEO Robert Struble now claimed the company had spent between $100-$150 million in 
research and development costs and “we’ve got to get something back” for that investment.198 
National Public Radio, having declared onstage that FM-IBOC could not be feasible 
without a multicast function, announced offstage that it had formed a Digital Transition Advisory 
Committee with an explicit focus on designing a multicast application for the iBiquity system. 
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Although NPR suspected commercial broadcasters were not enamored with the idea of 
multicasting due to the potential fragmentary effect it might have on shrinking radio audiences, it 
saw the feature as a way to draw disenchanted listeners back to the medium and provide IBOC 
DAB with an identifiable “killer application.” NPR used part of its 2002 digital conversion 
subsidy from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting to explore multicast technology and 
entered into negotiations with iBiquity over an equitable licensing fee structure for stations that 
might choose to multicast.199 Mike Starling, the man in charge of NPR’s exploration into 
multicasting, was quite candid about the need for such functionality: “The lack of a federal effort 
for multimode [multicast] digital radio standards could make IBOC a short-lived deadend and 
delay the advent of successful digital radio.”200 If the FCC refused to foster innovation in the 
DAB space, public broadcasters would take up the slack.
Dissent within the ranks of broadcasters over IBOC forced a bit of offstage introspection. 
Gary D. Sharpe, a veteran broadcast engineer, commented in Radio World that “[p]ersonally, I 
just cannot see any justification for IBOC...except as a way for equipment manufacturers to force 
up a staggering market....We are unfortunately already committed. Too bad. We’ve lost 
creativity in radio, now we are going to lose listeners entirely.”201 Microsoft’s Skip Pizzi, now 
part of Radio World’s regular roster of commentators, worried that IBOC was specifically 
tailored to appeal to commercial broadcasters. “While controlling one’s own destiny is a laudable 
goal and cherished promise of American enterprise,” he wrote, “the push for IBOC has run 
roughshod over another important American principle: consensus. It thereby violates one the of 
the basic rules of the road in today’s technology development. It hearkens back to an earlier, 
less-enlightened time, when corporate power and oligarchic hegemony could unilaterally control 
the path and market development of an industry.” 
From its conception, IBOC was “fundamentally a blocking policy, primarily intended to 
retain the status quo for incumbent broadcasters. From an engineering standpoint, it’s been a 
transition plan in search of a technology, with its primary requirements oriented toward damage 
control rather than growth.” In Pizzi’s view, there was little impetus for broadcasters to adopt 
IBOC en masse: “In fact, it is largely agreed that IBOC is a less-than-optimal migration path, yet 
it persists.” He lamented IBOC as an indicator of “how important the business aspects of radio 
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broadcasting are in the United States, and how reduced the public service value of the medium 
has become.”202 Although Radio World formally came out as an editorial proponent of IBOC in 
March of 2002, editor Paul McLane recognized that iBiquity “can appear prickly about questions 
that I consider legitimate points of discussion,” and urged the company to improve its image.203 
The onus, regarded McLane, was still on IBOC’s proponents to justify its potential benefits:204 
It’s not sufficient for [IBOC] supporters to say, “The world is going digital, and radio 
can’t be left behind.”...Managers will be asked to spend money on IBOC hardware, IBOC 
fees and IBOC promotion....Owners will want to see their return....One thing is clear 
from the questions being asked: iBiquity Digital still has work to do to educate 
broadcasters about the basics of digital radio and why stations should spend money on 
it....iBiquity and the NRSC should get that little problem solved, and pronto.205 
III. AM-IBOC Inflames Controversy
Less than a month after public comment had closed on the question of the FCC’s 
potential endorsement of FM-IBOC, iBiquity tendered its own report to regulators on the 
feasibility of its AM-IBOC system.206 iBiquity claimed that the test results demonstrated its 
system “offers significant benefits that cannot be matched by analog AM 
operations....[including] improved audio quality...accompanied by strong signal durability....The 
test program also determined that AM IBOC can be introduced without a harmful impact on 
existing analog AM operations.”207 The NRSC seemed inclined to agree, telling the FCC that 
“AM IBOC will transform AM broadcasting through dramatic improvements in AM audio 
quality....This will allow AM broadcasters to diversify their program offerings and compete for 
listeners with high quality non-broadcast audio and entertainment offerings....Any concerns 
about the potential impact of IBOC are outweighed by the tremendous benefits IBOC will offer 
AM broadcasters.”208 
Within ten days of iBiquity’s submission to the FCC, the NAB filed, on the NRSC’s 
behalf, the latter’s formal evaluation of iBiquity’s AM-IBOC system.209 Its conclusions were 
mixed. Considering that AM broadcast signal propagation has very different properties than FM, 
and that both IBOC modes fattened the spectral footprint of every radio station, the NRSC 
observed that implementing AM in an interference-free manner was next to impossible, and such 
interference would most likely be noticed by some listeners.210 This problem was noted by two 
observers to the NRSC field tests, which involved just four AM radio stations.211 “Clear Channel 
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raised concerns about a potential greater impact of AM IBOC on analog AM reception than is 
indicated by the data in the AM IBOC Test Data Report. C. Crane Company expressed concerns 
about the impact of potential AM IBOC interference on listeners distant from AM stations.”212 
Most notable was the omission of any test data from iBiquity on the performance of an 
AM-IBOC signal at night, when skywave propagation increased a station’s range - and the 
potential for a digital signal to create destructive interference over a larger area. The NRSC 
recommended that AM-IBOC be implemented during the daytime only, and even even suggested 
that nighttime operation of IBOC be restricted until such time as all-digital broadcasts became 
the norm.213 The NRSC concluded that “there are some unanswered questions that can only be 
answered by deploying the AM IBOC service on a larger scale than was possible for this test 
program. Such deployment is the only way to characterize a medium-wave service like AM 
IBOC with real certainty.”214 Three days after the NRSC tendered its latest report, the FCC 
opened a third round of public comment designed to interrogate the technical merits of iBiquity’s 
AM-IBOC system.215 
Backstage, iBiquity CEO Robert Struble met with representatives of the FCC’s Media 
Bureau, lobbying the agency to produce a Report and Order endorsing the rollout of IBOC on 
both bands by August 31, 2002.216 Publicly, iBiquity proclaimed in its comments that “[t]he 
NRSC’s recommendation that the Commission proceed with a daytime only service while 
additional nighttime testing is conducted” actually “reflects the NRSC’s enthusiasm about AM 
IBOC and the NRSC’s belief that the benefits to the public of IBOC should not be delayed....At 
the same time, this approach provides iBiquity and the broadcast industry with additional time to 
analyze the potential impact of AM IBOC on nighttime analog service and to develop an 
industry consensus on the best approach for nighttime [digital broadcasting].”217 iBiquity’s 
bottom-line concern was its bottom line. “Commission endorsement of AM and authorization of 
digital service, even on an interim basis pending development of final IBOC rules, will foster 
iBiquity’s commercialization schedule and the prompt introduction of the benefits of IBOC 
technology.”218 
The National Association of Broadcasters supplemented iBiquity’s enthusiasm. “NAB 
believes that IBOC is critical to the future of broadcasting in the AM band and believes that AM 
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must be included with FM in the initial authorization and deployment of IBOC service and 
receivers, so that it will be insured a place in radio’s digital future.”219 Advancing AM-IBOC 
deployment, argued the NAB, would “provide for real world experience with IBOC operations, 
particularly within the difficult AM environment.”220 Although FM-IBOC, in the NAB’s opinion, 
would provide “ a qualitative improvement to existing FM quality with few identifiable 
drawbacks,” AM-IBOC, “by contrast, will allow a dramatic – perhaps a transformative – change 
in AM quality.” Such a transformation “may require acceptance of more interference than would 
be acceptable in a more desirable listening environment, such as FM,” but the “constraints on 
current AM quality” would make this a “tradeoff of limited new [analog] interference for vastly 
improved digital quality.”221 
iBiquity’s broadcast-investors were qualified, but unified, in their basic support of AM-
IBOC. Susquehanna Radio recognized that AM-IBOC was “not without its shortcomings,” and 
explicitly acknowledged the real potential for interference, but concluded that “the gains of the 
system far outweigh the losses.”222 Infinity Broadcasting characterized AM-IBOC’s interference 
potential as “minimal, manageable, and should not be cause to delay the implementation of the 
IBOC AM system, as the problems that arise from potential interference in certain circumstances 
during the hybrid phase will be far outweighed by the vast benefits that will be realized from 
iBiquity' s IBOC technology.”223 Cox Radio, Inc., went so far as to ask the Commission to 
implement a plan to phase out analog AM broadcasting in order to alleviate the potential 
interference concerns raised by IBOC implementation.224 Only Disney, of all major broadcasters 
(and an iBiquity investor), urged a semblance of caution: “To adopt a digital system that creates 
interference at night in legacy receivers may be the equivalent of burning the bridge you are 
standing on.” That said, “[Disney] also recognizes that, like the sign in the highway construction 
zone which says ‘Temporary Inconvenience, Permanent Improvement,’ some compromises are 
unavoidable during the conversion process.”225 
Noting that “virtually every other means of electronic mass media is transitioning to or 
otherwise deploying digital technology,” National Public Radio endorsed the NRSC report 
approving AM-IBOC for daytime deployment. “Public AM radio stations must have the option 
of transitioning to digital technology as well in order to further their public interest mission, or 
141
risk falling further behind other mass media in signal quality.”226 However, NPR vehemently 
opposed the suggestion of phasing out analog broadcasting,227 and further questioned iBiquity’s 
broadcaster-licensing regime. NPR worried that license fees would be “unreasonably 
burdensome, particularly for public broadcasters who have limited resources. Therefore, the 
technology should be licensed for use by noncommercial educational radio stations either 
without charge or under terms and conditions that are reasonable and predictable under the 
circumstances.”228 
Among equipment manufacturers, the split of enthusiasm for IBOC between broadcast-
electronics companies and receiver vendors was now palpable. Transmitter-maker Nautel 
worried that “continued absence of an FCC endorsement of IBOC will slow this commercial 
launch and prevent the introduction of IBOC technology.”229 Harris Corporation, which had 
already paid iBiquity a licensing fee to manufacture IBOC-compatible transmitters, agreed.230 
However, the C. Crane Company - a receiver manufacturer which had raised concerns about 
AM-IBOC-generated interference during NRSC testing - urged the FCC to defer any 
endorsement of digital AM radio until its interference characteristics, especially at night, were 
more fully understood. “We are in a free market economy and consumers are not asking for this 
service,” C. Crane observed. “Millions of listeners will lose their choice of radio if full or partial 
conversion is achieved....Our country’s AM broadcast system has served us well. Any new 
system that is to serve us as well or better should not be implemented while still a work in 
progress.”231 The Consumer Electronics Association expressed renewed concerns about the IBOC 
system, specifically focusing on the potential for AM-IBOC interference.232 CEA suggested the 
FCC mandate that an AM-IBOC station be required to mitigate any interference it caused to 
neighboring broadcasters.233 
One consulting engineer, Glen Clark & Associates, agreed with the CEA’s assessment of 
AM-IBOC. “[Existing] AM frequency-allocation rules requires conventional AM transmissions 
to extend no further than 10 kHz on either side of the carrier frequency....The Commission's 
system of allocating AM licenses was founded on that base presumption,” Clark explained. “The 
proposed IBOC system extends beyond the limits proscribed in [existing rules].” Since the 
majority of the digital data in the AM-IBOC system is “actually transmitted in spectrum which is 
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part of the two first-adjacent channels, the presently-proposed system is...an IBAC (‘In Band 
Adjacent Channel’) system.” Clark candidly questioned whether the FCC’s current AM station 
allocation rules provided “sufficient separation between stations” to make AM-IBOC even 
viable.234 
Independent AM broadcasters were openly dismayed with the results of the NRSC’s 
evaluation of AM-IBOC. The Kentucky-based AM Broadcasters Association commented that 
consolidation precipitated by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 had detrimentally affected the 
competitive environment for AM broadcasting. In the Association’s view, AM-IBOC would 
simply make the situation worse by funneling licensing money from small broadcasters (who 
already operated close to the margins) to large broadcasters (the majority of which were invested 
in “iBiguity”). That led the Association to ask a critical question: “Is it the FCC's desire to give 
these few companies which control 50% of all commercial radio in the US complete control over 
the digital broadcasting of radio signals in the US and hold all stations hostage by requiring a 
royalty payment on a government mandated broadcast standard?”235 
Frederick R. Vobbe of Lima, Ohio, a broadcast engineer with more than 30 years of 
experience, observed that post-1996 industry consolidation had decimated engineering staffs at 
stations around the country, and as a result “there is not the attention paid to interference issues. 
One can successfully argue that if [AM analog] stations can not change power or pattern at their 
assigned times, how can you be sure IBOC will be turned off at local sunset, and returned at 
sunrise? Since the station(s) nor the Commission can police this issue reasonably the danger to 
the public is high.”236 Vobbe also pointed out that AM-IBOC, given the nature of skywave 
propagation, had the potential to interfere with stations in neighboring countries, and thus may 
contravene international treaties governing frequency allocation.237 A Canadian lawyer, Philip 
Rafuse, echoed this concern.238 
Some AM station owners argued that IBOC implementation should be put on hold until 
the interference potential of the technology was better known.239 Neal Newman, the chief 
engineer of WTTM-AM in Princeton, New Jersey, related his experiences of working at a station 
that had been AM-IBOC test bed. He questioned the validity of an evaluatory regime partially 
developed and wholly paid for by iBiquity.240 Many independent broadcasters simply could not 
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see the economic benefit of deploying AM-IBOC on small-market stations and, like public 
broadcasters, worried that iBiquity’s licensing scheme would make their marginal fiscal situation 
a dire one.241 
Nearly identical sentiments against AM-IBOC were found among the public. Interference 
was clearly a problem, and it puzzled many commenters why the FCC and NRSC were not 
treating the issue with the seriousness it deserved.242 According to Harry L. Helms of Ridgecrest, 
California,“It is perhaps difficult for those living in the eastern United States to fully appreciate 
how spotty and unreliable daytime AM coverage can be in the western states, even in a populous 
area such as California....However, the events of  September 11 have forcefully demonstrated 
there is still a clear need for AM signal coverage over wide areas to provide a means of  
communications to the public in the event of a national emergency.” Therefore, concluded 
Helms, “[a]dopting IBOC for AM broadcasting---with its accompanying adjacent channel noise 
and reduced daytime coverage---would leave large areas of the western United States and their 
population without a potentially vital means of communications in a time of crisis.”243 Joesph 
Fela of Plainfield, New Jersey filed a report detailing his experiences of hearing test AM-IBOC 
signals emanating from New York and catalogued his reception problems when the digital 
sidebands were present.244 Keven M. Tekel, a citizen with radio engineering experience, tendered 
his own receiver analysis using eight separate models that demonstrated the potential for digital 
interference on the AM dial.245 
Upon learning that AM stations would have to sacrifice analog fidelity for digital 
transmission, many members of the public openly criticized the notion of intentionally degrading 
incumbent radio service for the benefit of an unproven technology.246 Others worried about the 
proprietary nature of iBiquity’s business model.247 From the listeners’ perspective, the allure of 
AM-IBOC was nonexistent; a part-time digital radio service, with questionable reception 
characteristics and audio fidelity, was essentially a nonstarter.248 Michael Erickson of North 
Babylon, New York, challenged the primary operative metaphor: “Digital is NOT always 
better.” Radio’s inherent problem, in Erickson’s view, was more related to “WHAT is on the air 
and NOT how it sounds from a technical standpoint (we can all thank the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996 for this)....You can research to your heart’s content, but people simply get tired of 
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the same product over and over.”249 According to the Virginia Center for the Public Press, any 
radio broadcast technology that “decreases the number of stations a small business may advertise 
on, reduces the number of stations a nonprofit may have PSAs on, reduces the number of stations 
that a listener may turn to for different programming choices will ACCELERATE the public, 
nonprofit and small business abandonment of the existing [radio dial].”250 David S. Forsman of 
Lewiston, Idaho suggested that it “would be better for the FCC to choose one good system than 
having to send broadcasters and listeners through a succession of inferior ones.”251 From the 
perspective of the Amherst Alliance, “If the Federal Communications Commission is willing to 
give as much weight to the views of actual radio listeners, and of potentially threatened small 
broadcasters, as it assigns to the views of those with a direct financial stake in mandatory 
implementation of the IBOC technology, then the Commission’s next course of action should be 
obvious” - the consideration of alternate DAB technologies which would provide more listener 
choice and did not harm existing analog radio services.252
As in the previous two rounds of onstage activity, IBOC proponents ignored, dismissed, 
or misconstrued the growing opposition from several quarters. iBiquity had the temerity to claim 
that “[t]he record...shows that in the past eighteen months IBOC has been transformed from a 
developing technology into a commercial product awaiting imminent introduction. The public 
interest will be best served by prompt FCC endorsement of IBOC to support upcoming launch of 
commercial receiver sales next year.”253 Commenters who opposed AM-IBOC were 
characterized as arguing that “AM broadcasters should be relegated to the analog world with no 
digital future. This is not a credible argument in a world where all other analog radio services are 
migrating to a digital future.” With regard to increasing concerns about its proprietary nature, 
iBiquity dismissed them with confidence, noting there was no real Commission precedent for the 
active regulation of proprietary broadcast technology.254 Jumping to iBiquity’s defense, Greater 
Media claimed that the NRSC IBOC test program was “the most thorough program of its kind in 
the history of radio broadcasting” and guaranteed “a fair, accurate and unbiased evaluation of the 
system.”255 
Such hubris did not sit well with broadcast engineer Scott Todd: “I'd like to rebut 
iBiquity's comments that there is overwhelming industry support for IBOC. The ones who are so 
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enthusiastic are the corporate suits who think a little technical tinkering is going to reverse 
declining listenership caused by inept programming....I don't see the enthusiasm amongst the 
rank and file engineers....I know that I'll be fighting against it at my company.”256 
As conflicts between character-constituents grew onstage, iBiquity proceeded with its 
timetable for the public launch of its digital broadcast technology. It raised $45 million, mostly 
from venture capital funds, and projected the attainment of profitability by as early as 2003.257 It 
closed three more licensing deals with transmitter-manufacturers,258 announced its intent to 
conduct further field testing on AM-IBOC’s nighttime propagation characteristics,259 and re-
branded the technology with the friendly moniker of “HD Radio.” According to Radio World,  
“iBiquity’s first choice was iDAB,” but feared the potential of trademark litigation from Apple 
Computer.”260 The National Radio Systems Committee relatedly created a working group with 
the goal of crafting formal transmission standards for HD Radio, thus preparing to put a 
milestone-imprimatur on iBiquity’s technology.261 
iBiquity’s upbeat news was offset by reportage chronicling growing discontent with HD 
Radio’s fundamental deficiencies. Radio World reportbacks from the fall 2002 NAB Radio Show 
suggested the number of HD-contrarians within the radio industry was on the rise.262 This was 
reflected in reader-feedback to the publication, which increasingly questioned in pointed terms 
whether HD Radio actually represented an improvement over analog, or was instead designed to 
degrade analog radio so as to make HD seem like an improvement.263 Scott Clifton, the director 
of engineering at SportingNews Radio in Chicago and a man with a history of HD development 
work dating back to Project Acorn, proclaimed his discouragement in no uncertain terms
at what politics have done to the IBOC system. The shortfalls of the AM system seem to 
be getting handled like political damage control....What are the real benefits to either 
the industry or the consumers? Going digital for the sake of saying it [sic] digital is not 
the way to go, but appears to be the driving force behind IBOC....Everyone should be 
sharpening their pencils to draw out a new design that actually improves the 
broadcasters’ and consumers’ product. I am tired of seeing the audio quality being 
sacrificed in an effort to get IBOC on the air....Let’s consider new spectrum!264 
Radio World itself chastised iBiquity for not doing more pre-launch public education to increase 
the potential for marketplace adoption.265 Further complicating matters, Clear Channel - the 
largest broadcast conglomerate in the United States and an iBiquity investor - openly questioned 
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the feasibility of HD Radio. In an interview with Radio World, the company’s senior vice 
president of capital management, Bill Suffa, admitted he was not completely sold on the 
technology. “The whole...thing is one of economics. I don’t know what they are...from a 
financial basis, it’s very difficult to justify going to [HD] at this time.” Suffa lamented the fact 
that no HD receivers were available yet, which he cited as a reason to delay broadcaster-
investment. He also expressed concern about iBiquity’s licensing fee structure.266 
Consternation over iBiquity’s licensing policies began to resonate offstage. Tom Taggart, 
a partial owner of two FM radio stations in West Virginia, told Radio World that “[t]he fees will 
kill [HD Radio]. This will be a toy for the big groups in the major markets....iBiquity’s demand 
for fees up front is a sure sign that they know [HD] is doomed to failure. Otherwise, they would 
be content to collect a royalty of a few pennies on the sale of each...receiver. But they know that 
turkeys can’t fly, so they are going to be paid up front and get out.”267 The chief engineer of a 
radio station in Nebraska reported that when iBiquity’s licensing scheme was explained at his 
local Society of Broadcast Engineers meeting, the news broke “like wind when someone cuts the 
cheese.”268 
Columnist Skip Pizzi expanded concerns of HD Radio’s proprietary nature beyond the 
fiscal dimension: he contended that the “$100+ million spent to date on iBiquity’s work was 
expended primarily as a prophylactic investment by commercial broadcasters to ensure that their 
passage to the digital world would be made on their own terms.”269 Now that the effort was 
nearing fruition, Pizzi asked the industry to look back on what it had wrought: “What I primarily 
object to today are iBiquity’s proposed protectionist constraints on [HD] technology,” he wrote. 
“I fear these artificial restrictions will reduce [HD] to insignificance in the consumer 
marketplace, and thereby cause it to fail....The current plan is unbalanced in commercial 
broadcasters’ favor, and is therefore a risk.” HD Radio “may be the only bullet in broadcasters’ 
digital conversion arsenal. If that one shot misses, the battle will likely be lost. If someone 
notices the weapon is mis-aimed, it is their duty to try to correct the problem before the shot is 
fired.”270 
In response to this backlash, iBiquity announced a plan to waive the up-front licensing 
fees for stations that committed to HD Radio broadcasting by the end of 2002. Scott Stull, 
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iBiquity’s director of broadcast business development, assured readers of Radio World that the 
company “will work with broadcasters to develop a license fee model that is acceptable to both 
parties.”271 The publication was unimpressed: “The waiver is good news, but it comes too soon 
and ends too quickly for many broadcasters....Offering a waiver now, when the biggest groups 
are the ones that can afford to commit, only advances the perception held by some critics that 
iBiquity tilts toward its investor partners at the expense of smaller non-investors. Further, this 
waiver asks managers to commit to ordering equipment before the FCC has even indicated 
whether it approves of the concept, and in what form.”272 
Backstage, contacts between the FCC and iBiquity grew in frequency as 2002 ground on. 
Between May and August, executives and senior representatives of the company met at least 
once a month with FCC officials to brief them on the company’s development progress and to 
press for the unrestricted proliferation of HD Radio. Initially, iBiquity wanted FCC endorsement 
of its technology “by the end of Summer 2002.”273 That gradually slipped to “early September.”274 
In June, iBiquity told Chairman Michael Powell that it hoped the FCC would act expeditiously 
“to endorse IBOC and authorize interim AM daytime and FM IBOC operations,”275 and later 
repeated this plea to Commissioners Michael Copps and Kevin Martin.276 iBiquity was not the 
only one paying personal visits to the FCC: National Public Radio made two trips in September 
and October to educate Commissioners and senior staff about its FM-HD multicast development 
work.277 
IV. HD Radio Unleashed
Despite the apparent disagreement between actors, which was noticeable by now on all 
stages, The FCC gave iBiquity its blessing on October 10, 2002 and selected HD Radio as “the 
technology that will permit AM and FM radio broadcasters to introduce digital operations 
efficiently and rapidly.” With a simple application for authorization, AM and FM stations were 
given the permission to commence HD broadcasting at their discretion.278 Formal standard-
setting procedures for the technology were deferred to a future rulemaking.279 The policy 
trajectory could not have been clearer: “[W]e select the hybrid AM and FM IBOC systems tested 
by the NRSC as de facto standards for interim digital operation....[T]he Commission will no 
longer entertain in this proceeding any proposal for digital radio broadcasting other than [HD 
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Radio].”280 
The FCC praised HD Radio as a “remarkable technical achievement,” but acknowledged 
that it could not be implemented “without some service ramifications.”281 Citing the NRSC’s 
“comprehensive test program,” the FCC agreed with policy protagonists that “the record in this 
proceeding presents compelling evidence that...[HD] has the potential to significantly improve” 
the quality of broadcast radio.282 Surprisingly, the spectrum-expansion necessary to implement 
HD Radio went unaddressed in the Reportand Order. The FCC took at face value the comments 
of “the NRSC and the majority of commenters that the potential for new interference from [HD] 
operations is insignificant when compared with the advantages and opportunities inherent in this 
digital technology.”283 This “majority” could only be constructed by ignoring the wide-ranging 
opposition to HD Radio that had been filed in the proceeding. Regulators approved the 
unrestricted use of FM-HD sidebands, including iBiquity’s extended hybrid mode, and also 
authorized stations to experiment with multicasting. With regard to AM, the FCC heeded the 
NRSC’s advice and did not authorize nighttime HD broadcasting on a blanket basis until further 
testing was completed. Although it expressed sympathy “to the concerns of those commenters 
who object to the loss of the ‘legacy’ AM analog service,” the FCC rationalized its approval of 
the technology by noting that its uptake was voluntary, even as it foreclosed the consideration of 
alternative DAB technologies.284  
Acknowledging that many individual citizens and independent broadcasters supported the 
consideration of HD Radio alternatives, the FCC deemed such an approach infeasible, due to “no 
appreciable support within the broadcast industry,” and declared that it would “no longer 
consider this approach in this proceeding.”285 With regard to iBiquity’s licensing model, the FCC 
cast its decision as an opportunity to assess whether iBiquity and other patent holders “are 
entering into licensing agreements under reasonable terms and conditions that are demonstrably 
free of unfair discrimination. The Commission will monitor this situation and seek additional 
comment as warranted.”  The FCC characterized the licensing costs provided by iBiquity as not 
unreasonable “when compared with digital conversion costs in other services,”  and re-
emphasized the voluntary nature radio’s digital transition.286 
After the unanimous decision, three Commissioners issued public statements addressing 
149
HD Radio. Kathleen Abernathy and Kevin Martin, speaking jointly, acknowledged that there 
may be “some interference with existing services, but but we believe that the impact will be 
minimal and is outweighed by the benefits of digital audio broadcasting....In the interim, we 
expect that broadcasters will work closely with the affected parties to resolve these issues 
without intervention from the Commission.”287 Ultimately, however, it was Commissioner 
Michael Copps who unwittingly summed up the FCC’s ignorance of and predisposition toward 
“faith-based regulation” on the issue of digital radio. “A few questions remain to be settled, 
including how the [HD] system will function in the real world; what is the potential for and 
extent of interference that [HD Radio] could cause to existing services; and the technical 
feasibility of nighttime [AM-HD] transmissions,” he remarked [emphasis added]. Copps 
expressed confidence that keeping an eye on the pulse of the radio industry would suffice to 
address any problems that might arise.288 Radio World called the FCC ruling “historic” and 
reported that the NRSC and iBiquity were in deliberation to fast-track a formal HD Radio 
standard for FCC approval by mid-2003.289 NPR “applauded” the FCC’s nod toward 
multicasting.290 
The initial policy development of digital radio in the United States was marked by actors 
primarily speaking past one another, selectively engaging in dialogue with those that held 
apparent political or economic sway over the official endorsement of HD Radio by the FCC. 
iBiquity Digital Corporation’s aggressive work backstage, coupled with its impressive stable of 
broadcast conglomerate support, was adequate enough for the FCC to certify the proliferation of 
HD Radio without conducting any independent evaluation or analysis. Large broadcasters, 
having invested in the development of HD Radio for more than a decade, saw the technology as 
a digital transition mechanism that they could not only control, but profit from. Public 
broadcasters played a low-key but important role in HD Radio’s formal introduction; while they 
remained implicitly committed to the technology, when intra-industry doubts began to appear 
about its functionality, they reacted autonomously and proactively to work on developing an 
application - multicasting - that could provide the technology with a unique value above and 
beyond simply being “better than analog.”
Concerns expressed by the public and within the industry - ranging from individual 
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citizens to independent broadcasters - were ignored with few exceptions in the policymaking 
process, although the number and vehemency of these concerns was unprecedented for such a 
technical rulemaking. Listeners themselves repeatedly hammered at a core theme: improvements 
to radio in the United States required new content-based development, not a technological 
panacea. Ironically, although it was the Telecommunications Act of 1996 which provided the 
catalyst for industry consolidation (and increased investment in iBiquity), the public ultimately 
blamed regulatory detachment for decimating the programming quality and diversity of radio. By 
and large, they clamored for improvements to broadcast service, but not by digital means. The 
FCC effectively considered the proliferation of HD Radio as an economic exercise with little 
need for technical justification and completely devoid of any meaningful homage to a “public 
interest,” except as defined by dominant industry actors. With the sanctioned privatization of 
U.S. digital radio technology, the FCC signaled its clear intent to facilitate the ongoing 
neoliberalization of broadcasting.
In the end, iBiquity and its broadcast-investors got what they wanted: a technological 
monopoly on U.S. radio’s digital future and permission to begin the monetization process. 
However, by the time the FCC acted to endorse HD Radio, sentiments were far from unanimous 
on the inherent progressiveness of the technology itself. Although its protagonists dominated the 
first act of the FCC’s digital radio rulemaking and secured significant policy commitments in the 
process, the actual practical viability of the HD protocol was far from guaranteed.
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Chapter 5: The Troubled Proliferation of HD Radio
With the FCC’s initial approval of HD Radio, its proponents may have thought they were 
free and clear to implement the technology with few restrictions, and that its proliferation would 
be a given. After all, the FCC confirmed the operative metaphors behind the radio industry’s 
chosen technological platform and constructed policy so as to make HD the only allowable 
digital radio mechanism in the United States. However, as more stations began to implement HD 
Radio and iBiquity Digital Corporation worked to refine its technology, its fundamental faults 
became increasingly clear. This further alienated independent broadcasters and the public, who 
were already of the mind that such a questionable and proprietary technology threatened the 
viability of terrestrial radio itself. They ramped up their opposition to HD Radio through 
increased dialogue with the FCC. However, much like the initial debate over the technology’s 
introduction, the agency did not embrace this input and, in fact, worked with HD Radio’s 
proponents to further promote the technology and its uptake. Ironically, these regulations only 
exacerbated growing concerns with the protocol.
I. Backlash to the HD Radio Ruling
Within 10 days of the FCC’s initial rulemaking giving FM and AM stations the green 
light to implement HD Radio, two very different petitions were tendered to FCC imploring it to 
reconsider its decision. The Amherst Alliance, along with 33 other individuals and grassroots 
organizations, chastised the FCC for failing to consider legitimate opposition in the digital radio 
rulemaking.1 “Just as the right of parties to be heard, and not prejudged, lies at the foundation of 
the law,” wrote the Alliance et. al., “so does the principle that the law should be impartial. While 
there are endless exceptions to the law’s general rules, and while even a uniform rule may 
sometimes be tailored to particular circumstances, those who shape the law are accountable for 
explaining why different parties are treated differently.”2 The Alliance accused the FCC of 
ignoring important information regarding HD Radio’s deficiencies “when there was no 
compelling reason to do so.”3 
Consulting engineers Glen Clark & Associates of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania also filed a 
Petition for Reconsideration, but it asked the FCC to expand its Report and Order to give AM 
stations the opportunity to broadcast digitally at night. “Although a minority of AM stations 
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operating with [HD] at night would cause significant interference to distant stations on first-
adjacent channels,” Clark argued that “the number of stations which would cause interference is 
small. It is unnecessary to preclude all nighttime use of [AM-HD] because of a minority of 
cases.”4 It cited policy precedent allowing stations to “enter into mutual-interference agreements” 
and noted that in some cases, especially those involving the largest AM stations in the country, 
two stations that might interfere with each other were more likely than not to be owned by the 
same broadcaster, which could self-police its own airwaves to ameliorate any interference 
problems that arose.5 
Amherst’s Petition spurred a surprising amount of support from members of the public 
who had either participated in the initial DAB rulemaking or were directly affected by the 
interference HD Radio caused to their own listening experience. Kyle Drake, a radio engineer in 
Plymouth, Minnesota, observed that while “many engineers at the FCC and myself see eye-to-
eye on [the potential for HD-related interference]...they have still promoted the adoption of the 
service without even basic testing for interference concerns.”6 REC Networks argued that the 
FCC should “turn it all off and go back to the drawing board.”7 James Jason Wentworth of 
Fairbanks, Alaska argued that the radio industry labored “under the mistaken belief that a 
technological change, such as the implementation of [HD Radio], would increase radio 
listenership. This is incorrect. Improving the quality and increasing the variety of radio 
programming, as well as appealing to more demographic groups, are the only ways to attract 
more radio listeners.”8 Such sentiments were strongly echoed by “experienced broadcast radio 
enthusiast” Kevin Tekel of Warren, New Jersey, who worried that the adoption of a proprietary 
digital broadcast technology “might very well represent the final corporate takeover of the radio 
broadcasting industry and the end of independently owned radio stations.”9 Tekel was not alone 
in this concern: at the August, 2002 annual Grassroots Radio conference, which drew more than 
100 employees and volunteers from 38 community radio stations nationwide, attendees approved 
a resolution opposing HD Radio’s continued implementation without further study of its 
detrimental effects on the AM and FM bands.10 
Several radio listeners filed detailed reports with the FCC explaining HD-related 
interference caused by both AM and FM broadcasters. Commenters ranging from Arizona to 
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Florida, and many places in between, told the FCC about “rushing water” noises caused by 
digital hash from AM-HD stations in New York, Cincinnati and Chicago that had already ruined 
nighttime reception of AM signals in their home communities.11 The public was critical of Glen 
Clark’s petition to expand the use of AM-HD. Charles L. Hutton of Seattle, Washington 
observed that the FCC’s AM allocation rules and interference protection criteria were “based on 
transitory analog modulation conditions. Those deployment rules do not take into account the 
‘always on’ nature of the digital primary and secondary [HD] sidebands.” Until the FCC was 
willing to “model, quantify and perform field studies of nighttime [HD] interference, it is 
extremely premature (and likely incorrect, given early proof of [HD] interference) to consider 
approval of nighttime [AM-HD] operations.”12 Other members of the public noted that neither 
iBiquity, the NRSC, nor the FCC had adequately considered the diversity of radio receivers that 
existed in the marketplace, and warned that many inexpensive models would suffer significant 
HD-related interference.13 
Independent broadcasters also told the FCC that identifiable technological problems with 
HD Radio merited further scrutiny.14 Frederick R. Vobbe of Lima, Ohio - a broadcast engineer, 
amateur radio operator, and coordinator of his county’s emergency-management 
communications - asserted that the HD Radio system’s penchant to cause interference posed 
“serious harm” to existing stations and the public’s right to hear them.15 “While those of us who 
are engineers can understand this concept, and know what is happening,” wrote Vobbe, “the 
average public hears this noise and blames the station they are listening to, rather than the 
offending adjacent channel interference.”16 Vobbe also provided extensive observations about the 
existence of a digital “hissing” noise that affected analog AM stations “well over 1,000 miles 
away” from the offending broadcaster. For example, at night, reception of some of the most 
powerful stations in Chicago was “rendered useless” by digital sideband noise from an AM-HD 
broadcaster in New York.17 Vobbe advocated for the suspension of HD transmissions and the 
testing of alternate DAB systems by a “neutral, third party. The Commission does not want the 
perception of ignoring all options in a race to go ‘digital,’ nor should the Commission show 
preference towards any one party.”18 
On January 22, 2003, the FCC officially recognized the Petitions for Reconsideration and 
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called for further comment on them.19 The industry reacted loudly to this perceived threat. 
iBiquity reported that as of February it had “approximately 130 AM and FM stations” in 26 
states committed to deploying HD Radio technology, up from a dozen test stations the year 
before. This alone, it argued, was a “strong indication” of industry support for its technology.”20 
iBiquity accused the Amherst Alliance of using “any possible procedural argument in an attempt 
to delay the introduction of [HD] services.”21 Although it acknowledged the potential for AM-
HD signals to cause interference, especially at night, iBiquity dismissed this concern with a note 
that it was studying the issue to “improve” the situation.22 The National Association of 
Broadcasters characterized the Amherst petition as full of “frivolous charges and makeweight 
issues...[and] appears intended only to throw sand in the gears of the deployment of the only 
realistic digital solution for terrestrial radio in this country.”23  
The public was not willing to be brushed off so easily. The Virginia Center for the Public 
Press cited NRSC correspondence which suggested that the standards-setting group knew of 
AM-HD interference problems as early as March of 2002.24 “The only benefit of [HD Radio],” 
wrote the VCPP, “will be the ability to legally jam a weaker adjacent signal from the dial under 
the mistaken assumption that people will then have no choice but to listen to the jamming 
station....Hopefully [HD Radio] will make itself obsolete before too many broadcasters are 
bankrupted by [it].25 Citing the “rising tide” of public consternation about HD Radio and actual 
reports of interference in the record, the Amherst Alliance chastised the Commission for making 
a rush to judgment on radio’s digital future.26 The “bottom line point,” wrote the Alliance, was 
that 
the Commission’s conscious compilation of a minutely focused information base left the 
Petitioners with little publicly accessible knowledge and/or arguments for developing 
constructive alternatives to the iBiquity version of...Digital Radio technology. Lacking 
the financial resources we needed, the Petitioners were not able to develop much 
independent information for developing constructive alternatives....Meanwhile, lacking 
the resolve it needed, the Commission was not willing to develop much publicly available 
independent information on alternatives to the iBiquity...technology -- for use by the 
citizens it is supposed to serve.27  
After languishing for more than a year at the FCC, the Amherst Alliance and 63 other interested 
parties filed a Petition for Expedited Relief asking the FCC to formally rule on its Petition for 
Reconsideration.28 The FCC chose not to act.
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Meanwhile, the industry pushed for the expansion of HD Radio beyond the limited 
parameters set by the FCC’s initial approval. In 2003, iBiquity Digital Corporation and the NAB 
tendered studies justifying the unrestricted nighttime use of AM-HD. The NAB formed an ad-
hoc technical group with iBiquity to study the interference issue. This group conducted very 
limited laboratory and field testing, but the NAB was confident enough to proclaim that concerns 
of AM-HD interference would be marginal at best, and that the benefits of extending the reach of 
digital radio far outweighed any harm to analog reception.29 iBiquity predicted that, in a “worst 
case scenario,” less than 5% of AM listeners would be impacted by digital sidebands bouncing 
off the ionosphere and interfering with analog signals at night, and any resultant interference 
would be in the fringe coverage areas of the affected analog stations.30 In a nutshell, although 
iBiquity and the NAB admitted that AM-HD would cause some interference at night, its impact 
was downplayed and listeners were expected to simply deal with it. 
This was not an acceptable conclusion to the public. Eric S. Bueneman of Hazelwood, 
Missouri filed a detailed listening report providing an outsider’s perspective on the 
iBiquity/NAB testing regime. The interference he documented “proves, once and for all, that the 
AM, FM and shortwave bands ARE NOT SUITED for digital radio. [HD] is NOT THE 
ANSWER to radio's alleged ‘problems’.”31 Canadian commenter Philip J. Rafuse implored the 
FCC to consult with Industry Canada on the cross-border interference that was likely to result if 
AM-HD stations commenced nighttime operation nationwide.32
Public broadcasters, acting wholly on their own, met with FCC officials in an effort to 
convince the agency to make multicasting a permanent feature of the FM-HD broadcast protocol. 
In December of 2003, NPR representatives sat down with senior staff to tout the potential of 
multicasting.33 Less than three months later, NPR made a personal presentation of its own 
technical study on the feasibility of multicasting.34 It concluded that not only was it technically 
feasible to split an FM-HD signal into multiple program channels, but their audio quality was 
adequate and these sub-channels would reliably cover most of an FM station’s primary analog 
service area.35 Multicasting, argued NPR, would provide HD Radio with its killer application and 
jump-start listener uptake: “The driving force behind public radio’s digital transition is not just 
the improved audio quality and reduced interference, but the expanded public service and 
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programming opportunities demonstrated and proven by [multicasting].”36 NPR spent most of the 
month of March, 2004 at FCC headquarters meeting individually with every Commissioner’s 
senior legal advisor, touting the necessity of formally integrating multicasting into the HD Radio 
protocol.37 “Commercial stations are not completely enthused,” reported Radio World, “as they 
see secondary audio channels as potential threats to fragment their formats and market-share.”38
Shortly after the FCC’s initial Report and Order approving the proliferation of HD Radio, 
the Corporation for Public Broadcasting hired consulting engineer Doug Vernier to help plan 
NPR’s digital transition, and WUSF-FM in Tampa, Florida became the first NPR affiliate to 
place an order for an HD transmitter.39 The CPB announced it would make $4.5 million available 
to qualified stations to help cover digital conversion costs.40 iBiquity CEO Robert Struble told 
Radio World he expected the FCC to formalize HD Radio as the nationwide DAB standard by 
the end of 2003.41 The company also announced another licensing incentive program, slashing 
one-time broadcaster fees for the first 125 stations to adopt the technology after February 1, 
2003. All noncommercial stations who agreed to implement HD before June 1 would have the 
initial license fee waived completely.42 35 radio station group-owners announced plans to 
implement HD Radio on some 300 stations in 40 markets by the end of the year. Most of the 
companies committed to the transition had an equity stake in iBiquity;43 the company expected 
the number of HD-compatible stations to double by the end of 2004.44 
These seemingly positive developments were not reflected in commentary tendered by 
working broadcasters in the trade press, who spoke frankly in their letters to the editor of Radio 
World. Although the industry had worked diligently to convince the FCC to approve its chosen 
digital broadcast standard, there was little apparent momentum to convert stations to digital 
broadcasts until the full implications of doing so could be ascertained. Just because the industry 
got the policy it wanted did not necessarily mean that stations would begin the conversion 
process straightaway. Frank McCoy of American Media Services in Chicago echoed earlier 
concerns that HD Radio was nothing more than a blocking move to prevent new competition on 
the radio dial.45 KRCO-AM operations director Mike Shane called the imposition of HD Radio 
“a spectrum grab by those currently in possession of frequencies to keep future competition off 
the air....Why else would there be such a push for a signal that nobody will be able to hear, and 
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when they are able, won’t be excited enough to do anything about it?...I am ashamed to have 
missed this obvious point up till now and even more ashamed to be part of this business that, 
with complicity from the FCC, is perpetrating a major scam on the American listening public.46 
Christopher Maxwell, secretary of the Virginia Center for the Public Press, agreed. With the 
“relatively quick death of [HD Radio],” he argued the industry could “move to an ‘intelligent’ 
digital audio broadcast standard....But then again, by then, maybe we will all be getting our radio 
via repeating 802.11 towers with Winamp on our Palm Pilots. So maybe it’ll be a moot point as 
far as broadcasters kill off that waning interest by jamming each others signals and reducing the 
variety available even as wireless internet increase[s] the number of options there.”47 
Even Radio World staff were not overly excited about HD Radio’s proliferation. Editor 
Paul McLane lamented the lack of any substantive public education effort on the part of iBiquity 
and was shaken by the rising tide of skepticism among broadcasters about the technology.48 
Some openly complained that the combination of station equipment upgrades and iBiquity’s 
licensing plan would make HD conversion unaffordable for most small- to medium-market 
broadcasters.49 Larry Tighe, owner of WRNJ-AM in Hackettstown, New Jersey, reiterated the 
call for broadcasters to refocus on localism in programming as a source of industry growth, not 
on an unproven technology which seemed to have more detriments than benefits. “I’ll make a 
better rating with a carbon microphone in my studio than an [HD] station if my content is 
superior to theirs,” sniffed Tighe. “Now let’s see who’s correct after you spend all that money.”50 
Concerns involving HD interference and audio fidelity were hot topics offstage. Radio 
World observed that the technology “pits large group owners against smaller station owners and 
splits NAB’s radio membership.”51 Some broadcasters reported their own HD-related 
interference experiences on both the AM and FM bands.52 Al Germond, the owner of seven radio 
stations in Missouri, implored the industry to engage the listening population for help in 
documenting interference problems. “If [HD Radio] turns out to be deleterious to broadcasting,” 
he warned, “this will become a grassroots issue that should become a concern to both the House 
and Senate Commerce Committees.”53 Editorially, Radio World diplomatically expressed 
concern about the potential for HD-related interference to grow as more digital broadcasters took 
to the air. “It is hard for us to stand by and ignore the obliteration of any station on the dial due to 
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interference. Some stations already are up against the ropes and a defection of listeners due to 
interference could conceivably hasten such a station’s demise. But we are hoping for the best the 
technology has to offer and are looking toward the future as a larger picture.”54  
The radio industry was surprised by a May, 2003 decision of the NRSC to suspend 
standard-setting work on the HD Radio protocol. Following the technology’s preliminary 
endorsement by the FCC seven months prior, iBiquity “upgraded” its system by replacing its 
audio codec with a wholly proprietary one, so as to maintain its monopoly on the intellectual 
property aspects of HD Radio.55 Unfortunately, according to the NRSC, this new codec 
performed so poorly - especially at low bit rates like those used with AM-HD and FM-HD 
multicasting - that the entire viability of HD Radio’s digital audio encoding mechanism was 
called into question. The consensus of NRSC members was that the “new and improved” HD 
Radio produced audio quality that was simply “unacceptable.” This revelation disrupted industry 
plans to get HD stations on the air and, more critically, the timetable for receiver manufacturers 
to turn out compatible and compelling products.56 
Radio World reacted strongly to this pitfall. “The key for iBiquity now is to get a hustle 
on what ‘better’ means and get it done, as quickly as possible,” it urged. “Perhaps the receiver 
rollout is blown for 2004. Maybe not. But better to fix this now than wait to dump a problem in 
the laps of receiver makers and consumers. We urge iBiquity to be as forthright and as open as 
possible with the industry as it seeks solutions to this problem.”57 The NRSC standards-setting 
process was characterized as “far too secretive, and not well-defined....Why do we find ourselves 
so far along on the HD Radio rollout with a core piece of the digital radio puzzle not yet firmly 
in place?,” wrote editor Paul McLane. “ [T]he NRSC should open its meetings to all concerned 
parties - including those of us who cover the industry on your behalf....Public debate and news 
coverage will ensure vigorous scrutiny, to everyone’s benefit.”58 Radio World reported that the 
standards-setting “pause” was required because “the NRSC could not proceed and remain 
legitimate.” At least one transmitter manufacturer with an equity investment in iBiquity halted 
the manufacturing of HD-compatible units until the issue could be sorted out.59 Radio World also 
reported that, due to the codec controversy, the number of stations asking the FCC for 
authorization to broadcast in HD dropped significantly.60 The Amherst Alliance made sure to 
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formally notify the FCC of this controversy, while iBiquity held an emergency ex parte meeting 
with senior agency staff to downplay the problem.61 
It took three months for iBiquity to replace its failed codec. During this period of 
retrenchment, the company laid off Project Acorn facilitator and USA Digital Radio cofounder 
E. Glynn Walden, along with two other managers; these were followed by 32 more 
redundancies.62 Industry sentiment toward iBiquity turned increasingly sour. Milford Smith, 
chairman of the NRSC’s DAB Subcommittee, said he was “incredibly shocked and 
disappointed” by the layoffs and believed Walden had represented “the most reliable and 
dependable contact” at iBiquity. Radio World reported that the personnel cuts were due to the 
codec controversy as well as the company’s cash burn-rate, estimated to be $2.1 million per 
month. Although the publication reported that iBiquity raised “roughly $100 million” in a recent 
round of financing, direct investment from broadcasters had dropped significantly and the 
shortfall had to be made up by overtures to venture capitalists.63 iBiquity CEO Robert Struble 
denied the company was in a fiscal squeeze, although Radio World reported that the company 
was quietly seeking more broadcast-investors beyond the national conglomerates, with little 
success.64 
Broadcasters sounded off in the trade press with increasing skepticism. “Unless and until 
the public demands [HD Radio],” wrote consulting engineer Gary Jordan in a Radio World guest 
commentary, “the big guys investing the big bucks will have to stand tall before the investors 
one day. The simple reality is the listening public is happy with conventional radio broadcasting 
in the USA.”65 Commentator Skip Pizzi deplored the fact that HD Radio remained in “such an 
immature, unstable and speculative state,” and worried that the iBiquity’s layoffs gave good 
reason for the industry to question the “corporation’s ongoing viability” and “management 
sensibility.” Several professional broadcast engineers sent letters to Radio World further 
detailing real-world experiences with HD-induced interference to analog stations.66 Others 
reiterated the argument that programming improvements, not technological “upgrades,” were 
necessary to revive the radio business, and that HD Radio’s uptake involved inherent 
compromises, the likes of which had not been fully explained to the industry.67 Some 
broadcasters openly called on the FCC to re-open its exploration of digital radio to include 
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protocols other than HD.68 The NRSC’s Charles Morgan minced no words about the slow rollout: 
“Without broadcasters taking the lead and investing in [HD] installations, I fear that [HD] may 
become stalled or simply die a slow death. If that happens, I believe we will see some form of 
new-band terrestrial radio....Existing broadcasters will have no assurances that they will have the 
same role in this new service as they have today.”69 
By 2004, the visibility of HD Radio in the marketplace remained virtually nil. Although 
some receiver manufacturers produced limited numbers of aftermarket automotive receivers for 
the holiday shopping season,70 it was not until January 5, 2005 that Nathan Franzen of Cedar 
Rapids, Iowa became the first person in the U.S. to purchase an HD Radio receiver. The event 
made headline news in both Radio World and Current.71 FCC Media Bureau chief Ken Ferree 
predicted that radio’s digital transition would go much more smoothly than the DTV changeover, 
but Radio World characterized the “prospects and timeframe for wide-scale adoption by 
consumers” as “still anyone’s guess.”72 The NAB later bestowed E. Glynn Walden with its Radio 
Engineering Achievement Award for his pioneering work involving HD Radio; after being let go 
from iBiquity he became vice president of engineering for Infinity Broadcasting, an iBiquity 
investor.73 
II. Parsing HD Radio’s Fundamental Detriments
As HD Radio’s proliferation looked increasingly questionable in the real world the 
broadcast industry became more emphatic about its necessity in the policy world. The industry 
creatively recontextualized the FCC’s desire to implement “further rules” governing the 
technology into a crusade to push the agency toward “final rules” deciding the question of HD 
Radio’s place of primacy once and for all. Proponents did not blame anemic listener interest in 
HD on the technology or iBiquity’s business model, but “regulatory uncertainty” which only the 
FCC could fix by laying to rest any doubts about the technology’s viability and permanently 
authorizing its use.74 Although Disney admitted that the potential profits of HD Radio “appear 
small, especially in the short term,” permanent selection of HD as the sole U.S. DAB standard 
would “would encourage stations to construct and implement digital service.”75 Infinity 
Broadcasting celebrated the “extraordinarily encouraging” feedback received from “its engineers 
and other station personnel who have experienced improved [HD] service firsthand.”76 The 
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National Association of Broadcasters asked the FCC to “grant delegated authority to the Media 
Bureau to consider and...approve on a blanket basis new transmission techniques and apparatus 
that will enable broadcasters to bring the benefits of [HD] technology to the listening public in 
more efficient and/or cost-effective ways, further expediting the digital transition and providing 
additional incentives to initiate [HD broadcasting].”77 However, very few HD-supporters favored 
a mandatory analog/digital conversion deadline. Most corporate proponents and all but three 
state broadcasters’ associations petitioned the FCC to allow marketplace forces to govern the 
transition, on the premise that analog broadcasting would remain “the mainstay of radio 
broadcast service for years to come.”78 
With regard to questions of interference raised by the proliferation by HD Radio, industry 
proponents were not quite as unified as they were earlier in the DAB rulemaking, though they 
still worked to downplay this defect of the digital broadcast protocol. Most early-adopter 
iBiquity investors with large stables of FM stations promised to convert the majority of their 
stations in an orderly manner over the next several years.79 Entercom Communications Corp, 
which had implemented FM-HD broadcasts on four of its 71 FM stations, reported “the 
conversion to hybrid service to be a relatively simple process with no serious difficulties. The 
hybrid service has resulted in minimal disruptions to the stations’ analog service and has not 
been a drain on the stations’ resources.”80 
On the issue of AM-HD interference, many broadcasters advocated for its full-time 
authorization.81 Cox Radio, Inc. admitted that there was a “reasonable assumption that adjacent-
channel interference can result at nighttime,” and upon the receipt of any “credible” interference 
complaint it entreated the FCC to “halt the operations of the alleged source of [HD] interference 
immediately.”82 Clear Channel openly questioned whether the AM analog station allocation rules 
could be successfully applied to the HD system and suggested the FCC rethink this fundamental 
principle.83 On the more radical end of the issue, broadcasters like Buckley Broadcasting and 
Greater Media expressed their willingness to write off expanded nighttime (skywave) coverage 
in favor of robust digital service. Buckley dismissed its “fringe listeners” and commented that 
rising ambient noise levels on the AM band already made skywave propagation unreliable.84 
Greater Media went so far as to designate AM skywave service an anachronism:
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[T[he fact is that wide-area nighttime skywave service, while a fascinating propagation 
phenomena and very much a part of radio's historic past, is largely irrelevant in today's 
world. The number of persons deriving radio service via skywave propagation is tiny.  
Most persons under the age of 40 do not even know that this propagation mode exists, let 
alone listen to it. The need for a medium wave wide area skywave service in the U.S. has 
largely passed....This is, by far, the most significant compromise attendant to 24-hour 
AM digital operation. However, the upside...is worth the attendant deterioration of the 
skywave service component inasmuch as the vast majority of these stations' listeners and 
advertisers are within the groundwave service areas. For AM to have a future, it must 
transition to digital. To transition fully to digital will require this necessary 
compromise.85 
Greater Media cited no ratings data to prove that skywave listening no longer mattered to 
listeners of AM radio. Many agreed that the industry could sort out interference complaints 
among itself, and existing FCC remediation policies were adequate to the task.86 
Among HD Radio’s proponents, only iBiquity rose to answer criticism of its proprietary 
nature. “iBiquity believes its agreements have complied with the requirement to use fair, 
reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms,” wrote the company. “The Commission has rarely, if 
ever, interjected itself into defining what constitutes compliance with these requirements. Based 
on iBiquity’s existing licensing process, it would be extraordinary and unnecessary for the 
Commission to take any action on this topic.”87 
For the first time onstage, proponents of HD Radio stood virtually alone in their 
optimism for the technology. Independent broadcasters had never been so diametrically opposed 
to the expansion of HD Radio as they were when its proponents sought to implement “final 
rules.” They accused the FCC of being “enamored with all things digital” without responsibly 
studying HD’s detrimental effects on a well-established, regularly-used mass medium.88 
Independent broadcasters focused in detail on two of HD Radio’s three fundamental weaknesses: 
the potential for interference and iBiquity’s proprietary nature. 
Interference problems were now a significant matter of debate in the FCC rulemaking. 
Independent FM broadcasters lamented the fact that not enough data had been collected to 
guarantee even the most basic interference protections to analog service.89 Some even tendered 
analyses of existing instances of FM-HD interference.90 With regard to AM-HD, independent 
broadcasters pulled no punches. Oklahoma-based Reunion Broadcasting, among others, noted 
that although there were just some 30 AM-HD stations broadcasting nationwide by mid-2004, 
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these stations were causing enough harm to the band to raise serious concerns.91 The potential for 
interference from unrestricted AM-HD proliferation was a significant concern of small 
broadcasters.92 Many pleaded with the FCC to only allow AM-HD broadcasts at night after 
careful examination of a station’s potential to interfere with others.93 Whereas proponents 
believed the industry could resolve interference complaints by themselves or with minor FCC 
intervention, “[t]his ‘do it now, fix it later’ approach, wrote Reunion Broadcasting, “simply 
increases the uncertainty for each broadcaster seeking to move forward with digital 
broadcasting.....The public interest is not served by an unrestrained increase in interference that 
reduces the number of voices available to the listening public.”94 Several broadcasters filed 
reception reports detailing AM-HD interference affecting the communities they served, noting an 
explosion of “white noise,” “hissing,” and “buzzing” on the AM dial.95 
Many independent broadcasters also reported that they either could not or would not 
adopt iBiquity’s technology due to its expensive and proprietary nature.96 Georgia-based Radio 
Kings Bay, Incorporated called iBiquity’s licensing fee a “disgraceful extortion payment” that 
created “an inherent adhesion license, the terms of which are clearly and unmistakably one-
sided.”97 Paul Dean Ford characterized the Commission’s entire DAB rulemaking as one “in step 
with private vested interests” and called iBiquity’s licensing scheme a “questionable fiat from 
within.”98 KYPK-AM of Terrell, Texas warned of the “Commission sanctioned monopoly” that 
would result from iBiquity’s “unprecedented power over, and control of, the market. 
Historically, this country has viewed such monopolistic control as undesirable and as an 
impediment to commerce.” The station encouraged the FCC to impose open source requirements 
on iBiquity’s technology. “Ongoing or large lump sum royalty payments or fees proposed 
initially by iBiquity will only serve to slow progress in the adoption of [HD Radio].”99  
Public broadcasters engaged in onstage dialogue about HD Radio’s specifics to an 
unprecedented degree. National Public Radio’s primary goal was to cement multicasting as a 
necessary feature in the HD system. NPR organized nearly 150 of its affiliate stations, the 
educational institutions they were wedded to, and loyal listeners to deluge the FCC with positive 
sentiments about their experience with or belief in the potential of multicasting to increase 
program diversity.100 Puget Sound Public Radio, licensee of KUOW in Seattle, reported to the 
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FCC that it had committed more than $100,000 to providing multicast programming.101 Northeast 
Indiana Public Radio promised to use multicasting to target the underserved Hispanic audience 
in its community;102 KNAU-FM of Flagstaff, Arizona planned the same for Native Americans.103 
These promises assumed that underserved listeners would flock to stores to buy new, expensive 
HD Radio receivers in order to take advantage of specialized digital programming, and there was 
no evidence to suggest that was likely. Both NPR and CPB cast multicasting as “the driving 
force” behind HD Radio’s success and the only substantial mechanism by which the technology 
would improve listener experience in a digital broadcast environment.104 NPR would intensify its 
public campaign with a series of ex parte meetings with senior advisors to FCC Commissioners 
and Media Bureau staff emphasizing the need for multicasting to be required by rule in the HD 
Radio feature suite.105 
The split between transmission and reception equipment manufacturers over the future 
success of HD Radio grew wider. Transmitter and other broadcast equipment-makers assured the 
FCC there was adequate demand in the industry to make an HD transition not only fiscally 
sustainable, but inevitable; they urged maximum latitude in the implementation of digital 
broadcasting and minimal regulatory oversight.106 Harris Corporation even conducted an ex parte 
meeting with the senior counsel to all sitting Commissioners asking them to expedite further 
development of the DAB rulemaking.107 The enthusiasm of receiver manufacturers was much 
more restrained. The Consumer Electronics Association supported HD Radio in principle but 
urged the FCC to vigorously investigate AM-HD interference issues.108 Surprisingly, no receiver 
manufacturer participated openly in the opening policy debate surrounding the FCC’s second 
NPRM; only Kenwood Corporation - like Harris, an iBiquity investor - met privately with senior 
Commission advisors to discuss the HD Radio rulemaking, expressing concerns similar to those 
tendered by the CEA.109 
The public was not intimidated by the FCC’s apparent ignorance of its concerns; it 
redoubled the effort to demonstrate that not only would HD Radio ultimately be detrimental to 
listener choice, but that they simply didn’t want it. “There is a fallacy that ‘digital’ is always 
better than analog,” reiterated John Pavlica, Jr. of Toledo, Ohio, “and that is not always the 
case.”110 The Amherst Alliance pointed out that “[t]here has been no persuasive documentation 
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that millions of radio listeners, let alone tens of millions of them, are demanding a rapid shift to... 
any version of Digital Radio. In fact, to the extent that radio listeners and groups which represent 
them have expressed an opinion on [HD] in this Docket, they have overwhelmingly opposed its 
implementation, not demanded it.”111 Several media reform organizations, in a collective 
comment, took umbrage with the idea that HD signals used “no new spectrum.” “This 
technology...allows broadcasters to engage in activity which is the equivalent of constructing 
additional buildings on their spectrum sidewalks, taking space they have not been previously 
allowed to use.” Given “a media environment increasingly characterized by concentrated 
ownership, commercially-driven content, and a lack of civic engagement,” the self-styled “Pubic 
Interest Coalition” suggested the FCC use its HD rulemaking to “represent a new stage in the 
ongoing evolution of the public interest standard: a needed reassessment in light of dramatic 
changes in communications technology, market structures, and the needs of a democratic 
society.”112 
Interference concerns remained a major point of contention. Douglas E. Smith of Pleasant 
View, Tennessee observed that HD Radio violated “ a fundamental assumption of the allocation 
system: the assumption that energy at the outer edges of the signal will be only intermittently 
present....In [the HD environment], this energy is present at all times. The increase in 
interference potential is obvious, and large. It's like the difference between your neighbor's dog 
barking once, and it barking all day long. You'll tolerate the former; the latter may drive you to 
consider certain actions not acceptable to the Humane Society.”113 Eric S. Bueneman warned HD 
Radio “would prove devastating to the radio industry as a whole; robbing this country of literally 
hundreds of independent radio stations,” and called the FCC’s action on the topic “reckless.”114 
Several individuals filed comments directly opposing the full-time expansion of AM-HD 
broadcasting;115  many included detailed reception reports of what damage the few AM-HD 
stations already on the air caused to the band at night.116 Electrical engineer Charles Hutton of 
Seattle accused the FCC of acting on “incomplete and carefully selected tests...yet actual 
listening by third parties gives a drastically different picture.”117 
HD Radio’s proprietary nature also continued to chafe the citizenry. Douglas Smith 
suggested iBiquity be regulated so as to take away its ability to hike license fees in times of 
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corporate distress and recommended that, after a certain period ot time, the company should turn 
its intellectual property over to the public domain.118 The intimate fiscal ties between iBiquity and 
the nation’s largest radio conglomerates, argued the Amherst Alliance, “creates for a number of  
broadcasters an inherent conflict-of-interest that makes them questionable judges of which 
Digital Radio technology is really best for radio.”119 The FCC’s singular reliance on industry 
data, argued the Public Interest Coalition, was clearly designed “to further the interests of the 
entities that submit it....The data is not compiled in a manner that would aid independent 
academic research. Because most of the data presently relied upon by the FCC is proprietary and 
thus unavailable for others to use,” there was no honest way to quantify the promised benefits of 
HD Radio.120 
If the Commission was utterly committed to the proliferation of HD Radio, public 
commenters suggested creative ways to use the technology in order to reduce consolidation in 
station ownership and increase program diversity. William Jones of Raleigh, North Carolina 
proposed the FCC pool the “additional channel capacity” afforded by HD and auction it off to 
aspiring broadcasters.121 Only two individuals - HD Radio’s first public listener, Nathan Franzen, 
and an investment banker in North Carolina - filed comments in support of permanently 
authorizing the technology.122 Others implored the FCC to consider other alternative DAB 
systems;123 Scott A. Clifton of Naperville, Illinois suggested phasing out the AM band entirely in 
favor of a new-spectrum digital radio service.124 
This backlash could no longer be perfunctorily dismissed by HD Radio’s proponents. 
iBiquity disputed the notion that its technology used new spectrum with a profoundly circular 
argument:
The HD Radio system is “refarming” otherwise unusable spectrum in both the AM and 
FM bands....The Commission’s emission limits on analog signals create what is 
essentially a “guard band” between stations. This band cannot be used for any purpose or 
the technical integrity of the existing adjacent station would be compromised. Even 
though broadcasters do not “occupy” this band, they effectively “use” it by precluding 
anyone else from using that spectrum. It is this delicate balance that has insured the 
technical viability of the U.S. radio industry. [HD] technology allows broadcasters to use
that otherwise unusable spectrum....Collectively the broadcast industry is agreeing to 
accept additional interference to existing services in limited cases in order to facilitate an 
industry-wide upgrade to digital service. iBiquity objects to the...characterization of this 
as a spectrum grant.125 
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iBiquity called the growing concerns of HD-related interference “overblown” and argued that its 
“exhaustive testing” of the technology mitigated against the need to conduct a comparative DAB 
analysis.126 The NAB singled out complaints of “mercurial” AM-HD interference only to dismiss 
them as “theoretical or analytical engineering concerns.”127 Since iBiquity’s test data was the 
“only hard test data” in the record [emphasis in original], the NAB argued that public and 
independent broadcaster consternation over interference concerns was meaningless.128 Greater 
Media characterized the growing detail of AM-HD listener complaints as the fruit of 
“compromises inherent in the...system [that] are acceptable and necessary if there is to be a 
future for AM radio.“129 Notably, National Public Radio jumped to iBiquity’s defense, asserting 
that opening up digital radio signals to new broadcast-entrants would require “a sweeping new 
regulatory regime...that would, in fact, undermine the DAB transition and [is], therefore, 
contrary to the public interest.”130 Meanwhile, iBiquity began another backstage lobbying 
campaign with senior FCC staff urging acceleration of the DAB rulemaking;131 these personal 
contacts with regulators attempted to mitigate the growing record of public dissatisfaction with 
HD Radio.
By this point in the policy dialogue, it was clear that any firm alliances between the 
primary protagonists in the rulemaking had broken down. Proponents of HD Radio now 
consisted almost exclusively of iBiquity and its investor-broadcasters. Public broadcasters 
expressed an unprecedented degree of caution about HD’s interference potential and focused 
above all else on promoting the FM-HD multicasting function. Electronics manufacturers tacitly 
approved the promulgation of HD technology, but were not yet mass-producing digital radio 
receivers. Consulting engineers detailed technical concerns which the NRSC had failed to 
thoroughly examine. Independent broadcasters feared the noisy and monopolistic nature of HD 
Radio. And the public, which had always been critical of the technology, objected more strongly 
to its imposition.
Offstage, intra-industry and listener concern over the detrimental nature of HD Radio 
blossomed. By mid-2004, only 100 HD-enabled stations were on the air nationwide, and iBiquity 
hired three marketing professionals to help promote the technology’s uptake by broadcasters.132 
iBiquity and its investor-companies also produced a steady stream of news giving HD Radio a 
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semblance of momentum. Clear Channel announced it would spend up to $100 million over the 
next decade to convert its stations to HD, though the decision was spurred by unpublished 
“incentives” that reduced the company’s license fee burden.133  “Industry observers” predicted 
broadcasters would spend “approximately $115 million...over the next few years” to upgrade 
their stations to digital.134 iBiquity expected the first mass-produced tabletop receivers would hit 
the market by the spring of 2005, with a total of 15 to 20 HD receiver models (for car and home) 
on sale by the end of the year. BMW hinted that it would include HD Radio as a standard feature 
“in some models”  of its automobiles, but declined to provide concrete details.135 
Radio World found a consulting engineer who predicted HD Radio would reach 
marketplace criticality in 2009.136 iBiquity announced an “historic agreement” with 21 radio 
group owners to convert 2,000 stations in the top 100 radio markets by the end of 2005 and 
leaked details of a new license-discount program to entice HD adoption; Entercom and Greater 
Media pledged to convert all their stations within a matter of months.137 When a radio station in 
Puerto Rico went HD in 2005, iBiquity touted the milestone as “position[ing] the technology for 
widespread adoption outside the continental U.S.”138 The company raised another $30 million in 
financing, mostly from venture capital firms; Radio World totaled the company’s equity 
investment at $135 million since its founding in 2000.139 The Corporation for Public 
Broadcasting reported that as of September, 2004 it had invested $20 million to help 147 
noncommercial stations with HD conversion projects, including $250,000 in grants to explore 
the functionality of datacasting and $2.5 million to experiment with multicasting.140 By the end of 
2004, 50 public radio stations would be broadcasting in some form of HD, and CPB had funded 
262 station-conversion projects.141 NPR encouraged its FM affiliates to petition the FCC for 
multicasting authority, so as to demonstrate industry willingness to adopt the feature.142 It also 
unveiled plans to offer five “turnkey” music formats to fill multicast programming (classical, 
jazz, folk music, adult album alternative, and electronic music - the latter provided by a 
webcaster).143 NPR also announced it was experimenting with the transmission of Dolby 5.1 
Surround Sound on FM-HD stations, even though a station could not provide that service and 
multicast at the same time.144 
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That was the good news. In May, 2004, Radio World reported that a handful of AM-HD 
stations had turned off their digital sidebands due to interference concerns; iBiquity claimed 
these stations were aberrations, unrepresentative of HD Radio’s effects on AM reception 
nationwide.145 In October, Clear Channel ordered all of its AM stations to reduce the bandwidth 
dedicated to their analog signals, in hopes of “cleaning up” the band for HD adoption.146 Radio 
World also reported that the Canadian Association of Broadcasters and Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation asked its own broadcast regulators, Industry Canada, to “notify the FCC that the 
authorization of [AM-HD] transmissions, especially at night, will very likely result in harmful 
interference to Canadian signals.”147 The publication continued to receive a steady stream of 
letters from broadcasters documenting AM-HD interference in their communities.148 
Some early-adopter broadcasters took to the trades in an attempt to assuage industry 
discontent. Thomas R. Ray III, chief engineer of AM-HD station WOR in New York, admitted 
that AM’s digital transition would take upwards of 20 years and required compromises to analog 
signals, but that any other outcome was untenable. “[HD Radio] isn’t the three-headed monster 
it’s been portrayed to be. It’s time for a change in our industry. Education...is the key to 
understanding and using this new technology to our greatest advantage. Remaining the same 
while the world marches past us will place terrestrial AM and FM broadcasting among the 
dinosaurs, rendering us irrelevant.”149 John Arndt, the assistant chief engineer at Greater Media’s 
Philadelphia station cluster, called HD critics “naysayers” and downplayed any concerns of 
interference.150 Radio World’s anonymous commentator, “Guy Wire,” latched onto the 
“naysayer” moniker to portray HD critics as Luddites. 
Just because it’s digital doesn’t mean it’s better, they say...This reminds us all of the 
horse-and-carraige fans of the 1890s. Proponents of the newly invented automobile back 
then had to prove their case....HD Radio right now is like the first automobiles to travel 
unpaved roads. Think about what it will offer in another five or 10 years. History is 
squarely on the side of better technology as it pushes aside older, less efficient 
methods....The stage is set. Radio is entering a new era propelled by new technology. It’s 
really very simple. The digital bus with HD Radio onboard has left the terminal. Be on it 
or be under it.151 
Radio World Engineering Extra Tech Editor Michael LeClair similarly touted digitalization as 
inevitable, and HD the only path toward progress: “[I]t is not possible to stand still as other 
broadcast media surpass the performance of an older technology. The eventual result for [radio], 
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should stations decide not to pursue improvement, will be the loss of new revenue and a slow 
decline into irrelevance.”152 Hal Widstein, General Manager of KWED-AM in Seguin, Texas, 
challenged “[HD] dissenters” to demonstrate a better digital radio technology, although he 
admitted that he had not followed the FCC proceedings during which such an effort had been 
tried and rejected.153 
These arguments flew with other, smaller broadcasters like a lead balloon. Edward P. De 
La Hunt, owner of De La Hunt Broadcasting in Park Rapids, Minnesota, declared that he would 
be “damned if any of my facilities will ever sign on to creating interference to other 
broadcasters.”154 Several station owners expressed shock in Radio World that the industry was 
willing to accept a degradation of analog service in exchange for the promises of a relatively 
untested product.155 Alan H. Dunkin of Atlanta, Georgia felt that broadcasters who bought into 
the notion that increasing harm to analog broadcasting was a reasonable compromise in the 
implementation of HD Radio should “[g]et out of the business now while there is still something 
to save. Let those of us who still give a damn about quality try to save what’s left.”156 
The general manager of Oxford, Mississippi’s WOXD-FM, Ron Cox, wondered how 
small-market broadcasters were supposed to pay iBiquity’s license fee when hundreds of stations 
across the country “struggle to pay the electric bill from month to month.”157 Radio consultant 
Tim Johnston related the story of a client-station who spent $100,000 on HD upgrade work “for 
nothing but bragging rights and a technology to which no one can listen...Let’s stop this pony 
before it takes us over the cliff.”158 Robert C. Savage, president of WYSL-AM in Avon, New 
York, called on the industry to return to the drawing board and come up with a DAB system that 
served the interests of all broadcasters. Otherwise, “[we] will rue the day we permitted a single 
manufacturer - not an objective industry consortium - to...impose [a digital radio] standard on the 
band that only benefits certain...broadcasters, and to the detriment of others.”159 The Christian 
Broadcasting System’s CEO, Jonathan R. Yinger, called on independent broadcasters “at this 
late hour” to “stand up and make our voices and concerns heard. If we don’t, our...stations will 
be unheard.”160 
The lack of receivers in the marketplace exacerbated the uncertainty surrounding HD 
Radio’s ultimate viability. By the end of 2004, aftermarket auto HD receivers cost between 
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$500-1000, while tabletop units sold for more than $300 each.161 Radio World blamed the lack of 
receivers on reluctance within the consumer electronics industry to adopt the technology,162 while 
Art Reis, the chief engineer for Crawford Broadcasting Co.’s Chicago cluster, laid fault at the 
feet of iBiquity. “Where is the marketing support that is supposed to help launch...HD Radio into 
the public mainstream of the electronics industry? Where are the ads on radio, TV and in print?,” 
asked Reis. “As it stands now, iBiquity isn’t even on the public’s radar screens. Just walk into 
any Radio Shack and ask about iBiquity or HD Radio. You’ve got questions, they’ve got blank 
stares....That, folks, is a danger sign....The time to make the big marketing move is now, 
iBiquity. You, and radio broadcasting in this country, have too much to lose to not get the 
population of the United States on your bandwagon and keep them there.163  
III. Developing the HD Radio “Standard”
In the face of simmering industry and widespread public opposition to the detriments of 
HD Radio, its proprietors doubled down their bets with the FCC, on the assumption that the 
agency would do nothing to interrupt the regulatory trajectory leading to the technology’s 
dominance of U.S. digital broadcasting. On May 18, 2005, the National Radio Systems 
Committee tendered a formalized HD standard to the FCC. “NRSC-5,” as it was known, was not 
your typical broadcast technology standard: most are open for review, in order to generate 
industry consensus around them. The NRSC’s standard only detailed the AM- and FM-HD 
hybrid analog/digital waveforms and included placeholders for such features as multicasting and 
datacasting, due to the fact that no substantive data had been tendered to the Committee on their 
functionality.164 Petitioning the FCC to establish HD Radio as the official U.S. DAB standard 
would legally preclude any discussion of or action on competing technologies. The FCC 
tendered the NRSC proposal for public comment within a month of its submission.165 
Industry investors and proponents of HD Radio lined up again to cast the technology as 
radio’s only hope to navigate a convergent media environment. Disney believed that adopting 
NRSC-5 “would give much greater certainty to broadcasters...who are expending significant 
resources to convert their FM and AM stations to [HD Radio].”166 The NAB boldly claimed that 
the development of NRSC-5 was “open, inclusive, lengthy, exhaustive and conducted under 
rigorous due process procedures,”167 and implied that “the future of radio broadcasting in the U.S. 
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rests on” the FCC’s approval of the standard.168 Susquehanna Radio Corp. looked forward to the 
day when “our ‘interim operation authority’ will be replaced with permanent [HD] licenses.”169 
The honesty of the NRSC standard-setting process was called into question. Impulse 
Radio, a developer of DAB datacasting solutions, told the FCC about pressure within the NRSC 
to achieve consensus on NRSC-5, even though it and others had significant concerns about the 
lack of solid technical information on which to judge the standard. Impulse accused iBiquity of 
blocking moves within the NRSC to open the HD standard up for use beyond its own proprietary 
feature-sets. “We believe...without question that iBiquity has wielded an undue amount of 
dominance over this standard setting process,” wrote Impulse Radio. “It has been the sole 
proponent of technology; it has, by action and inaction, influenced the time line for consideration 
of the various parts of the standard, and has used its leverage as the dominant voice in the 
proceedings to gain unfair competitive and commercial advantage.”170 Debates went on for 
“months and months” as the NRSC wrestled with proposing a DAB standard that had “missing” 
components, such as normative and informative references on the protocol’s codec and ancillary 
features.171 None other than Microsoft argued that, by leaving significant aspects of HD Radio 
technology out of the NRSC-5 standard, iBiquity could “remain outside the NRSC patent 
licensing policies,” which raised risks that the company would exploit its licensing regime and 
generated “uncertainty” that was “likely to slow product development and deployment.”172
Public broadcasters, as a constituency, deferred to National Public Radio to speak for 
them on the standards issue. National Public Radio called the promulgation of a standard “a 
significant technical milestone” and urged the FCC “to approve the standard without delay.”173 
Although it was not pleased by the lack of codec specifications within NRSC-5, NPR expressed 
confidence that iBiquity would not leverage its monopoly power over the technology.174 It also 
echoed industry proponents’ desires to keep the new features of HD Radio unregulated.175  
If independent broadcasters had been reticent about HD Radio before, during the 
standards-debate they became apoplectic. Timothy C. Cutforth, a broadcaster and consulting 
engineer, worried that the endorsement of an incomplete technical standard would create “vast 
wastelands of interference” and “petrify DAB innovation” in the straightjacket of iBiquity’s 
proprietary framework. “If this system is adopted piecemeal as proposed, then the FCC will have 
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traded Manhattan for a few shiny beads and disregarded their very reason for existence.”176 Many 
passionately argued that the tradeoffs necessary to implement NRSC-5 were not worth the 
compromises it would cause to the integrity of analog broadcasting.177 Industry assertions that 
HD Radio caused no interference were belied by the record; independent broadcasters also 
reiterated the fact that most American radio listeners had no basic knowledge with which to 
identify digital radio interference.178 More stepped forth with real-world reports of HD-related 
interference to their stations.179 Ralph McBride, the owner of stations in the Beaumont, Texas 
area, likened the standards argument to
sort of modern range war, with the FCC playing circuit judge. A huge combine is 
coming to town, and it is moving the fences of existing property owners, with the 
permission of the sheriff....So the combine bandits are making money coming and going, 
and shutting out all competition, with the help of the corrupt “local” law enforcement. It 
is my most sincere hope that in the end, the FCC rides into town wearing the white hats 
we think of them wearing.180 
Independent broadcasters also contextualized the push to cement NRSC-5 as something driven 
by an irrational “GOOD of achieving DIGITAL” that seemed to “outweigh all existing rights of 
analog broadcasters and the rights of the listening public.”181 Aritaur Communications, licensee 
of WMVY-FM in Newport, Rhode Island, urged the Commission “to realize that it would do the 
public great harm to have one broadcasting clique” controlling the future of digital radio. 
“Neither NRSC nor its members are in the business of governance,” argued Aritaur. “This 
proceeding is an opportunity for the Commission to stand in the bully pulpit and set expectations 
for full disclosure of this technology.”182 WRPQ-AM in Baraboo, Wisconsin told the FCC it felt 
betrayed by its trade organization, the NAB, for uncritically supporting NRSC-5 to the detriment 
of the nation’s independent broadcasters.183  
Consulting engineers urged the FCC to undertake the standard-setting discussion with 
thoughtfulness. Although David Maxson noted that FM-HD broadcasters to date had been 
“highly successful” in avoiding widespread interference to analog neighbors, the potential for 
such interference remained quite real, and that the real-world implications of AM-HD 
interference remained effectively unresolved. If the FCC was prepared to implement HD Radio 
as a standard, “ a reference method or methods of verifying compliance should be articulated,” 
something neither iBiquity nor the NRSC had yet done.184 Engineer George M. Frese provided 
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further evidence of AM-HD interference plaguing the northwest United States.185 Canadian 
broadcast engineer Barry McLarnon cited chapter and verse of international frequency allocation 
treaties and asserted that HD Radio did not comply with them. “Simply stating that interference 
will not increase significantly because existing emission masks are respected is a subterfuge that 
hides the problem,” McLarnon wrote.186 This was buttressed by correspondence from the 
Mexican Technical Secretary of the Plenum, which called upon the FCC to withhold any 
expansion of HD Radio until questions of cross-border interference were better understood.187 
Both Mexican and Canadian authorities were now on the record with concern about HD-related 
interference. McLarnon also revealed that “a sizable number of the [NRSC DAB] subcommittee 
members (seven) felt that NRSC-5 was incomplete and should not be committed to a 
vote....These members were persuaded to abstain rather than cast a negative vote,” thus 
shattering the illusion that true industry consensus existed on the standard.188 George Frese added 
an emotional plea: “Don’t throw away tomorrow by following somebody else’s pipedream 
today. Pipedreams are caused by a flawed understanding of the needs of the people, natural laws 
of physics, along with an overactive ambition for personal gain.”189 
Many commenters asked the FCC to amend NRSC-5 itself to guarantee interference-
protection to analog broadcasters, which would have required a major redesign of the HD Radio 
protocol.190 More listeners came forward with reception horror stories, including audio 
submissions, of digital “hissing,” “hash,” and “whizzing” produced by existing HD Radio 
stations.191 Paul W. Smith of Sarasota, Florida begged for a ban on all nighttime AM-HD 
broadcasting “until such date that analog broadcasting ceases and the all digital signal can be 
placed In Band On Channel as the name suggests.”192 Paul and Lucille Burkardt, a visually-
impaired couple in Watertown, Massachusetts, requested that the HD standard “be respectfully 
abolished, and that normal quality standards be restored to all stations concerned.”193 
Members of the public were also suspicious of NRSC-5’s proprietary nature. Jonathan E. 
Hardis of Gaithersburg, Maryland, who cared enough about the issue to request membership on 
the NRSC, echoed reports that disagreement within the Committee was forcefully quashed to 
provide the illusion of industry consensus on the standard to the FCC.194 He accused the NRSC of 
“cross[ing] over “from making technical judgments...to making regulatory judgments,” for which 
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the FCC was the proper forum.195 Hardis blamed iBiquity for defaulting on its obligation to 
disclose information “that they themselves had volunteered to provide” earlier in the standard-
setting process.196 By “concealing rather than teaching the essential knowledge required to build 
compatible devices,” Hardis warned the HD standard would stifle innovation in the U.S. DAB 
space.197 David L. Hershberger characterized the partly “secret” nature of NRSC-5 as an open 
door for a “perpetual windfall” of licensing fees to iBiquity and its investor companies.198  
Doug Dingus of Portland, Oregon called HD Radio “a technology not yet cooked.” Given 
the “lack of demonstrable public demand for digital radio and the number of outstanding issues,” 
he wrote, “I find it hard to justify a narrow window for technology change, particularly when the 
quality and cost expectations are being changed as well. If the radio industry is truly seeing a 
listener crisis, while failing to properly address content issues, said decline cannot be used as a 
solid justification for a rapid implementation of digital radio, simply because the two problems 
are not related.”199 Radio listeners reiterated their sentiment that HD Radio was a technology they 
simply didn’t want. “HD seems an ill conceived, ‘rushed to market’ relic from the 1990’s, 
rendered obsolete by subsequent technological developments,” commented Paul V. Zecchino of 
Englewood, Florida. “If interference is of no consequence, why do HD promoters thwart 
discussion of it and ridicule those who do?”200 Gregory O. Smith of Brookeville, Maryland called 
the imposition of NRSC-5 a giveaway of “our free airwaves to a few corporate thugs....Few HD 
radios have been sold, as consumers have not bought into this farce....This FCC sole-source, non-
competitive contract award to iBiquity is a total travesty!”201 Nickloaus E. Leggett of Reston, 
Virginia - whose petition to create a new LPFM service led to its creation202 - commented that 
“[i]f broadcast radio continues with its highly automated operations, it will continue to become a 
music box that merely grinds out canned entertainment with no local connection at all. In this 
situation, it would make sense to replace most of broadcast radio with music streams sent out 
over the Internet and reallocate many broadcast frequencies to some other purpose.”203 
Seven years into the FCC’s rulemaking on digital broadcasting, media reform 
organizations finally began to engage in debate over the fundamental detriments of HD Radio. 
Only one of them - J.H. Snider of the New America Foundation - recognized HD for what it was. 
“[T]he radio broadcasters’ political genius was to redefine the meaning of the word ‘channel’ 
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and to develop a standard that would abide by that definition,” he explained. “With this 
Orwellian verbal magic, they could have their cake and eat it too; they could double their 
spectrum holdings to facilitate their digital radio transition without calling the doubling a ‘second 
channel.’”204 Incumbent commercial broadcasters, Snider argued, had nearly a decade to “create 
facts on the ground” in order to foster the imposition of HD Radio with little to no independent 
oversight.205 He also blamed the public interest community for strategic missteps that resulted in 
a lack of diligence with regard to radio’s digital future.
Central to the political genius of the radio broadcasting lobbyists was their understanding 
of the limitations of the press and public interest community. They understood that the 
press and public interest community were both uninterested in technical details and 
technically illiterate. They were confident that they wouldn’t read the details and, if they 
did, wouldn’t understand their significance....During the period in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s when the key digital radio decisions were being made, the public interest 
community, and the press they educated, were focused on the low power FM debate. 
LPFM only required a tiny fraction of the FM spectrum whereas [HD Radio] used up 
huge amounts of it. But low power FM was nevertheless a great issue for the grassroots 
driven public interest community because everyone understood FM, many individuals 
and organizations throughout America wanted to be their own FM broadcasters, and the 
time horizon for implementing LPFM suggested the closest thing you can get to 
immediate gratification in a spectrum policy proceeding. In the end, [HD Radio] would 
get more than 95% of the white space between the FM channels but virtually no one in 
the public interest community would link the issues and alert the press.206 
Snider concluded that it was “essential that the FCC stop relying on standards developed by the 
broadcast industry. These clever and politically motivated standards are designed to constrain, in 
a highly biased fashion, the range of policy options available to the FCC.”207 Other than Snider’s 
incisive memorandum, inexplicably filed as an attachment to an ex parte submission from the 
Campaign Legal Center, those representing “media reform” in the United States effectively 
overlooked the fundamental controversies of HD Radio during the standard-setting process. 
Broadcast-investors attacked such criticism. Crawford Broadcasting told the FCC that it 
had to approve an incomplete standard as “the window during which [HD] technology can be 
successfully implemented in the terrestrial radio broadcast service is narrow; any delay would be 
detrimental – and perhaps ultimately fatal, particularly for AM.”208 Clear Channel was 
“comfortable” with NRSC-5 as-is, and did not expect iBiquity to gouge them in the future.209 The 
heads of the NRSC’s DAB Subcommittee, Charles Morgan (Susquehanna Broadcasting), 
Milford K. Smith (Greater Media) and Andy Laird (Journal Broadcast Group), provided the FCC 
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with their own perceptions of the Committee’s standards-development work; in essence, they 
claimed that since dissenters like Jonathan Hardis and Impulse Radio did not stand their ground 
during the NRSC’s decisionmaking process, they had consented to the standard by default.210 
iBiquity, the NAB, and CEA also worked to dismiss HD “naysayers.” They argued that existing 
concerns were nothing more than re-hashes of arguments settled and buried by the FCC’s initial 
DAB Report and Order of 2002.211 
HD Radio’s primary broadcast proponents -both commercial and noncommercial - were 
concerned enough with the diversity of opinion in the record to launch another backstage 
lobbying campaign with key FCC officials to minimize delay of the agency’s approval of NRSC-
5.212 However, they were not alone in making personal contacts with regulators; Microsoft 
representatives met or corresponded with the senior legal advisors of all Commissioners to 
express “serious concerns about the adequacy of NRSC-5, particularly the failure of the standard 
to specify an initial codec or a registration and signaling mechanism for optional codecs. These 
concerns should be fully considered and addressed by the Commission before adopting any 
digital broadcasting standard.”213 
Offstage, in the trades, the confidence expressed by HD Radio’s proponents in the policy 
proceeding was belied by an increasing sense of panic that the technology would not find 
adoptive traction. More independent broadcasters related to Radio World their experiences with 
HD-induced interference to analog broadcasts, alternatively described as sounding like 
“garbage,” “1,000 demonic cicadas,” “nasty hiss,” “havoc,” and “digital crap.”214 Early adopters 
of HD Radio reported that the digital signal was not as robust as advertised, nor was it 
demonstrably better than its analog equivalent.215 iBiquity responded with promises of license-fee 
caps and announced imminent developments such as new datacasting features and a plethora of 
HD-compatible receivers preparing to flood the market.216 NPR continued to push multicasting as 
HD Radio’s killer application.217 “The shouting is over,” proclaimed NRSC DAB Subcommittee 
co-chairman Milford Smith. “Let’s work together on moving forward rather than lusting after an 
analog past which is already becoming, by technology standards, ancient history.”218 
To that end, a cartel of a dozen investor-broadcasters formed the HD Radio Alliance in 
2006, in order to coordinate marketing, promotion, and multicast activities in major markets.219 
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Alliance members committed to setting aside $200 million worth of airtime to run spots 
promoting HD Radio.220 The Alliance would also oversee the rollout of commercial multicast 
stations in such a way as to preclude digital program competition in any given market.221 Most 
commercial multicast streams would be derivations on an existing FM station’s primary 
format.222 Peter Ferrara, a former executive at Clear Channel, was tapped to head the Alliance: 
“From an anti-competitive standpoint, if the industry didn’t work together, in a cohesive manner, 
with consistent messaging, and providing the consumer the benefit of new and unique choices, 
diverse choices, the technology either will take a long time to emerge or may not happen at all,” 
Ferrara told Radio World.223 But even he was not unabashedly optimistic: “Since I started this 
job...I’ve felt somewhat like the guy in the Ed Sullivan show keeping all of the plates spinning in 
the air on little sticks.”224 The HD Radio Alliance first launched a branding campaign entitled 
“Are You Def Yet,” touting HD Radio’s “high definition” quality, and coordinated with retailers 
in New York, Los Angeles and Detroit to make HD Radio receivers available to the public.225 
Clear Channel established a “Format Lab,” similar to NPR’s foray into multicast syndication, to 
provide its stations with pre-producced content to fill secondary digital radio channels.226 In 2007, 
the Alliance increased its airtime-commitment to HD promotion to $250 million for the year.227 
Many broadcasters were not buying the hype. By 2006, more than one-third of CPB-
member stations expressed no desire to “upgrade” their facilities to HD.228 Cox Radio, an 
iBiquity investor, installed AM-HD on “three or four” of its stations and then turned it off when 
listeners complained about the interference digital signals caused to analog broadcasts.229 Open 
hostility toward iBiquity was now a regular theme in the trade press. “Why has the FCC allowed 
iBiquity to rape the small-market stations with exorbitant license fees, not to mention huge 
capital investment with little or no return?,” asked Tom Andrews, president of Lake Cities 
Broadcasting Corp. in Angola, Indiana. “What happens when the commission mandates [HD] 
implementation by a particular date? Soon the flashing red lights standing sentinel on the 
outskirts of Smallville, USA will be extinguished.”230 More than one broadcaster told Radio 
World that multicasting would not succeed if its programming amounted to nothing more than 
non-local variants on the cookie-cutter formats that dominated contemporary broadcasting.231 
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Larry Roy called the expense of iBiquity licensing “a showstopper for many smaller 
broadcasters.”232 Jack Hannold hoped HD Radio would fade away before more broadcasters 
invested “prematurely and unwisely” in the technology.233 Jim Jenkins, the owner of WAGS-AM 
in Bishopville, South Carolina, predicted that if HD Radio lived on, “[o]nly the ‘big guys’ will 
have enough money to play.”234 Jerry Arnold, the director of engineering for four stations in Terre 
Haute, Indiana, believed iBiquity would petition the FCC to mandate HD compatibility as soon 
as it realizes “that a huge majority of...broadcasters are resisting their suggestion to go 
[digital].”235 Paul Dean Ford figured the only solution to increased digital interference on the AM 
band was simple reciprocity: “If any particle of fairness is left in [the FCC], it must immediately 
change AM rules to allow analog broadcasters to interfere with [HD] stations way above and 
beyond the strict rules now in effect, in order to maintain some semblance of a service area that 
is and/or will be destroyed by this unbelievable debacle of digital AM....Has the FCC ever heard 
of the Golden Rule?”236 
The dearth of digital radio receivers became an increasingly sensitive topic within the 
radio industry. Four years after the FCC’s initial approval of HD Radio, there were few to be 
found. Commercial and noncommercial broadcasters reported that when they went out to their 
local electronics retailers and asked for “HD Radio,” sales staff steered them toward satellite 
radio receivers; if a store had an HD display unit, more often than not it wasn’t even plugged 
in.237 An NPR plan to distribute 50,000 HD Radio receivers had to be scaled back to a paltry 
purchase of 500, because the “radios failed to materialize.” In addition, since NPR did not 
receive permission from iBiquity to sell the receivers, it was forced instead to “share them with 
board members, university officials and backers of their digital conversion campaigns.”238 At the 
2006 NAB annual convention only a handful of demo HD receivers could be found on the 
exhibition floor, belying earlier claims that consumer electronics manufacturers widely 
supported the technology.239 Portable HD radios were nonexistent, because iBiquity’s receiver 
chipset was still too large and power-hungry to fit into such a device.240 
Listener demand for HD Radio was similarly insubstantial. Gartner Research predicted 
that just 9% of U.S. households would have digital radio receivers by 2009.241 A Bridge Ratings 
survey of radio listenership forecast the 2010 HD audience at just 8.84 million - “trailing well 
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behind satellite radio and even audio streaming to mobile phones.”242 It also reported that only 
13% of respondents even knew what HD Radio was, while just 7% “said they were ‘very’ or 
‘somewhat interested’ in owning an HD receiver.”243 “Significant consumer resistance” existed 
due to suspicion among listeners “related to the benefits of HD Radio.”244 Public broadcasters 
began to hedge their bets by using alternate digital audio distribution mechanisms, such as the 
Internet and cellular telephony, to provide HD multicast streams to a larger potential audience.245 
iBiquity CEO Bob Struble revised his “critical mass” forecast from 2009 to 2018.246 Halfway 
through 2007, Bridge estimated the national HD listening audience at just 450,000 per week.247 
If listeners were uninterested - or worse, sullied - on the HD Radio experience, asked 
broadcast engineer Brian Crawford, “for whom are we doing it?”248 Industry consultant Mark 
Ramsey dubbed HD’s promised improvements to broadcasting “vaporware” and urged his 
colleagues to take a cold, hard look at the roots of listener apathy:
Does it bother anyone else that every article written in any neutral publication, meaning a 
wide circulation newspaper as opposed to an industry trade, can never seem to reconcile 
the puffery with the usage or lack thereof? Is it good PR for potential listeners to be 
reminded that most people still aren’t listening?...For HD Radio, we’re selling the selling 
hard. Since listeners buy benefits and don’t buy “selling,” whom is this selling for? Could 
the answer be “Wall Street”?...It’s really about time the powers-that-be in our industry 
faced up to that.249 
Many broadcasters - and even Radio World by the end of 2006 - openly called for the FCC to 
reconsider alternate DAB systems.250 Others counseled a more radical course of action - dropping 
digitalization and getting back to the fundamentals of radio’s pre-1996 business model. “I’ve 
read and listened to all the radio group heads, most of them fairly smart people...talk about how 
HD Radio will be the thing that saves radio from satellite, iPods, Internet radio and all the other 
things eroding radio listening,” opined Bob Raleigh of Jones Radio Networks. “I’ve not read or 
heard one person talk about how we are going to train new radio talent to be compelling on-air 
talent, how we are going to better serve our community with localism, teach our PDs to be more 
than a music director on steroids, build a stronger news staff, offer better weather coverage, get 
involved with community events, or how to simply be better at being entertaining and 
informative. It appears we are all going down the same road we’ve already been down.”251 HD 
Radio is “change for the sake of change,” remarked Jerry Arnold. “It’s not the medium, it’s the 
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message” that needed improvement.252 
Perhaps the best example of growing industry revolt against digital broadcasting came in 
an extended Radio World interview with Edward De La Hunt, inspired by his earlier criticism of 
the technology. Hunt is the father of Edward De La Hunt, Jr. - associate chief of the FCC’s 
Audio Services Division and, later, its Deputy Chief of Engineering. Hunt the Younger’s career 
with the FCC spanned the entire initial developmental and policymaking process of HD Radio; 
he retired from public service to work for the family broadcast business in 2006, the same year 
Hunt the Elder was elected into Minnesota’s Broadcaster Hall of Fame. “Everybody is forgetting 
about the small markets, where profit margins, where they exist, are very narrow,” said Hunt Sr. 
“The other day I closed 30 schools because of the weather. I was wondering if I could have done 
that any better on digital as on analog....It seems foolish to me to buy any kind of system that 
obsoletes what we already have....[Other] small owners think it’s ridiculous.” However, if you 
mentioned HD to Hunt Jr., “his eyes light up; he thinks it’s the greatest thing since sliced bread. 
The rest of the family says ‘No, no, no.’ It’s an FCC ‘thing’....They don’t look at the solid 
technical stuff. They look at who they like and don’t like.”253 Hunt then listed more examples of 
how his radio stations served their listeners and, in the process, repudiated the most significant 
“accomplishment” of his son’s career. 
[HD Radio is] not going to make my fundraising any better, it’s not going to make my 
community service any better. I don’t own these radio stations. I own the equipment. I’m 
a franchise holder of a license to serve the people of this country. Broadcasters need to 
come back to the idea that they’re here to serve. If they don’t want to come back to that, I 
guess they deserve what they get.254 
Hunt’s interview resonated with many other broadcasters. “He’s right on the money and I salute 
his core values,” responded Harvey Twite, general manager of KEDU-LP in Ruidoso, New 
Mexico. “What we need now is a scientist who can clone him.”255 Jack Taddeo, president of 
WLKN-FM in Park Ridge, Illinois agreed wholeheartedly. “Ed speaks volumes when he says he 
doesn’t need or want HD...service inflicted on his stations because he’s plenty busy broadcasting 
local sports, news, etc. without having to decide where to spend the ‘extra’ money he makes 
from his operation.”256 Robert A. McClanathan, a professional engineer based in Portland, 
Oregon, deemed Hunt’s remarks “technically correct” and hoped “all...station owners...read this 
interview and seriously evaluate the consequences of their technical decisions and the impact it 
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will have on their listeners.”257 
IV. FCC Endorses HD Expansion
In the late spring of 2007, the FCC’s Media Bureau published more detailed rules 
governing the proliferation of HD Radio. Although the agency was not prepared to formally 
adopt the NRSC-5 standard, “Radio stations and equipment manufacturers need to move forward 
with the DAB conversion, and we need not wait until after final action is taken on the [standard] 
to provide such guidance to them.”258 This “guidance” gave permission for FM-HD stations to 
deploy iBiquity’s “extended hybrid” mode for the purposes of unrestricted multicasting and 
datacasting; it also codified the use of separate analog/digital FM antennas and unleashed full-
time AM-HD broadcasting.259 Although “the iBiquity...system places digital information on 
frequencies immediately adjacent to the analog signal,” any compromises to the integrity of 
existing analog radio service were worth the tradeoff.260 The FCC also declined to put any new 
public interest obligations on a broadcaster’s digital programming and only required stations to 
provide an HD signal qualitatively equal in fidelity to its analog one; this important metric was 
left undefined.261 FM-HD stations were allowed to lease their multicast streams to third parties, 
but existing broadcasters were prohibited from renting the spectrum of stations they did not 
own.262 Broadcasters were “encouraged” to experiment with the all-digital mode of HD Radio, 
but the FCC declined to formally sanction the mode pending the review of technical data which 
did not yet exist.263 It also deferred action on a mandatory analog/digital transition deadline: 
“[T]here is no evidence in the record that marketplace forces cannot propel the DAB conversion 
forward, and effective markets tend to provide better solutions than regulatory schemes.”264 
Noting that iBiquity had “abided by the Commission’s patent policy up to this point in 
the DAB conversion process,” the FCC refused to regulate the company’s license fees.265 It 
dodged the question of international interference: “While we are optimistic that we will be able 
to resolve any outstanding issues with Canada and Mexico or other countries, these issues remain 
subject to ongoing negotiations.”266 All pending Petitions for Reconsideration were summarily 
denied. “[N]o technical support” existed to buttress counterclaims of HD-related interference; 
from the agency’s perspective, the public interest would not be served “by further delay of the 
long-contemplated digital conversion of the terrestrial radio service.”267 The Commission also 
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promised to conduct annual surveys of HD broadcasters to keep a pulse on the technology’s 
proliferation.268  
Republican Commissioners rejoiced the passage of the second Report and Order. FCC 
Chairman Kevin Martin believed that more substantive HD rules would “promote radio’s 
transition from the analog world to the digital one,” though he did not specifically articulate how 
that might occur.269 Commissioner Deborah Taylor Tate was pleased that the agency allowed “the 
market to determine the pace of the transition and the stations to determine how to use their 
digital bandwidth. The flexibility...will unleash the creativity of the market and, hopefully, 
provide opportunities to new entrants, resulting in improved radio service for all Americans.”270 
“Thank goodness the private sector did not wait for the government to act.,” remarked 
Commissioner Robert McDowell. “The Commission has delayed adopting these 
standards...while we debated whether to foist additional regulations on this budding 
technology...the Order ensures that terrestrial radio has the technical capacity to remain 
competitive with satellite radio services and other media.”271 
The FCC’s two Democrats were less sanguine about HD Radio’s prospects, and both 
dissented in part with the second Report and Order. Commissioner Michael Copps stated that 
“the digital transition involves more than just developing new technical standards. Digital 
broadcasting has the power to reconfigure the communications landscape in good and powerful 
ways—if we get our policies right.” He expressed significant concerns about allowing the 
wholesale proliferation of HD Radio without new digital public interest obligations. “The item 
sidesteps what I believe is a fundamental responsibility of the Commission: to determine what 
the public interest means in the digital age.”272 Commissioner Jonathan Adelstein agreed: “[I]t is 
another missed opportunity for the Commission to promote diversity, another dream deferred. 
After years of ignoring the issue, punting the question, and delaying a constructive dialogue to 
develop meaningful solutions, it is really disappointing that the Commission has once again 
failed to step up to the plate.” The sheer unwillingness of the FCC to ask “general and open 
questions how the ‘public interest,  convenience and necessity’ can best be served by radio 
broadcasters in the digital age” was “unacceptable.” Apparently unaware of the spirited debate 
already in the record, Adelstein called for more public input on the issue of digital radio 
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broadcasting.273 In summary, the FCC’s decision allowing the unrestricted proliferation of HD 
Radio seemed to have been made in a vacuum - its protagonists satisfied and its antagonists 
ignored or dismissed.
Almost immediately, two Petitions for Reconsideration disputing the FCC’s second 
Report and Order were filed by the public. Jonathan Hardis castigated the FCC for ignoring the 
wholly proprietary nature of the HD Radio system. “The Commission cannot hand out patents 
that provide better deals than the ones earned at the Patent Office....Technical specifications that 
either explicitly or implicitly rely on essential details that are well-guarded trade secrets amount 
to perpetual Government patents to those privileged to know the secrets. They stifle competition 
and innovation....The history of this proceeding is tarnished by deceit.”274 The HD Radio 
proceeding was “not about a cute little digital add-on to traditional radio, something that 
consumers may accept or reject at their option. Instead, this proceeding is about the permanent 
redefinition of the broadcast radio service in the United States.”275 Rather than rewarding iBiquity 
et. al. for “abiding” by a 40-year old patent policy, Hardis felt the FCC should be “issuing 
sanctions for their quiet bait-and-switch.”276 
A coalition of public interest groups also filed a Petition for Reconsideration. The New 
America Foundation, Prometheus Radio Project, Benton Foundation, Common Cause, Center for 
Digital Democracy, Center for Governmental Studies, and Free Press disagreed with the 
Commission’s cavalier attitude regarding the widening of every radio station’s spectral footprint. 
“The Second Report & Order is premised on the unexamined and unsupported assumption that 
the Commission is not assigning new spectrum for mutually exclusive commercial uses to  
incumbent licensees,” they argued. “This spectrum may be worth billions of dollars, and may 
allow incumbents to provide additional program streams, engage in datacasting, and provide 
other types of services. Yet, the FCC neither requires licensees to pay for the use of this 
additional spectrum nor to provide any additional benefits to the public in return for its use.”277 
The FCC failed “to address the question of whether it should hold auctions or take other action to 
prevent unjust enrichment” by incumbent broadcasters. “Instead, it asserts in some places that it 
is not authorizing broadcasters to use spectrum beyond their existing channels, while it 
acknowledges that it is, in other places.”278 Finally, although the second Report and Order called 
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for further inquiry on “enhanced public interest requirements, there is no guarantee that such 
requirements will in fact be adopted.”279  
HD Radio’s protagonists were quick to discount the backlash. iBiquity claimed both 
Petitions for Reconsideration provided no “new evidence or legal justification to make changes” 
to the Commission’s newly-minted rules. “In fact, the petitions merely repeat arguments each 
Petitioner presented earlier in this proceeding, which arguments the Commission consistently has 
rejected. Commission’s precedent, the record in this proceeding and the public interest all 
demand that the Commission dismiss the petitions and uphold the Second Report and Order.”280 
Citing its $200 million investment in HD Radio, iBiquity claimed that marketplace forces would 
trump any semblance of public consternation with the technology.281 iBiquity claimed that media 
reform groups misunderstood the technical rationale behind HD Radio and assured the FCC that 
new digital features would provide plenty of opportunities to serve the public interest in the 
absence of proactive regulation.282 Speaking directly to Jonathan Hardis’ claims that its 
technology was unfairly proprietary, iBiquity responded that it had “made extensive patent 
disclosures and licensing commitments to the NRSC and the Commission....iBiquity believes it 
is very significant that the complaints about access to information from perennial critics such as 
Mr. Hardis have never been backed up by any complaints from the equipment manufacturers and 
broadcasters that use HD Radio technology.”283 It characterized Hardis’ Petition as “nothing more 
than bitterness for industry rejection of his views.”284 
The National Association of Broadcasters buttressed iBiquity’s position. It asserted that 
the Petitions for Reconsideration were “bottomed on a faulty premise” and represented a “simply 
wrong” understanding of HD Radio technology.285 The NAB requested the FCC dismiss Hardis’ 
Petition because the adoption of HD Radio by stations remained entirely voluntary, and thus 
concerns about a technological monopoly were misplaced.286 National Public Radio also filed 
formal opposition to the Petitions for Reconsideration. “As is abundantly clear from the Second 
Report and Order and prior decisions in this proceeding,” wrote NPR, “there is nothing 
revelatory about the presence of certain proprietary technology in the iBiquity [HD Radio] 
system....Even if the use of proprietary technology in the iBiquity system had not been 
addressed, [the Hardis Petition] provides no basis for reconsidering the Second Report and Order 
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absent evidence that iBiquity is exploiting the situation inappropriately.”287 NPR also denied 
there was any “fundamental inconsistency” in allowing radio stations to expand their spectrum 
holdings without public interest obligations attached.288 Entertaining the petitions would 
“harm...the DAB transition and the new public services NPR and others are developing.” 
Reconsidering the Second Report and Order in response to the...Petitions would, at a 
minimum, cast a significant cloud of uncertainty over the future of DAB. That is because 
each of the Petitions challenges the basic decision to authorize the iBiquity system and 
not merely some incidental aspect of it. Accordingly...we urge the Commission to 
consider the potentially catastrophic consequences for the future of digital radio and the 
public.289 
Such wholesale scrutiny of HD Radio, which arguably should have been conducted by the FCC 
five years prior, was simply outside the realm of acceptable policy discourse. 
Hardis and his new-found public-interest allies would not be so cavalierly dismissed. 
“NPR warns of ‘harm’ and ‘potentially catastrophic consequences,’” replied Hardis. “If so, I 
would think that iBiquity would be highly motivated to do the right thing [and make the HD 
Radio standard more open] — once the Commission holds them accountable.”290 Hardis 
challenged the NAB’s notion that adoption of HD Radio was purely voluntary. “This may well 
be true from NAB’s vantage point as an association of broadcasters. My Petition is from a 
different vantage point, that of an individual consumer, a near-daily user at the receiving side of 
the broadcast radio service.” From that perspective, “‘voluntary’ is not an apt description....NAB 
[argues] that since today’s [HD] operations are ‘only interim in nature’ and since all-digital 
broadcasting might be a long way off, the Commission shouldn’t concern itself with that end-
point today. I agree that the nose of the [HD] camel is now only slightly in our tent. But when 
would it be a better time to ensure that the camel is healthy?”291 Hardis asserted that iBiquity was 
“so bereft of counter-argument that their opposition is reduced to distortion, falsehood, 
irrelevancy, and ultimately, impugning the motives of those who dare to speak up.”292 The New 
America Foundation et. al. also did not take its lumps lying down. “Oppositions’ arguments do 
not obscure that the [HD Radio] system increases the bandwidth occupancy of broadcasters,” 
they wrote. “At best the incumbents’ arguments highlight the glaring need for the FCC to 
perform a ‘reasoned analysis’ and provide a clear rationale for [its] decision.”293 
Offstage, the FCC’s further endorsement of HD Radio encouraged the technology’s 
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proprietors to explore the development of new features. iBiquity announced a development 
agreement with the Rupert Murdoch-owned NDS Group to develop a pay-radio application 
known as “conditional access.” This technology, branded “RadioGuard,” would allow stations to 
encrypt a portion of their digital audio streams and charge individual listeners for the right to 
access them. Such functionality, however, would not be backward-compatible with existing HD 
Radio receivers.294 Thomas. E. Ruckenwald, NDS’s director of data applications, boasted that 
services which “provide consumer choice and simultaneously enhance the financial strength of 
broadcasters tend to be in the best public interest.”295 
To demonstrate its own fiscal strength, iBiquity opened a new research and development 
laboratory, designed to develop chipsets for portable HD Radio receivers, which spoke volumes 
about the consumer electronics industry’s lack of enthusiasm for the technology.296 iBiquity also 
celebrated the fact that 1,500 HD Radio stations were now on the air, though this number 
represented less than 10% of all broadcast radio stations in the United States.297 The Corporation 
for Public Broadcasting opened another funding window for digital conversion assistance, after 
having already doled out nearly $30 million in HD-related subsidies.298 Meanwhile, the HD 
Radio Alliance re-chartered itself for a third year and reported its member-stations would devote 
$230 million worth of airtime to HD promotion activities in 2008. Alliance members were also 
allowed more flexibility to experiment with competing multicast formats.299 In May of 2008, 
iBiquity announced it raised another $15 million in venture capital.300 
Despite the puffery, the intra-industry dialogue as documented in Radio World was 
overwhelmingly pessimistic about HD Radio’s future. In the minority were those who supported 
the technology. John Schneider, a sales manager at Quincy, Illinois-based transmitter 
manufacturer Broadcast Electronics, blamed critics within the industry for slowing the HD 
transition: “These naysayers from within our own industry would probably complain about the 
quality of the lifeboats on a sinking ship....If we all don’t get behind it as our best chance for 
survival, the train will leave the station and we will all be looking for a new line of work.”301 
Stephen Poole, the chief engineer of Crawford Broadcasting Co.’s Birmingham, Alabama station 
cluster, declared that “until the naysayers can propose a real, feasible, doable and cost-effective 
alternative to help AM grow and survive in an increasingly competitive (and increasingly 
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digital!) marketplace, I’m finding myself increasingly uninterested in what they have to say.”302 
Crawford Broadcasting’s Art Reis continued the trope: given the FCC’s recent endorsement of 
HD Radio, “why are the naysayers griping about the ‘slow pace’ of HD Radio acceptance?...This 
is a great lesson for you doomsayers out there who predicted that HD Radio is a flawed 
technology that will never be accepted by the public. It’s about time that you all became part of 
the solution instead of part of the problem.”303 
The majority of intra-industry dialogue, however, expressed growing concern with HD 
Radio’s viability. More listeners submitted reports to Radio World detailing their HD-related 
interference problems.304 “I don’t believe [HD Radio] is legal,” wrote Chuck Ermatinger of St. 
Louis, Missouri. “It has made a nightmarish mess out of the AM broadcast band. There’s no 
escape from it, and it’s ruining my AM listening. It’s been bad enough hearing it in the daytime, 
but at night, stations are wiping each other out....If [iBiquity] thinks I’ll buy one of its blasted 
receivers, it’s wrong.”305 In Brooklyn, New York, Steven Daniel reported to Radio World that 
AM-HD interference at night had “made a dramatic, even shocking, difference” to his listening 
experience. 
I used to listen to a lot of stations in the Northeast corridor, but now I’m limited to a few 
local powerhouse stations....The rest of the dial is a useless wall of interference. I’m 
willing to complain about this and write a few letters, but I doubt it will do any good. I 
expect that, in a month or so, I’ll miss listening to my radio at night and will break down 
and purchase a stand-alone Internet radio. I figure that’s the next best thing to “real” 
radio.306 
James O’Neal of Falls Church, Virginia asked station owners “with [HD] and clear frequencies” 
to “put their money where their mouths are. If you’re not interested in serving other than a local 
audience, please power down. You’ll save a lot of money on electricity and transmitter costs and 
keep things clear for the stations that do want to reach audiences beyond their city limits 
signs.”307 Amateur radio operator Karl Zuk of Katonah, New York expressed disbelief that the 
industry was willing to sacrifice a proven technology that “can achieve direct nationwide 
distribution using a $10 handheld receiver” with a digital version that cost 30 times more.308 
Small-market AM station owners reported destructive interference from major-market 
stations hundreds of miles away. “I can testify that my coverage has indeed suffered,” wrote 
Larry Langford, the owner of two small AM stations in Michigan. “[AM-HD interference]...has 
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taken out an entire market for me...along the resort shore of Lake Michigan. Those who support 
[AM-HD] say that Ibiquity will work out the kinks and have a solution. Who are they kidding? If 
it’s the digital carrier that is causing the hiss on the analog signal, there is no way to ‘fix’ that.”309 
Langford termed FM-HD technology “junk science,” and AM-HD “science fiction.”310 
On October 1, 2007, 16 AM-HD stations owned by iBiquity broadcast-investor Citadel 
Radio turned off their digital sidebands. Radio World reported the move was due to “interference 
complaints from listeners and stations on adjacent channels, the latter from both Citadel- and 
non-Citadel-owned stations in and outside the markets....Listeners who have complained say 
they hear hiss and adjacent-channel stations say they hear noise on the channel.” Citadel clarified 
that most of the complaints originated from self-interference - that is, interference between high-
power Citadel-owned AM stations.311 
The following month, station WYSL-AM in Avon, New York filed the first formal 
complaint with the FCC seeking AM-HD interference remediation. Based on “more than 100 
hours” of interference recordings covering “more than 700 miles in field tests,” the complaint 
alleged WYSL’s signal was being stomped on by 50,000-watt CBS-owned WBZ in Boston, 
which operated on an adjacent channel to WYSL. Neither CBS nor the FCC would comment on 
the complaint; WYSL’s owner, Bob Savage, established “an anti-[HD] website” to call for a 
Congressional investigation into what he termed the “cruel steamrolling of independent AM 
operators, and a nighttime medium-wave morass certain to drive away what’s left of the 
dwindling AM-band audience.”312 In letters to Radio World, Savage argued that the interference 
he suffered “poses a threat to public safety and communications....If CBS continues to delay and 
dither, we’ll have no choice but to file a federal lawsuit and seek an injunction, and at the same 
time we may petition the FCC for a refund of our regulatory license fees. We pay good money 
for the use of our frequency, and WYSL is being deprived of our spectrum use by the very 
agency which charges for it.”313 Savage further characterized AM-HD as having “all the 
consumer appeal of a $200 electric fork,” with the “destructive potential capable of wiping out 
what remains of entrepreneurial radio in the United States....Dismissing the everyday use of a 
billion perfectly serviceable analog AM radios to favor an estimated 357 HD-AM listeners 
makes perfect sense. If the FCC were only around in April 1912, maybe we could have outlawed 
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icebergs.”314 
HD interference problems were not confined to the AM dial. Doug Vernier, a consulting 
engineer working on a study of FM-HD interference for NPR, reported in a front-page Radio 
World Engineering Extra article that changes iBiquity made to its FM-HD spectral mask actually 
allowed more digital energy onto adjacent channels than previously predicted. He confirmed the 
increased potential for FM-HD interference by conducting signal contour analyses and collecting 
real-world listener reports.315 Vernier also noted that several stations broadcasting in FM-HD 
reported “that their analog air monitors exhibit white noise in the background. Perhaps the most 
serious threat to the hosting station is when [analog and digital FM signals are broadcast 
separately].”316 He also debunked proponents’ claims that the technology used no new spectrum: 
What we have done with the introduction of [HD] is to superimpose a new transmission 
method over an existing allocation system, hoping it will work. In many cases it does, but 
there are more cases coming to light every day where there are problems....There are 
those who say, ‘Don’t look a gift horse in the mouth’; the FCC gave us the use of this 
new spectrum, so let’s make the best of it. Being neighborly to the stations and their 
listeners seems to have taken a back seat over a more hedonistic view of ‘Let’s push on 
and make amends for what we have done later.’” [emphasis added]317 
Radio World reported that several anonymous but well-respected broadcast engineers and station 
executives were frustrated with the “fraud” of HD Radio; they wanted to turn off the digital 
sidebands on their AM and FM stations but were prevented from doing so by corporate 
management.318 At the 2008 Consumer Electronics Show, Radio World columnist Skip Pizzi 
observed that “[s]entiment against [HD Radio] is gradually morphing from a fringe movement to 
a serious threat....If any other major broadcast groups drop [HD], the format will be in serious 
trouble.”319 
Many within the industry were not surprised by these revelations. By 2008, there was still 
virtually no listener demand for HD Radio, and at least one transmitter manufacturer reported 
diminishing enthusiasm among broadcasters. Of the 255 transmitters Valatie, New York-based 
Energy-Onix Broadcast Equipment Co. sold in 2007, all were analog-only models.320 Seven 
straight years of flat local radio advertising sales and a dearth of affordable HD receivers also 
deepened the gloom among broadcasters.321 Without firm commitments from vehicle 
manufacturers to include HD Radios as standard equipment, Radio World predicted most stations 
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would abandon their digital signals within 10 or 20 years.322 Wilifred Cooper told the publication 
that he attended the fall 2007 NAB Radio Show hoping to purchase an HD Radio and was 
“impressed with the [HD] theme” of the convention. However, “retro radios were being sold in 
the NAB Radio Show store, the kind also able to play LP records. No HD Radio receivers were 
for sale.”323 Radio audience researcher Thom Moon took a trip around the Cincinnati 
metropolitan area looking for HD receivers and found just a handful of models in stock. Very 
few store clerks knew much about how HD Radio worked or how to sell its virtues.324 Repeating 
the experience in New York, Moon found that “HD Radios were a bit easier to find....But 
education of salespeople about HD Radio technology and the ability of potential customers to 
sample real HD-R broadcasts are problematic.”325 
The public was certainly not jumping to the sound of HD Radio. A Bridge Ratings survey 
published in the summer of 2007 projected “booming expected growth for Internet radio...and 
wireless Internet...in the coming decade, with terrestrial radio...essentially flat, then eroding 
toward 2020, and HD Radio use bubbling along only near the bottom.” The number of surveyed 
listeners who were “very interested” in purchasing an HD receiver actually declined - from 9 to 
7%326 Research firm Parks Associates projected HD Radio’s national audience would grow from 
a paltry 4.2 million in 2008 to 30 million in 2012 - the most optimistic numbers of HD Radio 
uptake yet published, but representing less than 10% of analog radio’s regular listenership.327 
None of this bad news surprised many people. Fred Weinberg of Las Vegas told Radio 
World that HD was “going nowhere fast” because “nobody ever asked the vast majority of radio 
station owners” about their expectations for a viable digital radio service. “What passed for 
leadership in our industry made the best deal they could to make themselves richer, and the 
owners of the other 8,000 licensed stations were just expected to go along....The smartest thing 
the HD Radio promoters can do is sell out to someone who actually understands the business.”328 
Kent Lankford, the owner of an AM/FM combo in Lawrenceville, Illinois took pride in signing 
his stations off the air every night, and firing them up every morning. “We are proud to be the 
only live broadcasters in the Lawrenceville, Ill. and Vincennes, Ind. areas,” he wrote. “When we 
broadcast, there is a heartbeat at the facility....Old fashioned, yes, but it works well here. [HD 
Radio]: Not needed in many smaller markets. Service: Always needed.”329 Radio World’s Skip 
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Pizzi openly questioned the future fiscal health of iBiquity and warned that the decision to place 
radio broadcasting’s digital future in the hands of a single corporation could threaten the entire 
industry. “Ironically, the unusual licensing structure of [HD Radio] may also be slowing the 
transition because it has kept some (particularly the larger) consumer electronics manufacturers 
from adopting the format due to their lack of comfort with the unorthodox approach” [emphasis 
in original].330 By mid-2008, Radio World declared that it had “become clear to us that radio’s 
health and growth do not rely on any one tool or platform but rather on a willingness to be 
flexible, to try something new and not be afraid to fail at one project and then try another.”331 
Naysayers were no longer a fringe element in the industry.
Between 2004 and 2008, HD Radio’s protagonists convinced a compliant FCC to allow 
the technology to proliferate, regardless of the growing record of its fundamental detriments. 
Apparently working off the mantra, “if you build it, they will come,” major-market broadcast 
conglomerates and National Public Radio teamed up to provide a front which suggested to the 
Commission that industry support of the HD Radio was widespread. However, a growing 
amount of discontent with HD Radio was registered on-, off-, and backstage. Incredibly, the FCC 
seemed blind to this uprising. Relying on incomplete and skewed technical information from 
iBiquity Digital Corporation, the National Association of Broadcasters, and the National Radio 
Systems Committee, the agency sanctioned expanded use of HD Radio despite its shaky 
performative metrics. The real-world results were inversely proportional to regulatory 
expectations: every time protagonists “won” a policy skirmish with independent broadcasters, 
consulting engineers, and the public, tangible perceptions of the technology soured. 
After eight years in existence, iBiquity still did not have a viable business model, staying 
alive through periodic infusions of venture capital. Funding from radio broadcasters themselves 
dwindled to nearly nothing as the industry endured a recession. HD Radio’s ballyhooed 
promotional campaign consisted of commercials aired using unsold spot inventory on investor-
stations and reached nobody of consequence, as demonstrated by HD’s miniscule listening 
audience - especially relative to other nascent forms of radio such as satellite broadcasting and 
webcasting. Receiver manufacturers may have had the last laugh: although they had cautioned 
the FCC about HD’s pitfalls early on, their public objections dwindled while their actions spoke 
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louder; nobody stepped up to mass-produce HD receivers. Although the characters in this 
dramaturgy first blamed each other for HD Radio’s tepid proliferation, as time wore on it became 
clearer that the faults of the system were inherent, and the arguments of antagonists had a point. 
No amount of regulatory permissiveness could fix a digital broadcast technology which 
overpromised and underdelivered. As the second decade of the 21st century loomed, radio’s 
digital future was murkier than ever. 
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Chapter 6: HD Radio’s Questionable Future
The FCC’s Second Report and Order in 2007 authorizing HD Radio to proliferate with 
few restrictions or any real oversight was the most significant policy victory for its proponents 
during the technology’s brief history on the air. However, no amount of regulatory 
permissiveness could make up for HD Radio’s fundamental shortfalls. The question of the 
protocol’s true extensibility and proprietary nature became wider points for debate within the 
radio industry (though not within the FCC). Meanwhile, the growth of other digital audio 
distribution platforms - especially those involving the Internet - eroded the listening audience for 
terrestrial broadcast radio. During the last half of the decade, the collective uptake of digital 
audio services not related to broadcasting overtook the growth of HD Radio itself. Part of this 
was due to a recession that hit broadcasters hard during the 2000s, which led to cuts in the 
resources stations and their owners could devote to new, HD-exclusive programming. While 
local programming on FM-HD multicast streams, for example, was promised by broadcaster-
proponents, there is little evidence that such services actually exist to any meaningful degree.
For AM broadcasters, problems involving digital-to-analog interference effectively halted 
the expansion of HD service in the United States. In fact, as the inherent deficiencies of digital 
broadcasting on the AM band became more widely recognized, usage of the AM-HD protocol by 
iBiquity’s own broadcast-investors has declined, and is now confined primarily to a handful of 
major markets. Many early-adopters have turned off their digital sidebands completely. 
However, so long as the largest AM broadcasters in the country continue to dabble with HD 
Radio, interference from their activities will continue to affect smaller stations who share 
frequencies with “clear channel” broadcasters around the country. 
On the FM side, HD’s proponents were initially satisfied with the authority to experiment 
with the technology’s “value-added” applications, such as multicasting, datacasting and 
conditional access services. However, six years of real-world experience showed that FM-HD 
also did not perform as advertised. Without a guarantee that FM-HD programming could reach a 
potential audience equivalent to existing analog FM broadcasts, questions of the technology’s 
long-term viability loomed large among broadcasters. This would lead HD-backers on a final 
two-year policy push to allow FM stations to increase the power of their digital sidebands. From 
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a regulatory perspective, this request was contextualized as an “improvement” to HD Radio 
which might diminish the apathy among the majority of the nation’s broadcasters regarding its 
adoption. However, FM-HD interference had long been identified as an issue of concern, at least 
by independent broadcasters, the public, and within trade press discourse, and the move to 
increase the allowable digital power any station might broadcast with provoked further 
consternation about the trajectory of digital radio in the United States. HD’s proponents again 
moved in what appeared to be a counterintuitive direction, hoping to facilitate the uptake of the 
technology by effectively raising the probability of harm it would cause to the legacy analog 
broadcast system. In doing so, they exacerbated what had been a minor controversy with FM-HD 
technology into another colorful argument over the validity of HD Radio itself as a useful 
mechanism that allowed broadcasters to navigate a convergent media environment. The fight 
over an FM-HD power hike was clearly a remedial action by proponents of the technology, yet 
the FCC would continue to contextualize their actions as “progress” where none really existed.
I. Proposing a Boost to FM-HD Power
Almost a year to the day after the FCC promulgated comprehensive rules on the 
operation of HD Radio, several commercial and public broadcasters petitioned the agency to 
raise the power level of digital FM signals.1 The group requested the FCC allow stations to 
increase the power of their FM-HD broadcasts by a factor of ten (equal to 10% of an FM 
station’s analog transmission output).2 Proponents argued this increase was necessary because 
FM-HD signals simply did not come close to replicating the coverage area of their analog host. 
In fact, FM-HD signals were so weak that their reception was nearly impossible within 
buildings.3 Unbeknownst to the rest of the industry and the listening public, the broadcasters 
petitioning for the power increase had already received permission from the FCC to conduct field 
experiments with increased FM-HD power levels. They used one CBS-owned station in Los 
Angeles to collect their data. According to their filing, under the original power level, existing 
FM-HD signals could be received “at only one of the test locations and analog reception was 
described as noisy or poor at 75% of the test locations.” When the power was increased, “the 
digital signal could be received reliably at 75% of the test locations and at selected locations in 
the remaining 25% of the buildings.”4
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National Public Radio quietly completed a 50-station simluation-analysis of the effects of 
a blanket FM-HD power increase on analog radio reception. The results of this study were 
personally presented to FCC senior staff. Unfortunately for the the proponents of the power 
increase, NPR’s research did not paint a painless picture with regard to analog-to-digital 
interference. NPR’s report did conclude that an FM-HD power hike would increase the reliable 
service area of the digital signal, especially in a mobile listening environment. However, it would 
come with a significant cost. 
Mobile analog FM covered population would be reduced an average of 26% for the 
sample stations. Interference would affect some stations severely in portions of their 
analog mobile service area: 41% could lose one-third or more of their covered population 
and 18% would lose more than half of their population. With 10% [FM-HD] transmission 
power: Indoor and portable [FM-HD] covered population totals would be 83% and 
81% of analog coverage, respectively. Analog FM indoor and portable covered 
population totals are reduced by 22% and 6%, respectively. Interference would affect 
some stations severely in portions of their analog indoor service area: 27% could lose 
one-third or more of their covered population and 16% could lose more than half of their 
population.5 
In other words, not only did the proposed increase in power stand to exacerbate the potential for  
interference between FM stations, but raising the power of FM-HD sidebands could also cause 
detrimental self-interference between the analog and digital components of an FM station. NPR 
noted that listener reports of interference under existing FM-HD power limits were “minimal,” 
but chalked that up to public ignorance about how digital radio interference manifested itself.6 
Despite these conclusions, NPR suggested some change was necessary to increase the 
robustness of FM-HD Radio signals and asserted that any solution would have to be 
transmission-based in nature.7 NPR’s analysis predicted that a 10-fold increase in FM-HD power 
would “cause substantial interference” to analog radio listening;8 yet “[t]he question of getting 
from here to there without substantial penalties to analog coverage is likely a matter of 
successive, calculated strategies, potentially trading off some increments in analog interference 
risk for more digital coverage, commensurate with increases in digital receiver penetration.”9 The 
report ultimately advised the FCC not to implement any rules that would dramatically decrease 
the analog coverage area of FM radio stations.10 Additionally, NPR cautioned that raising the 
FM-HD power level tenfold “could [double] original HD transmission cost projections” - an 
extremely unattractive option for cash-strapped noncommercial radio stations.11 Although NPR 
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concluded that “no convenient basis is evident” to provide a blanket 10-fold increase in 
allowable digital power, it did not formally oppose the basic concept.12 The tacit signal to the 
FCC was that NPR would be willing to support some form of FM-HD power increase, but 
worried about its implementation in uncontrolled circumstances and the implications it might 
have on analog listenership during the ongoing digital radio transition. 
In response to the NPR study, iBiquity Digital Corporation filed its own “test report” 
with the FCC on the feasibility of increasing FM-HD power levels. Its conclusions could not 
have been more different from NPR’s. iBiquity engaged the services of investor-broadcasters in 
three major markets; they obtained experimental authorization to broadcast with digital power 10 
times in excess of what was then allowable by FCC rules. iBiquity concluded that such operation 
dramatically increased the robustness of FM-HD signals without any “meaningful increase in the 
potential for harmful interference.”13 This conclusion was construed to suggest that a blanket 
power hike was not actually a substantive change to existing HD operational regulations: 
“broadcasters have become comfortable that the introduction of digital broadcasting does not 
present a credible risk of harmful interference to existing analog broadcasting.”14 
Were any problems to arise, iBiquity again expressed confidence that the FCC’s own 
interference-remediation procedures could handle them.15 The National Association of 
Broadcasters, CBS Radio, and the HD Digital Radio Alliance all contacted the FCC expressing 
support for a blanket tenfold FM-HD power increase. Although the NAB acknowledged that the 
action “may create new instances of interference in certain situations,” it believed “that the 
benefits to be gained for FM broadcasters and FM listeners will far outweigh the limited 
additional interference predicted by iBiquity’s studies.”16 This was an argumentative point 
straight from the script used to promote the imposition of full-time AM-HD broadcasting. 
iBiquity executives met with senior staff from the FCC’s Media Bureau in October, 2008 and 
made a PowerPoint presentation on the need for a blanket FM-HD power increase. Notably, the 
presentation spent much of its time downplaying the negative findings of NPR’s interference 
study and pledged cooperation between all segments of the radio industry toward the goal of 
raising FM-HD power.17 
The FCC’s Media Bureau issued a public notice formally requesting comments on the 
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proposed power hike.18 The resultant dialogue was more feisty than proponents had expected. 
iBiquity hammered home the notion that a power increase was necessary to make FM-HD 
reception viable, especially for its multicasting application which, unlike a station’s primary 
programming, had no analog fallback.19 The company cast NPR’s interference analysis as 
unrealistic. “Throughout its many years of testing the HD Radio system, iBiquity has always 
found field tests offer the most accurate prediction of digital compatibility and performance,” it 
claimed. iBiquity suggested NPR’s report painted a “worst case scenario” regarding a tenfold 
FM-HD power hike: it argued that all stations would not simultaneously increase their digital 
power levels, and iBiquity expected that “digital receiver penetration levels will be much more 
dominant long before all stations have adopted digital broadcasts. At that point, the impact of 
digital on existing analog signals will become much less important.20 
Furthermore, iBiquity announced its intent to work with broadcast-investors to create 
more facts on the ground by applying for additional experimental authorizations to explore the 
implications of an FM-HD power increase.21 The “Backyard Broadcasting Group,” the benign 
moniker for a plethora of iBiquity investor-companies such as CBS, Bonneville, Clear Channel, 
Emmis, Entercom, Greater Media, and several transmitter manufacturers, among others, filed 
comments encouraging expeditious action on the issue. It, like iBiquity, suggested the power 
increase would have “a tolerable potential for interference” in “limited” situations.22 Noting that 
NPR had “publicly stated that it is not fundamentally opposed to - and sees the need for - a 
digital power increase,” the Group similarly painted NPR’s interference analysis as an 
“unrealistic prediction” of any real-world impact such an increase might have.23 It further 
reminded the FCC that the industry had collectively spent “in excess of $225 million on HD 
Radio technology” to date, and that a denial of their request could put that investment in 
jeopardy.24 The National Association of Broadcasters construed iBiquity’s study as providing “a 
sufficient and strong basis” for the FCC to improve a blanket power increase.25 The modification 
was necessary “for the evolution of digital radio....Moreover, with over 85% of stations yet to 
convert to digital, authorizing a power increase now will be more efficient because stations just 
starting HD service will be able to build fuller digital facilities and avoid the expense and 
disruption of a retrofit at a later point.”26 
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Only two public broadcasters thought iBiquity’s et. al.’s proposal would be trouble-free. 
John W. Harelson, a board member of KMCE-FM in Manitou Springs, Colorado, thought the 
notion of protecting analog radio signals from digital interference represented an unwise bias 
toward an “older, inferior” broadcast technology to the detriment of a “newer, superior one.” “If 
increased digital power should cause interference to analogue signals,” argued Harelson, “it 
would encourage conversion to digital technology, which, in the long term, will be in the best 
interest of all concerned.” Seton Hall University's public radio station, WSOU, also supported 
the industry’s request for a blanket tenfold power increase, though it believed the threat of 
increased interference as noted by NPR should move the FCC to implement any changes “slowly 
over time.”27 
The majority of public broadcasters reacted negatively to iBiquity’s assertion that any 
power increase would be painless. Minnesota Public Radio, which had signed on to the initial 
request for an FM-HD power hike, backed away from that stance, to the point of formally 
dissociating itself with the originating petition.28 “We are...committed to the integrity of the FM 
spectrum as a whole, and it would be inconsistent for us to...object to the many incursions on the 
integrity of the spectrum...while at the same time ignoring the interference that could be caused 
by an indiscriminate increase in power for HD,” wrote MPR. “We know and trust the thorough 
methods that NPR Labs has demonstrated in the past, and believe that this current HD testing is 
representative of what we could realistically expect if the HD power increase of 10% was 
allowed to pass. MPR recommends that the Commission seriously consider approving a solution 
that allows the broadcasters to find an HD power level that works with their neighbors and would 
not sacrifice analog reception.”29 It also argued that increased FM-HD interference would 
damage its ability to fundraise, as “ support from...many individuals and organizations will not 
be sustainable if the audio that they receive on their radios is not clean, clear and free of the 
scratchy, annoying noise that a close-by HD signal could impose over the analog.”30 MPR 
announced that it was in discussion with NPR, iBiquity and others to “develop a measured 
approach” to an FM-HD power increase, and requested the FCC defer consideration of the issue 
until “those organized efforts” bore a compromise.31 
The Association of Public Radio Engineers observed that both iBiquity’s and NPR’s 
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studies projected a “significant” increase in digital-to-analog interference and requested the FCC 
explore alternate methods to help improve the robustness of FM-HD Radio signals.32 One 
suggestion would allow stations to asymmetrically increase the power of their digital sidebands; 
if an FM station had a nearby neighbor to one side of its channel but not the other, perhaps that 
station could increase its digital power in the spectral direction where interference was less likely 
to present a problem.33 The APRE also believed no power increase should be implemented until 
further study of its implications could be conducted.34 NPR itself strongly defended the validity 
of its interference analysis report, detailing the care and transparency with which it had 
accumulated its data.35 Conceding in principle that an increase in FM-HD power was necessary, 
NPR asserted that a blanket 10-fold increase would be “insidious” and could endanger the fiscal 
viability of public radio stations.36 “Materially degrading the technical quality of a station's signal 
is therefore more than an aesthetic issue,” argued NPR. “It would likely mean the loss of 
listeners because most people will simply stop listening once reception becomes 
poor....Ultimately, the interference would mean diminished resources to sustain the station's 
service, let alone fund a robust transition to HD Radio....Particularly in difficult economic times, 
the consequences for some stations could be dire.”37 NPR announced that it “had begun intensive 
technical planning to carry out additional testing to address this and related issues in the next few 
months,” and also urged the FCC to defer any decision until that information was assembled.38 
Equipment manufacturers were of mixed minds about an FM-HD power increase. Only 
one transmitter manufacturer, Energy-Onix Broadcast Equipment Company, filed comments, and 
those were firmly against a power hike. “I strongly recommend that the FCC does not permit any 
increase in the existing HD radio subcarrier powers,” wrote company president Bernard Wise. 
“This action will destroy the economics and technical reception of FM broadcasters.”39 On the 
other hand, two automobile manufacturers - Ford and BMW - commented in support of the FM-
HD power increase. Both construed the proposal as key to stimulating listener acceptance of the 
technology.40 The Consumer Electronics Association was more circumspect about the 
implications of an FM-HD power hike. “Consumer demand for analog audio receivers still 
greatly exceeds demand for digital audio receivers. Although CEA anticipates that a power 
increase will accelerate consumer demand for digital audio receivers, CEA respectfully urges the 
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Commission to condition any power increase authorization on compliance with technical rules 
providing adequate interference protection to analog receivers.”41 CEA further suggested the 
FCC look outside iBiquity and NPR - now considered the technology’s two primary innovators - 
for more forthright analysis of digital-to-analog HD interference.42 
Independent broadcasters redoubled their efforts to oppose any exacerbation of HD 
Radio’s fundamental flaws. Reising Radio Partners, the licensee of an AM/FM combo in 
Columbus, Indiana, requested the FCC conduct its own independent tests instead of relying on 
industry-concocted data to authorize a potentially destructive change to the HD Radio rules. 
Reising was extremely critical of the proponents of the FM-HD power hike, especially the 
National Association of Broadcasters, which it asserted no longer honestly represented the 
interests of all radio licensees.43 “Neither the 87% of broadcasting conducted outside the [HD 
Digital Radio] Alliance nor the Public should pay the price for a failed technology with cost 
prohibitive receivers and reduced service areas,” declared Reising.44 Broadcast engineer Robert 
R. Hawkins of Edinburgh, Indiana drew on his 41 years of experience in the field to forcefully 
oppose an FM-HD power hike. “While the current system technically does work at 1% injection, 
it doesn’t work well. The request for an increase from 1% to 10% injection is not unlike building 
a ‘trucks only’ lane on the interstate and later being told that for it to work properly, the speed 
limit would have to be increased to a level that would not be safe for traffic in adjacent lanes. 
This should have been considered before the [HD] standard was approved.”45 Hawkins, along 
with other independent broadcasters, provided observations of interference caused by existing 
FM-HD power levels in a variety of markets.46 Some stations used NPR’s interference-prediction 
methodology to calculate the disruption to their analog service areas that would occur should a 
blanket power increase be approved.47 All believed any increase should be conducted on a 
station-by-station basis and that the FCC needed to monitor the potential of increased 
interference very closely.48 
The destruction of analog FM listening was a common theme among the comments of 
independent broadcasters. “The sooner that analog FM is unusable, the sooner it can be turned 
off,” commented broadcast engineer Brian J. Henry of Napa, California. “I am disturbed that in 
our rush to convert...for the sake of going digital we are irreversibly damaging our existing 
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broadcast services that currently provide service to the vast majority of radio listeners. I find it 
absolutely absurd that we are attempting to replace highly spectrum efficient, fully linear modes 
of transmission that work extremely well with one that is spectrally inefficient, uses substantial 
amounts of data compression and has questionable performance.”49 If the FCC’s mandate was to 
serve the public interest by providing an FM broadcast environment where robust radio reception 
was the goal, “I find it hard to see how increasing the level of interference to mature broadcast 
services that have millions of listeners by one that has thousands fulfills that objective.”50 
Small- to medium-market radio station owners - both commercial and noncommercial - 
openly worried that the onus of increased interference would fall disproportionately on them, 
thereby depriving listeners of choice in markets least likely to have much to begin with.51 “You 
were promised the new technology, if permitted, would revitalize and, indeed, revolutionize 
terrestrial radio,” commented Edward F. Perry, Jr, president of WATD-FM in Marshfield, 
Massachusetts. “You accepted the premise, granted the petition, but the promised benefits never 
materialized. The digital proponents are now before you again admitting the technical design 
flaws in their system and seeking an even larger piece of an already congested FM spectrum to 
try and make their system work....Why should you trust them a second time when every extra 
watt of power in the guardband creates additional danger to the quality of conventional FM 
signals?”52 
“Existing FM digital operation probably interferes with more analog listeners than the 
number of receivers available to hear the digital broadcasts,” commented broadcast engineer 
Paul Dean Ford of Dennison, Illinois. From his perspective, the bottom line was that “[i]ncreased 
digital signals increase interference to analog signals. The FCC is mandated to provide increased 
broadcast service. This proposal decreases broadcast service. Gradually increasing the ‘noise 
floor' degrades all broadcasting. The public has not requested, nor is it buying [HD Radio]...HD 
now is merely filling the spectrum with annoying noise. Do not increase the noise.”53 Talley 
Broadcasting Corporation, the licensee of three radio stations in “rural mid-Illinois,” termed the 
proposal for a blanket FM-HD power increase “arbitrary, capricious, [and] irresponsible in the 
extreme.”54 
Digital emissions, by their nature, are noise-like, and most people cannot distinguish a 
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digital interference source the way that they can analog sources. So, the vast majority of 
the victims of [HD]-caused interference do not recognize what is really happening. 
Therefore, they do not complain....The Commission therefore cannot grant blanket 
approval for such a radical increase in noise and interference levels. The toothpaste must 
remain in the tube.55
 
The Educational Information Corporation, licensee of noncommercial station WCPE-FM in 
Raleigh, North Carolina, contextualized the power hike proposal as a sign of HD Radio’s failure 
as a viable digital broadcast technology and urged the FCC to explore alternative DAB systems.56   
 Consulting engineers were similarly critical of the FM-HD power increase proposal. 
Canadian Barry McLarnon questioned the reliability of studies compiled by vested interests in 
the technology and asked the FCC to dismiss their request on that basis alone.57 Douglas Vernier, 
who oversaw NPR’s FM-HD interference analysis project, was even more candid about its 
results than NPR. “It is true that U.S. broadcasters and the Commission have bought into a 
digital radio system that has some advantages over the current FM analog system, but it also true 
that it poses a threat to our analog system to which a vast majority listens,” he commented.58 
Having presented numerous papers at broadcast engineering conferences and NAB trade shows 
on the subject of FM-HD interference,59 Vernier thought the drive for a digital power increase 
was an inefficient attempt to “improve” what was a flawed technology by design. “It is not 
surprising that we see interference to analog FM stations since with [HD Radio] we are 
attempting to impose a different allocation procedure on a system for which it was never 
intended,” he explained. “With the [HD] system we are squeezing in signals into spaces which 
for years have acted as guard bands between the channel assignments. Any interference that we 
see now will be amplified in full if the...power increase is given a carte blanche.”60 
Gaithersburg, Maryland-based Mullaney Engineering argued that degrading the 
listenability of analog FM broadcasting to “save” a digital broadcast technology that was “too 
big to fail” was unwise. “This sounds just like the arguments being offered by many financial 
institutions & manufacturers in their weak justification of why Congress must bail them out of 
the mess that in some instances they were responsible for creating. iBiquity has nobody to blame 
for its problems but itself.”61 It also suggested the time was ripe for the FCC to explore other 
DAB technologies, given the weak proliferation of HD Radio.62 The firm of Cohen, Dippell and 
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Everist urged the FCC to brook no compromise to analog service, and observed that “a workable 
methodology needs to be developed that permits a determination of whether or not harmful 
interference to existing analog service will result.”63 It suggested that it was the Commission’s 
duty to devise digital-to-analog interference metrics given that no industry consensus existed on 
the issue.64 
Members of the public latched onto NPR’s interference analysis in opposition to an FM-
HD power increase.65 Several expressed disbelief that broadcasters would willingly degrade 
reliable analog radio service for a digital technology that had no demonstrable listener support.66 
H. Donald Messer, who served on the National Radio Systems Committee during the 
construction of the NRSC-5 standard, reported that the NRSC had worked to set the initial FM-
HD power levels very carefully, with the minimization of digital interference to analog 
broadcasts in mind.67 Messer noted that “[i]t took over a decade to get to agreement...over the 
composition of NRSC-5....If the digital coverage area is not to the liking of the system’s 
proponents and endorsers, it is up to them to show conclusively...that this increase is not unduly 
detrimental to other authorized users of this band.”68 Jonathan Hardis argued that the lack of 
industry consensus around the issue was “all the more reason why the Commission should not be 
bullied into a hasty decision,”69 and he savaged iBiquity’s study. “The Commission must 
recognize [iBiquity’s] test report for what it is: an advocacy document that was conceived and 
then edited to advance a narrow, competitive commercial interest. There is nothing inherently 
wrong with that - except when such a document alone might be relied upon to decide the public 
interest.”70 The Prometheus Radio Project, National Federation of Community Broadcasters, and 
New America Foundation jointly filed comments opposing any FM-HD power increase.71 
Prometheus et. al. believed the blanket request advanced its position that the addition of digital 
sidebands constituted a new spectrum allocation, and should be treated by the FCC as such.72 
Only two members of the public commented in favor of an FM-HD power increase. 
Brian Kirby of Lisle, Illinois could not conceive that the radio industry would knowingly 
degrade the reception of its stations and was of the opinion that the entire industry would 
undergo “a slow death” if HD Radio’s proliferation was compromised in any way.73 Kevin 
Redding of Adamsville, Tennessee noted that current FM-HD power levels were simply 
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inadequate to reliably cover rural America, and no other option to correct this problem existed.74 
II. FCC Puts Power Hike in Play
In May of 2009, the FCC issued a curious notice asking for more public comment on the 
idea of an FM-HD power increase. The request was framed in such a way as to disinvite 
discussion about the inherent necessity of a power hike and encourage comment on how much of 
an increase should be allowed.75 This implied that regulatory support for some digital power 
increase was inevitable. The National Association of Broadcasters used the opportunity to 
dismiss independent broadcaster and public opposition as “without merit and contrary to the 
public interest.”76 Claiming to represent a “tremendous range of broadcasters,” the NAB 
reiterated that iBiquity’s FM-HD interference analysis was more scientifically sound than 
NPR’s, and urged the Commission to allow a blanket tenfold power increase so as to 
“not...hobble the vastly greater number of stations that will want to optimize the digital service 
they provide to their audiences when real world testing indicates such can be done without 
significant or widespread interference impacts.”77 “Backyard Broadcasting” similarly touted the 
superiority of iBiquity’s interference study and suggested that an FM-HD power increase be 
authorized only for commercial broadcasters, so as to give noncommercial broadcasters the 
additional time they desired to study the issue.78 iBiquity proclaimed there was “a virtual 
consensus” among commenters that an FM-HD power increase was necessary, and argued that 
protecting “incumbent” analog services had the potential to “choke off the emerging 
technology.”79 
“Backyard Broadcasting,” along with several additional iBiquity investors, warned the 
FCC that the lack of an FM-HD power increase would put the “significant investments” made in 
HD Radio so far “at risk,” in large part due to the reticence of receiver manufacturers who 
quailed at the idea of investing in a radio technology that was hard to tune in.80 Questions of 
potential digital-to-analog interference were dismissed as a “non-problem,” though they offered 
up a compromise proposal to increase FM-HD power levels by a factor of four instead of ten: 
“An interim increase to that level, while inadequate to completely solve the coverage and 
building penetration problems which beset [current] operation...would allow at least some 
broadcasters to improve their HD Radio service....[E]xperience with [it] will serve to further 
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validate the findings that operation at higher digital power levels will not create widespread 
harmful interference.”81 
iBiquity and Charles River Broadcasting Company - a subsidiary of broadcast-investor 
Greater Media - filed further “technical studies” in support of a tenfold FM-HD power increase. 
“Put..bluntly, in many building types, digital reception is simply impossible on well performing 
table model receivers and similarly nonexistent on the new class of portable receivers about to be 
introduced into the market place,” they reported. “Although an incremental digital power 
[increase] may serve to partially mitigate the situation for plug in receivers in some fixed 
locations, only a full 10 dB increase will permit reliable service to portable receivers and result 
in a close approximation of analogue coverage, two very basic and critical listener 
expectations.”82 
Among major broadcast conglomerate early-adopters of HD Radio, only Entravision 
Holdings - one of the largest Spanish-language radio broadcasters in the country - stepped 
forward to publicly oppose the industry’s push for a blanket power increase. Citing NPR’s 
research as well as its own experience with digital-to-analog interference, Entravision asked the 
FCC to defer on the issue. “At the heart of the broadcast regulatory policy is a station’s right to 
interference-free operation and interference from DAB operations on adjacent channel radio 
stations therefore contravenes the public interest.”83 
National Public radio solidly stood by its interference analysis and initially opposed any 
“interim” FM-HD power enhancement. It reported that it had convened a “Peer Review Group” 
of “other industry parties” to look for a way to implement a managed FM-HD power increase.84 
Should such a compromise be achievable, NPR requested the FCC impose “an obligation on 
stations operating with increased power to give potentially affected stations prior notice so that 
those stations might alert their listeners or conduct their own interference measurements.”85 Any 
increase in FM-HD power levels was “no small matter,” argued NPR. “Unless the Commission 
is prepared to revisit the evolutionary approach of transitioning from analog to hybrid 
analog/digital and, eventually, to a purely digital radio system, the Commission cannot grant the 
proposed power increase and simply disregard the adverse consequences for analog service.”86 
To the extent that commercial supporters approved of a blanket power increase, NPR argued that 
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“they largely rely on diversionary rhetoric rather than addressing the technical merits of the 
issue.”87 
Several public broadcasters supported NPR’s cautious approach, suggesting that any 
further experimentation should be transparent, collaborative, and incremental, and urged the 
Commission to defer a decision until additional NPR-led research into the interference question 
was completed.88 Rhode Island Public Radio, the licensee of WRNI-FM, reported to the FCC that 
iBiquity’s earlier field experiments with increased FM-HD power levels had caused destructive 
interference to its analog signal, and it had contacted technical experts at NPR to assess the 
problem. As they field-documented the interference, 
Greater Media and iBiquity came on the scene and insinuated themselves into the testing 
and evaluation of the reception conditions in all of the measurements. [A Greater Media 
representative] was present in the NPR van, which was tailed by an iBiquity van 
occupied by iBiquity and Greater Media personnel....It was apparent...that the purpose of 
Greater Media’s and iBiquity’s presence was not to promote accurate, real-world results, 
but instead to minimize any evidence of actual interference to the analog signal of a first 
adjacent station.89 
HD Radio’s commercial proponents reacted forcefully to this disclosure. iBiquity and the 
National Association of Broadcasters claimed there were “no legitimate complaints” of FM 
digital-to-analog interference, and cast the power increase as vitally important to spur 
marketplace acceptance of HD Radio.90 
In the wake of an increasingly antagonistic public broadcast constituency, the NAB 
finally acknowledged that “the record in this proceeding shows significant concerns about the 
successful implementation of HD Radio,” but blamed these faults on regulatory failure to 
approve an FM-HD power increase. “Further delay in doing so will only exacerbate uncertainty 
that may be creeping into the digital radio marketplace,” making the need for an FM-HD power 
increase “compelling.”91 Commercial HD proponents attacked Rhode Island Public Radio’s 
allegation that iBiquity and its broadcast-investors disrupted their interference-analysis project. 
WRNI’s “scenario” represented “only an isolated allegation that hardly reflects an interference 
pandemic.”92 Clear Channel ginned up another quick field test on one of its FM stations to 
buttress iBiquity’s position that a tenfold digital power increase would be relatively harmless, 
and that public broadcasters’ concerns were invalid.93 Greater Media called Rhode Island Public 
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Radio’s accusation of malfeasance “egregiously distorted or fallacious,” based on “allegations 
and innuendo that have no factual underpinning” and would “undermine the integrity of the 
FCC’s procedures.”94 iBiquity asserted that the “caustic nature” of RIPR’s interference report to 
the FCC not only harmed the development of industry consensus on an FM-HD power increase, 
but cast significant doubt on the objectivity of NPR’s ongoing interference analysis project. It 
challenged NPR to “make its personnel available to the Commission staff to address any 
concerns the Commission may have,” and suggested that NPR’s “continued silence on this 
subject will ultimately undercut the industry’s and the Commission’s confidence that the test 
program was conducted in an appropriate fashion.”95 
Consulting engineers, independent broadcasters, and the public were nearly unified in 
their opposition to an FM-HD power increase. Consulting engineers warned the FCC it was 
treading into uncharted territory without adequate scientific data to make a decision on the issue. 
Barry McLarnon called it “remarkable” and “foolish in the extreme” that the Commission would 
even consider a power increase given the lack of respectable technical justification. He 
characterized iBiquity et. al.’s FM-HD experiments as “subterfuge” and demonstrative of a “lack 
of critical analysis that has been a characteristic of the [HD] system since its early days.”96 
McLarnon also accused the FCC of an inclination to regulate radio’s digital transition for the 
benefit of a minority of broadcasters who had a fiscal stake in iBiquity, “ignor[ing] or 
dismiss[ing] documented complaints of interference.”97 The power-hike proposal, concluded 
McLarnon, “ignor[ed] the laws of physics.”98 Douglas Vernier reminded the Commission that the 
protection of analog FM radio broadcasting was a prime directive in its mission to serve the 
public interest. Although he believed some increase in FM-HD power was necessary to save the 
viability of digital radio, “we should not precede [sic] blindly to implement a uniform across-the 
board increase. All relationships between stations are not the same. Despite the preambles of 
self-interest, an [FM-HD] power increase can take place if it is done in a studied manner which 
preserves the technical integrity of analog broadcast.”99 Referring to “numerous situations where 
station engineers and management have noted [HD] interference,” Vernier cautioned the FCC 
not to make new policy just to “see how many complaints we get.”100 
Manassas, Virginia-based Cavell, Mertz & Associates implored the FCC to wait until 
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further research on a power hike was completed: “There is no known benefit to rush to a decision 
that has the potential to disrupt the entire FM allocations methodology in order to satisfy the 
wishes of a minority of broadcasters....The future of the FM Broadcasting Service should not be 
decided based on the anecdotal experience of such a small sample.”101 Mullaney Engineering 
reported receiving “numerous calls from Analog FM stations complaining about the ‘real world’ 
loss [to their] Analog service area....The listening public does not care if this loss of service is 
legally defined as interference, they only know that they used to be able to receive their favorite 
FM station at their home, work or while traveling in the area but now they can’t receive it 
anymore.” Mullaney predicted that an FM-HD power hike would “encourage many of the 
listeners of FM radio stations to seek out other alternate technologies.”102 Klein Broadcast 
Engineering commented that “[t]he integrity of the analog FM Broadcasting Service is on the 
line here.”103 It, too, suggested that “a significant number of instances” of FM-HD-related 
interference already existed and provided details of a case between two stations in California on 
which it had been called to investigate.104 
Independent broadcasters presented a plethora of reasons why an FM-HD power hike was 
a bad idea. Simmons Media Group of Salt Lake City, Utah felt a power increase would be 
“contrary to the best interests of the majority of...licensed broadcasters who primarily operate 
with analog devices, to favor the large market, well funded broadcasters who wish to boost the 
coverage of their digital signals at the expense of their analog competitors.” Should an increase 
be approved, “the FCC would essentially enable larger well funded broadcasters to enjoy signal 
advantages and competitive opportunities not available to smaller, locally owned broadcasters. 
We believe allowing digital broadcasters these proposed power increases would further harm 
smaller analog broadcasters who are struggling for their survival” [emphasis in original].105 
Creative Educational Media Corp., the licensee of six noncommercial FM stations and five FM 
translators, reiterated the request that the FCC conduct its own independent analysis of the 
implications of an FM-HD power increase. “All radio licensees such as Creative have been given 
licenses to operate on the channels assigned by the FCC,” it noted. “We think it is the duty of the 
FCC to make policy that does not tread on the rights of Creative as a broadcaster. Creative 
should not have to accept less signal coverage and interference from another station on the sole 
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reason that the station has gone to [HD] operations.”106 Positive Alternative Radio, a religious 
broadcaster with 23 FM stations and 47 translators, commented that the “white noise” nature of 
digital-to-analog interference made it difficult for broadcasters and listeners alike to discern its 
true source.107 “The scarce resources of the Commission should be spent judiciously,” it 
recommended. “Allowing power increases subject to listener complaints or the agreement of 
individual station licensees is not an appropriate spectrum policy....[HD] stations...that are 
allowed to infringe upon the analog signal of another radio station would institute a complete 
breakdown in the protection regulations already set forth by the FCC.”108 
Harry Ruhweidel, a broadcast engineer with more than 42 years of experience, entreated 
the FCC to base any power-increase decision on more than “anecdotal accounts and questionable 
lab studies designed to ignore many real life conditions.” He argued that it was not logical for the 
Commission to “disrupt a primary broadcast service for the sake of adopting ‘technology’ that 
benefits only a few patent holders financial interests.”109 He and other independent broadcasters 
also suggested the FCC open up its rulemaking to consider alternatives to HD Radio, given the 
technology’s stagnation in the marketplace.110 Leroy C. Granlund, a working broadcast engineer 
with “fifty years of experience in the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of radio 
and television broadcast facilities in the U.S. and worldwide,”111 commented that HD proponents 
had “selectively edited” their analyses to portray any power increase as without significant 
risk.112 Considering that “99 percent of all listeners can receive only analog FM at this time,” 
Granlund could not countenance jeopardizing this service to promote a languishing digital 
“upgrade.”113 Butler, Maryland-based Talley Broadcasting Corporation observed that “[t]he trade 
press and specialized web sites devoted to the topic of [HD] Interference are rife with horror 
stories of interference to analog Broadcasts....There is no need to rush here.”114 Estimating the 
number of HD Radio receivers actually in the hands of listeners only numbered “in the hundreds 
of thousands,” while “hundreds of millions” of analog receivers were in use, Talley urged the 
FCC to “keep in mind that the tail does not wag the dog.”115 
Several independent broadcasters, cognizant that the FCC seemed predisposed to 
sanction some sort of FM-HD power increase, forcefully requested the agency implement a 
proactive remediation program to minimize any increase in digital-to-analog interference that 
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would occur.116 James K. Davis, the manager of a commercial FM station in Indian River Shores, 
Florida, noted that it was already difficult enough for radio broadcasters to retain listeners “in an 
age of increased ‘new media’ competition. Poor reception should not be a cause for listeners to 
migrate away from our services.”117 Michael Gehring, in the 36th year of his radio career, 
indicted the nation’s largest broadcasters for “pushing their collective weight around…spending 
money lobbying, and dictating to their smaller brethren what they want done. It is solely self-
serving.”118 Press Communications accused the country’s consolidated broadcast corporations of 
acting in outright contradiction to the public interest. “With all due respect,” commented Press, 
“the ‘successful roll-out’ of a private commercial venture is not a valid basis for Federal 
spectrum management policy.  That is especially true when that private commercial venture is 
asking the Commission, in effect, to reallocate FM spectrum and, in so doing, jeopardize the 
ability of the vast majority of the U.S. commercial radio industry to continue to serve their 
listeners” [emphasis in original].119 
Although the public had been effectively ignored during the HD Radio policymaking 
process, that did not stop it from attempting to halt the expansion of what it had clearly identified 
as an inferior and destructive digital broadcast protocol. Aaron Read of Geneva, New York 
suggested that any increase in FM-HD power levels would contravene long-standing 
interference-protection precedents that had served radio well for several decades.120 Jonathan 
Hardis accused HD proponents of presenting justification for a power increase that didn’t “even 
approach...the standard of comprehensive and impartial testing.”121 Edgar Reihl suggested that 
the lack of widespread HD-related interference complaints could not be construed to paint the 
technology as nondestructive. “It is becoming increasingly clear that the [AM-HD] system is a 
colossal failure,” he declared. “Now iBiquity would like the Commission to grant a tenfold 
increase in the digital sideband power on the FM band, without waiting for important technical 
studies to be completed....The AM radio band has already been effectively ‘trashed’ by 
interference from [HD] transmissions. This must not be allowed to happen to the FM band.”122 
Ultimately, radio listeners reiterated the fact that they simply did not want HD Radio. 
Gregory Smith of Gaithersburg, Maryland characterized the technology as “all about what 
broadcasters want, not consumers....Few HD Radio...receivers have been sold, and most have 
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been returned for dropouts, poor coverage, and bland programming,.”123 He suggested the entire 
protocol “should be abandoned, or moved outside the existing...broadcast frequencies.”124 James 
Wilhelm of Fairmont, West Virginia, seconded Smith’s motion. “Any other response by the 
Commission would be irresponsible and not in the public interest and give the appearance that 
the Commission is showing favoritism.”125 Wilhelm believed the success or failure of HD Radio 
should rest in the hands of receiver manufacturers and listeners, “not on a handout from the 
FCC....I challenge iBiquity to prove the need for a power increase based on solid evidence of 
consumer acceptance.”126 He noted that “[t]he general public is silent and slow in understanding 
the scope of the transition to digital radio giving commercial interests a louder voice. Is it the 
desire of the Commission to take advantage of this lack of public understanding and allow the 
interests of [HD proponents] to take precedence by essentially force-feeding a hybrid system on 
the public?”127 The Prometheus Radio Project echoed these concerns to argue that the 
preservation of analog FM broadcasting should continue to take precedence at the FCC for the 
foreseeable future.128  
As the comments over the proposed power hike flew back and forth, many constituencies 
personally reached out to FCC Commissioners and staff to make their cases. On behalf of the 
public, the Media Access Project met five times between April and November, 2009 with senior 
staff in each Commissioner’s office as well as the management of the FCC’s Media Bureau. All 
meetings focused on the lack of substantive data to justify an FM-HD power increase, and urged 
the Commission to proceed on the issue with extreme caution.129 MAP’s forceful entrance into 
backstage dialogue was spurred by the organization’s late realization of what FM-HD 
interference might to do LPFM stations - a service to which it had made a significant investment 
in advocacy. One large religious broadcaster, the Educational Media Foundation, also made 
special trips to Washington, D.C. to urge the FCC to protect LPFM and translator stations from 
digital-to-analog interference.130 
However, these efforts paled in comparison to corporate lobbying on behalf of HD 
Radio’s proponents. iBiquity met repeatedly with each Commissioner’s senior legal advisors and 
key employees in the Media Bureau to downplay concerns about an FM-HD power increase.131 
iBiquity went to far as to claim that any increased digital interference to analog FM signals 
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would be largely masked by “existing thermal and man-made noise.”132 iBiquity’s backstage 
performances were supplemented by the Broadcaster Traffic Consortium, a group of large 
broadcasters with investments in iBiquity, which urged the FCC to implement an FM-HD power 
hike in order to improve the robustness of nascent datacasting services.133 Public broadcasters 
also supplemented iBiquity’s efforts, telling senior Commissioner and Media Bureau staff that 
while they did not oppose an FM-HD power increase outright, such an effort needed to be 
managed carefully, and hinted that further analysis on the issue would be forthcoming by the end 
of 2009.134 
Only Rhode Island Public Radio, whose flagship station had already been the source of 
controversy over FM-HD power testing, broke with the public broadcast constituency in an ex 
parte contact to implore the FCC not to “run roughshod over the considerably older and 
significantly more deeply embedded analog service. [HD Radio] was sold to the broadcast 
industry on the principle that digital could coexist peacefully with analog. We begged to differ 
with that claim in our comments and reply comments, based on our real-world experience.” 
RIPR suggested that iBiquity and major broadcasters’ smear campaign against its engineering 
staff for bringing a case of FM-HD interference to light suggested an “ill grace” and “signals a 
willingness to employ a scorched-earth means to their ends.”135 
III. Openly Debating HD Radio’s Viability
Offstage, trade press discussion of the proposed power increase was feisty. One one hand, 
NPR’s HD Radio point-man, Mike Starling, reported that a blanket increase would result in 
problems “to the detriment of existing analog FM signals,” and that the potential for interference 
would vary “greatly from city to city.”136 On the other, Caryn G. Mathes, the general manager of 
WAMU-FM in Washington, D.C. and a self-proclaimed “evangelist for HD Radio,” boasted that 
her station had “several full-time employees” that “produce more than 50 hours a week of live 
original programming for our multicast channels,” and contextualized an FM-HD power hike as 
necessary to promote the vitality of HD Radio’s multicast function.137 
However, such heavy investment in multicasting was an exception, not the rule, in the 
public radio universe, and use of the application to date seemed to diminish the constituency’s 
long-standing claim that multicasting would radically expand program choices for radio listeners. 
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NPR found itself with an “unexpected shortfall in revenue” in 2009, which led the organization 
to deprioritize investments in HD Radio programming, make a 7% cut to its workforce, and 
leave 21 open positions unfilled.138 One of NPR’s multicast filler-feeds, the Classical Public 
Radio Network, was shuttered on June 30, 2009 due to a lack of new funding and weak station 
subscription-growth.139 A Current survey of public radio executives found that most stations 
multicasting did so with canned programming. “Enthusiasm was muted” for HD Radio: most 
believed the technology would never become a major component of terrestrial radio 
broadcasting; 20% expected HD Radio to wither and die on the vine; only 4% expected HD 
Radio to grow quickly.140 Tom Ammons, a technician with public radio station WQED-FM in 
Pittsburgh, hoped that “we don’t end up with an FM band that is mostly fuzz.” He observed that 
HD Radio was “stalled”: “With less than 1 percent of our listening audience capable of HD 
listening, it’s hard to argue that our management should put resources into multichannel 
programming. All of this should give us pause about the inherent limitations of HD Radio as it 
stands.” Ammons suggested broadcasters explore an out-of-band, all-digital service immediately. 
“Do we have to wait for wireless Internet radio to blow us out of the water before we move to an 
all-digital mode?,” he asked. “Will it be too late then? I fear that I already know the answer.”141
Among commercial broadcasters, Radio World reported that many engineers felt “anxiety 
and even doubt about the success of HD Radio.”142 Bert Goldman, the vice president of 
engineering for Independence Media and a member of the NRSC, told the publication that 
“everyone I’ve turned my [FM-HD interference projections] over to has gone into hiding or said 
it’s conservative...I would like nothing more than to have someone tell me that I’m all wrong and 
why. Unfortunately nobody has yet done that, and if my suspicions are correct, then substantial 
harm could be inflicted on hundreds of FM analog stations that count on their fringe...signals.” 
Goldman was also displeased that proponents of an FM-HD power increase completely 
circumvented the NRSC in its testing to justify the hike to the FCC.143 Richard Brown of 
Washington Crossing, Pennsylvania warned that “studies from manufacturers of HD Radio tend 
to slant toward their own concerns, lacking objectivity and impartiality, with conflict of 
interest.”144 Several broadcasters noted that, as of 2009, there was still no standard way to 
monitor the successful operation of an HD Radio signal, which provided significant potential for 
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all sorts of interference-related problems.145 Dave Obergonner, a broadcast engineer in St. Louis, 
reported that he personally measured FM stations running HD sidebands in excess of their 
licensed analog power. “This is a basic, fundamental flaw in the HD Radio system that will 
cause all kinds of grief in the future if [digital] power levels are increased, and the radios are in 
greater circulation,” wrote Obergonner. “The only winners in this game will be the larger group-
owned, larger-market stations who can afford this. Smaller-market (mostly independent) stations 
will pay a dear price nonetheless, with considerably increased interference....The rich get richer, 
and the smaller stations go bankrupt.”146 
Robert Savage, whose AM station already suffered from ongoing HD-related 
interference, opined that it was “tragic how we continue to argue and tinker with a technology 
left behind by the listening public and the majority of broadcasters long ago, while wireless 
Internet radio and other compelling platforms thrive and grow.”
This is not the time to pit broadcaster against broadcaster over HD Radio interference 
issues. We need to present a united front, clean our programming house and offer real, 
not illusory value to our listeners and advertisers instead of endlessly wrangling over a 
technology nobody in the real world cares about.147 
These sentiments were strong enough that Radio World published an editorial urging HD 
Radio’s proponents and the FCC to not “blindly move forward with an across-the-board digital 
power increase that robs Peter to pay Paul. Legacy stations deserve protection from 
interference.”148 However, the publication also held out hope that mass-produced HD receivers 
would be in the hands of consumers “beginning in perhaps 2011 or 2012 (though obviously the 
recession could play into that),” and suggested that any further tweaks to improve the viability of 
digital broadcasting should take place before that point in time.149 
Offstage, among broadcasters, there appeared to be growing recognition that the HD 
Radio protocol itself was simply not robust enough to provide terrestrial radio with a meaningful 
foothold in a convergent digital media environment. “The [HD] transition is evolutionary in 
every sense of the word,” wrote Skip Pizzi. “This implies that it could take geologic epochs of 
time to elapse before it concludes. And this may be just too slow for the species to survive....The 
fact that FM analog radio is ‘good enough’ for most consumers doesn’t help.”150 Michael 
Baldauf, a programming consultant in Pueblo, Colorado, told the industry that new content, not 
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new technology, would entice listeners back to traditional radio broadcasting. “You can come up 
with a bazillion channels, digital or analog, but if it all comes out of the same pre-recorded, 
canned, MP3-quality, low-creativity cookie cutter, the audience is not going to be there,” he 
warned. “Success lies in the ability to find ways to embrace your audience. If you aren’t willing 
to be at every possible public event, hang up station banners, give out bumper stickers, do 
contests and giveaways and become part of the life of your listeners and advertisers, you aren’t 
in the right business.”151 Without direct connections to the communities it served, Ed Dulaney of 
the Rocky Mountain Radio Network forecast that “radio will become a secondary service....But 
until we get our act together and start taking radio seriously again, not even HD Radio will get us 
out of this hole we’ve dug.”152 
Radio World editor Paul McLane questioned whether anyone in the industry even had the 
knowledge to “appeal in a compelling way to a modern media consumer, particularly someone 
born after, say, 1980.”153 “Perhaps the problems started with deregulation,” suggested Bill Parris, 
who managed several stations in Washington, D.C. and Baltimore. “Rolling up losing stations 
into market clusters reduced the root of radio’s resilience....The long-term effects are proving 
near-fatal: a lack of new ideas, a lack of creators, and a management structure driven exclusively 
by cost reduction....For more than a decade we have been making a lousy product and getting 
away with it.”154 If broadcasters could find no budget for the creation of compelling multicast 
programming, industry consultant Mark Lapidus suggested they “let someone else take a chance 
with your digital spectrum.”155 A listening test conducted by Amanda Alexander, the chief 
engineer of Crawford Broadcasting’s Denver station cluster, found that the majority of HD-
enabled broadcasters in the market had automated multicast streams: “I never heard a person 
other than the voice doing the liner for the station.”156 The same was found in Boston, where one 
station broadcast duplicate content - a simulcast of its analog signal - on two HD multicast 
channels, for no practical purpose.157 
Tom Taggart, the owner of two FM stations in St. Mary’s, West Virginia, declared he had 
“no intention of wasting money on [HD Radio]....[T]he idea that there will be a wave of 
consumer [HD] receivers that...include...special features...is a pipe dream.”158 In 2009, HD 
Digital Radio Alliance president Peter Ferrara resigned from his post, citing “time for a 
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change.”159 iBiquity also laid off “an undisclosed number of people” that year, though CEO 
Robert Struble assured the industry that the company was in firm financial shape.160 
At the 2009 NAB Radio Show, discussions between commercial and public radio station 
engineers and managers over the issue of an FM-HD power increase were described as 
“acrimonious” with “some very unpleasant hallway talk that lent a sour ‘us vs. them’ feel to the 
proceedings.”161 Radio World conducted an interview with FCC Audio Division chief Peter 
Doyle, who remarked that “it’s clear to the commission that the current power level is ‘fraught 
with problems’ and...the agency has seen a slowdown in the number of notifications from 
stations converting to [HD Radio]. And while the commission has received interference 
complaints...’There is no formal complaint before us.’” What a “formal complaint” would need 
to consist of before the FCC would investigate instances of HD-induced interference was left 
undefined.162 Such a remark was astounding given that at least two AM stations had indeed filed 
formal complaints with the FCC alleging destructive interference to their analog signals, and the 
record of the HD Radio proceeding was replete with comments detailing problems on both the 
AM and FM bands.163 NPR’s Mike Starling defended his employer’s FM-HD interference 
analysis and advocated for civil dialogue between commercial and noncommercial broadcasters 
on the issue.164 In a commitment to resolving the FM-HD impasse, NPR announced its HD Radio 
research would be rolled into a larger “Technology Research Center” with 77 employees and an 
operating budget of approximately $1 million per year.165 
In reality, a compromise on the FM-HD power increase issue had already been reached 
between the technology’s primary proponents. Less than a month after Starling made his appeal 
to commercial broadcasters offstage, NPR filed an ex parte report with the FCC calling for a 
blanket fourfold increase in the power of FM-HD sidebands, with a maximum tenfold power 
hike allowed provided stations could show little risk of destructive interference. The report was 
the product of collaborations between NPR, iBiquity, CBS Radio, Clear Channel, and Greater 
Media,166 and utilized a very small sample of stations for actual field analysis.167 This, combined 
with subjective listening tests - where participants were exposed to the sounds of FM-HD 
interference at various digital power injection levels168 - led the “Joint Parties” to conclude that a 
fourfold FM-HD power increase provided the “median ratio” for raising a station’s digital power 
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without severe negative consequences. Although the results “do not necessarily justify a 
proposed blanket increase,” the Joint Parties expressed confidence that, with further industry 
research and FCC assistance, a power hike would be relatively painless for all involved.169 This 
report was, in essence, a capitulation by NPR to the year-old power-hike “compromise” 
proffered by “Backyard Broadcasting.”
The day after filing its report with the FCC, NPR issued a news release touting its 
collaboration with iBiquity. “We are delighted that the radio industry is now poised to push this 
technology ahead together,” said iBiquity CEO Robert Struble. “We’ve found practical and 
balanced solutions that will greatly improve reception while limiting interference to existing 
analog operations.” NPR’s Mike Starling believed public broadcasters “are optimistic about the 
future of HD Radio...and eager to continue to work with iBiquity on the developments that will 
make this power increase work to everyone’s advantage – stations, listeners, and receiver 
makers.”170 The day of the news release, iBiquity filed comments with the FCC formally 
requesting an FM-HD power increase along the lines requested by the Joint Parties. “The parties 
believe the framework they have outlined...addresses the concerns that have been expressed 
about a digital power increase,” the company wrote. “Broadcasters remain committed to 
providing their listeners with the best digital service possible. iBiquity and NPR urge the 
Commission to expeditiously authorize a digital power increase consistent with the 
[compromise].”171 The National Association of Broadcasters declared that the deal “will enable 
digital radio broadcasters to improve digital coverage, better replicate their analog service and 
insure reliable reception of new multicast signals....The record in this proceeding is now 
complete.”172 iBiquity, the NAB, and NPR followed up quickly with personal visits to FCC 
headquarters urging expeditious action on the power increase.173 
The speed with which this compromise was reached left few with adequate time to 
criticize it. The New Jersey Broadcasters’ Association provided the most substantive critique. It 
called any increase in FM-HD power levels “a violation of the spirit and letter of the law, 
substantively adverse to public policy, and counterproductive to the rules promulgated by the 
FCC.” It believed any increase would be “severely deleterious” for the coverage of area of many 
New Jersey FM radio stations, which already suffered from congested channel conditions caused 
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by the existence of major broadcast markets bracketing the state, and reminded the agency that 
the NAB, NPR, and iBiquity did not speak for all broadcasters on the issue.174 The power 
proposal worked “at cross purposes to achieving the goals both Congress and the Commission 
have long expressed: localism, diversity of voices, equal opportunity opportunities, and 
intelligent local content. The obvious truth is that this HD power increase is being pushed 
through the Commission without reasonable opportunity for parties adversely and irreparably 
impacted by this pronouncement from even being heard as to what type of ‘deal’ is being 
considered.”175 
Less than three months after the compromise had been unveiled - and without formal 
solicitation of any public comment on it - the FCC blessed the Joint Parties’ request. After 
observing that the number of FM stations applying for HD broadcast authorization had been in 
decline since 2007,176 the FCC asserted that allowing an FM-HD power increase would change 
this trajectory.177 Based upon “analysis and data, as well as five years of interference-free FM 
hybrid digital operations...we are convinced that an immediate voluntary [fourfold digital power] 
increase...is appropriate, with the option for stations to request a full tenfold power hike.”178 The 
FCC directly appropriated the latest NPR-led interference analysis report to justify the move.179 
Remarkably, where the question of interference remediation was concerned, the FCC elucidated 
an incredibly difficult route by which formal complaints would receive attention. It put the onus 
on victim-stations suffering interference to provide
at least six reports of ongoing (rather than transitory) objectionable interference. For each 
report of interference, the affected FM licensee must submit a map showing the location 
of the reported interference and a detailed description of the nature and extent of the 
interference being experienced at that location....The complaint must also contain a 
complete description of the tests and equipment used to identify the alleged interference 
and the scope of the unsuccessful efforts to resolve the interference.180 
Historically, those who propose to expand or repurpose the use of occupied spectrum bear the 
regulatory onus to justify that their activity will not harm incumbent users. Requiring that the 
burden of proof to demonstrate harm be placed on stations affected by FM-HD interference, 
rather than on those likely to cause it, turned decades of spectrum integrity policy on its head.  
The technical knowledge, time, and resources necessary to satisfy this burden of proof is far 
outside the scope of an independent broadcaster or listener. Listeners themselves were 
268
effectively cut out of the interference-reporting process, despite the fact that the policy record 
clearly showed that digital radio interference was an ongoing problem. It also sent a strong 
message that the FCC didn’t really want to be bothered with the real-world implications of HD 
Radio, thereby promoting the further promulgation of the technology on the basis of willful 
ignorance about its fundamental detriments and in line with a neoliberal ideology surrounding 
media regulation more generally.
The FCC’s decision sent shockwaves through consulting engineers, independent 
broadcasters, and the public. Several immediately filed appeals of the latest Order. Mullaney 
Engineering was aghast: “It is an insult to the existing FM licensees, some of which have paid 
hundreds of thousands of dollars to the Federal Treasury to secure their licenses, to pretend that 
[HD Radio] does not cause interference to existing Analog FM service areas because vested 
interests in iBiquity’s...radio system have negotiated or redefined the definition of what is 
‘objectionable’ interference.”181 Alan Jurison questioned the underhanded way in which NPR and 
iBiquity achieved their compromise, and the manner by which the FCC opaquely decided the 
issue.182 Leroy Granlund called the FCC’s interference reporting requirements “unrealistic and 
impractical.”183 Religious station WRBS-FM in Baltimore, Maryland reported that it already 
received “significant interference” from nearby stations broadcasting in HD, and declared that 
the “scope of lost listenership and revenue will be incalculable, causing clear irreparable harm to 
[the station].”184 
Press Communications accused iBiquity of “blatantly misrepresent[ing] the system they 
promoted.”185 It excoriated the FCC’s new interference-reporting requirements: “Listeners today 
have a myriad of choices that did not exist decades ago and are about to get more. To suggest 
that a broadcaster would have to aggregate 6 continuous complaints and then have to wait 
months for the complaints to be remediated is ridiculous,” equivalent to “asking people to 
explain their sightings of UFOs.”186 
Let’s call this Order for what it really is, an unparalleled assault on analog FM Radio 
listeners and to further reorder the competitive landscape to the favor of higher power 
large market broadcasters. The role of the Commission is to ultimately protect the 
consumer, not some special interests who have yet to prove the public really wants (or for 
that matter needs) the product HD Radio is selling....We should ask ourselves whose 
interest, need and convenience does this order serve; the fewer than 5% of radio listeners 
who have ever heard an HD broadcast or the 95% plus of the American public who rely 
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on analog FM radio on a daily basis....The answer seems more than obvious. The path the 
Commission has taken [supports] a minority of broadcasters who made a bad bet on a 
flawed technology and now can hopefully salvage their investments and maybe their 
reputations.187 
Jonathan Hardis claimed the FCC “exceeded its delegated authority” by blindly accepting the 
Joint Parties’ power increase compromise.188 “The proposition of a tenfold power increase, to put 
it bluntly, is primarily a gambit to occupy spectrum that would otherwise be put to other uses,” 
Hardis wrote. “Here, the remedy (a massive power increase) is vastly disproportionate to the 
supposed problem.”189 There was “no logical nexus” that explained the FCC’s Order or its 
rationale; Hardis felt this demonstrated HD Radio proponents’ desire to “put...business interests 
ahead of the public interest.”190 The Prometheus Radio Project accused the FCC of blatantly 
ignoring its own record, where HD Radio’s fundamental weaknesses had been so well 
documented.191 As a result, “[FCC] Staff failed to provide a reasoned basis for its actions, failed 
to consider all of the evidence presented to it, and failed to articulate a rational connection 
between the presented facts and its decision.”192 
The National Association of Broadcasters reacted strongly to the backlash. It asserted the 
FCC acted properly on “the basis of a well-developed and lengthy record,” and did not ignore 
critical comments - it “simply disagreed with the objectors’ arguments.”193 iBiquity claimed the 
FCC’s decision was properly executed and designed to “advance the Commission’s digital radio 
broadcasting goals,” and argued that all appeals to the latest Order were focused “principally on 
those parties’ overall displeasure with digital broadcasting rather than specific issues with the 
digital power increase authorized” by the Commission.194 NPR again declared that consideration 
of any appeal would “upset...the digital radio transition itself.”195 Although the Commission “has 
acknowledged that the introduction of radiofrequency energy into a mature spectrum band 
requires trade-offs between service and interference,” NPR felt the “rigorous” remediation 
procedures put into place would assuage any concerns.196 The FCC supported the proponents: it 
dismissed all appeals without prejudice.197 Although many of the appeals have since been re-
filed, the Commission has effectively ignored them. Without the time and resources for critics of 
HD Radio to press their case, this situation is likely to continue indefinitely.
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IV. HD Radio’s Second Decade
By the end of 2010, it was clear that HD Radio was still looking for traction in the 
marketplace. Stations did not leap at the chance to implement higher FM-HD power levels, 
leading the FCC’s Peter Doyle to term the industry response to the opportunity “disappointing.”  
A year after the passage of the latest Order, only 150 FM stations had applied to boost their 
digital power.198 Just 135 stations added HD functionality in 2009.199 By April of 2011, the FCC 
reported that just 1,627 radio stations - 16% of the national total - had installed HD technology, 
and the number of new implementations had slowed to “maybe a handful” each month. 200 Radio 
World editor Paul McLane lauded the “remarkable support from our nation’s regulators,” but 
cautioned that “[t]he day has not yet come when digital FM has earned priority over analog.”201 
Bob Savage of WYSL quipped that when “the first decision ordering an interfering station to 
reduce power” occurred, “I’m buying you a steak dinner. It will never happen.”202 Two FM-HD-
related interference complaints have since been formally filed with the FCC, but there is no 
regulatory inclination to investigate them.203 18 months after the FCC’s order allowing the FM-
HD power boost, Radio World published a two-part article by Dave Hershberger, a senior 
scientist at transmitter-manufacturer Continental Electronics, detailing the increased likelihood 
of self-interference between FM analog and boosted digital signals; he urged stations to proceed 
with extreme caution on any FM-HD power increase.204 
AM-HD Radio is now effectively in decline. Several major broadcast-investors in 
iBiquity, including Bonneville, Citadel, Clear Channel, and Disney/ABC, have shut off some or 
all of their AM-HD signals at night due to the interference their stations produced.205 Although 
iBiquity has revised its hybrid AM waveform in an attempt to better protect the integrity of 
stations’ analog signals,206 the change effectively reduces the digital carrying capacity of AM-HD 
Radio, which is unlikely to convince many stations to invest in it.207 Several broadcast engineers 
and executives contacted by Radio World to describe the state of AM-HD in 2010 refused to go 
on the record, “citing the sensitivity of the subject and company policy.”208 Barry McLarnon now 
keeps a running online tabulation of AM-HD stations on the air: as of January 8, 2011, out ot a 
total of 4,786 existing AM stations,209 just 235 (a shade under 5%) are broadcasting in HD, and of 
those, only 80 are confirmed to be operating in digital at night. Approximately 60 stations have 
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abandoned the protocol completely.210 Heberto Limas-Villers, the owner of two AM stations in 
Denver, Colorado, worried that AM-HD would eventually devalue all AM radio stations, 
regardless of whether they broadcast in analog or digital. “[T]he future of the AM band is, at 
best, bleak,” he told Radio World. “You used to pay so much money to belong to the ‘exclusive 
club’ of FCC license holders. When the exclusive club is no longer, how much is an AM license 
going to be worth? In the end, radio is a business and you need to make so much to pay the bills. 
If the value of AM licenses drops so much, what are we, the small radio owners, working so hard 
for?”211  
From an “unscientific online survey” of readers, the Clear Channel-owned trade 
publication Inside Radio reported that 44% of respondents believe HD Radio will never reach the 
“tipping point” where it could conceivably replace analog broadcasting.212 Mike Vanhooser, the 
president of Dallas-based Nova Electronics, observed that the industry was stuck with an 
“albatross,” and encouraged the larger, non-consolidated segment of the radio industry to “take 
the albatross from around their neck and make their analog signal an engineering 
masterpiece...and put some programming worth listening to on it....Radio was a fantastic medium 
when it was all live and always different. Digital repeater radio doesn’t cut it. Get back to what 
works, and you will be surprised at the results” [emphasis in original].213 Larry Tighe, owner of 
WRNJ-AM in Hackettstown, New Jersey, felt that “if broadcasters got back to the business of 
programming the main channel to serve their communities and stop trying to emulate a satellite 
service, their bottom lines might come off the floor and make radio again what it is supposed to 
be: an asset to the community of license.”214 Energy-Onix president Bernard Wise declared he 
would boycott future industry conventions out of shame “to be associated with the NAB in their 
promotion of this inferior system.”215 Some “naysayers” have newly-elevated status within the 
radio industry; Radio World commentator Skip Pizzi, who became increasingly critical of HD as 
it proliferated, was hired by the NAB in December, 2010 as its “director of digital strategies”;216 
since his promotion, however, he has not made any public statements about the future of the 
technology. 
Listener uptake of HD Radio also reflects a crippled state of affairs. In a presentation at 
the 2008 NAB Radio Show, Jacobs Media general manager Paul Jacobs presented ethnographic 
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research on the audio consumption habits of young adults. “Mild groans went up in the 
broadcasters’ conference when one respondent, asked whether she had a radio, said that she 
might have one ‘in the top of my closet,’ though it might not work.”217 Jacobs told broadcasters 
that he would have loved to show segments demonstrating young listeners’ engagement with HD 
Radio, “but only two of them even knew what it was, and it was clear that they didn’t know what 
they were talking about.”218 In a 2009 survey of 30,000 public radio listeners, nearly half 
expressed awareness of HD Radio, but only 3% had actually bought HD-capable receivers. Of 
the rest, 11% said they were “very likely” to purchase an HD receiver, while 65% reported they 
were “somewhat” or “not at all likely” to jump on the HD Radio bandwagon.219 Another Jacobs 
Media listener survey reported that 40% of respondents didn’t know enough about the 
technology to form a firm opinion of it, while 37% complained that digital receivers were too 
expensive. Overall familiarity with HD Radio “dropped from 70 percent in 2007 to 60-some 
percent in 2008, according to the findings.”220 
That same year, Arbitron and Edison Research published a report which concluded that 
66% of listeners surveyed were not interested in HD Radio, while only 6% responded that they 
were “very interested.” A separate study from American Media Services put national listener 
awareness of HD Radio at a paltry 33%.221 Bridge Ratings published two alarming studies in 
2009 and 2010 which clearly show public interest in radio broadcasting more generally trending 
lower, while the use of alternate digital media distribution systems experienced significant 
growth.222 According to the research, terrestrial radio listening reached a downward tipping point 
in 2002-2003, while the “collective momentum of digital [audio] alternatives” began to outpace 
terrestrial radio listening in 2007 - suggesting that HD Radio was, from its policy-inception, an 
also-ran in the convergent media environment of digital audio listening.223 Arbitron estimates that 
overall radio listening fell 16% in the last decade, and 23% among listeners between the ages of 
18 and 24.224
The decline in traditional radio listening has been exacerbated by a radio industry in deep 
recession. In 2008, the Radio Advertising Bureau reported that station revenues were down 9% 
from the year before;225 in 2009, that decline had doubled.226 The RAB observed that the only 
industry growth through this period came in the category of revenue from station web sites, 
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which increased 13% between 2008 and 2009.227 Although radio revenues recorded their first 
uptick in a decade in 2010,228 there is no guarantee that a long-term recovery awaits. Industry 
analysts BIA/Kelsey expect weak revenues for terrestrial radio to continue for the foreseeable 
future, while online audio distribution services are poised to add 30% to their bottom lines 
between now and 2013.229 Broadcast-investors in iBiquity no longer have the fiscal wherewithal 
to support the company, as reflected by an enormous devaluation of publicly-traded broadcast 
company market capitalization. At the end of 2008, shares in Entercom nose-dived from a peak 
of $66.56 to 78 cents a share; Citadel dropped from $22.08 to 25 cents; Emmis from $58.09 to 
50 cents; Cumulus from $53 to $1.28; Spanish Broadcasting from $40.25 to 19 cents; Salem 
from $33.08 to 88 cents; Cox from #35.31 to $6.19; CBS from $45 to $7.79; and Saga from $29 
to $4.18. At the end of 2010, these stocks continued to trade at a fraction of their all-time highs. 
Clear Channel re-privatized itself after taking a beating on Wall Street during the first half of the 
decade.230 The value of radio stations themselves is also dropping precipitously: in the heyday of 
consolidation following the Telecommunications Act of 1996, station valuations averaged about 
15 times their yearly revenue potential. That multiple is now down to nine, and dropping.231 In 
2008, for the first time since the passage of the Telecom Act, the value of radio station 
transactions dipped below $1 billion.232 
All of these factors have obviously put a strain on the ability of broadcasters to invest in 
HD Radio station conversions. Radio World reported in 2009 that an informal survey of 
executives in charge of capital expenditures at broadcast conglomerates found many planned to 
delay their digital conversion campaigns.233 Beasley Broadcast Group chief technology officer 
Mike Cooney confirmed that his company was backing down on “HD conversions in the small 
markets and started putting money more in things that have a quicker return on investment for 
the capital money.”234 In 2009 Crown Broadcast, a transmitter-manufacturer, reported that 
inquires about HD-compatible equipment were virtually nonexistent.235 According to Tim Bealor, 
vice president of sales for Broadcast Electronics, “Unless we can figure out a way for 
broadcasters to make back their investment, [HD adoption] be a futile effort.”236 The sentiment 
was echoed by Mike Troje, sales manager for Continental Electronics. “It’s a task to come up 
with what the right responses are for the industry when we don’t know what the end game is.”237 
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Paragon Media Strategies CEO Mike Henry declared radio’s traditional business model to be 
broken. “The old radio model is now seriously underwater from the perfect storm of advertising 
declines and new competition,” he told Radio World. “The new radio model combines hyper-
local content and community-building with multi-platform distribution and revenue streams.”238 
This is not a business model which those who control the majority of radio industry revenue 
appear ready to embrace.
Irrespective of HD Radio’s fundamental flaws and general industry weaknesses, the 
critical metric which will decide digital broadcasting’s fate is the number of available HD 
receivers in the marketplace. Although consumer electronics manufacturers gradually backed 
away from direct opposition of the technology during the early stages of public policy 
proceedings, their inaction on receiver production may give them the last laugh. In the summer 
of 2010, iBiquity reported that three million HD Radio receivers had been sold since 2002, 
representing a market penetration of just .04%.239 Although the company claimed that it signed 
licensing agreements with 140 companies to develop HD Radio receiver components and 
products,240 the gear has not appeared. 
In November of 2008, J.R. Russ toured electronics stores in Philadelphia and found a 
paucity of receiver choices; in locations that actually had HD Radios, most were nonfunctional 
and the sales staff knew nothing about the technology. “How can broadcasters expect the public 
to get excited about HD Radio when it can’t be uniformly heard everywhere?,” asked Russ. 
“How can retailers sell the product if they don’t stock it. Or if the products they do have on hand 
can’t be demonstrated and employees are clueless? How can manufacturers justify building the 
product if it doesn’t sell for these reasons?”241 Aaron Read, who works at an HD-capable FM 
station in upstate New York, reported similar dismal news. “Most stores don’t carry any 
receivers at all. The few that do, like RadioShack and Best Buy, often ‘hide’ them in a distant 
corner and don’t hook up the antenna to the display unit....[G]iven the overall lack of originality 
in the formats, I fear there is little compelling reason for a listener to invest the $100+ for an HD 
Radio in our area.”242 Portable media devices capable of receiving HD Radio signals are similarly 
scarce. Microsoft discontinued production of its Zune media player in 2011, removing from the 
marketplace the only third-party portable device with HD functionality.243 
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In vehicles - a location where terrestrial radio broadcasting has traditionally enjoyed a 
significant competitive advantage for the listener’s attention - HD Radio now occupies an 
ancillary position. Some luxury automakers, such as BMW, Jaguar, Mercedes, and Volvo, only 
offer HD Radio as a factory-installed option in select models.244 A Radio World-sponsored 
sampling of vehicle dealerships in eastern Missouri found little to no customer demand for the 
product, and little to no knowledge of HD Radio among car salespeople; dealers “will respond 
when customers demand information, not before.”245 Longtime HD evangelist Tom Ray III, the 
chief engineer at WOR-AM in New York, was frustrated when he bought a new Ford and 
assumed iBiquity’s claims that the automaker included HD Radio as a standard option were 
truthful. 
Lisa, the sweet sales person, promptly pointed to the Sirius sign and said that the car 
came with Sirius. Um, no, I told her. I said HD Radio. She got the head of the parts 
department. Nope — never heard of it. She got the head of the service department. Nope 
— never heard of it. She brought over the owner of the dealership, who went to his office 
and came back with what amounted to a ream of paper. It contained nothing about HD 
Radio from Ford. I drove off the lot the next day with the factory AM/FM radio that came 
with the car.246   
Even iBiquity CEO Robert Struble now realizes radio’s place of primacy in the dashboard is at 
risk, and it will have to “fight for its position.”247 
At the 2011 Consumer Electronics Show, Toyota announced it would include HD Radio 
in its new Entune in-vehicle entertainment system, which integrates the capability to stream 
Internet-delivered radio into the mobile listening environment.248 Ford’s SYNC information suite 
already allows for the “tethering” of smartphones to the dashboard.249 In fact, the dominant trend 
among automakers and the consumer electronics companies which support them is to add 
Internet streaming capability to receivers much faster than they are adopting HD Radio; at CES 
2011, Kenwood, Pioneer, and Sony all rolled out aftermarket auto receivers that allow drivers 
and passengers to tune in webcasts.250 iBiquity claimed that its digital broadcast technology was 
present in 17 brands of vehicles, covering “more than 85 vehicle types,” and 36 individual 
models included HD Radio as standard equipment.251 However, no automaker has yet committed 
to provide their newly-developed digital entertainment systems as standard equipment across all 
makes and models, and it remains to be seen whether the addition of HD functionality on the 
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coattails of a larger investment in Internet-delivered radio reception will provide the broadcast 
protocol with enough momentum to spur widespread listener adoption. Traditional broadcast 
outlets could simply provide Internet simulcasts of their on-air signals in order to take advantage 
of the growing listener move toward online radio listening, but in 2009 industry analysts 
observed that less than half of all radio stations were webcasting.252
The dearth of digital radio receiver penetration is not helped by the fact that two legal 
firms are exploring class-action lawsuits on behalf of luxury vehicle owners who were enticed 
into purchasing HD receivers only to find that reception of digital signals is skittish and actual 
improvement to the fidelity of broadcast radio is questionable. The lawyers plan to target vehicle 
manufacturers on the grounds of deceptive advertising.253 If this probe gains traction, it could kill 
what tepid enthusiasm the auto industry has for HD Radio.  
It is thus unsurprising that HD Radio’s proponents are undertaking radical action to try 
and resuscitate the market for the technology. In February, 2010 iBiquity reduced the one-time 
licensing fee for radio stations from an average of $25,000 to $10,500 and agreed to accept 
payment in installments.254 In September, iBiquity and Citadel Media announced a new initiative 
whereby stations could convert to HD on the barter system, exchanging advertising inventory for 
capital expenditure, including the initial license fee.255 Since Citadel is fronting the money and 
receiving the advertising inventory, this arrangement calls into question the viability of 
iBiquity’s broadcaster-license revenue stream. The fact that a broadcast-investor is attempting to 
subsidize the uptake of HD Radio speaks volumes about the fiscal strength of iBiquity to 
successfully market its wares. 
No broadcaster has yet turned a profit on their investment in HD Radio. Some stations 
have leased FM-HD multicast channels to third parties, which have ranged from condom makers 
to professional hockey teams.256 Perhaps the ultimate irony is that HD proponents are exploiting 
analog signals to carry content that goes unheard by the nonexistent digital masses. In 2006, the 
National Association of Broadcasters petitioned the FCC to allow AM radio stations to purchase 
FM translator stations. These low-power repeaters, argued the NAB, would help AM 
broadcasters overcome increasing noise on their band and guarantee them coverage of their 
primary service areas at night; in 2009 the FCC approved the practice. It also gave AM owners 
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of FM translators the right to utilize HD Radio technology on their translators, providing a back 
door to the full functionalities of the protocol, such as multicasting, which the AM-HD system is 
incapable of offering.257 FM radio station owners are also resorting to unique measures in order to 
recoup their investment in HD Radio programming through non-digital conduits. CBS Radio 
imports analog signals from stations in major markets and feeds them as FM-HD multicast 
channels in smaller ones.258 FM-HD stations are also purchasing translator stations in order to 
simulcast - in analog - the content of their digital multicast streams. Cumulus Broadcasting has 
been the most aggressive at positioning these simulcasts not as enticements for listeners to try 
HD Radio, but rather as entirely new analog program outlets.259 “Not using new local channels for 
new local programming ideas feels like a lost opportunity and might invite further criticism that 
radio is not putting its spectrum to best use for local service,” worried Radio World.  
On the policy front, there is really nothing the FCC can do to further stimulate interest in 
HD Radio, short of mandating a digital transition deadline as it did in the DTV proceeding. 
There is no information to suggest that any of HD Radio’s proponents, much less the FCC, 
support such action, especially since its voluntary acceptance was a primary justification for 
implementing the technology in the first place. Instead, the National Association of Broadcasters 
is advocating a legislative mandate for the inclusion of FM-HD Radio chips in mobile 
telephones. The trade association believes that if listener trends are moving away from 
traditional, terrestrial broadcasting and toward Internet-delivered audio accessed through 
smartphones, it is incumbent upon broadcasters to have purchase in this new receiver space.260 
However, the NAB has much less political capital in Washington, D.C. than it enjoyed just a 
dozen years ago, when the drive to implement HD Radio was just getting underway. 
If unable to advance a mobile phone HD mandate on its own, the NAB hopes to co-opt 
the music industry into its campaign. Record labels have negotiated the payment of performance 
royalties from other digital audio distribution outlets; historically, the radio industry has been 
exempt from the payment of such royalties,261 but the music industry no longer sees the necessity 
of maintaining this privilege, given radio’s decreased importance within the larger realm of 
digital listening technologies that now exist. As part of ongoing negotiations over this issue, the 
NAB Radio Board published a “Term Sheet” in October 2010 which stipulated the performance 
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royalty rates broadcasters were willing to pay. These rates were directly dependent upon a 
cooperative initiative between the broadcast and music industries to get Congress to pass 
legislation involving a “Radio Chip Mandate” in mobile computing devices. If such an effort 
failed, the NAB offered to pay more in performance royalties.262 The music industry wasted no 
time hammering the proposal, calling it an unwarranted complication to negotiations which, until 
the promulgation of the Term Sheet, appeared to be heading toward an amicable resolution.263 
The Consumer Electronics Association was incensed that its constituents might be forced 
to include radio chips in their devices. “Members of Congress rightly judge their constituents to 
be in no mood for government mandates or interference with the marketplace,” CEA president 
Gary Shapiro told the NAB. “We have yet to identify one member of Congress willing to support 
your attempt to impose old FM technology on new portable products. As the representatives of 
an innovative and forward-looking industry, CEA will vigorously oppose any effort to force 
manufacturers by legislative fiat to include legacy technology in devices....Radio is a legacy 
horse and buggy industry trying to put limits on innovative new industries to preserve its format 
monopoly.” Shapiro explicitly noted that the “additional inclusion of HD radio in the proposal 
will likely be harmful to manufacturer enthusiasm for and adoption of this technology....We 
suggest you delete the technology mandates and recognize the free market works.”264 
If the free market is working, it is not in favor of HD Radio. This has prompted deep 
introspection among broadcasters about the future viability of traditional broadcasting itself. 
“Will it fight fire with fire and move to selected microformats, or come full circle and return to a 
variety schedule?,” Skip Pizzi asked in Radio World 18 months before he went to work for the 
NAB. “Or could some form of hyperlocalism find its way back into broadcasters’ DNA, 
emerging from an almost forgotten chromosome?...At the moment, everyone acknowledges these 
questions, but no one has many answers.”265 A new consensus is developing that suggests the 
bridge to radio’s profitable place in a convergent media environment will be through devices and 
platforms that do not involve its traditional distribution infrastructure.266 Pizzi advises that HD 
Radio be seen as “the long-term, speculative play in the portfolio, and balance it with other 
components on a faster and more likely track to new media [return on investment].”267 However, 
radio historian Matthew Lasar questions whether terrestrial radio itself will be an also-ran as a 
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digital audio distribution platform, given the swift adoption of listener-customized streaming 
services such as Pandora, Slacker and Last.fm.268 This skepticism is reinforced by the fact that 
smartphone owners - the fastest growing segment of mobile telephone users - seldom use their 
devices for any sort of interaction with an AM or FM broadcaster, and have no inclinations to 
start doing more of it.269 
It is fair to say that HD Radio is on life support in the United States. Even after getting 
the FCC to authorize more digital-to-analog interference in order to stimulate FM-HD adoption, 
broadcasters, receiver manufacturers and listeners still seem unwilling to invest in the 
technology. The policy and marketplace development of HD Radio is not a story of evil people 
doing stupid things, or stupid people doing evil things; characterizing this saga in such a manner 
fails to indict the system of policymaking which ignorantly allowed a self-indulgent radio 
industry to facilitate its own marginalization through the implementation of a digital broadcast 
technology fraught with problems. 
There is no one actor to blame for the current condition of HD Radio. Its evolution was 
guided by tactical impulses instead of strategic thinking about the phenomenon of convergence 
and its implications. This process began with the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996, which fundamentally transformed the radio industry, giving a minority of players an 
inordinate amount of political and economic leverage to promulgate a digital audio broadcast 
standard incapable of competing in a convergent media environment. The fight for - and possible 
failure of - HD Radio in the United States will most likely be the lasting legacy of a 
wrongheaded law which unleashed consolidation and cost-cutting, turning radio away from its 
traditional strengths of localism and program diversity, and transforming it into what is now a 
hollow husk of a mass medium. The HD Radio policy proceeding also represents a capstone in 
the long history of the FCC as a captured regulator, as it repeatedly ignored or dismissed 
substantive questions of who and what represents “the public interest” raised during the 
policymaking process, and moved further away from basing decisions on solid technical 
information in favor of purely economic rationales.  
However, while the United States represents the most dramatic case of traditional radio’s 
inability to navigate the digital transition, the viability of digital broadcasting is questionable on 
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a global scale. Whereas HD Radio may represent the worst of available digital audio broadcast 
technologies, no DAB system has yet gained any meaningful purchase anywhere. The 
technologically-agnostic failure of digital audio broadcasting has not yet been fully examined, 
but there is enough evidence to suggest that radio’s digital dilemma is real and worldwide. 
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Chapter 7: Digital Radio Around the World
Although the United States’ failure to successfully implement digital radio broadcasting 
may be the most comprehensively documented to date, problems of regulatory dysfunction and 
marketplace uncertainty affect all digital audio broadcast technologies, including the oldest of 
the bunch (Eureka 147, known in Europe simply as “DAB”) and the newest entrant (Digital 
Radio Mondiale). This chapter is not meant to definitively chronicle the global scene for digital 
radio, which could well be its own dissertation; a true comprehensive analysis along these lines 
remains to be done. Instead, this exploration highlights those countries which have tried to 
implement digital radio technologies and offers potential reasons why these efforts also seem to 
be stagnant. In sum, it is very clear that the failure of terrestrial digital radio broadcasting is 
technologically agnostic, though the reasons for its inhibited uptake in other countries differ 
compared to the situation in the United States.
I. The Technological and Regulatory Fragmentation of Digital Audio Broadcasting
The development of Eureka 147 DAB began in 1985 under the auspices of collaboration 
between European broadcast and receiver equipment manufacturers, as well as public service 
broadcast organizations from several countries.1 German scientists invented the audio codec 
inherent to the Eureka 147 system, while French engineers developed its broadcast waveform. 
Similarly to HD Radio, a primary driver of early Eureka 147 development was the creation of a 
digital broadcast standard with functionality far beyond the simple provision of audio. In 1987, 
formal study and promotion of the Eureka 147 project was founded by a consortium of 19 
broadcast and electronics organizations from France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom.2
The Eureka consortium contextualized its technology as a means by which European 
broadcasters could “take the lead in the digital terrestrial radio space and, hopefully, promulgate 
a world standard.”3 The commercial implications of this goal drove the technology’s initial 
development: according to Brian O’Neill and Helen Shaw, “Strengthening the competitiveness 
of the European audiovisual industry has been a mainstay of European policy since the mid-
1980s with an emphasis on the development of a single market, support for regulatory 
harmonization and an enhanced, centralized role for the European Commission in the 
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communications sector.”4 Eureka 147 was cast as a means by which European electronics 
manufacturers could capture the high ground in this nascent broadcast technology and place 
themselves in a more favorable position to compete against Asian electronics manufacturers.5 To 
facilitate this outcome, early Eureka 147 proponents believed that its successful implementation 
could only be achieved by pan-European regulatory consensus, with each country agreeing to 
harmonize their spectral allocation and DAB operational rules so as to provide a digital radio 
technology which would be truly continental in scope. However, during the time of Eureka’s 
development, progress in the technologies of mobile telephony and the Internet also surged; 
surprisingly, these advancements “had little immediate impact - if any - on research and 
development of digital broadcasting systems in Europe or in the US.”6 This would prove to be a 
strategic oversight, as mobile telephony would later become a primary vector for the provision of 
Internet-based digital audio delivery in Europe; were Eureka 147 compatible with mobile 
telephony from the outset, it might have found early purchase in this growing receiver-market.
A continental consensus over digital radio never materialized. Instead, countries 
approached DAB using the templates of their existing analog radio broadcast systems. This 
would have significant negative effects on the proliferation of Eureka 147 technology throughout 
Europe, and it quickly soured Asian consumer electronics manufacturers on the notion of 
entering the Eureka 147 receiver market, as they were not interested in manufacturing new radio 
products which might work in one European country but not in another.7 Consequently, activities 
toward the implementation of DAB in any given country had to navigate the incumbencies found 
in each nation’s system of broadcast organization. As a function of design, Eureka 147 
broadcasts are best suited for providing regional or nationwide program coverage, reflecting an 
historic mission of European public service broadcast institutions. Therefore, Eureka’s uptake 
has been most successful in countries where public service broadcasters dominate the radio 
industry.8 However, the lack of DAB’s ability to accommodate local programming has been a 
major factor in its tepid adoption.9 Additionally, during the time between the technology’s 
development and proliferation, many European countries experienced significant growth in the 
commercial sectors of their radio industry, which has primarily catered to local audiences. As the 
political and economic power-balance between commercial and public service broadcasters has 
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shifted, so has the regulatory paradigm of DAB, which further complicates its implementation.
Qualitatively, the operative rationale for digital radio broadcasting in Europe was not 
substantive enough to spark deep interest among regulators or the listening public with regard to 
justifying the apparent “need” to digitalize the medium. Like HD Radio’s proponents in the 
United States, Eureka 147 consortium members ultimately sold the promise of increased audio 
quality and a vaguely-defined potential for ancillary services such as datacasting as the principles 
by which a digital radio transition would succeed.10 According to Stephen Lax, this positioning 
invited a conundrum: “As a technological solution to a perceived problem, DAB would be 
considered by most to be successful, but it is by no means clear what the nature of the ‘problem’ 
actually is.”11 
By 1995, European broadcast regulators defined the swaths of spectrum on which Eureka 
147 broadcasts could be implemented. Unlike HD Radio, the Eureka system uses “multiplexes,” 
or single digital transmission outlets which are designed to cover a specific geographic area. 
Multiplex operators are licensed separately from broadcast stations, who are no longer 
responsible for their own transmission infrastructure. In a manner similar to cable television, 
stations feed DAB programming into a multiplex where it is then bundled with other program 
services and fed out over a single digital broadcast channel. Receivers then decode the multiplex 
signal and play back the program stream that the listener desires. How the multiplex system is 
operated, and which stations can be on them, differs from country to country: most nations 
reserve space for their incumbent public service broadcasters while the rest of the capacity is 
typically determined by auction, with stations leasing space on a multiplex for a fixed period of 
time. In simple terms, the multiplex operator handles the broadcast function while the stations 
provide the programming. In a typical Eureka 147 multiplex operation, depending on how the 
bandwidth is divided, a multiplex transmitter could originally carry between five to ten “radio 
stations.”12 Although this represented a fundamental shift in the method of radio transmission (by 
consolidating its infrastructure), Eureka’s developers and backers noted that it would not directly 
impinge upon legacy analog radio stations, which would operate normally while the Eureka 
system was deployed.
In 1995, the British Broadcasting Corporation became the first broadcaster to implement 
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a multiplex DAB transmission system. Hailed as “a new dawn for radio,” the milestone was 
characterized as the most significant development in radio history since the introduction of FM 
stereo broadcasting. The Eureka 147 consortium confidently predicted that its technology would 
ultimately replace analog AM and FM service completely; it pointed to surveys which showed 
“great interest” in DAB among one in four German, Spanish, British, and French listeners.13 That 
same year, with the support of the European Broadcasting Union, the European DAB Forum 
(EuroDAB) was founded to promote Eureka’s spread throughout the continent. This was later 
reconstituted as the WorldDAB Forum in 1997, suggesting strong confidence among the 
technology’s proponents that the Eureka system would quickly catch on worldwide. One of the 
Forum’s primary talking points emphasized the fear that, unless its technology took hold, radio 
broadcasting would be left behind as an analog adjunct to an increasingly digital media 
environment.14 
The initial hype surrounding the launch of Eureka 147 DAB was quite impressive. Five 
companies exhibited Eureka-compatible transmitters at the National Association of 
Broadcasters’ annual convention in 1996.15 Receiver penetration estimates projected that 
Europeans would purchase 50 million DAB receivers in the first ten years, with sales quickly 
rising to 35 million per year thereafter.16 An International Symposium on Digital Audio 
Broadcasting held in 1996 attracted more than 500 participants from around the world. Australia 
announced it would begin testing of the Eureka system. France, India, and Italy were in the midst 
of DAB experiments; the Netherlands and Denmark announced progress toward the provision of 
nationwide DAB service. Germany, Switzerland and Canada also unveiled plans to start DAB 
testing programs.17 By 2002, the WorldDAB Forum represented companies and organizations 
spanning 25 countries.18 Sony and Microsoft formally joined the WorldDAB Forum in 2003 and 
2004, respectively;19  by 2003, more than 284 million people could theoretically receive some 
sort of Eureka-based DAB signal and 400 digital program services were available in 20 different 
countries.20 In 2006, the Forum changed its name again, to WorldDMB (“digital multimedia 
broadcasting,”); by this point, more than 1,000 DAB services had been launched in 40 nations, 
reaching 500 million potential listeners.21  
In reality, however, the proliferation of Eureka-based DAB was struggling at best. 
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Broadcasters told receiver manufacturers early on that the technology’s success or failure rested 
firmly in their hands; without affordable receivers, there would be no listener uptake and the 
technology would languish.22 A year after the BBC launched the first Eureka-based DAB service, 
no receivers were yet in mass production. The delay was based, in part, on inter-Forum 
squabbles over the Eureka datacasting standard. Considering that datacasting had been construed 
as the first feature of DAB to take the service beyond the provision of audio content, a unified 
datacast protocol was seen as necessary to promulgate a pan-European DAB service. However, 
the British and Germans had each developed their own datacast protocol, and the Eureka 
framework could only accommodate one of them. This dispute would not be settled - and thus no 
datacast-capable receivers would be produced - until 1998. Thus, DAB service was launched by 
early-adopter broadcasters with minimal datacasting functionality, and early DAB listeners were 
not attuned to the feature, much less its potential.23 
Amplifying the problem was the patchwork manner in which Eureka systems were 
implemented across the continent. The technology could be applied on different swaths of 
spectrum, depending on geographic availability. Thus, DAB multiplexes in one country were not 
contiguous to those in a neighboring country; this created obvious complexities for receiver 
manufacturers hoping to produce interoperable radios. They and EuroDAB estimated in 1996 
that an interoperable receiver would first enter the market with a price point “below $750.”24 
After spending an estimated €300 million on DAB transmission development by 1999, there 
was still no affordable means by which to listen to the new service.25 In 2002, two British 
companies announced the development of Eureka-compatible chipsets that were cheap and easy 
to mass-produce, which would bring the DAB receiver price-point down “to the equivalent of 
about $140.” By this point, however, malaise among listeners regarding DAB was palpable, and 
a simple discount in receiver price would not be enough to stimulate them. The lack of 
interoperable and inexpensive DAB receivers forced some countries to abandon further DAB 
testing and curtail existing digital broadcast services.26 Survey data from several European 
countries showed very little listener interest in DAB, even among those that actually knew 
something about it.27  
The failure of DAB to gain a real hold anywhere lies not just with receiver 
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manufacturers. The spotty nature of national commitments to DAB, a lack of any real pan-
European sense of regulatory urgency over the issue, and further innovations within the Eureka 
147 development community itself have fragmented any hopes of a coordinated analog-to-digital 
radio transition, even within individual nations. On the regulatory front, incentives for 
broadcasters to adopt the Eureka system differ from country to country. For example, in the 
U.K., analog radio broadcasters were given automatic extensions to their existing licenses if they 
committed to providing content within the DAB network. However, in Finland and Denmark, 
regulators simply made the addition of DAB content a requirement for all analog radio licensees.
In all instances, commercial broadcasters seemed to have been treated as afterthought-
constituencies during the formative DAB policymaking process.28 This is likely due to historical 
bias within the structure of European broadcasting: unlike the United States, where commercial 
broadcasters dominate the regulatory proceedings and the entire system is oriented in such a way 
as to serve their concerns first, state-run public service broadcasters have traditionally occupied 
this privileged position in Europe. As the primary constituents behind the development of Eureka 
147, they ultimately established the frameworks by which DAB policy would be implemented, 
and their needs superseded those of commercial broadcasters.
Reticence within the commercial broadcast industry to DAB was amplified by a strategic 
miscalculation on the part of Eureka 147 proponents, who assumed that public service 
broadcasters would maintain their place of primacy within European broadcasting indefinitely, 
and that commercial broadcasters would always follow the lead of their state-run colleagues. 
However, the political and economic position of public service broadcasters relative to 
commercial broadcasters over the last two decades has changed as commercial radio industries 
grew. Commercial broadcasters’ lack of enthusiasm for a digital transition has been exacerbated 
by an economic slowdown which, since 2008, has hit the European radio industry quite hard. 
The BBC actually abandoned plans to launch a major DAB channel, and several commercial 
DAB program providers have forfeited their multiplex channels because of falling revenue.29 
With the sentiments of commercial broadcasters ranging from lukewarm to cynical on the 
potential for DAB, this has further aggravated anxiety among receiver manufacturers and 
retailers about investing in a new digital product that may not contain the same program diversity 
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as its analog counterpart.30 Although WorldDMB has announced plans to develop an 
interoperable DAB receiver that will work across Europe, no such receiver yet exists.31 
Similarly, the European Commission is simply uninterested in pursuing substantive 
policy regarding radio’s digital transition. The EC, argues Brian O’Neill and Helen Shaw, has 
been preoccupied with Europe’s digital television transition, and thus “have left the success or 
failure of DAB in the hands of ‘market players.’”32 These battles subsequently default to the 
national level for resolution, where by and large a lack of “urgency and political priority” has 
“deferred the question of whether AM and FM broadcasting needed to be replaced” at all. The 
lack of regulatory engagement at both the continental and national level sharpened the tensions 
between market players to which the development, proliferation, and marketing of DAB were 
left.33 
Further complicating matters for proponents of the Eureka system was technological 
progress itself. More than 20 years have passed since DAB’s initial development and several 
upgrades and new variants to the Eureka 147 system have been released. These include DAB+ 
(essentially an upgraded version of the original DAB system, with a more efficient audio codec), 
DVB (digital video broadcasting, with two variants - one for televisions and one for portable 
media devices), and DMB (digital multimedia broadcasting, which can convey many forms of 
digital content to a variety of devices). All branch from the original Eureka 147 design, but none 
are cross-compatible with each other. Therefore, for countries which have already implemented a 
DAB system, if they choose to upgrade they must completely replace their entire multiplex 
transmission infrastructure. Some countries are considering implementing new Eureka variants 
to complement incumbent DAB systems; others are shutting down old multiplexes with the 
intent of replacing them with upgraded ones; still others are canceling all DAB-related projects 
until the marketplace either decides on a single Eureka-based standard or receivers become 
interoperable between them all.34 
According to Marko Ala-Fossi, “The genie had now been let out of the bottle. Suddenly, 
after 2005, DAB was not only competing with all the other digital systems but also with its own 
derivatives, which were obviously considered as substitutes to each other as well.”35 The primary 
rationale for European radio digitalization - a desire for improved audio quality - was suddenly 
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subsumed by competition within the technological suite regarding superiority between variants. 
In the words of Brian O'Neill, Marko Ala-Fossi, Per Jauert, Stephen Lax, Lars Nyre, and Helen 
Shaw, “Although the technical functionality of radio may have been extended, to the extent to 
which it has substantially changed or improved radio in practical or editorial terms remains a 
matter of debate. Traditional forms of broadcasting continue to dominate on new digital 
platforms, with little obvious exploration or experimentation with the communicative novelties 
that new media might offer” [emphasis in original].36 
The actual multimedia capacity of DAB, especially relative to the capacity of the 
Internet, has turned out to be “relatively modest.” In addition, the original receivers marketed for 
the DAB system either did not have datacast-reception functionality or only provided 
rudimentary, text-based services like station or program information.37 Listeners, already burned 
by high prices for receivers that offered few perceived improvements to radio, and further sullied 
by a lack of pan-European interoperability, have not been rushing out in droves to purchase 
newer, more expensive DAB receivers to take advantage of the technology’s upgraded variants.
Today, the pan-European perspective on radio’s digital transition is a muddy one. While 
there is consensus that “[b]ringing radio into the digital era means more than simply changing its 
mode of delivery into digital form,”38 the steps by which this will occur remain unclear. After 
conducting interviews with radio broadcasters in the U.K., Canada, Ireland, and Finland, Ala-
Fossi concluded that there is “no single platform or technology” that respondents could agree 
upon that constitutes a viable mechanism for radio’s digital transition.39 Competition between 
platforms, audience fragmentation, and uncertainty among radio broadcasters and regulators has 
probably led to “less consensus now about the future of radio than at any time in the past.”40 
Depending on one’s perspective, argues Ala-Fossi, “radio is currently either facing the danger of 
fragmentation or is surviving by infiltrating new platforms and becoming more polymorphic.”41 
In practical terms, European broadcasters and media scholars now see radio as a multi-
platform medium, with distribution via incumbent analog technology, DAB variants, satellite and 
the Internet all playing a factor in radio’s future.42 Analog radio broadcasting remains alive and 
well, and is expected to continue to play a significant role in the radio space: at its annual 
conference in February 2010, the Association of European Radios - a continental trade group 
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representing more than 4,500 commercial broadcasters - approved a resolution opposing any 
mandatory analog/digital sunset date.43 Lax argues that the exhortation of radio’s inherent 
necessity to digitize will not subside anytime soon, but the medium’s digital transition should be 
more properly construed as a technical exercise instead of being driven by “economic, and to 
some extent, ideological considerations” which have marginalized DAB over the last twenty-plus 
years.44 O’Neill and Shaw assert that although Eureka 147 development was initially portrayed as 
a replacement for analog broadcasting, it was really about “find[ing] the best or most innovative 
neutral digital audio solution - it was, by the very nature of who framed the questions, to find the 
best and most innovative digital radio solution with would best serve the needs of the status 
quo.”45 Around the world, Eureka 147 variants have found minimal purchase at best in a handful 
of countries - but in no place is the technology’s future truly guaranteed.
II. Digital Radio in the United Kingdom
The most intensive research done on the proliferation of Eureka 147-based DAB 
technology has focused on the U.K., the first country to adopt the broadcast standard and the 
only country in which DAB has received what could be called wide-ranging discussion in terms 
of affected constituencies. A key point of consternation over DAB development in the U.K. has 
been the government’s decision to cede direct control over the operation of multiplexes. Instead 
of licensing individual stations on each multiplex, the multiplex operators themselves are private 
corporations, granted license terms by the national government. In turn, multiplex operators pay 
a yearly fee to the government for the privilege of operating the transmission system. Stations 
wishing to be heard on DAB multiplexes must pay the multiplex operator a lease fee for carriage 
on one or more multiplexes. Rates for carriage on a U.K. DAB multiplex vary from market to 
market. The BBC is reserved space on most multiplexes.
In order to entice analog broadcasters to produce programming for the DAB system, 
regulators offered to extend the terms of their existing analog licenses as an incentive for DAB 
participation.46 This practice was formalized as standing policy in 2007,47 and thus automatically 
favored broadcast incumbents as preferred entrants in the new digital radio environment. At the 
time of the BBC’s launch of its first exclusive Eureka-based DAB service, U.K. radio regulators 
were well into a 15-year campaign of commercializing what had historically been a government 
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monopoly on broadcast spectrum. The resultant growth in the political and economic power of 
commercial broadcasters in the U.K. began to reshape the DAB service itself. Multiplexes, for 
example, were established in such a way as to roughly replicate existing radio markets. The net 
effect, concludes Richard Rudin, has been to “greatly restrict the flexibility of the system - at the 
local level DAB is no more efficient in the use of frequency spectrum than analogue.”48 
In 1996, the passage of the U.K. Broadcasting Act unleashed an unprecedented wave of 
consolidation within the country’s commercial radio industry. DAB deployment was affected: 
national broadcast conglomerates began to simulcast programs from one station on national 
multiplex agreements and got into the business of owning and operating the multiplexes 
themselves.49 This not only further diminished the importance of localism on DAB services, but 
also allowed vertical integration to occur within the nascent digital radio industry.50 Grant 
Goddard, a U.K. radio professional with 30 years’ experience in programming, management, 
consultation, and regulation, believes commercial broadcasters were driven “to invest in DAB 
infrastructure, rather than content, because it created an opportunity to control this new broadcast 
platform. Radio stations might be good at radio, but that does not mean they will necessarily be 
good at running other businesses,” including oversight of an embryonic digital broadcast 
protocol which was initially designed by state-supported public service broadcasters and 
intended to “revolutionize” the practice of radio broadcasting. Goddard concludes that because 
the radio industry’s ultimate motivations to adopt DAB had little to do with the listener, “the 
consumer became lost in the execution strategy.”51 What few promises had been made to the 
public, such as a significant increase in the fidelity and digital extensibility of radio broadcasts, 
would ultimately go unfulfilled.52 
U.K. broadcasters and regulators thus launched DAB with many hopes that it would 
catch on simply by existing. There were no “robust and wide-ranging discussions as to what 
DAB could do, or what it should be used for; the main focus for attention seems to have been on 
the subject of how best, technically, to deliver it.”53 Proponents of the U.K. DAB system focused 
on the buildout of multiplexes first and trumpeted their initial program diversity. By early 2001, 
more than 40 DAB program streams were on the air in the London area alone.54 In 2002, the 
BBC launched its first DAB-only station, 1Xtra, featuring an urban contemporary music 
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format.55 In December of that year, the first portable DAB receiver went on sale in the U.K. 
Depending on the model’s features (such as the ability to time-shift programming), prices ranged 
from approximately $155 to $300.56 In 2003, the BBC announced it would launch five DAB-only 
national radio services and develop supplementary multiplex systems to increase local program 
content.57 The addition of local DAB multiplexes did increase program diversity, leading to 
digital radio channels devoted to subjects ranging from Islam to environmental news to gay and 
lesbian niche programming.58 By the end of the year, DAB proponents hoped to sell 500,000 
receivers.59 
A decade into the U.K.’s DAB deployment initiative, its fortunes took a dramatic turn for 
the worse. Questions regarding the audio fidelity of DAB channels became a crucial point of 
debate in 2004. The conflict pitted program diversity against audio quality: some multiplex 
operators believed it was more important to divide their bandwidth up into as many program 
streams as possible - in the process sacrificing the amount of dedicated bandwidth per channel - 
or carrying fewer program streams in the higher, promised fidelity.60 By 2004, the BBC’s official 
position on the parsing of multiplex channels favored program diversity over fidelity, thus 
undermining the original selling point of DAB in the U.K.61
The shift toward cramming as many program streams as possible into every multiplex has 
led to a situation where “bitrates are determined the minimum necessary for acceptable listening, 
not the maximum or even the recommended levels for effective audio performance....Multiple bit 
streams and compression, therefore, are extended to the highest acceptable limit resulting in a 
quality of transmission that is frequently described as ‘worse than FM.’”62 While regulatory 
studies of the issue have been inconclusive, the lack of receiver uptake, coupled with the 
decision to intentionally degrade DAB’s chief “improvement” over analog radio, have worked 
against the technology’s inherent potential to offer improved audio fidelity.63 Further 
complicating matters, complaints of spotty digital coverage became an increasing concern as the 
number of multiplexes grew. Regulators’ response to this problem was not to investigate the 
conditions of the multiplexes themselves, but instead to require retailers of DAB receivers to 
install signal-amplifiers in their stores to provide potential buyers with a good initial listening 
experience. Imagine the disappointment when those listeners took the radios home and found 
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that they didn't work as well as advertised.64 
The first decade of the twenty-first century also saw the U.K. radio industry fall into a 
recession, with significant consequences for further DAB deployment. Analog station valuations 
have plummeted since the consolidation frenzy of 1996, thereby depleting national broadcast 
conglomerates of equity from which to draw DAB development capital.65 Multiplex ownership 
has also consolidated significantly, inflating lease rates for channels on DAB multiplexes and 
reducing program diversity on the digital dial.66 
In 2008, many commercial analog broadcasters abandoned their DAB program services 
citing prohibitive operational costs.67 What is left are automated, cookie-cutter formats with no 
live digital programming that demonstrate no substantive improvement over existing analog 
radio services.68 In 2009, three new DAB program providers joined the national commercial 
multiplex network; one of them is government-subsidized, though separate from the BBC. On 
local multiplexes, the growth of noncommercial DAB programming is advancing, but it's 
difficult to project exactly how such program providers can stay afloat without some sort of 
direct subsidy of their own.69 Goddard believes DAB service providers are losing an average of 
£27 million per year, which “represents around 5% of commercial radio's revenues, a significant 
impact on an industry which is only marginally profitable overall at present.” 
The nub of the problem is this: digital radio stations presently account for 5.3% of 
listening to commercial radio, but digital radio stations attract only 0.3% of commercial 
radio revenues. Here is a massive economic disconnect that requires much more than a 
mere increase in productivity or some kind of performance improvement. Doubling or 
even tripling these stations' revenues would barely dent the problem.70 
With regard to the BBC itself, there are subtle movements afoot to back away from further 
investment in DAB-specific programming; the institution has increasingly invested more money 
in alternate digital audio distribution platforms such as those based around the Internet, like 
podcasting and streaming-on-demand.71 Goddard notes that“[t]he most listened to exclusively 
digital radio station in London is BBC 1Xra, which ranks 22nd and attracts only a 0.5% share of 
listening in the market.”72 In contrast, the BBC Asian Network “is listened to less now than it 
was almost seven years ago, when only 158,000 DAB radios had been sold....For the BBC, it is 
becoming increasingly hard to justify spending, for example, £12.1m per annum on the Asian 
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Network when its peak audience nationally is only 31,000 adults.”73 U.K. regulators have 
sanctioned the deployment of advancements in the Eureka suite of digital broadcast technologies, 
such as DAB+ and DMB, but there is simply no momentum to be had to upgrade an “upgrade” 
to radio services which has not provided a meaningful return on broadcaster investment.74 
After more than a decade of regular service in the U.K., only 9.2% of commercial radio 
listening is conducted via DAB, while 79% of all new radios sold are still old-fashioned analog 
models.75 In February of 2010, the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders, which 
represents more than 500 companies in the U.K. automotive industry, submitted a report to the 
government detailing its opposition to any government mandate involving digital radio receivers 
in vehicles, citing the “reputational risk” that electronics manufacturers and automakers 
themselves would assume by installing such components in their vehicles.76 In 2007, there were 
34 million cars on U.K. roads, but only 200,000 had DAB receivers installed. The same year, 2.4 
million new vehicles were purchased in the U.K., but only 20,000 buyers chose to install their 
own DAB receiver.77 In the decade since regular DAB service was introduced in the U.K., more 
than 7 million DAB receivers have been sold, but in 2009 alone, more than 8 million analog 
receivers were purchased.78 
Regulators would now like to see low-cost conversion modules made available to bring 
DAB reception capability to analog radio receivers. Unfortunately, this is unlikely to happen: 
Intellect, the trade group which represents U.K. consumer electronics manufacturers, told 
Parliament in February, 2010 that “there are currently no products on the market that can adapt 
an analogue radio to receive DAB signals,” nor are there any plans to start manufacturing such a 
device, citing a lack of consumer demand.79 Two 2009 listener surveys published by U.K. 
broadcast regulator Ofcom show no real listener demand for DAB. 64% of those polled said they 
were not likely to purchase a DAB receiver; 20% were on the fence; while only 16% expressed 
any interest in active engagement with digital radio.80 The second survey found that 91% of 
listeners were satisfied with the analog radio service they receive, “a proportion that has risen in 
recent years. This demonstrates that dissatisfaction with existing radio provision is extremely 
low, making it very difficult for any new platform to attract a substantial audience by offering 
content that will gratify consumers’ few unsatisfied demands.”81 
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Goddard claims DAB listening in the U.K. “fell off a cliff during the last quarter of 2009. 
This did not appear to be the result of any specific strategy shift (no station closures, only one 
minor format change) but more the result of increasing public malaise about the whole DAB 
platform and the radio content that is presently being offered on it….Total listening to digital 
radio stations is back down to the level it achieved in 2007.”82 By 2010, the schism within the 
industry was clear: the largest commercial broadcasters still held out some hope for DAB, as did 
the BBC, because both had deeply invested in the technology, while smaller commercial and 
community broadcasters were most pessimistic about DAB’s future. All agreed, however, that 
due to the technological limitations of Eureka 147 technology and its lack of unified support 
among the nation’s broadcasters, analog service would remain a crucial component in the future 
of U.K. radio from 2015 onward.83 
Regulators and proponents are trying a multitude of measures in hopes of turning around 
a slumping DAB service. In 2008, Ofcom proposed that stations should be freed of local 
program origination requirements in exchange for participation in the DAB network. 
Commercial broadcasters argued that without localism requirements, they might find more 
money to spend on DAB program production. The key question is whether such a value is 
worthy of sacrifice as a stopgap measure to belatedly entice broadcasters onto a platform that 
seems to have no meaningful purchase with radio listeners, in part, because it essentially 
duplicates the programming already heard over analog conduits.84 Commercial broadcasters have 
floated proposals to restrict existing broadcasters from distributing digital content over any 
mechanism other than DAB, and suggested giving away one DAB receiver to every household in 
the U.K.; these have gained no traction.85 
In 2009, British broadcast regulators suggested forcibly migrating all radio services to 
DAB by 2013. This angered many commercial broadcasters who lack the capital to invest in 
DAB programming; they were also very concerned about losing the majority of their listening 
audiences when the analog signals are turned off. Similarly, auto manufacturers reacted 
negatively to the proposal, as they see no consumer demand for a technology bereft of innovative 
programming and promised quality improvements.86 The government published the Digital 
Economy Bill in 2009, which codified enticements for broadcasters to adopt the DAB platform. 
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The bill automatically extends the analog license duration of commercial stations who agree to 
produce DAB content and gives them breaks on analog license fees paid to the government. 
Although regulators have since mentioned 2015 as a hard deadline for an analog/digital radio 
transition, such language is conspicuously missing in the Digital Economy Bill.87 
The government is also apparently unwilling to push for a receiver mandate in handheld 
devices, without which Goddard believes the chances of DAB maintaining a foothold in the U.K. 
are slim to none.88 Having failed to motivate listeners to make an expensive purchase in a 
technology with no discernible return on investment, and having failed to produce enough 
compelling content from the outset to entice listener uptake, Goddard concludes the future of 
digital radio in the U.K. is up for grabs.89 The future will most likely be multi-platform - program 
distribution will occur over the existing digital radio transmission infrastructure as well as the 
Internet, and perhaps as an adjunct to digital television broadcasting - and the industry’s 
salvation will be found most likely in a return to a focus on the production of compelling 
content.90 “Perhaps we do not need more new radio stations, or even existing local commercial 
radio brands rolled out nationally as faux new digital brands,” argues Goddard. “What we need is 
the ability for consumers to access engaging radio content, when, where and how they want it. 
The days of listener loyalty to one radio station are fading fast.”91 
III. Digital Radio Elsewhere in Europe
The story of digital radio in the United Kingdom represents the most positive picture of 
DAB on the European continent. Elsewhere, the condition of the technology’s promotion and 
uptake is much more confused. In Ireland, for example, regulators adopted a “wait and see” 
approach to the idea of digital radio. Due to a lack of FM spectrum congestion, a preexisting 
local programming focus by Irish stations (both commercial and noncommercial), and a healthy 
community radio sector, neither regulators nor broadcasters identified a compelling need to 
adopt any DAB technology quickly. As a result, all constituencies seem satisfied with the analog 
state of Irish radio,92 and regulators are turning their interest instead toward the eventual 
promulgation of the Eureka digital video broadcast (DVB) standard, which incorporates the 
provision of digital audio as just one functionality among many.93 
Back on the continent, France’s on-and-off affair with DAB is representative of the 
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technology’s unstable state. In 2009, France settled on the digital multimedia broadcasting 
(DMB) standard of the Eureka suite - which opened up the digitalization of media beyond radio - 
and proposed a timetable to cover 95% of the national population with DMB service by 2013. 
Commercial radio broadcasters are “increasingly ambivalent” over this proposal, however, 
expressing concern that the infrastructure will favor homogenized national content over local 
digital radio coverage. Some have even begun legal action against French broadcast regulator 
CSA in opposition to the rollout plan.94 In the final months of 2009, CSA pushed back its 
timetable to launch a DMB network to the end of 2010, citing recalcitrance among broadcasters 
to invest in an unproven technology with no discernible business model.95 
Even within the government, some call the DMB launch proposal “implausible” and 
suggest that a viable economic model for digital radio needs to be identified before an estimated 
€600 million to €1 billion is spent over the next two years on the rollout of digital broadcasting 
in France.96 In November of 2009 the trade lobby for France's commercial broadcasters met with 
regulators and reiterated their opposition to any digital radio transition. According to the Bureau 
de la Radio, “the cost of the [digital radio] project is not compatible with the economics of the 
radio medium and does not allow plans for the launch of digital radio to proceed under positive 
conditions.”97 Even so, the CSA warned that unless a digital radio service of some sort was 
launched by 2010, there would likely be no digital future for French radio.98 The expected launch 
did not take place; analog broadcasting in France remains mostly unruffled by the country’s 
digital radio experimentation.99 French regulators have since announced a two to three-year 
“moratorium” on further DAB development, preferring instead to spend more time studying the 
DAB experiences of other countries before formulating a revised plan to implement digital 
broadcasting.100
Given that French engineers played an integral role in the development of the Eureka 147 
system, the country’s level of noninvolvement in its uptake is surprising. The same cannot be 
said for Germany, where DAB has been tried and failed to take root. Regulation of spectrum 
allocation is a state-level function in Germany, not a federal responsibility; as a result, there has 
never been a coordinated plan for a national rollout of DAB service. In 1996, Bavaria became the 
first German state to license a multiplex, containing two channels from public service 
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broadcasters and three from commercial broadcasters.101 However, less than a year after its 
launch, the trade association for commercial German broadcasters announced it was withdrawing 
support for DAB programming. Commercial broadcasters complained about the “harmonizing” 
coverage nature of the DAB multiplex system, the DAB program subsidies given to their public 
broadcast-competitors, and the lack of receivers in the marketplace.102 By 2002, although state 
governments continued to offer multiplex licenses,103 there were few takers.104 German 
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder confidently predicted analog radio could be turned off by 2015, 
but the marketplace penetration of DAB shows no upward momentum at all.105 During the first 
decade of the 21st century, broadcasters tinkered with alternatives to DAB, including DAB+, 
DVB, and other technologies, but the lack of consensus on a digital radio technology and its use 
has consigned these practices to the experimental level.106  
In 2009, German broadcast regulators rejected a call for an additional €42 million in 
funding to continue building out its DAB network, because “substantial elements of the criteria 
agreed previously with broadcasters had not been met and the viability of the projects could not 
be demonstrated.” Analog FM broadcasts would not end until 2020 at the earliest, because it was 
not expected that DAB would account for 90% of all radio listening until that point in time - an 
admittedly optimistic forecast. German commercial broadcasters helped nix the funding request; 
Hans-Deiter Hillmoth, deputy head of the German private broadcasters’ association (VPRT) 
remarked, “Currently there is no viable business model [for DAB].”107 Germany’s two national 
commercial stations have subsequently discontinued DAB programming.108 
German commercial broadcasters further pressed the issue in a January, 2010 report 
declaring analog FM the dominant radio platform for the foreseeable future. It suggested 
regulators recognize that FM broadcasting has the most market penetration and listener coverage, 
is the most spectrally-efficient of all radio broadcast systems, and still has room for technical 
improvement that will not introduce uncertainties and large potential investments for little return 
such as DAB systems require.109 German broadcast regulators would like to “re-launch” digital 
radio in 2011, perhaps using DAB+ or DMB, but will only do so if there is empirical evidence of 
significant interest among radio broadcasters and listeners. Such evidence has yet to be found.110 
Germany’s neighbors have not fared much better. In Switzerland, one commercial 
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broadcaster carried the flame for the implementation of HD Radio. Tests commenced in 2007 
and were declared successful in 2008.111 The following year, four more commercial stations 
began broadcasting in HD,112 but further deployment suddenly screeched to a halt. Markos Ruoss, 
the owner of Swiss station Radio Sunshine, which had facilitated the exploration of HD Radio in 
the country, suddenly ended his association with iBiquity in August of 2010. With him went the 
rest of the handful of broadcasters who had also experimented with HD Radio.113 In the 
meantime, Swiss regulators moved ahead in 2009 with a proposal to launch DAB+ service; five 
of the eight licenses up for grabs expired without any applicants for them.114 
In Austria, Germany's 2009 decision to not invest further in DAB has caused much 
conversation but no firm decisions regarding the country's digital radio future.115 Austrian 
broadcast regulators have subsequently announced that the country’s digital radio transition is on 
indefinite hold, as there is no consensus on which form of DAB technology to adopt. 
Commercial broadcasters in Austria believe the only way that a DAB launch could succeed is 
under some sort of pan-European standard, which is politically infeasible.116 In Poland, plans 
were outlined in 1995 to launch a Warsaw-area multiplex with at least four program channels, 
and the multiplex’s spectral allocation was adjusted in 1997, but no further progress has been 
made.117 
Elsewhere in Europe, the situation of DAB implementation remains haphazard at best. 
After a trial run, the Dutch DAB Foundation ended its experimental broadcasts in 2000 because 
“there is no government policy on licensing DAB frequencies.” Lack of DAB-compatible 
receivers was cited as a significant problem.118 Commercial and public broadcasters have 
halfheartedly tinkered with the technology in the interim, to no perceptible gain. Ten years later, 
the government of the Netherlands adopted a “carrot and stick” approach to rejuvenate the 
proliferation of DAB. According to Goddard, in November of 2010 regulators “offered existing 
national commercial radio stations automatic renewals of their licenses for a further six years 
until 2017, if they agree to broadcast on the DAB platform for the next six years and to cover at 
least 80% of the country. This renewal will avoid the licenses being re-auctioned in 2011, as 
required by existing law.” Dutch commercial broadcasters have not reacted favorably to the plan; 
one noted that their analog station reaches more people online than it does over the network of 
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DAB transmitters it’s been operating for three years. Others cite the high upfront capital 
investment costs in building a DAB network, and complain about the continuing lack of 
receivers in the Dutch marketplace. “Originally, there had been a government plan to turn off 
FM radio broadcasts completely by 2015, but this has been dropped.”119 
Spain has a similar communications regulatory system to Germany, in that the licensing 
of broadcasters falls to state and local governments. This has led to a radio industry with a focus 
on local and regional content.120 Spain formally adopted the Eureka 147 standard in 1997, but it 
has never been a high priority among regulators.121 Instead of setting up a national DAB network, 
Spain has licensed low-power multiplexes to operate at the municipal or regional level: as a 
result, “local radio has never been omitted, but neither has it been given any priority” in the DAB 
space.122 Because localism has been a bedrock of Spanish broadcasting, the harmonizing aspects 
of DAB simply contravened widely-held service priorities for Spanish broadcasters.123 In 2008, 
the WorldDMB Forum assessed the situation in Spain to be “at a standstill, as...radio groups 
remain unsure due to the perceived threat to their [analog] markets.”124 In 2009, Spanish 
regulators declared the DAB system “obsolete” and a “road to nowhere.”125 In Catalonia, the state 
of DAB was characterized as in “a technical coma.” Of 48 DAB licenses issued by the radio 
regulator there, only 23 stations are on the air and “are reported to have no impact on radio 
audiences.126 
In Norway, although state broadcaster NRK has suggested the end of analog broadcasting 
could arrive as soon as 2014, the number of analog receivers sold there still outpaces DAB 
receivers by a factor of eight.127 Between 1998 and 2008, Norwegians purchased a total of eight 
million radios, of which 300-400,000 were DAB receivers.128 In 2009, NRK proposed the 
government conduct a cost analysis of switching off analog FM broadcasts altogether. The idea 
received no political traction.129 In 2010, sales of Internet-streaming radio receivers surpassed the 
sale of DAB receivers. The Norwegian Electronics Industry Association now estimates that there 
are somewhere between 12 and 15 million FM radios in regular use, while only 290,000 DAB 
receivers remain in circulation. The NEIA continues to recommend that consumers purchase 
analog radios over DAB receivers. The idea of a digital/analog switchover is not popular: 78% of 
broadcasters oppose a hard transition deadline, while just 18% seem open to the idea.130 This has 
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not stopped Norway’s Culture Ministry from proposing a plan to implement DMB service and 
terminate analog broadcasting by 2017, but the plan is filled with so many caveats that an actual 
analog-broadcast sunset by that deadline is practically infeasible.131 
Sweden was an early-adopter of Eureka 147 technology, but began turning it off in 2002 
after failing to realize the promised improvements of the protocol.132 In December of 2005, the 
government of Sweden announced it would not invest any more money in its DAB 
infrastructure. Instead, the country explored the notion of piggybacking digital radio service on 
the country's digital television infrastructure (DVB).133 This did not pass muster;134 now the 
country is considering the re-launch of DAB service with the improved DAB+ variant sometime 
in the 2010-2011 timeframe. Although Sweden has had some form of DAB service on the air 
since 1995, it only reaches 35% of the national listening population. Trial service of DAB+ 
began in limited form in 2009; the results of this experiment have yet to be made public.135 
DAB+ receivers are for sale in Sweden, though they cost about $200.136 
In Denmark, regulators are currently debating the next round of funding for public 
broadcasters; a part of this discussion involves the potential of setting an analog/digital radio 
transition deadline. Although a timeframe of 2016-2018 has been bandied about, the idea of any 
hard transition is opposed by a large portion of the country's broadcasters, both private and 
public. Only 1.5 million DAB receivers have been sold in Denmark as of 2010, which accounts 
for just 8% of total radio listening.137 Danish broadcasters interviewed by Ala-Fossi suggested 
analog FM broadcasting would be the dominant form of radio through at least 2015, and the 
most logical mechanism for radio’s digitalization is the Internet.138 
In Finland, public broadcasters were supposed to lead the DAB vanguard, with 
commercial broadcasters to follow. This did not occur: public broadcaster YLE began DAB 
broadcasts in 1998 only to discontinue them three years later, “clearly see[ing] little future in the 
technology.”139 Finland has since focused on the DVB variant of the Eureka system, and hopes to 
provide digital radio as a subsidiary function through this protocol. In 2005, DAB-only 
broadcasts were discontinued in Finland, effectively ending the country’s experimentation with 
digital radio as a stand-alone medium.140   
In the remaining European countries that have experimented with Eureka 147 variants, 
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none have progressed beyond the trial stage. Hungary began testing Eureka 147 transmissions on 
December 1,1995; another multiplex was installed to complete DAB coverage of Budapest in 
1998, but there has been no further significant development. In Slovenia, test DAB broadcasts 
began in 1997, but have not progressed beyond the experimentation stage. In the Czech 
Republic, broadcast regulators would like to test the Eureka 147 system, but there are no strong 
domestic proponents pushing the issue. The state-owned broadcaster in Romania hoped to have 
two DAB transmitters in operation by the end of 1999, but that, too, has only materialized in 
experimental form.141 In Greece, regulators established a DAB multiplex for the 2004 Summer 
Olympics, but have not made any significant move to expand the service since then.142 Malta has 
launched a DAB+ network, but the island nation needs little spectrum and few multiplexes to 
provide national coverage; even here an analog-to-digital radio transition is not a priority.143 
IV. Digital Radio Outside Europe
The same can be said for many non-European adopters of the Eureka 147 technology as 
well. In Israel, the government is now accepting bids from private companies to build out either a 
DAB+ or DMB network, or both. Authorities expect to subsidize the buildout to the tune of 
roughly $6.4 million. There is no timetable on implementation.144 Several countries in South 
America have investigated the Eureka feature set, but only Brazil seems committed to an actual 
buildout.145 The country is also not foreclosing other options: Brazilian regulators have given 
stations the authority to experiment with both HD Radio and Digital Radio Mondiale.146 
As of yet, no single digital radio technology seems to be in a position to take its 
proliferation to the next level. Australia began testing the DAB standard in 1998 as an offshoot 
of its exploration into the country’s DTV transition, but no plan was formally proposed for the 
digitalization of radio until 2005, when Australian regulators committed to the Eureka suite.147 
Within a year they were rewriting their proposal to accommodate the new DAB+ variant, set to 
launch in 2009. To entice incumbent broadcasters into the DAB sphere, a six-year grace period 
was written into law that would disallow new programming entrants into the system.148 Although 
the DAB+ service was launched on time, it is too soon to judge it a success. DAB+ service is 
restricted to Australia's largest cities, and the country is simply too large to put up the number of 
multiplex-repeaters required to cover the entire continent. Therefore, Australian regulators are 
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considering other digital radio technologies, such as Digital Radio Mondiale, to bring digital 
radio to non-urban areas. There is no timeframe on when this may occur. Furthermore, spectrum 
planning for the DAB multiplex system restricts program choice to less than what is currently 
available on analog radio service; O’Neill notes that “the large community radio sector has 
struggled to gain sufficient spectrum, even for some of its city-wide services, and has expressed 
its unhappiness with the provision for community radio.” There is also concern that Australia's 
late start gives DAB+ a disadvantage considering that plenty of other digital audio delivery 
mechanisms now exist which can do what DAB+ does just as well - or even better. “Industry 
interests concede that digital radio may be a long term project, relying on a strategy of 
embedding services with younger audiences on the understanding that a sustainable level of 
adoption may take many more years.”149 
In Asia, South Korea waited for developments in the Eureka suite to shake themselves 
out and have chosen the DMB standard as its digital broadcast future. However, the Korean 
DMB system uses a codec that is incompatible with its European cousin.150“Trial services” of 
Eureka 147 have taken place in China, Singapore, India, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Taiwan, but 
none have yet progressed to a stage of organized proliferation.151 The only country that seems to 
have designed a “successful” digital audio broadcast service is Japan - and it did so by avoiding 
the built-in bias to design a technology around the specific medium of radio. Instead, Japan 
developed the Integrated Services Digital Broadcasting (ISDB) protocol, which provides 
interactive audio, video, image, and text support across a wide range of devices, including radio 
and television receivers, portable media devices, and mobile telephones.152 Ala-Fossi says what 
sets Japan apart from the rest of the industrialized world when it comes to radio’s digitalization is 
that the country pursued network convergence, or the idea of digitizing all broadcast media en 
masse, while regulators elsewhere focused on network digitalization, or the transition of 
broadcasters in a piecemeal fashion.153 In this regard, Japanese regulators appear to have cast the 
phenomenon of convergence itself not as a specter which threatens the distinctiveness of 
previously-separate forms of media, but rather as a means by which to promote innovation 
among media producers by offering them a seamless technological mechanism by which to 
navigate the phenomenon. ISDB does not require different types of broadcasters to invest in their 
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own digital distribution networks, and Japanese broadcasters - unlike their counterparts 
elsewhere - have not appeared to approach the analog/digital transition with a predisposition to 
hold onto their legacy distribution conduits.
Closer to home, Canada and Mexico have both had active yet troubled forays into digital 
radio broadcasting. Between 1994 and 1995, Canada formally endorsed the Eureka 147 system 
and developed a plan to award “conditional” licenses to early adopters of the technology; it also 
required significant commitments from broadcasters regarding the amount of original 
programming required for the new service. This chilled commercial broadcasters’ enthusiasm 
toward the notion of DAB adoption.154 These requirements were quickly diluted, and Canadian 
broadcasters began organized DAB tests in 1995.155 At first, regulators hoped to use a mixture of 
terrestrial and satellite-based transmitters to bring digital radio service to the entire country, but 
the plan ran afoul of the United States, which objected to the use of spectrum that it had reserved 
for military test telemetry purposes (the same reason why Eureka 147 was nixed in the U.S.). 
Canadians were therefore forced to remove the satellite portion of their transmission system, 
which severely compromised its plans to provide digital radio service to its highly dispersed rural 
population.156  
In November of 1995, the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications 
Commission (CRTC) published a draft allotment of DAB spectrum for the country and began the 
process of soliciting British-style licensees for multiplexes. All AM and FM radio broadcasters 
would be granted a “transitional license” without the need for a public hearing - a move designed 
to engender interest in DAB among the Canadian broadcast community. These would be 
replaced “virtually automatic[ally]” with permanent DAB licenses at a later date. Private 
Canadian broadcasters began preparing for the transition, with many expressing the hope of 
transmitting DAB signals sometime within 1996.157 As investment costs in the infrastructure 
became better understood, however, broadcaster interest in the technology cooled. The Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation suffered a 10% decline in revenue in 1996, yet remained DAB’s 
primary proponent. Others began to openly question whether the promises of increased audio 
fidelity would be enough to sell the technology to a disinterested public.158 
Meanwhile, Canadian regulators moved forward with a plan to license multiplexes 
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around the country and experimented with new multiplex configurations in a drive to lower the 
cost of national network buildout.159 DAB receivers were expected to hit the Canadian market in 
“mid to late 1997.”160 Between the end of 1996 and 1997, the CBC and many commercial 
broadcasters announced the launch of DAB multiplexes in Canada’s largest metropolitan areas; 
the CBC hoped to have 75% of its existing analog radio audience covered by DAB transmissions 
by 2002.161 As coverage pitfalls in the Canadian national DAB network were identified, the 
system was tweaked and by 2002 broadcasters seemed confident enough in the technology  to 
tentatively invest in DAB-only programming.162 Auto manufacturers, which had been watching 
the development of DAB technology closely, appeared to give the platform a boost when 
General Motors of Canada announced in 2002 that it would factory-install DAB receivers in its 
cars.163 Receiver price-points were trending down toward the CN$100 mark. By 2002, there were 
57 stations broadcasting in DAB, reaching 35% of the Canadian population.164 
However, receivers were nowhere to be found: although the average cost of a Canadian 
DAB receiver was US$75 by 2004, they were not yet widely available.165 General Motors of 
Canada, citing “difficulties...over supply of equipment,” subsequently rescinded its commitment 
to include DAB receivers as standard options in their vehicles. Initial listener reaction to DAB 
was underwhelming; complaints circulated that the fidelity was not as good as advertised, and 
digital signals were not as robust as their analog counterparts. Many of the promised DAB-
exclusive program services never materialized from commercial broadcasters, who simply used 
the technology to simulcast their analog signals.166 
By 2005, commercial broadcasters openly decried the lack of a viable business model for 
DAB.167 In 2006, the Canadian Association of Broadcasters argued that it was “simply not 
realistic to assume that a successful digital transition will be no more than the replacement of the 
existing business with minor additions and adjustments. Nor does digital transition necessarily 
mean the destruction of the old business and the creation of a new one.”168 However, back in 
1995 - when the initial regulatory decision to adopt DAB was made - the impetus was to replace 
analog radio with a digital platform, and no adaptations were made for the introduction of new 
technologies, such as Internet-based audio distribution, which eventually outpaced the perceived 
advantages of DAB in Canada.169 By 2006, 62 of the 73 licensed DAB multiplexes in Canada 
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were on the air, reaching a potential audience of just 11 million listeners. Receivers were still 
difficult to find; official radio audience measurement services don’t even bother to quantify DAB 
listenership anymore.170 
In 2006 the Canadian government ordered a complete reassessment of its digital radio 
transition plan and opened up the field to Eureka alternatives.171 This resulted in a brief Canadian 
affair with HD Radio. After first being “unimpressed” by initial demonstrations of the 
technology in 1995,172 Canadian broadcasters, led by the largest commercial conglomerate, Corus 
Radio, urged regulators to allow HD experimentation in 2006.173 This was authorized in 2007, 
and for a year the technology was tested by both public and commercial broadcasters.174 A report 
tendered by CBC/Radio Canada concluded that they would “make no further investments in [HD 
Radio] until the interest of other Canadian broadcasters is gauged and while it monitors the 
rollout of data services and applications in the United States.”175 The interest of other Canadian 
broadcasters never firmly materialized; by 2009, more station owners were concerned about HD-
related interference from U.S. stations than they were about adopting the technology 
themselves.176 
Canada’s digital radio transition received a double-whammy in 2010. Declaring DAB to 
be “in limbo” and “in peril,” the CBC shuttered four DAB channels in Montreal in June. This 
was interpreted as part of an industrywide move away from the Eureka 147 platform.177 That 
same month, the Canadian Association of Broadcasters disbanded.178 Suddenly, there was no 
coherent broadcaster constituency left to advance the cause of digital radio in Canada. Regulators 
have since proposed reallocating DAB spectrum for fixed and mobile wireless devices; 
ultimately they would like to see broadcasters develop a digital platform that complements 
existing analog broadcasting services, but the broadcast community is wholly unprepared to 
assume such a task.179 
In summary, the Canadian experience can be described as one that, “[d]espite extensive 
regulatory intervention to protect Canadian interests, the pace of technological change and the 
dominant influence of U.S. interests have made the transitional path to digital radio even more 
uncertain than it was 10 years ago.”180 O’Neill says the Canadian sojourn through digital radio 
technologies “underscores the weakness of a laissez-faire or market-driven approach” to a digital 
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radio transition.181 Today, Canadian broadcasters, like their counterparts around the world, still 
believe that analog broadcasting will rule the roost in the short term, but radio’s digital future 
will be multiplatform, and that the Internet will play an increasingly important role in the 
medium.182 
Mexico is following somewhat in the footsteps of the United States, in that it is exploring 
HD Radio as the primary mechanism by which to facilitate a digital radio transition, but the 
technology lacks intra-industry consensus on its viability. In 1995, as Mexican regulators 
debated the merits of existing digital radio technologies, the radio industry was torn between 
Eureka 147 and HD Radio. Initially, Mexican regulators made moves to allocate spectrum for the 
promulgation of a Eureka-based DAB system.183 However, neither Eureka 147 nor HD Radio 
moved out of the testing stage until 2004 - the same year that the FCC promulgated detailed rules 
on the domestic use of the HD Radio protocol. Radio World reported that “a group of engineers 
from the Mexican equivalent of the NAB” hoped to recommend a digital radio system to 
regulators by 2005.184 In 2007, after the FCC’s promulgation of an HD Radio “standard,” 
Mexican regulators allowed stations within 200 miles of the U.S. border to commence 
broadcasting in HD; many of these stations are targeted toward U.S. audiences.185 
Mexican regulator Cofitel subsequently received reports of HD-related interference to 
Mexican analog stations; in 2008, it wrote to FCC Chairman Kevin Martin urging the agency to 
certify HD Radio as in compliance with all international broadcasting treaties, citing the 
interference reports it had accumulated.186 Although the FCC promised to respond to the 
concerns, Mexican authorities expected any resolution of the issue would take “the next couple 
of years.”187 In 2009, the Mexican government announced a plan to wean all AM broadcasters off 
analog spectrum voluntarily; no timetable was given, nor was a technology selected to facilitate 
this transition.188 The following year, Radio World reported that Mexican regulators were set to 
select HD Radio as the country’s national digital radio standard. At the time, 10 Mexican FM 
stations and 11 AM stations were broadcasting in HD, all within the 200-mile buffer zone with 
the United States. It was estimated that it would cost the Mexican broadcast industry somewhere 
between $280-$840 million in capital expenditures to adopt HD Radio.189 Significant uptake of 
HD broadcasting by Mexican stations has not occurred.
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HD Radio itself has no real global presence. Although iBiquity and the trade press claim 
that HD Radio has been tested or gained “significant interest” in dozens of countries, all of them 
have either frozen their experimentations or selected a different digital audio broadcast standard 
instead.190 Only the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Panama, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico have 
formally adopted HD Radio as their digital broadcast technology of choice.191 None of these 
countries have the sort of market mass necessary to strengthen HD Radio’s position among 
global DAB competitors.
V. Net Effect of Digital Radio Mondiale
Even the latest entrant in the digital radio race, Digital Radio Mondiale (DRM), may end 
up as little more than the newest also-ran. In March of 1998, members of research institutes, 
equipment manufacturers, and broadcasters from more than 30 countries met in China under the 
banner of the Digital Radio Mondiale Consortium to discuss developing a new digital radio 
standard specifically for the AM and shortwave bands. Unlike HD Radio, DRM would be all-
digital from the start, replacing analog signals at the outset of its implementation; it would also 
be based on open source technologies, eliminating any proprietary impediments to innovation 
and proliferation.192 By 2001, a mobile DRM receiver was demonstrated at Germany’s largest 
consumer electronics show; in 2002, the International Telecommunications Union endorsed 
DRM for use on the AM and shortwave bands, and the DRM Consortium expected the mass 
production of DRM receivers to begin shortly afterward.193 
In 2003, The BBC, Voice of America, Deutsche Welle, DeutschlandRadio, Radio 
Netherlands, Radio Canada International, and Swedish Radio all began shortwave broadcasts in 
DRM, targeting all continents on the planet except Antarctica.194 Two major U.S. transmitter-
manufacturers, Harris and Nautel, both committed to building DRM-compatible transmitters in 
short order.195 Regulators in many countries saw DRM as a “drop-in replacement for 
existing...allocations,” and therefore a potential technology by which to jump-start stalled or 
stuttering digital radio conversion efforts.196 In 2003-04, the DRM Consortium and WorldDAB 
Forum announced a joint promotional agreement between their technologies, and all existing 
patents on the DRM technology were pooled to promote further innovation within the DRM 
space.197 Between 2005 and 2008, more than 50 AM and shortwave broadcasters around the 
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world adopted DRM technology, producing more than 350 program-hours per day in DRM 
mode, and several countries began test programs to evaluate the possibilities of widespread DRM 
deployment.198 H. Donald Messer, director of the Spectrum Management Division of the U.S. 
International Broadcasting Bureau, resigned his post in 2005 to work full-time with the DRM 
Consortium.199 That same year, the Consortium also announced plans to develop an FM variant 
of its technology (DRM+), thus positioning DRM as the only digital radio broadcast protocol 
that could digitize the entire gamut of existing analog broadcast stations in place.200 The DRM+ 
standard was certified for global deployment in 2007.201 
However, like the two digital radio technologies that preceded it, DRM suffers from a 
lack of qualitative improvements and strong commitments from regulators, broadcasters, and 
receiver manufacturers. While DRM offers a perceptible increase in audio fidelity over analog, 
and allows multicasting on every band, the disruptive nature of entirely replacing incumbent 
analog signals with digital ones is a risk no broadcaster or state seems willing to take.202 Sony 
Corp., a member of the DRM Consortium, has declined to actually manufacture DRM-
compatible receivers, and no company seems poised to break the technology into the vehicular 
market. As of 2006, only 1.3 million DRM radios had been sold.203 About the only broadcasters 
demonstrating any realistic uptake are those in the shortwave band, where DRM is the only 
digital broadcast option they have. U.S. shortwave stations are organizing to petition the 
government to end the prohibition of broadcasting to domestic audiences so U.S. listeners might 
more fully enjoy the benefits of DRM on shortwave.204 Should DRM come to dominate 
shortwave broadcasting, that mode alone does not have enough broadcaster or listener mass to 
change the confused trajectory regarding the digitalization of the rest of analog broadcasting 
worldwide.
Although multiple digital radio technologies are now in deployment to some degree 
around the world, none of them have achieved a level of penetration that challenges the 
incumbency of analog broadcasting, much less be taken seriously as viable replacements to 
analog radio itself. In fact, even in those countries where digital radio transition plans have 
advanced the most, both broadcasters and regulators now admit that any terrestrial digital 
broadcast system will ultimately be complementary to analog radio. Despite the fact that all 
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digital audio broadcast systems seem to resist the phenomenon of convergence, in that they all 
attempt to maintain a unique distribution network for radio broadcasting alone, the belief that 
radio must eventually go digital refuses to die. The real question now, on a global level, is not 
whether this will take place, but in what form it will occur. It is clear that simply converting 
broadcast radio signals from analog transmissions into radiated bitstreams will not be sufficient 
to provide the medium with a viable path into a convergent media environment. In fact, it seems 
increasingly likely that, in the future, radio will be delivered via multiple digital platforms that 
look nothing like the analog distribution infrastructure of the 20th century. 
One can cite regulatory missteps and false starts, economic shifts in the balance of power 
between various constituencies in national radio industries, and the recalcitrance of radio makers 
and listeners to actually invest in digital broadcasting for the lack of a successful digital radio 
transition anywhere. Irrespective of the blame game, if the apparent stagnation of terrestrial 
radio’s digital conversion is a global and technologically agnostic phenomenon, perhaps this says 
something about the inherent necessity of digitizing radio, and, with the development of non-
broadcast digital audio distribution technologies, invites significant confusion over the future 
identity of “radio” as we know it today. These implications, as yet, have been left almost wholly 
unexplored: they were ignored in the early stages of thinking about digital radio broadcasting, 
and remain unresolved in the surviving iterations of technologies still trying to take root.
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Chapter 8: Confronting Radio’s Digital Dilemma
Radio’s digital dilemma is quite real. The circumstances that led to this dilemma are now 
clear. What remains to be seen is whether the policy trajectory of the medium’s digitalization is 
amenable to proactive modification, and whether broadcasters themselves have the wherewithal 
to adapt to a convergent media environment irrespective of the technology they ultimately use. 
Initial attempts have not been successful, thanks to the disruptive implications of digitizing radio 
signals and the lack of regulatory engagement with the consequences of such action. Simply 
becoming “bit radiators” does not address shifting expectations among the listening public about 
what “radio” in a digital environment can offer. So long as broadcasters and regulators continue 
to address the phenomenon of convergence in such a single-dimensional, neoliberal fashion, this 
dilemma will only become more complicated and challenging. 
I. Neoliberalism Complicates the Digital Radio Transition
When ideology trumps science, seemingly rational actors can make arguments and 
decisions with a degree of ignorance that is painful to behold. Fundamentally, the broadcast 
industry’s narcissistic oblivion regarding the speed of convergence, and an FCC which was 
enamored with the word but had no clear interpretation of its meaning, led to the deployment of a 
technology unsuited for the successful digitalization of radio. However, given the amount of 
investment made in HD Radio, it is not likely to be abandoned anytime soon. This will have 
consequences, one of which is the opening of legitimate debate regarding the future of terrestrial 
broadcasting from perspectives beyond those historically defined. This could have constructive 
implications - provided that the grip of neoliberalism on media policy can be weakened.
 Among the broadcast incumbency, the critical interventions of public broadcasters in the 
development of HD Radio cannot be overstated. As an afterthought to the Public Broadcasting 
Act of 1967, National Public Radio has always occupied a secondary position of power within 
the political economy of the U.S. media environment. However, HD Radio represents the first 
time public broadcasters have promoted their future in such close consort with the commercial 
“competitors” to which they are supposed to be alternatives. Initially reticent about the 
technology, public broadcasters ceded the future of radio to the wishes of their commercial 
brethren, if only to preserve future agency in the process of the digital transition. This decision 
marked an important consensus between the policy actors whose ideas the FCC valued most 
342
when considering radio’s digitalization; this consensus legitimized the adoption of HD Radio in 
the mind of regulators. National Public Radio not only developed important features of HD 
Radio (such as multicasting and conditional access, directly subsidizing a proprietary 
innovation), but produced important technical data for FCC consumption that provided a patina 
of legitimacy to the technology that otherwise would not have existed. This complicity is 
important because it demonstrates the complete alignment of dominant broadcast incumbents 
under a paradigm not just favored but created by the commercial. Although seemingly more 
astute than commercial broadcasters about the implications of convergence, NPR also did not 
recognize the inherent insufficiency of simply digitizing terrestrial radio’s existing broadcast 
platform. 
The sheer volume of critical public comment registered both on- and offstage - especially 
among knowledgeable industry participants and committed radio listeners - represents an 
indictment of HD Radio as a worthwhile DAB technology and illustrates the captured nature of 
the FCC on fundamental questions of spectrum allocation, access to the airwaves or any 
meaningful homage to the public interest. As J.H. Snider noted in Chapter 5, the sheer political 
beauty of the HD Radio policymaking process was to force constitutive choices about the 
technology concurrent with FCC deliberation on the creation of a new Low Power FM (LPFM) 
radio service. While those who would later sow the seeds of the modern media reform movement 
advocated for crumbs of analog spectrum under highly restrictive conditions, incumbent 
broadcasters were constructing a digital future for radio that would, at best, marginalize these 
new stations and, at worst, silence them. 
The failure to engage in the early debates over digital radio’s development was a tragic 
mistake on the part of modern broadcast reformers. The data (or lack thereof) regarding HD 
Radio’s technical viability should have been red flags to any public interest advocate thinking 
about the future of the medium; this condition was the impetus for the research which led to this 
dissertation. Had an informed and engaged public been organized around the issue of digital 
radio when its key regulatory principles were being constructed, it - combined with the open 
hesitance of independent broadcasters (who, even now, represent the majority of radio licensees) 
- might have provided an opportunity for coalition-building that could have forced a more 
comprehensive and honest consideration of digital radio itself. In hindsight, LPFM turned out to 
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be an inopportune distraction that diverted the potential for organized opposition to the 
fundamental re-provisioning of spectrum that HD Radio represents. 
By the time any form of organized opposition to this principle appeared , the operative 
metaphors that digital radio was meant to address, as proffered by conglomerates and public 
broadcasters, were too ingrained in the regulatory paradigm to challenge effectively. It is 
somewhat remarkable that the lack of bona fide consensus around the viability of HD Radio was 
clear in the trade press long before the implementation of digital broadcasting began, and went 
unrecognized for what it portended regarding the sordid outcomes of digital radio policymaking. 
In fact, the offstage environment became more aligned with the perspectives of HD Radio’s 
critics as its regulation developed. However, this process, like the arousal of an organized public 
interest constituency to resist HD Radio, began too late and moved too slowly. The record 
illustrates missed opportunities for changing the developmental trajectory of digital radio 
broadcasting, but does not provide much clarity on identifying new opportunities to proactively 
influence HD Radio’s future evolution. 
It seems increasingly likely that the success or failure of digital radio’s adoption lies in 
the hands of consumer electronics manufacturers. They were from the outset opposed to the 
technology’s development and proliferation, but the political and economic power of the 
broadcast industry among regulators during the formative years of policymaking wholly 
outclassed them. As the development of HD Radio continued, consumer electronics 
manufacturers adopted a public position of cautious optimism about the technology while 
effectively ignoring it in the real world. Not only have they declined to partake in substantial 
research and development tasks, forcing broadcast-proprietors to shoulder that burden alone, 
they have refused to invest in the manufacture and marketing of digital radio receivers. The 
actual performance of the technology in the real world does not provide incentives for consumer 
electronics manufacturers to include HD compatibility in their products. Lacking their active 
support, a primary ingredient necessary for the technology’s successful proliferation has never 
materialized. Now that other variants of “radio” exist, and their methods of delivery are 
beginning to approach levels competitive with terrestrial broadcasting, this further marginalizes 
HD Radio’s position, especially when consumer electronics manufacturers embrace these new 
digital radio technologies while shirking HD compatibility. 
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Taking the dashboard as an example, what was once a listening space traditionally 
dominated by terrestrial radio broadcasting is now up for grabs. Satellite radio subsidized its 
position in the car: it gave auto manufacturers a cut from listener subscription fees up front in 
order to entice them to add satellite reception capability to vehicles. This made the sale of each 
vehicle more profitable for its manufacturer. Although satellite radio continues to be a marginal 
player in the contestation of radio’s digital identity, the expansion of program choice it provided 
engendered competition for listening in the car. Today, anticipating market trends in wireless 
broadband access, vehicle manufacturers are creating entertainment centers which allow drivers 
to link other digital media devices into them. Current iterations of this technology, which tether 
smartphones to the dashboard or, in some vehicles, provide direct mobile wireless broadband 
access, adds webcasting to the radio menu, further fragmenting listenership. It is clear that 
vehicle manufacturers are making these investments on the assumption that “radio” is no longer 
limited to the AM or FM broadcast bands. Radio itself is but one of several types of media that 
can be accessed in the car, and multiple forms of radio are now available. Without the active 
support of consumer electronics manufacturers, terrestrial digital radio broadcasting will 
languish. Satellite-like subsidies to encourage its adoption are out of the question: its proponents 
can’t afford them. 
iBiquity Digital Corporation, the product of a “grand alliance” of HD Radio’s proprietors, 
was founded to consolidate the core development of HD Radio and provide a sense of market-
consensus around the protocol which would convince regulators to sanction its proliferation. By 
the time iBiquity was founded, HD Radio’s technical framework was more than a decade old and 
showed its age. The failure of HD Radio’s business models has left iBiquity without an 
independent and sustaining source of revenue.1 The digital conversion rate of stations is 
pathetically slow; receiver manufacturers are opting out of a technology which has no discernible 
value-added benefit for their products; and innovation within the HD Radio space is hampered 
greatly by its proprietary constraints. Wobbling along on infusions of radically devalued radio 
company stock and venture capital cannot continue indefinitely. However, as the product of the 
most powerful broadcast incumbents, iBiquity has no recourse except to struggle on with making 
“improvements” to its inherently flawed technology. The best broadcast-investors can seem to 
manage in terms of tangible support for HD Radio is the devotion of unused advertising minutes 
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to a promotional campaign; this does not pay any bills, much less recoup investments made in 
the technology or spur innovative practices with it.
The potential failure of HD Radio in the marketplace highlights the destructively 
overarching influence of neoliberalism on media policy and exposes the limitations the ideology 
places on innovation involving new media technologies. Ironically, it may just be the best thing 
to happen to radio in a long time. The collapse of HD Radio would force a radical rethinking of 
radio’s place within a convergent media environment. But so long as a perception that HD Radio 
might still succeed exists, policy options outside the incumbent-controlled paradigm will not 
gain currency unless two outcomes regarding the technology’s adoptive failure are met. 
The first is the abandonment of an all-digital broadcast conversion. At present, there is no 
willingness on the part of any constituency to advocate a hard analog/digital transition deadline 
for radio as there was with digital television.2 Proponents of HD Radio promised they could 
navigate a digital transition in stages. The first stage, hybrid analog/digital broadcasting, has 
stalled; yet an all-digital form of HD Radio is the technology’s logically assumed end-state. 
iBiquity has not produced any substantive data on the actual functionality of its all-digital mode 
and there is little demand among the broadcast industry or the FCC to advance its development. 
Given the amount of investment HD Radio has attracted from broadcasters, there is little chance 
that any proponent will countenance its renunciation. However, this period of hybrid uncertainty 
cannot last forever, especially when the speed of convergence and the decline in terrestrial radio 
listenership that it has encouraged are taken into account.
There will come a time when HD Radio’s proponents must make a concerted effort at all-
digital broadcast adoption, regardless of whether or not the technology is ripe. This would most 
likely involve an FCC mandate invoking a deadline for an analog/digital radio transition. The 
experience of DTV does not suggest that this process will be timely or orderly, and the FCC has 
so far avoided important questions about HD Radio’s proprietary nature by making its uptake 
purely voluntary. Those broadcasters who believe they can risk their legacy analog audience by 
going all-digital may try, but HD Radio’s near-invisibility among the general public makes this 
an unlikely proposition. Therefore, if the all-digital mode of HD Radio is never realized, the 
likelihood of its eventual demise increases, at which time the policy and practical objectives of 
digital radio could be reassessed. 
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Secondly, broadcasters may attempt to coerce consumer electronics manufacturers to 
include HD reception capability in their growing portfolio of digital media devices. A forced 
imposition is not likely to succeed. Broadcasters want electronics manufacturers to include 
extraneous technology which is not only proprietary, but increases the complexity of product 
design and manufacture to such a degree that device-makers have no logical pecuniary 
motivation to bother. In contrast, the Internet Protocol (IP)-based streaming element of new radio 
services provides functionality within existing digital media infrastructures for which many 
products are already designed. Consumer electronics manufacturers passively influence the 
uptake of “alternatives” to terrestrial radio broadcasting by ostracizing HD Radio functionality. 
To require all devices capable of receiving “radio” to be HD-compatible would almost certainly 
take an act of Congress. From a neoliberal perspective, the current dearth of stand-alone HD 
receiver adoption mitigates against such action: the marketplace has already spoken. Regardless, 
the NAB’s latest attempt to enlist the support of the music industry in an interoperability 
campaign under the guise of performance royalty negotiations demonstrates that the radio 
industry has not given up on the idea of imposing incumbent broadcast reception capability on 
new digital media devices. The consumer electronics industry, whose political clout is on the rise 
relative to broadcasters and record companies, has and will continue to resist any receiver 
mandate attempt vigorously.
If the adoption of the all-digital mode of HD Radio never comes to pass, and devices 
designed to receive it remain scarce, only then might consideration of radical options to change 
the domestic digital radio trajectory become possible. Such consideration will have significant 
consequences for the medium of radio as we’ve traditionally understood it. Additionally, there 
are industry forces at work that seek to repurpose radio spectrum for other uses, and regulators 
have a new hunger for spectrum by which to promote the wireless provision of broadband 
Internet access. 
Broadcasters have already employed their channel allocations for digital, non-broadcast 
purposes. SiriusXM provides a Federal Aviation Administration-approved service that transmits 
real-time weather information for use by pilots. In 2002, Clear Channel experimented with 
providing Internet access via DTV. Subscribers installed a special receiver card into their PC; 
downstream data was delivered on the sideband of Clear Channel-owned DTV stations at speeds 
347
of up to 768 kbps. Disney launched the Moviebeam service in 2006, leasing portions of local 
DTV channels to transmit movies-on-demand to subscribers. A similar network called iBlast, 
founded by a league of broadcast and publishing companies, feeds movies, music, games, and 
software via DTV sidebands. News Corporation has launched U.S. Digital Television: this 
venture uses DTV spectrum to broadcast 12 encrypted basic cable channels to subscribers for 
$20 per month, designed to undercut the bottom end of cable TV’s subscriber base.3 None of 
these experiments have achieved any real traction, given that existing broadband Internet access 
platforms and on-demand cable television already provide such services more efficiently than a 
DTV conduit can. 
In the context of radio, the problem is that a single AM or FM channel, even fully 
digitized, does not contain enough bandwidth capacity to provide broadband-standard services. 
However, given the consolidated state of the industry, especially in major markets, cumulatively 
organizing radio bandwidth is theoretically possible - with the use of a technology other than HD 
Radio, which is designed to work within the context of individual radio stations. Bandwidth 
aggregation would radically change the identity of radio in its own right. The fact that economic 
incentives exist for incumbent broadcasters to reemploy their spectrum for purposes other than 
broadcasting must be seriously considered as a potential market-driven outcome of radio’s 
digitalization. 
A more realistic evolution in the policy of digital radio broadcasting may be found in the 
government’s desire for the increased development of broadband access. In 2010, the FCC 
released a National Broadband Plan, which called for the reclamation and repurposement of 
several hundred megahertz of spectrum for wireless broadband provision.4 The agency is looking 
far and wide for such spectrum, including among incumbent users of the airwaves. In November, 
the FCC promulgated a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking seeking to reclaim some 120 MHz of 
DTV spectrum for the provision of wireless broadband.5 Considering that a single DTV channel 
covers approximately 6 MHz, the FCC seeks to repurpose 20 DTV channels’ worth of spectrum 
for wireless broadband access. Broadcasters have vowed to resist this effort, claiming a property 
right to the airwaves which is rooted in neoliberal ideology - an ironic assertion considering that 
the $60 billion spectrum-subsidy which made DTV possible has already allowed broadcasters to 
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experimentally repurpose the spectrum on their own. This will complicate regulators’ efforts to 
fundamentally change the use of broadcast spectrum through new rules of allocation.
AM radio spectrum is not a good candidate for such repurposement, given the paucity of 
bandwidth occupied by the entire band and the propagation characteristics of AM signals. In 
addition, as noted in Chapter 6, AM broadcasters are using the back door of FM translator 
stations to simulcast their signals in an environment where HD Radio has some recognizable 
functionality. This suggests a shift toward FM as the singular terrestrial digital radio platform of 
the future. The FM dial occupies a cumulative 20 Mhz of spectrum, and its properties are ideal 
for wireless broadband provision. The line-of-sight and building-penetration capabilities of FM 
radio signals are similar to those found in the VHF band of television.6 Should HD Radio fail to 
guarantee the broadcast industry its digital spectrum subsidy, the FCC might very well open the 
door to refarming FM spectrum as part of its campaign to develop a national wireless broadband 
infrastructure. 
Although the political and economic power of the radio industry mitigates against this 
possibility in the short term, if radio revenue and listenership continues to decline the medium 
could conceivably reach the point of popular obsolescence more quickly than traditional 
television broadcasting. Regulators are unlikely to fundamentally shift their perspective on a 
medium’s future viability until it has tried and failed to digitize, and the failure of HD Radio is 
incipient. An increasing willingness on the part of regulators to repurpose broadcast spectrum 
would almost certainly mark the end of radio’s distinctiveness as identified by the historic 
possession of a spectrum subsidy. Incumbency, argues Stuart Benjamin, is “[o]ne of the major 
impediments to spectrum liberalization,” and broadcasting may not be the “highest valued use of 
the spectrum” anymore. Barring wholesale repurposement, Benjamin believes that regulators 
should allow incumbent spectrum occupants increased flexibility over its use.7 However, simply 
providing incumbents with flexibility to use the spectrum as they see fit - as we have seen in the 
case of both DTV and DAB - does not guarantee communicative innovation.
If broadcast radio spectrum is repurposed for the provision of broadband, either through 
internal or external forces, that will denote a radical reinterpretation of radio as we’ve known it. 
Although spectrum reappropriation is the most unlikely outcome of digital radio policymaking 
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considered here, it may be the one most worthy of further exploration. In the words of Michael 
McCauley, it is the duty of media scholars engaged in policy studies to not let “vested 
interests...define their questions or their area of inquiry or in such a way as to see ‘realistic’ 
policy proposals as those which will be acceptable to the vested interests in the short term and 
without a struggle. It is always dangerous in such an undertaking to try to guess what will be 
acceptable and it can act as a distraction from the very real difficulties of working out and then 
fighting for what you believe to be true.”8 With convergence in play, perhaps untethering 
“broadcasting” from “radio” is the best possible outcome for the medium in the long term.
II. Implications for the Future of Broadcasting and Communications Policy
Examining the dramaturgy of digital radio policy helps to explain how and why the 
navigation of convergence will be arduous for the medium’s incumbents. It draws attention to 
the metaphors each actor uses in the policymaking process, provides a mechanism by which 
those metaphors can be interrogated for substance, and allows the critical examination of policy 
outcomes in the context of the rationales that drove them. Although the digitalization of radio 
was cast by its proponents as a purely technical exercise, the dramaturgy of radio policy shows 
that the science behind DAB was not a primary motivator for this activity. The promised 
“improvements” digitalization would bring to the medium were steeped more in rhetoric than 
demonstrable fact. When conflicts arise between the operative metaphors of contemporary digital 
radio policies and their practical application, it begs the question whether such regulation is 
actually constructive, or even rational. 
The fact that communications policy is firmly grounded in the precepts of neoliberalism 
has not helped matters. Regulatory dysfunction involving radio’s digital transition was 
precipitated by broadcast incumbents who attempted to navigate the phenomenon under 
conditions they could wholly manipulate. These conditions were defined almost exclusively in 
economic terms and favored increasing private control over the airwaves above all other possible 
outcomes, even in countries where state-run public service broadcasters initially dominated the 
medium. Contextualizing the development of digital radio within a neoliberal paradigm allowed 
its proponents and regulators to ignore or downplay the inherently disruptive nature of 
convergence and mitigated against the adaptation and innovation necessary of incumbents to find 
purchase in an increasingly digital media world. Not only were the technologies of DAB 
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designed without taking the collaborative and extensible aspects of convergence in mind, but as 
DAB service was deployed its lack of ability to adequately address these aspects confused and 
sullied several important constituencies on the viability of digital broadcasting. 
The Federal Communications Commission has been remarkably aloof regarding the 
development and promulgation of digital radio. The signs of the agency’s capture by neoliberal 
principles are clear: the decision to adopt HD Radio was made with no independent analysis, a 
willful disregard of direct and meaningful public input, and with the use of economic metrics 
above all else to justify the industry’s chosen technology. Over the years, the FCC has shed its 
ability to make empirically-sound judgments; this comes at a time when these skills, given the 
pace of emergent digital media development, are more necessary then ever. Perhaps the FCC 
sees such innovation as “a threat to its standard definitions and procedures.”9 If true, then the 
dilemma of digital radio policy in the United States has significance beyond technological 
ignorance or the simple favoritism of one constituency over another; it opens up for contestation 
the core ideology of the policymaking process and its outcomes. 
Dallas Smythe’s concern that “market forces” would come to dominate the “allocation of 
the spectrum as a whole” is now the operative rationale of communications policymakers in the 
21st century; the story of digital radio just happens to be the most stark example of this 
regulatory paradigm in action.10 That the digital transition itself is stalled does not seem to 
concern regulators so long as historical precedents involving the promulgation of a neoliberal 
policy agenda are honored. A spectrum-subsidy remains at the core of the broadcast business 
model, and HD Radio provides two benefits to incumbents for the price of one: it increases the 
private control of available radio spectrum and provides them with the power to govern the 
functionality of all stations which operate in the digital domain. The FCC, as a captured 
regulator, placed its faith in the “free market” to successfully move radio broadcasting from an 
analog to digital environment; not only have market forces failed to engender a constructive 
digital transition, but in abdicating their responsibilities during the formative years of digital 
radio development regulators have deprived themselves of the ability to take decisive remedial 
action.  
The fact that HD Radio is utterly proprietary - the creation of investments made by the 
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nation’s largest broadcasters - clearly demonstrates who is in control of terrestrial radio’s digital 
future. The policy and promulgation of HD Radio is a legacy with strong roots in the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, which firmly cemented the primacy of neoliberalism in the 
regulation of digital communications. Were it not for the frenetic consolidation of radio station 
ownership during the critical years of HD Radio’s development, the technology just might have 
withered and died on the vine had the FCC took the time and effort to seriously consider its 
fundamental detriments. Instead, the economic heavyweights of the radio industry embraced the 
“digital equals better” myth and framed the adoption of digital broadcasting as necessary to 
“compete” with vaguely defined competitors that threatened their legacy business model. 
Considering that the constitutive choices about HD Radio were made before convergence 
was clearly identified, it is no surprise that digital radio actually complicates navigation of the 
phenomenon for incumbent broadcasters. Since the policy process to justify radio’s digitalization 
did not require any substantial rationales beyond those offered by its proponents, policy was 
made with casual heedlessness about what real-world effects digitalization would have on the 
medium itself. The technocratic nature which underlies the neoliberal paradigm was actually 
undermined by the chosen digital broadcast technology. The result was the adoption of a DAB 
technology with little justification beyond a chimerical economic potential. Viewed in its 
entirety, this potential of HD Radio is far outweighed by its detrimental effects on the maximally 
efficient use of the public airwaves - which ironically may have deleterious economic effects on 
the radio industry over the long term.
By the time HD Radio wended its way through an FCC overwhelmed by its other duties 
as executor of the Telecommunications Act, the agency effectively abdicated the future of radio 
regulation to the most economically powerful coalition of broadcasters. Contemporary digital 
radio policy represents the triumph of neoliberalism in the history of broadcast regulation, and 
that has cursed broadcasters to deploy a technology resistant to convergence. This explains why 
analog broadcasting remains the primary site of terrestrial radio’s practical value in the eyes of 
the majority of broadcasters and listeners. Convergence is very real in the sense that consensus is 
developing around the use of IP-based communication as a “universal language” by which 
digital media will be distributed. The Internet shows us a glimpse of what a future, convergent-
in-the-real-sense digital media infrastructure may look like.11 At the same time, the Internet itself 
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is a network of networks whose practical makeup is more an amalgam than a unified entity. Its 
regulation also remains in an uncomfortable state of flux, and there are many signs that 
neoliberal influences on Internet policy may serve to disrupt its communicative potential. At 
present, the Internet is “transparent” only in the sense that the language of content distribution is 
universal, allowing access to digital media over a plethora of devices that speak the language of 
the Internet Protocol. The fact that radio is now heard on-air and online, via wired and wireless 
conduits, diminishes the perceived necessity of the medium’s incumbent transmission 
infrastructure. Attempts so far to develop a technological bridge between this infrastructure and 
the convergent media environment are simply not working.12 Ultimately, this calls into question 
the identity of radio as it has been historically defined.
In 1999, U.K. broadcasters firmly believed that, without digitalization, analog radio 
would become obsolete within 10 years. That deadline has passed, and more than a decade of 
digital broadcast operation seems to suggest that, for the foreseeable future, digital radio will 
play a supplementary role to its analog counterpart.13 This clearly contravenes the “digital equals 
better” myth. Structural changes in the ownership, operation and regulation of radio broadcast 
systems took their own toll on the medium’s inherent utility prior to its attempted digitalization. 
Thus when existing DAB systems are compared to the analog state of affairs it is no surprise that 
consumer electronics manufacturers and the public see little value in digitizing the status quo. 
From the perspective of incumbent broadcasters, digitizing the status quo was a rational 
opening move in addressing convergence. It protects the elementary value of their investments - 
in this case, the occupation of valuable spectrum. Although HD Radio is now openly criticized as 
“a business and allocation plan in search of technology”14 and “a tactical move, a short-term 
corporate survival kit and, perhaps, an obstacle to further development of radio as a digital 
medium,”15 its primary benefit to incumbent broadcasters is the gift of new spectrum on which to 
deploy a digital signal. The fact that the applications designed to “enhance” the radio experience 
- datacasting, multicasting, and a complicated yet underwhelming attempt at mimicking 
interactivity16 - have failed to gain any purchase in the broadcast marketplace highlights the 
constricting design of extant digital radio technologies. Simply put, cramming digital sidebands 
onto already-crowded analog broadcast spectrum or replicating analog programming on a new 
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broadcast platform are inefficient and non-innovative methods of digitizing radio.17 
The constriction of innovation by design and policy complicates evaluation of radio’s 
digital transition. With the lack of any meaningful consensus around a fully-digital audio 
broadcast standard, was well as no consensus around the notion of abandoning legacy analog 
service, the supplementary nature of digital radio relative to analog broadcasting will continue to 
be reinforced.18 However, due to convergence, radio now carries in the minds of a growing 
number of listeners a greater expectation of quality and service than that provided by terrestrial 
broadcasters.19 From the point of view of incumbent broadcasters, securing the spectrum to 
deploy DAB technology was primarily an effort to preserve a place of primacy within a wireless 
digital audio space, and little more. As a result, current DAB technology does nothing to address 
the strategic question of how incumbent broadcasters will maintain relevance within a 
convergent media environment, much less adapt to the public’s shifting definition of what radio 
really is. Among listeners, the medium has been redefined to include subscription-based satellite 
broadcast services as well as a plethora of customizable Internet-based audio content providers 
such as Pandora, LastFM, Slacker, Spotify, and the larger world of podcasting. It is no longer the 
exclusive purview of the AM and FM broadcast bands.
This has forced many incumbent broadcasters to distribute their program content outside 
the traditional broadcast infrastructure. For example, Clear Channel aggregates the webcast-
streams of its radio stations in an online portal, while NPR has secured distribution of its 
programming over the SiriusXM satellite radio network. They also utilize the Internet directly to 
expand their presence in our digital media environment by producing content that speaks the 
“universal language” of convergence from inception. As incumbents move online outside of 
DAB to compete directly with new digital radio services, their distinctiveness relative to these 
new services is blurred, further complicating the identity of radio in the 21st century. 
Many new digital radio services remove the human element from the provision of 
content, relying instead on algorithms designed to “learn” a listener’s tastes and suggest 
programming for them. This is why webcasters don’t openly call themselves broadcasters: they 
aggregate audiences by catering to the desires of each individual listener, and the human element 
remains an important ingredient in the authenticity of broadcasting. When incumbent radio 
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broadcasters marginalized the human element of their programming in favor of a more highly 
consolidated and automated industry, they forfeited a distinctiveness which has not gone 
unnoticed by listeners. They have repeatedly complained - in the FCC’s digital radio rulemaking 
and elsewhere - about the lack of program diversity and localism in today’s radio environment. 
This suggests that the public still finds value in the act of broadcasting, which cannot be wholly 
replicated or displaced by newer forms of digital radio. 
Regulatory and industry de-emphasis of broadcasting’s key ingredients has detrimentally 
affected traditional radio listenership, In conjunction with the flourishing of new digital radio 
systems, this has led to open questions about whether broadcasting as it has been practiced in the 
20th century is actually relevant in the 21st. Incumbents may find the answer to that question by 
reinvesting in the attributes of the medium which made it unique in the first place. Many 
independent broadcasters and listeners believe a restoration of the core attributes of broadcasting 
will entice listeners back to terrestrial radio, but they all speak within the context of the analog. 
How radio stations might be able to profitably port the practice of broadcasting into a convergent 
media environment remains to be substantively explored.
Legacy media systems have a long history of difficulty navigating disruptive change. 
Early conceptions for use of the radio spectrum assumed it would simply extend the practice of 
telegraphy. Gone unacknowledged by AT&T, among others, were innovations during the early 
20th century that used radio for means other than the point-to-point relay of Morse-coded 
messages. Broadcasting defined the medium of radio.20 However, this did not stop AT&T from 
unsuccessfully attempting to assert wireless telegraphy as radio’s “killer application,” which 
caused the company to miss opportunities to utilize its wired network in a manner that could 
have ingratiated it in the act of broadcasting itself.21 In the same regard, broadcasters first cast 
convergence as a phenomenon that would simply extend the practice of radio; now that radio is 
being redefined, they resist accommodating the inevitable changes. These lessons need not be 
repeated in the digital domain.
That said, it is dangerous to romanticize the phenomena of satellite radio and webcasting 
as services which may subsume the identity of radio entirely. SiriusXM, the monopoly provider 
of U.S. satellite radio, has a subscriber base of just 20 million listeners (6% of the country’s 
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population) after more than 10 years on the air. Since the company has already achieved 
profitability, increasing its subscriber base is but one of several options that may drive the 
company’s future growth.22 In the arena of satellite radio, providing ubiquitous service is not the 
ultimate outcome, whereas the development of terrestrial radio was designed with that goal in 
mind. 
Ongoing industry and policy developments regarding access to the Internet itself impart a 
significant element of uncertainty to the growth and maturity of webcasting. Companies that 
dominate Internet access and the promulgation of online content are pushing for regulatory 
conditions that would give them increasing power over the basic functionality of new media.23 
For example, where unlimited data consumption used to be the norm with regard to Internet 
access, caps are being imposed by broadband service providers which could significantly limit a 
listener’s ability to “tune in” radio online.24 Although the business model behind the customized 
provision of IP-delievered digital audio content is profitable,25 the commodification of broadband 
cannot help but have detrimental impacts on the communicative potential of the Internet itself.26 
Paragon Media Strategies analyst Larry Johnson believes that traditional radio broadcasters 
should not overreact to the “threat” of Internet broadcasting; as of 2010, webcasting accounted 
for just 4% of all radio listening. Johnson considers it more important right now “for terrestrial 
stations to be on the menu as delivery of Internet audio becomes more prominent in the way we 
listen to radio and audio services” than it is to duplicate or co-opt the attributes of new entrants.27 
So long as legacy radio broadcasters maintain an inexpensive and nearly ubiquitous 
conduit for the distribution of audio, and concentrate innovation within that conduit, they should 
maintain a position of influence within a convergent media environment. However, present 
iterations of DAB technology actually work against this outcome. There is an increasingly 
popular short-term view among independent broadcasters and radio listeners that perhaps the 
best way to navigate convergence is to set aside digitalization in favor of improving the act of 
broadcasting. There is little doubt that radio as we’ve known it will one day be all-digital in 
nature, but the mechanisms by which radio broadcasters will evolve in that direction remain 
underdeveloped. Unfortunately, the attempted digitization of existing radio stations is but the 
first step in an arduous process which has years, if not decades, left to play out. The longer that 
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broadcasting itself remains marginalized, the more likely it is that the the crisis of identity among 
those that have historically claimed ownership of “radio” will be exacerbated. The answer to this 
quandary may not be found in a technological panacea, but rather in a renewed focus on the core 
attributes of radio broadcasting which has served it so well for so many years.
In the midst of great uncertainty regarding radio’s digital future, there still exists a strong 
sentiment within the public that believes the FCC’s mandate to serve the “public interest, 
convenience and necessity” should have some literal meaning. In the time preceding the 
industry’s consolidation, this was primarily expressed through concepts of localism, which 
helped to facilitate program diversity and strengthened the communicative act of broadcasting 
itself.28 Many believe that, were the FCC to simply return to some core principle of localism in 
the regulation of radio, the dilemma of digitalization could be addressed productively and 
without danger to the integrity of the medium;29 at least a few FCC Commissioners and staff 
appear inclined to agree.30 However, the dominance of neoliberal ideology on media policy in the 
wake of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,31 coupled with the disruptive influence of new 
digital media technologies which contest the identity of “radio” itself, means that a return to 
localism alone is not likely to alter a system of broadcast policy which has a built-in bias away 
from this principle. This raises the uncomfortable question of whether a “a viable broadcast 
reform movement” to “enhance radio’s public service function in the digital era”32 has 
meaningful currency in a convergent media environment, where the notion of broadcasting itself 
is being openly challenged.33 
So long as spectrum-incumbents firmly control both access to and the means of digital 
development of the airwaves, the likelihood of proactively influencing the evolutionary 
trajectory of digital radio through conventional means is greatly diminished.34 Perhaps this issue 
can only be effectively addressed after the broader goal of strengthening media literacy among 
the public is achieved.35 Media literacy is widely defined as the promotion of knowledge about 
the technical and organizational attributes of media systems, as well as the fostering of skills to 
effectively use the tools of media production and critically evaluate content. The speed of 
innovation regarding digital media technologies and distribution platforms makes the imparting 
of basic digital media literacy skills absolutely necessary before an aroused public can 
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constructively affect change in a convergent media environment. As it stands, brush fires are 
being battled over individual, specialized aspects of convergent media policy, the vast majority 
of which are being lost; under these conditions, where radio does not attract any meaningful 
attention among the milieu of developments in the world of digital media, the perils of HD Radio 
simply do not register on anyone’s radar.36 The deficiency of media literacy within the 
policymaking process itself, which does not deal well with speedy and uncertain evolution in 
new communications technologies, is clearly on display here.37 
The “’sovereign citizen vision’ of community and civic life supported crucially by a web 
of accessible electronic pathways and services” that Patricia Aufterheide believes needs to be 
“imagined, discussed, nurtured, and experimented with” in order to actualize a more democratic 
media environment has not yet materialized,38 and the functional inability to simultaneously 
address media policy through the lens of convergence and in the context of meaningful public 
interest standards only exacerbates this problem.39 The increasing propertization of digital media 
itself is clearly a step in the wrong direction,40 and suggests that “support for a neo-liberal 
ideology that views government restrictions as political impediments to the success attainable via 
the free market” will continue to control contemporary media policymaking, despite its well-
documented detriments.41 
A heightened focus on the principles of media literacy would raise the effectiveness of 
public intervention into issues of media policy by demystifying the apparently complex 
phenomenon of convergence. This would help to build a base of collective knowledge that could 
be employed across issues to holistically engage in media reform and, ultimately, resist the 
neoliberal paradigm which has captured the policymaking process. Key to claiming agency in the 
regulatory development of new technologies is to act “before an unplanned commercial system 
becomes entrenched,” so that their social value can be assessed.42 Throughout the history of 
broadcast regulation, regulators have failed “to affirm a considered vision of what broadcasting 
should be, only following and accommodating the evolution of business models.”43 There is no 
reason why such behavior should continue, especially when the identity and future viability of an 
such an important medium as radio broadcasting is in a state of significant change.
Tim Wu suggested that new media technologies go through a “Cycle” of openness and 
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closure. Openness spurs innovation and uptake, while closure is precipitated by attempts to 
control a technology’s monetization. “History also shows that whatever has been closed too long 
is ripe for ingenuity’s assault: in time a closed industry can be opened anew, giving way to all 
sorts of technical possibilities and expressive uses for the medium before the effort to close the 
system likewise begins again.”44 In the context of digital radio’s development, the phase of 
openness was truncated (or, in the United States, did not really occur at all); the designs of DAB 
systems were predisposed to closure. Using Wu’s rubric, digital radio represents at best a 
sustaining innovation, in that is ostensibly designed to “improve” radio broadcasting, but is more 
properly evaluated as a disruptive innovation, in that it has allowed for the introduction of 
competing technologies that call themselves “radio” to upset broadcasting as we’ve understood it 
for the last 100 years.45 
Most importantly, radio’s digital dilemma should not be seen as an excuse for giving up 
on the medium, especially in its analog form. The only place where digital radio broadcasting 
has been attempted in any substantive fashion is the industrialized world, and its track record 
does not suggest that legacy stations will be successfully digitized in the near future. In 
developing countries, analog radio still occupies an important place in the media environment 
and will continue to do so. In fact, efforts are afoot to merge analog community radio projects 
with digital media literacy efforts, suggesting that not only does “traditional” radio have a long 
life yet to live, but the practice of broadcasting itself can thrive in a convergent media 
environment.46 Perhaps the industrialized world can learn from these experiences. Furthermore, 
until broadband Internet access is realistically ubiquitous, it is unlikely that the provision of radio 
by this means will usurp the primacy of the legacy broadcast infrastructure.47 Those who still care 
about the future of radio need to remain engaged in structural analog broadcast reform efforts 
and aspire to a more comprehensive education about the implications of convergent media policy 
more generally.
Eric Klinenberg asserts that media reformers can draw lessons from the environmental 
movement of the 1960s, which brought a network of disparate interests together to 
fundamentally reshape the world in which we live; there is no reason why such a media-
environment movement is not possible.48 The impetus for interests to coalesce in the manner 
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which Klinenberg suggests ultimately takes such a movement far beyond radio, with eyes firmly 
locked on the goal of influencing the pace and “rules” of convergence itself. Understanding and 
working to change the trajectory of radio’s digital future would be a good object lesson from 
which to steepen the learning curve of contemporary media reform efforts. Under present 
circumstances, the convergence phenomenon will continue to “be a kind of kludge - a jerry-
rigged relationship among different media technologies - rather than a fully integrated system. 
Right now, the cultural shifts, the legal battles, and the economic consolidations that are fueling 
media convergence are preceding shifts in the technological infrastructure. How those various 
transitions unfold will determine the balance of power in the next media era.”49  Recognizing and 
resisting the marketplace metaphor which now controls nearly all frames of acceptable discourse 
around media policy and practice is key to shaping a convergent media environment with 
maximum democratic potentiality. 
The development of digital radio makes plainly clear that a purely neoliberal view of 
information organization and regulation does not lead in the direction of results which foster 
democratic discourse, much less a recognizable public sphere.50 Until “fundamental issues of 
power” are addressed within modern political culture, efforts at media reform will remain 
balkanized, issue-specific, and by and large unsuccessful.51 Without meaningful autonomy from 
corporate capital on subjects of convergent media policy, it is likely that regulators will make 
even more of what seem like arbitrary and capricious decisions on important subjects regarding 
the future of all digital media.52 Only after the public “attempt[s] to understand how the world 
works” can it be empowered to seek democratic change.53 Properly contextualized, radio’s digital 
dilemma could provide an opportunity for convergent media reformers to make a strong 
beachhead from which to address future issues with even higher stakes and the confidence to 
succeed in those struggles.
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Appendix A: Public Radio’s Concerted Support for Multicasting
During a month-long period in mid-2004, public broadcasters and their allies conducted a 
massive public comment campaign to convince the FCC that the multicasting feature of FM-HD 
Radio would be the technology’s salvation. Developed by NPR, the multicast function initially 
received tepid support from commercial broadcast interests; were it not for a strong showing of 
support among incumbent broadcasters, there was the chance that the FCC would not authorize 
the functionality on a permanent basis. 
As the FCC considered further rules on the HD Radio Service, NPR, its affiliates, 
university executives, station board members, state and regional public radio networks, and loyal 
listeners flooded the FCC with correspondence near the end of the public comment period urging 
the agency to authorize multicasting as a permanent part of the HD Radio feature suite. Unlike 
“astroturf” campaigns conducted during the HD Radio rulemaking by the NAB, multicasting-
supporters generally wrote their own individual comments - although it is clear that they shared 
similar talking points. The size of the campaign is unprecedented in the HD Radio rulemaking, 
dwarfing the cumulative astroturf campaigns run by the NAB during 12 years of policy 
discussion.
Word-processing programs choke on footnotes that are more than five pages long; this 
appendix is a chronological list of all public radio broadcasters’ and supporters’ comments  on 
HD multicasting, less the handful that were cited in-text for illustrative purposes. 
May 28:
1. Comments of WUMB Public Radio, Miami University, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511348715 (January 16, 2010).
2. Comments of KUAF-FM, University of Arkansas Public Radio, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511349903 (January 16, 2010).
3. Comments of Wyoming Public Radio, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511350596 (January 16, 2010).
June 1:
4. Comments of Anthony Hunt, Indiana Public Radio, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511359708 (January 16, 2010). 
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5. Comments of WXEL-FM, West Palm Beach, FL, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511359615 (January 16, 2010). 
6. Comments of WMFE-FM/TV, Orlando, FL, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511359264 (January 17, 2010).
June 2:
7. Comments of KUAT Communications Group, University of Arizona, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511361183 (January 16, 2010).
8. Comments of John Shelton, Ellettsville, IN, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511361064 (January 16, 2010).
June 3:
9. Comments of Durwood Felton, Richmond, VA, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511362354 (January 17, 2010).
June 8: 
10. Comments of WNPR, Connecticut Public Radio, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365142 (January 17, 2010).
June 10:
11. Comments of Don Rinker, Alaska Public Broadcasting Commission, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365332 (January 17, 2010).
12. Comments of WILL AM/FM/TV, Urbana, IL, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365327 (January 17, 2010).
13. Comments of KUAC FM/TV, University of Alaska, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365336 (January 17, 2010).
14. Comments of Boise State Public Radio, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365361 (January 17, 2010).
15. Comments of KRBW AM/FM, Barrow, AK, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365340 (January 17, 2010).
16. Comments of Terry Anderson, Lawton, OK, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365345 (January 17, 2010).
17. Comments of James L. Linder, Wichita, KS, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365368 (January 17, 2010).
18. Comments of Candace France, Yakima, WA, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365367 (January 17, 2010).
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19. Comments of Thomas E. Richardson, Moscow, ID, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365349 (January 17, 2010).
20. Comments of Donna L. Zuba, Kennewick, WA, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365333 (January 17, 2010).
June 11:
21. Comments of Mark Norman, Lawton, OK, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365405 (January 17, 2010).
22. Comments of Maine Public Broadcasting, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365396 (January 17, 2010).
23. Comments of WDAV, Davidson College, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365392 (January 17, 2010). 
24. Comments of WFIU-FM, Indiana University, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365389 (January 17, 2010).
25. Comments of KWGS-FM/KWTU, Tulsa, OK, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365388 (January 17, 2010).
26. Comments of WVIK, Augustana 
College,http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365385 (January 17, 2010).
27. Comments of KRVS-FM, Lafayette, LA, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365381 (January 17, 2010).
28. Comments of WUFT/WUJF-FM, University of Florida, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365379 (January 17, 2010).
29. Comments of Perry Metz, Bloomington, IN, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365401 (January 17, 2010).
30. Comments of Chuck Leavens, South Park, PA, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365391 (January 17, 2010).
June 14:
31. Comments of Mark Handley, President, New Hampshire Public Radio, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365484 (January 17, 2010).
32. Comments of Public Radio Partnership, Louisville, KY, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365521 (January 17, 2010).
33. Comments of Carolyn Day, Development Director, KUVO-FM, Denver, CO, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365522 (January 17, 2010). 
34. Comments of WKMS-FM, Murray State University, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365526 (January 17, 2010).
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35. Comments of Public Radio in Mid-America, St. Louis, MO, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365546 (January 17, 2010).
36. Comments of Talbert T. Gray, Elizabeth City, NC, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365538 (January 17, 2010).
37. Comments of James V. Paluzzi, General Manager, Boise State Radio, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365552 (January 17, 2010).
38. Comments of WIlliam L. Stengel, Wichita, KS, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365569 (January 19, 2010).
39. Comments of Yellowstone Public Radio, Montana State University-Billings, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365567 (January 19, 2010).
40. Comments of Ms. Lee Starkel, Wichita, KS, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365565 (January 19, 2010).
41. Comments of KOSU-FM, Stillwater, OK, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365560 (January 19, 2010).
42. Comments of North Dakota Public Radio, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365558 (January 19, 2010).
43. Comments of Daniel L. Campbell, Memphis, TN, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365482 (January 17, 2010).
44. Comments of the Executive Committee of the Board of Trustees of Fordham University, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511366379 (January 24, 2010).
45. Comments of University Radio Foundation, Inc. (WFAE/WFHE-FM), Charlotte, NC, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511434888 (January 24, 2010).
June 15:
46. Comments of WUSF, Tampa, FL, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365579 (January 17, 2010).
47. Comments of WRTI-FM, Philadelphia, PA, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365577 (January 19, 2010).
48. Comments of WIUM/WIUW, Western Illinois University, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365576 (January 19, 2010).
49. Comments of WDUQ-FM, Dusquene University, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365572 (January 19, 2010).  
50. Comments of KISU Radio, Pocatello, ID, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365621 (January 19, 2010).
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51. Comments of Wichita Radio Reading Services, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365614 (January 19, 2010).
52. Comments of KMUW-FM, Wichita, KS, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365607 (January 19, 2010).
53. Comments of WGBH Radio, Boston, MA, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365599 (January 19, 2010).
54. Comments of WXPR Public Radio, Rhinelander, WI, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365596 (January 19, 2010).
55. Comments of WKSU, Kent State University, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365593 (January 19, 2010).
56. Comments of WERU-FM, East Orland, ME, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365590 (January 19, 2010).
57. Comments of Darrell Penta, Waltham, MA, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365583 (January 19, 2010).
58. Comments of Roseyle C. Swig, San Francisco, CA, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365626 (January 19, 2010).
59. Comments of WRTI-FM, Philadelphia, PA, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365637 (January 19, 2010).
60. Comments of Nancy St. Clair Finch, Richmond, VA, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365629 (January 19, 2010).
61. Comments of Vermont Public Radio, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365692 (January 19, 2010).
62. Comments of Tamara O. Breeden, Wichita, KS, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365688 (January 19, 2010).
63. Comments of KUSP (Santa Cruz) and KBDH (San Ardo), CA, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365684 (January 19, 2010).
64. Comments of Northwest Public Radio,, Pullman, WA, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365682 (January 19, 2010).
65. Comments of WJSU-FM, Jackson, MS, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365678 (January 19, 2010).
66. Comments of Texas Public Radio, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365676 (January 19, 2010).
67. Comments of the School Board of Miami-Dade County, FL, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365675 (January 19, 2010).
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68. Comments of KQED, Inc., San Francisco, CA, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365671 (January 19, 2010) 
69. Comments of John Lilly, Minneapolis, MN, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365660 (January 19, 2010).
70. Comments of Public Broadcasting Atlanta, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511366336 and 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511366337 (January 24, 2010).
71. Comments of Michael K. Dugan, Morganton, NC, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511366425 (January 24, 2010).
72. Comments of WABE, Atlanta, GA, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511366427 (January 24, 2010).
June 16:
73. Comments of Ross W. Pierce, Wichita, KS, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365817 (January 19, 2010).
74. Comments of Mike Wood, Wichita, KS, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365900 (January 24, 2010).
75. Comments of Pat V. Hayes, Wichita, KS, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365729 (January 19, 2010).
76. Comments of Carol A Cartwright, member, NPR Board of Directors; President, Kent State 
University, http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365701 (January 19, 2010).
77. Comments of WUMB-FM, Boston, MA, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365697 (January 19, 2010).
78. Comments of Patricia Monteith, WUMB Radio, Boston, MA, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365696 (January 19, 2010).
79. Comments of North Texas Public Broadcasting, Dallas, TX, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365752 (January 19, 2010).
80. Comments of WHYY-FM, West Philadelphia, PA, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365748 (January 19, 2010).
81. Comments of the Curators of The University of Missouri, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365788 (January 19, 2010). 
82. Comments of WJCT-FM, Jacksonville, FL, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365786 (January 19, 2010).
83. Comments of Oregon Public Broadcasting, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365771 (January 19, 2010).
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84. Comments of KMUW Radio, Wichita, KS, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365769 (January 19, 2010).
85. Comments of WEMU-FM, Eastern Michigan University, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365766 (January 19, 2010). 
86. Comments of WMHT-FM, Schenectady, NY, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365765 (January 19, 2010).
87. Comments of WCAL, St. Olaf College, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365764 (January 19, 2010).
88. Comments of State of Wisconsin Educational Communications Board, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365763 (January 19, 2010). 
89. Comments of Eric DeWeese, Pasadena, CA,  
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365762 (January 19, 2010).
90. Comments of KSMU-FM, Springfield, MO, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365761 (January 19, 2010).
91. Comments of New York Public Radio, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365759 (January 19, 2010).
92. Comments of WCVE-FM, Richmond, VA, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365757 (January 19, 2010).
93. Comments of WAER-FM, Syracuse, NY, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365865 (January 16, 2010).
94. Comments of WPRL-FM, Lorman, MS, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365853 (January 19, 2010).
95. Comments of Public Radio KUMR-FM, Rolla, MO, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365844 (January 19, 2010).
96. Comments of WVTF Public Radio, Roanoke, VA, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365835 (January 19, 2010).
97. Comments of Hampton Roads Educational Telecommunications Association, Inc., Norfolk, 
VA, http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365826 (January 19, 2010).
98. Comments of KXCV/KRNW, Maryville, MO, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365848 (January 19, 2010).
99. Comments of WBHM, University of Alabama, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365845 (January 19, 2010).
100. Comments of KPVU, Prairie View, TX, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365830 (January 19, 2010).
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101. Comments of WWNO, University of New Orleans, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365808 (January 19, 2010).
102. Comments of the James Madison University Board of Directors, Licensees of WMRA, 
WXJM, WMRL, and WMRY, Harrisonburg, VA, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365790 (January 19, 2010).
103. Comments of KUNM, University of New Mexico, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365789 (January 19, 2010).
104. Comments of Friends of KEXP, Seattle, WA, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365827 (January 24, 2010).
105. Comments of KUT Radio, University of Texas at Austin, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365880 (January 24, 2010).
106. Comments of Aspen Public Radio, Boulder, CO, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365950 (January 24, 2010).
107. Comments of KPLU Radio, Tacoma, WA, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365946 (January 24, 2010).
108. Comments of Paul Delaney, Washington, D.C., 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365944 (January 24, 2010). 
109. Comments of Capital Public Radio, Sacramento, CA, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365939 (January 24, 2010).
110. Comments of WNCU, Durham, NC, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365936 (January 24, 2010).
111. Comments of Station Resource Group, Takoma Park, MD, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365935 (January 24, 2010).
112. Comments of KCLU, Thousand Oaks, CA, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365934 (January 24, 2010).
113. Comments of Newark Public Radio, Newark, NJ, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365932 (January 24, 2010).
114. Comments of Capital Community Broadcasting (KTOO-FM), Juneau, AK, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365921 (January 24, 2010). 
115. Comments of WGTE Public Broadcasting, Toledo, OH, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365918 (January 24, 2010).
116. Comments of KCRW-FM, Santa Monica, CA, 
://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365915 (January 24, 2010).
117. Comments of Southern California Public Radio, Los Angeles, CA, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365911 (January 24, 2010). 
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118. Comments of WDET-FM, Detroit, MI, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365910 (January 24, 2010).
119. Comments of WAMU, American University, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365895 (January 24, 2010). 
120. Comments of Minnesota Public Radio, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365894 (January 24, 2010).
121. Comments of WXPR Public Radio, Three Lakes, WI, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511365887 (January 24, 2010).
122. Comments of the WFCR-FM, University of Massachusetts, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511366333 (January 24, 2010). 
123. Comments of WBFO-FM, University of Buffalo, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511366334 (January 24, 2010).
124. Comments of Public Radio Arizona, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511366335 (January 24, 2010).
125. Comments of the University of South Florida, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511366363 (January 24, 2010).
126. Comments of Friends of Public Radio Arizona, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511366412 (January 24, 2010).
127. Comments of Eastern Public Radio, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511366413 (January 24, 2010).
128. Comments of Clement Geitner, Vale, NC, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511366416 (January 24, 2010).
129. Comments of Murray State University, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511366420 (January 24, 2010).
130. Comments of Wisconsin Public Radio, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511366421 (January 24, 2010). 
June 17:
131. Comments of Garza Baldwin, Charlotte, NC, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511366783 (January 24, 2010).
132. Comments of J.J. Carmola, Charlotte, NC, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511366785 (January 24, 2010).
133. Comments of Angela Beaver Simmons, Hickory, NC, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511366524 (January 24, 2010).
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134. Comments of Nebraska Public Radio Network, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511366781 (January 24, 2010).
June 18:
135. Comments of Community Radio for Northern Colorado, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511434890 (January 24, 2010). 
136. Comments of WYPR 88.1 FM, Baltimore, MD, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511436303 (January 24, 2010).
June 21:
137. Comments of the WABE Board of Directors, Atlanta, GA, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511366933 (January 24, 2010).
138. Comments of Nevada Public Radio, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511366932 (January 24, 2010).
139. Comments of WFAE/WFHE Board of Directors, Charlotte, NC, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511434956 (January 24, 2010). 
June 23:
140. Comments of Lawrence M. Kimbrough, WFAE Board member, Charlotte, NC, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511434957 (January 24, 2010).
June 30:
141. Comments of Linda Saunders, Phoenix, AZ, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5511436299 (January 24, 2010).
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